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
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THE HISTORY

OF THE

STATE OF INDIANA

FROM THE

Earliest Explorations by the French to
the Present Time.

CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRINCIPAL
CIVIL, POLITICAL AND MILITARY
EVENTS FROM 1763
TO 1903.

BY
WILLIAM HENRY SMITH.

VOLUME II.

1903.
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CHAPTER XXVII.

THE MEXICAN WAR.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to give a detailed account of the causes which led to the war with Mexico, or even of the events of that war, only so far as they have to do with the history of Indiana. Texas had been a part of the Mexican Republic, but had declared its independence, and after a sanguinary war had achieved it. Upon the conclusion of the war the project of a union with the United States was broached in both countries. In fact, the matter had been pretty generally discussed before the war for independence closed, and it was freely charged that that war had been brought about by designing politicians in this country, with a view to the ultimate annexation of Texas. Be that as it may, the proposed admission of Texas as a State of the Union found many opponents, especially in the Northern States, who contended that it was advocated solely for the purpose of extending the area of slave territory. By the terms of the proposed admission, Texas could, in the future, be divided into as many as five States, thus giving to the South ten additional members of the United States Senate, and an additional representation in the House of Representatives; also a material addition to its strength in the electoral college. The feeling against slavery had been growing in the Northern States for several years, and this proposed extension of slave territory aroused the most bitter antagonism, and added fuel to the flame of opposition to the peculiar institution. It was also urged that the annexation of Texas would be but a prelude to a war with Mexico, and

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that was a thing not desired. The annexation bill passed both Houses of Congress, missing defeat in the Senate however, by a very narrow margin.

When the terms of annexation were accepted by Texas, General Zachary Taylor, who was in command of the troops in Louisiana, was ordered into Texas, and his army called the "Army of Occupation." Everything pointed to war. A dispute arose as to the boundary line between the United States and Mexico, or rather the United States set up a claim to a new line. This brought on a collision between the troops under Taylor and the Mexican force. President Polk at once issued a proclamation declaring that a state of war existed, and General Taylor was ordered to assume the offensive. Measures were at once taken to increase the regular army and to call out volunteers. The first call was for a period of twelve months, and Indiana quota was fixed at three regiments. This was afterward increased to five. The war was not popular in the North, but in the South it was hailed with the greatest enthusiasm. It gave the people of that section a vent for their overflowing military spirit, while offering a prospect of the extension of slave territory. Even then there was a marked difference between the North and South in the habits and nature of the people. The North was a steady-going, prudent, money-making section, caring little for military glory or the pomp of war. On the other hand, the people of the South delighted in the sound of the fife and the drum, and in military parades.

The regiments called for from the South were quickly recruited and officered mostly from those who had graduated from West Point. Nearly all the officers of the regular army were Southerners. This arose from two causes. As a rule, Northern men who entered West Point did so for the sake of the education there afforded, with no intention of remaining in the army, and soon after their graduation returned to civil life. A military life was suited to the Southern character, and as most of those who entered West Point from that section were members of the wealthy and aristocratic classes, and had private fortunes, they were able to devote their lives to the army regardless of the small pay of officers. As a rule, the War Department had been filled for many years with men

Southern birth, and General Scott, the commanding General, was also a Southerner. It was natural that choice berths and promotions mainly went to the South. When the Mexican war came, there were few Indianians who had received a military training. Hence the Indiana regiments were officered by volunteers. The State promptly raised its quota of five regiments, and sent them to the field. The first had for its Colonel, James P. Drake, with Henry S. Lane for its Lieutenant Colonel. Mr. Lane afterwards became Governor of the State and Senator in Congress. Among the captains was Robert H. Milroy, who became a Major General during the war of the rebellion, and fought with great distinction. Lew Wallace, another distinguished Major General during the rebellion, and who also won honors as a diplomat, and as the author of "Ben Hur," was a second lieutenant in this regiment.

The first Colonel of the second regiment was Joseph Lane, soon promoted to a Brigadier Generalship, and afterward Governor of Oregon and United States Senator from that State. William A. Bowles succeeded Mr. Lane as Colonel of the regiment. Among the captains of this regiment were several who won distinction in the war of the rebellion. Nathan C. Kimball became a Brigadier General, and commanded the famous brigade which left its dead nearer the parapets at Fredericksburg than those of any of the other Union troops. Lovell H. Rousseau became a Major General, and fought on many of the famous battlefields in the West and South. W. T. Spicely and W. L. Sanderson also became Brigadiers. The third regiment was commanded by James H. Lane, who was at one time Lieutenant Governor of Indiana, and later Senator from Kansas, and who was made a Brigadier General during the rebellion. The Colonel of the fourth regiment was Willis A. Gorman. In the list of Lieutenants is the name of Ebenezer Dumont, who became a distinguished Brigadier on the Union side during the Civil War. On the expiration of its term of service the third regiment was disbanded, and Colonel Lane was appointed Colonel of the fifth. In this regiment Mahlon D. Manson served as a Captain. He became a Brigadier in the Civil War, and was subsequently Lieutenant Governor of the State.

From various causes the South won most of the honors

of the war, and Indiana, through an unfortunate occurrence at the battle of Buena Vista, rested under a stigma for many years. At that battle the second Indiana regiment, under command of Colonel Bowles, broke and fled from the field, and without examining into all the circumstances the regiment was censured. Jefferson Davis, who commanded the Mississippi Rifles, and afterward became the President of the Southern Confederacy, in his report of the operations of his regiment in the battle reflected severely upon the Indiana regiment. His reproach was undeserved. It is true that the regiment broke and left the field in great disorder, but until that moment it had acted with conspicuous gallantry, and some of its members rallied and returned to the field, and assisted in saving the Mississippi regiment from what might have been a disastrous overthrow. The second Indiana, supporting a small battery of artillery, had been placed by General Lane several hundred yards in advance of the other American troops, and in a most trying and exposed position. It was exposed to a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. General Lane believed that by making another advance his troops would not only get nearer the enemy, but would find a less exposed position. The battery at once took the new position assigned it, but the infantry turned to the right and left, hastily leaving the field. In their flight they were met by the Mississippi Rifles, when Colonel Davis endeavored to rally them, calling to them that his regiment was a "mass of men behind whom they could rally and find protection." About two hundred of them did rally, and again entered the battle, assisting the Mississippians in repulsing a charge of the Mexicans. They then hastened to a plateau on which General Taylor was stationed with Bragg's battery, and there joined in repulsing the last charge of the Mexicans.

It was charged that Colonel Bowles gave the order to retreat, but he insisted that no such order was given, and that the regiment began the retreat of its own motion. Before the court of inquiry it was proved that the order to retreat had been given by him at a time when General Lane was with the regiment. Those who did not again join in the battle at the front rallied and assisted in defending the trains in the rear. Among the acts of individual gallantry,

of members of the regiment, that of Gilles Chapman should not be forgotten. When the regiment broke he returned to the battlefield to carry off a wounded comrade, right in the face of a charge of the Mexican lancers, and lost his own life, receiving eleven lance thrusts. In his report of the battle General Taylor thus speaks of the second regiment:

"In the meantime the enemy was concentrating a large force of infantry and cavalry under cover of the ridges, with the obvious intention of forcing our left, which was posted on an extensive plateau. The second Indiana and the second Illinois regiments formed this part of the line, the former covering three pieces of light artillery under the orders of Captain O'Brien—Brigadier General Lane being in immediate command. In order to bring his men into effective range General Lane ordered the artillery and the second Indiana regiment forward. The artillery advanced within musket range of a heavy body of Mexican infantry, and was served against it with great effect, but without being able to check its advance. The infantry ordered to its support had fallen back in disorder, being exposed, as well as the battery, not only to a severe fire of small arms from the front, but also to a murderous cross fire of grape and cannister from a Mexican battery on the left." In another part of his report he highly commends the third Indiana regiment for its part in the battle, and that portion of the second which returned to the field, mentioning with especial distinction Lieutenant Colonel Hadden of the second regiment.

The report of the killed and wounded of the regiment in the battle proves that it was not lacking in gallantry. It lost in killed three officers and twenty-two non-commissioned officers and privates; in wounded, eight officers and seventy-one non-commissioned officers and privates, and four missing; a total of one hundred and eighteen. In the same battle the third regiment lost in killed, one officer and eight privates; wounded, three officers and fifty-three privates, a total of sixty-five. The fourth Indiana was conspicuous in the fight at Huamantla, and at Puebla, under the command of General Lane. Indiana furnished to the Mexican war a total of 4470 men. Besides those killed in battle 218 died from disease.

Just before the battle of Buena Vista a duel between General Joseph Lane and Colonel James H. Lane was narrowly averted. A dispute had arisen between those two officers over a trivial matter. General Lane became incensed at some remark of the Colonel, and at once produced a pair of duelling pistols, and asked the Colonel to take his choice. The latter promptly seized one of the weapons, but before the men could fire friends rushed between them. The affair did not end there. Colonel Lane left the tent and took his place at the head of his regiment, which was drawn up for dress parade. While the regiment was thus drawn up, the General approached with an old-fashioned rifle on his shoulder, and called loudly to the Colonel to arm and defend himself. Colonel Lane at once ordered one of the color guard to load his musket with ball cartridge. Fortunately, while this was being done, the officer of the day appeared, and placed both men under arrest. Had he not acted with such promptness a terrible tragedy would probably have followed. The second regiment was devoted to the General, and when it heard of the difficulty began arming itself to avenge its commander, while the third, which was equally devoted to the Colonel, stood ready to do battle in his cause. These two men were the most distinguished Indiana soldiers in the Mexican war.

Joseph Lane was born in Buncombe County, North Carolina, December 14, 1801. At the age of fifteen he came to Indiana, settling in Warrick County. He was elected to the Legislature before he was twenty-one, and had to wait until he reached legal age before he took his seat. For nearly a quarter of a century he was a member of the Legislature, serving in both Houses. When the Mexican war came he was a member of the Senate. He resigned and joined Captain Walker's company as a private. When the second regiment was organized he was chosen Colonel, and on the 1st day of July, 1846, was appointed a Brigadier General by President Polk, at the suggestion of Robert Dale Owen, who was then a member of Congress. He at once proceeded to Mexico. He served under both Taylor and Scott, and commanded at the battle of Huamantla. Soon after the close of the war he was appointed, by President Polk, Governor of Oregon Territory. In 1850 he was

removed from office by President Taylor, but the next year was elected a delegate to Congress, and continued as such until Oregon was admitted as a State into the Union, when he was sent to the Senate, and remained a member of that body until 1861. In 1860 he was nominated for Vice President by the Southern wing of the Democracy, on the ticket with John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky.

After leaving the Senate he never again held public office. He was severely wounded at the battle of Buena Vista, and again while he was a delegate in Congress, in a conflict with the Indians. As Governor of the Territory of Oregon General Lane had acquired great influence with the Indians. While he was absent attending Congress at Washington, the Indians became hostile and broke into insurrection. President Pierce asked General Lane to return to Oregon and take command of the troops detailed to suppress the Indian uprising. When he took command he found the Indians intrenched and well protected by fallen trees. Stopping his troops he advanced alone and demanded a parley. He was fired on and shot through the shoulder. He gave no evidence of his wound, but continued to advance until he was recognized by some of the chiefs. He then demanded the surrender of the Indians who had been guilty of killing the settlers, telling them that he was determined to have them, but if they were surrendered he would make peace with the tribes. They were surrendered and afterward hanged. Later he received another wound that troubled him the remainder of his life. While in the act of dismounting from his horse, upon returning from a hunting trip, a pistol carried in his hip pocket was discharged, the ball entering his back and coming out in front, near the hip joint.

General Lane retired from the Senate a poor man, and built himself a log cabin on the top of a mountain, where with his wife, who had been his companion for fifty years, he lived until his death in 1881. General Lane was about five feet nine inches high, and had a ruddy complexion and dark hazel eyes. He was a man of unusual physical strength and of great personal bravery. He was not a man of remarkable talents, but was possessed of much force of character. He read a great deal, and remembered what he read. Having been born in the South, his affiliations

were all with that section, and in Congress he was the steadfast friend of the institution of slavery.

Colonel James H. Lane was a son of Amos Lane, one of the most distinguished lawyers of Indiana in the early days, and who served in Congress from 1832 to 1836. James H. was a brilliant speaker, of a fiery and impetuous temper. At the first call for troops to engage in the war with Mexico, he threw his heart and soul into the work of recruiting. He was made Colonel of the third regiment and commanded it until the expiration of its term of service, when he came back to Indiana and recruited the fifth regiment, with which he returned to Mexico. In 1849 he was elected Lieutenant Governor of Indiana, holding that office until 1852. He served in Congress one term, from 1853 to 1855. At that time the struggle between the free State and the pro-slavery men in Kansas was about to break out. Kansas promised to be a scene of turmoil just suited to the temperament of Colonel Lane, and he went to that Territory. He soon became recognized as one of the leaders of the free State party, and took a leading part in the scenes of violence which deluged the Territory with blood. He was indicted, with others, for treason, and for a while fled the Territory, but recruiting a large number of immigrants from the Northern States, he returned at their head. He organized a small army and had several engagements with the Missouri men, being uniformly successful. His hasty temper served to embroil him several times with some of his associates, and he engaged in two or three personal encounters. When Kansas was admitted into the Union as a State, he was elected to the United States Senate, and served from 1861 until 1866, when he took his own life.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE CIVIL WAR—CONDITION OF AFFAIRS PRIOR TO THE WAR.

To thoroughly understand what the nation did, and the great part Indiana took in the civil war, it is necessary to review the condition of the country and of Indiana prior to the breaking out of the war. Hardly fifteen years had elapsed since the close of the last war in which the country had been engaged, yet the martial spirit had practically died out, when the country was once more plunged into strife. This was especially true of the Northern States, and more or less true of the Southern. Our country was so vast, and so isolated from all other nations, except the weak Republic of Mexico, and the Canadian provinces of Great Britain, that public men and the people generally became imbued with the belief that never again would the United States engage in war. Hence it was felt on all sides that we needed no standing army, except a few troops to control the Indians and protect the frontier, and no navy, except a few vessels for show.

The nations of Europe were maintaining large armies, building new navies, experimenting with and adopting new arms. But the United States did none of these things. From time to time some man would recite the old and well-worn maxim, that "the way to maintain peace is to be prepared for war," but he would be immediately frowned down as an alarmist. The last foreign war cloud had blown away in 1846 when the dispute over the Oregon boundary had been settled by an amicable agreement between the United States and Great Britain, and it was not

thought possible that another would ever arise, so the country gave itself up to the pursuits of peace, the North to manufactures and commerce and the South to agriculture.

The relations between the States, or rather between the two sections of the country, had been growing more and more strained for several years. These strained relations were not wholly over the question of slavery, but that institution was the main factor. Slavery had bred an aristocracy in the South that wanted to pose as the ruling class. From the very foundation of the government the South had exercised a dominating influence in the nation. That section had held the Presidency forty-four years out of the seventy-two years the republic had existed, and had dictated the nominations and elections for twelve of the remaining twenty-eight years. It had held a like predominance in the cabinet. In Congress it had dictated legislation. This prolonged lease of power had bred a spirit of arrogance which would brook no opposition.

This condition of affairs had continued until Northern men had become irritated and disposed to resent the domineering attitude of the South. The North was growing far more rapidly than the South, in population and wealth. The West was rapidly filling up and was demanding its proper place in the nation. All this was aggravating to the Southern leaders. They saw political power slipping away from them, and they became more exacting in their demands. The States then permitting slavery were rapidly filling up with slaves, and that institution was becoming every year more dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of those States—so much so that it was necessary to extend the area of slavery to prevent the South from becoming the scene of a servile insurrection. This was necessary also if the political predominance of the South was to continue. These causes had operated to create strained relations between the two sections, which became more threatening every year.

The first step to extend slavery was the repeal of the Missouri compromise. The efforts to force slavery on Kansas by bodies of armed men from Missouri alarmed the whole North, and the people of that section began preparations to resist at the polls the aggressions of the South.

A new political party was formed, and in 1856 carried nearly all of the Northern States. Then threats of disunion began to be more frequently heard. From 1856 to 1860 the new party grew rapidly, and in the latter year was successful and elected Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency. This success was almost immediately followed by the secession of South Carolina. This action of the fiery little Huguenot State was not at first regarded seriously at the North, except by a few, wiser than the great majority, the general opinion being that if South Carolina was not permitted to stir up a tempest in a tea pot every once in a while, the world would forget that such a State existed. It was remembered that once before the same State had practically passed an ordinance of secession, and that when the leaders had been told by President Andrew Jackson in unmistakable terms that such action was regarded as treason, and would be punished as such, they had quickly backed down and repealed their ordinance. In fact the North regarded South Carolina with contempt, and would have been more than willing to let that State withdraw quietly, as it was regarded as a chronic disturber of the peace. Other Southern States followed the lead of South Carolina and passed ordinances of secession, and still few at the North believed there would be war. On the other hand, the South did not believe that the North would fight. "They are only shop-keepers and mudsills, intent on accumulating money, and dare not meet us in battle," was the thought of the South. "The Southerners are boasters," thought the North, "and will not fight to get out of the Union, therefore there will be no war."

Others of the North said: "Let them go; we would be better off without them, and they will soon either be fighting among themselves, or wanting to get back into the Union, and then we can fix our own terms." Only a handful in either section believed in or desired war. Those in the South who wanted war expected that a division of territory would be consented to as the price of peace, for they had no other idea than that they could easily defeat the North in battle, and that that section would be willing to make large concessions of territory for the sake of peace. In the South there had always been a martial spirit, which is often the offspring of idleness. Busy people are, as a

rule, averse to the glitter and pomp of armies. Rome conquered because the freemen of Rome were idle; slaves tilled the soil, in fact performed all the labor, while the Roman citizen idled or joined the army. In the old England, the nobles were idle, and the same was true of France, hence a martial spirit prevailed for centuries in those countries. Sons of nobles could not engage in trade, and the church and the army and navy furnished them their only careers.

The ruling classes in the South were idle, and they found in military exercises the chief outlet for their activities. Nearly every County had its militia company. Many of the Northern States, on the contrary, were wholly without a militia system, and even where such a system existed only a few organizations were maintained. Yet the people of the North were descendants of those who had fought under Cromwell, or William the Silent, or had contended with the Indians for possession of the country. Their forebears had not been cowards, and there was no reason to believe they were cowardly.

Notwithstanding the general opinion that there would be no war, there was a great and growing anxiety in the minds of the thoughtful over the situation of affairs. It was not known at the time, but was afterward developed, that the Southern leaders had been for months actively preparing for war. The Secretary of War in President Buchanan's cabinet was a Southern man, and had been quietly issuing orders transferring arms to Southern arsenals. At the Norfolk navy yard in Virginia, hundreds of cannon and many tons of ammunition had been collected. So it was at other places in the South.

The Secretary of the Navy, although a Northern man, had adopted similar measures. He had scattered the few vessels of the navy to remote points, so that it was impossible to get them together quickly in an emergency. Nearly all the troops of the small regular army were stationed in the South, under Southern officers. The National treasury was embarrassed. Thus the National Government found itself seriously handicapped in the presence of the uprising at the South. As one State after another seceded, the arms belonging to the Government were seized and placed in the

hands of the troops raised for the purpose of resisting the national authority; money in the custom houses, post-offices and mints was also seized, and all the forts not garrisoned were taken possession of.

Much of this work was done before Congress assembled. President Buchanan called attention, in his message, to the state of the country, but took the position that while the States had no right to secede, the Government had no power under the constitution to prevent secession, or to coerce a State to obey the Federal laws. This had the effect of strengthening the hands of the secessionists. General Cass, Secretary of State, resigned, so it was said, because the administration would take no aggressive steps to preserve the Union. His resignation was soon followed by that of several other members of the cabinet, and the President gathered around him men who were intensely loyal to the Union.

Of course there was great anxiety as to the course Mr. Lincoln would pursue when he became President, but he gave no sign. Here and there throughout the North there were men bold enough to declare in favor of war, if war became necessary to preserve the Union. Among the ablest and boldest of these was Oliver P. Morton, who had just been elected Lieutenant Governor of Indiana. He may not have been the first public man to give utterance to such sentiments, but if not the first, he was among the first. In November, 1860, only a few days after the election of Mr. Lincoln, a Republican jollification meeting was held in Indianapolis. Mr. Morton was one of the speakers on that occasion, and among other things said:

“What is coercion but the enforcement of the law? Is anything else intended or required? Secession or nullification can only be regarded by the general government as individual action, upon individual responsibility. Those concerned in it can not entrench themselves behind the forms of the State government so as to give their conduct the semblance of legality, and thus devolve the responsibility upon the State government, which of itself is irresponsible. The Constitution and laws of the United States operate upon individuals, but not upon States, and precisely as if there were no States. In this matter the President has no

discretion. He has taken a solemn oath to enforce the laws and preserve order, and to this end he has been made commander-in-chief of the army and navy. How can he be absolved from responsibility thus devolved upon him by the Constitution and his official oath?"

He then argued that the Constitution provided no way whereby a State could get out of the Union, and that the President had but two alternatives—enforce the laws or acknowledge the independence of the seceding States—and that he could only take the latter alternative by the authority of Congress. He then said:

"The right of secession conceded, the nation is dissolved. Instead of having a nation, one mighty people, we have but a collection and combination of thirty-three independent and petty States, held together by a treaty which has hitherto been called a constitution, of the infraction of which each State is to be the judge, and from which any State may withdraw at pleasure. . . . The right of secession conceded and the way having been shown to be safe and easy, the prestige of the republic is gone, the national pride extinguished with the national idea, secession would become the remedy for every State or sectional grievance, real or imaginary. . . . If South Carolina gets out of the Union, I trust it will be at the point of the bayonet, after our best efforts have failed to compel her to submission to the laws. Better concede her independence to force, to revolution, than to right and principle. Such a concession can not be drawn into precedent and construed into an admission that we are but a combination of petty States, any one of which has a right to secede and set up for herself whenever it suits her temper or views of peculiar interest. Such a contest, let it terminate as it may, would be a declaration to the other States of the only terms upon which they would be permitted to withdraw from the Union. . . . Shall we now surrender the nation without a struggle, and let the Union go with merely a few hard words? If it was worth a bloody struggle to establish this nation, it is worth one to preserve it, and I trust that we shall not, by surrendering with indecent haste, publish to the world that the inheritance our fathers purchased with their blood we have given up to save ours. *

* * * * * We must, then, cling to the idea that we

are a nation, one and indivisible, and that, although subdivided by State lines for local and domestic purposes, we are but one people, the citizens of a common country, having like institutions and manners, and possessing a common interest in that inheritance of glory so richly provided by our fathers. We must, therefore, do no act—we must tolerate no act—we must concede no idea or theory that looks to or involves the dismemberment of the nation.

. . . Seven years is but a day in the life of a nation, and I would rather come out of a struggle at the end of that time, defeated in arms and conceding independence to successful revolution, than to purchase present peace by the concession of a principle that must inevitably explode the nation into small and dishonored fragments. . . .

The whole question is summed up in this proposition: 'Are we one nation, one people, or thirty-three nations, or thirty-three independent and petty States?' The statement of the proposition furnishes the answer. If we are one nation then no State has the right to secede. Secession can only be the result of successful revolution. I answer the question for you, and I know that my answer will find a true response in every true American heart, that we are one people, one nation, undivided and indivisible."

This speech of Governor Morton attracted great attention throughout the whole country, and soon came to be regarded as the "key-note" of the policy that would be pursued by Mr. Lincoln's administration. It was the spark to the latent patriotism of the North, and within a very short time the talk of letting "the wayward sisters go in peace," was heard no more. As the time drew near for the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln the anxiety to hear what he would say as to the condition of affairs, and the future, became more intense. It was hoped, both in the North and the South, by those who loved the Union, that he would say something that would allay the agitation and that the cloud of disunion would blow over. Never was there a more earnest, more eloquent plea sent forth by any ruler than the first inaugural of Abraham Lincoln.

In calm, dispassionate tones he reasoned with the disunionists, and in almost pathetic terms he appealed to their patriotism. He argued against the right of secession, against the necessity of secession, against secession being a

cure for the ills complained of; announced his fixed determination to enforce all the laws, in all the States, but to do so under the sanction of the constitution, and then closed with the following pathetic appeal to the South:

"In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I shall have the most solemn one to 'preserve, protect and defend it.'

"I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

This appeal to their reason and their patriotism had no effect on the leaders in the South who were determined to break up the Union, and their preparations for war went on steadily. A new government was formed, troops raised, arms purchased, and the forts held by the soldiers of the government beleaguered. Davis and other Southern Senators withdrew from Congress, one after another, some with dramatic speeches, others sullenly, while a few displayed sorrow. Army and navy officers resigned and cast in their fortunes with their States. In Texas General Twiggs surrendered his force to the insurgents as prisoners of war. Still the government took no steps to prepare for the war that all now felt was bound to come.

Let us now turn to the condition of affairs in Indiana. Indiana had been a member of the Union but forty-five years; it had a population of 1,350,000, scattered all over the State, most of them engaged in agricultural pursuits. It had no cities. Indianapolis was little more than a straggling village in the forest. The last of the Indians had been removed only twenty-four years before, so Indiana was still, in 1860, practically a frontier State. In its earlier years it had been necessary to maintain a militia, which

had been continued until 1830, when there were enrolled about 52,000 men. The system then died and the arms were scattered and lost. During the war with Mexico five regiments had been raised and sent to the field. With the return of peace the military spirit had once more disappeared.

At the regular session of the Legislature, in 1861, Governor Lane, in his inaugural address, called attention to this subject. He said:

"The importance of a well organized and thoroughly drilled militia in the present critical condition of our National affairs, can not be over estimated; and I will most heartily concur with you in any measure which you may devise for the purpose of giving greater efficiency to the present very defective militia laws of our State. A possible (I hope not a probable) contingency may arise during the present session of the Legislature, which will make it necessary and proper for you to appropriate a sum sufficient to equip a portion of the Indiana Militia for the purpose of aiding in the prompt execution of the laws, and in the maintenance of the government. If this contingency shall occur during your session, I doubt not that you will meet it in a spirit becoming freemen and patriots."

A militia bill was promptly introduced into the House and passed that body, but failed in the Senate. The Legislature was timid. Many resolutions were offered during the session, yet no positive declaration could be secured from either House on the absorbing question of the hour. Governor Morton made repeated and persistent appeals to the members to take a decided stand in favor of supporting the Federal Government in case the South should venture on war. He saw the inevitable, and his whole soul seemed to be given to the one thought of preparing the minds of the people of Indiana for the alternative of resistance to secession or the dismemberment of the Union.

It was proposed to celebrate the anniversary of Washington's birthday with elaborate ceremonies, a part of which was to be the raising of the stars and stripes over the State House. A programme had been arranged, the speakers selected being Senator Lane, ex-Governor Hammond, Mr. Hendricks and Mr. Voorhees. An immense throng assembled, and the speeches were made according

to the arrangement. All the speeches were of a placatory character, but they did not suit the temper of the crowd, and loud calls were made for Morton. He quickly responded, and at once a very different phase was put on the meeting. His speech was full of fire. It reached the hearts of the vast multitude, and was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm. Among other things he said:

"We live at a time when treason is running riot through the land. Certain States of this Union, unmindful of the blessings of liberty, forgetful of the duties they owe to their sister States and to the American people as a nation, are attempting to sever the bonds of the Union, and to pull down in irretrievable ruin our fabric of government, which has been the admiration and wonder of the world. We are lost in astonishment at the enormity of the wickedness and folly of this attempt. Surely it requires no prophetic eye, no second sight, to perceive that social and political destruction will speedily overtake the seceding States if they persist in the desperate and criminal enterprise in which they are now engaged. The civilized world looks upon their unholy schemes with horror, and the voice of the nation is raised in solemn rebuke of that treason which is aiming a fatal blow at the liberties of the world. It is a time when the hearts of all men should beat in unison, and every patriot join hands with his neighbor and swear eternal devotion to liberty, the constitution and the union.

"In view of the solemn crisis in which we stand, all minor, personal and party considerations should be banished from every heart. There should be but one party, and that the party of the constitution and the Union. No man need pause to consider his duty. It is inscribed upon every page of our history, in all our institutions, and on everything by which we are surrounded. The path is so plain that the wayfaring man, though he be a fool, can not err therein. It is no time for hesitation; the man who hesitates under circumstances like these, is lost. I would here, in all kindness, speak a word of warning to the unwary. Let us beware how we encourage them to persist in their mad designs by assurances that we are a divided house, that there are those in our midst who will not permit the enforcement of the laws and the punishment of their crimes. Let us diligently search our hearts and see if there

are any party prejudices, any party resentments that are, imperceptibly and unknown to ourselves, leading us aside from the path of duty, and if we find them there, pluck them out and hastily return. For myself, I will know no man who will stop and prescribe the conditions upon which he will maintain that flag, who will argue that a single star may be erased, or who will consent that it may be torn, that he may make choice between its dishonored fragments. I will know that man only who vows fidelity to the Union and the constitution, under all circumstances and at all hazards; who declares that he will stand by the constituted authorities of the land, though they be not of his own choosing; who, when he stands in the base presence of treason, forgets the contests and squabbles of the past in the face of the coming of danger; who then recognizes but two parties—the party of the Union, and the base faction of its foes. To that man, come from what political organization he may, by whatever name he may have been known, I give my hand as a friend and brother, and between us there shall be no strife.

“When the struggle comes, if come it must; when the appeal to arms is made (which may God in His infinite mercy avert) we must then rely, not on a standing army, but on the citizens of the land—on those men whose hearts beat high with pulsations of love for the Union, and who will strike for it with strong arms.”

This speech had a profound influence, and from that time to the close of the session of the Legislature there was a firmer tone. An act was passed authorizing the Governor to collect what arms could be found belonging to the State. At that time, according to the report of the Adjutant General, there were perhaps less than five hundred stand of effective first-class small arms in the State, besides eight pieces of dismantled cannon. Scattered throughout the State, most of them in the hands of private citizens, were an unknown number of old flint lock or altered muskets, such as had been used in the war with Mexico. They were gathered, or at least many of them, and found to be worthless. The worst feature was that the State treasury was practically empty, containing only about \$10,000, and all of that belonged to some special fund.

Immediately upon the adjournment of the Legislature Governor Morton hastened to Washington and endeavored to procure a supply of arms. He saw that war was inevitable, and believed that the North ought at once put itself on a war footing. He found that the national armories were almost empty, but after a hard struggle he obtained an order for five thousand muskets. Before they were shipped the war came.

Thus it was that Indiana, when called upon to furnish its quota of troops to maintain the Union, was without a militia or a militia system; with no independent military organizations, aside from perhaps half a dozen companies in different parts of the State; without arms or munitions, without clothing for troops when recruited; without experienced officers to lead the troops, and with an empty treasury. The National Government was but little better off. Men there were in plenty willing to volunteer, but the Government had no arms, no organized commissariat, no supplies of stores or clothing, and no ammunition for what guns she could command, and the national treasury was empty. Never was a Government more completely at the mercy of an enemy. How she arose to meet the emergency, how she surmounted all difficulties, coming out victorious in the end, must be told by the historian of the nation's struggle. Here will be told only the story of what Indiana did—how, without a soldier, without arms, without experienced officers, and with an empty treasury, this State raised, equipped and sent to the field more than a quarter of a million of its sons, who fought on more than three hundred fields, shedding their blood in every State south of Mason and Dixon's line, from the Atlantic to Texas; how they fought in the first and last engagements of the war; how all this was done in the face of the hostility of a faction at home; how its troops were better cared for than those of any other State; how they were in the van in almost every battle, the first to attack and the last to retreat; how they returned when the war was over, and what the State has done for them and their memory.

CHAPTER XXIX.

INDIANA SPRINGS TO ARMS.

The North was destined to be rudely awakened. The leaders of the secession movement had grown desperate. The border States had not followed the example of those in the cotton belt. The Union sentiment was strong in Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland and Missouri, and considerable opposition to secession was being developed in Alabama and Georgia. The leaders saw that they must commit some overt act, first to hold the States that had already passed ordinances of secession, and next to force the border States to unite with them. They determined to force the issue, and South Carolina was chosen as the State to begin the first act in the great drama. Out in Charleston harbor were two forts—Moultrie and Sumter. They were on islands belonging to the United States, and not to South Carolina, and over which South Carolina, by act of its Legislature, had surrendered jurisdiction to the National Government.

To attack these forts was to attack the United States. When the secession movement began to take form there was a small garrison at Fort Moultrie, while Sumter was in charge of a Sergeant and two or three men. Major Anderson, the commander in the harbor, concluded that it would be best to abandon Moultrie and hold Sumter. So one night he quietly hauled down his flag at Moultrie and moved the little garrison to Sumter. This movement of Major Anderson created wild excitement in the little State of South Carolina, and "Commissioners" were at once sent to Washington to demand that he be ordered back to

Moultrie. This was not done, but instead, an effort was made to reinforce him and also to send him some needed supplies. These supplies were sent on an unarmed vessel, but the Confederates had erected a battery which commanded the entrance to the harbor, and the *Star of the West* was driven back. The intent was to starve the little garrison to forsake the fort. It was not proposed to permit Major Anderson to quietly evacuate the fort on account of the lack of supplies, and when it became known that within three or four days hunger would drive him and his little band to leave their post of duty, it was determined to begin the attack.

On the 11th of April, 1861, the surrender of the Fort was demanded and refused. About two o'clock, on the morning of the 12th, Major Anderson was notified that unless he surrendered within an hour fire would be opened. No attention was paid to this, and about 3 o'clock fire was opened from Fort Moultrie, the batteries on Sullivan Island, and a floating battery. Major Anderson waited until it was full daylight before replying to the fire. He divided his small garrison into three reliefs, each relief to work the batteries for four hours.

All day of the 12th and all that night the fire was kept up, until the interior of Fort Sumter was a mass of ruins, and all the buildings inside the walls were on fire. The bombardment continued until the afternoon of the 13th, when Major Anderson, driven out by the fire that raged in the barracks, agreed to evacuate the Fort, carrying with him all the personal and company property of the garrison, and the flag, saluting it before it was hauled down. The Southern leaders had opened the war; they had so shaped affairs that the Government would be compelled to take active measures to coerce them to an obedience to the constitution and the laws. They believed that any such step would drive the border States to join their fortunes with them.

The news that fire had been opened on the Fort was soon flashed to the North and caused the most intense excitement in every section. On the morning of April 15th, Governor Morton sent to President Lincoln the following dispatch:

"On behalf of the State of Indiana, I tender to you, for the defense of the nation, and to uphold the authority of the government, ten thousand men."

Within the next few hours, fully 20,000 citizens of Indiana offered themselves for the service of the Government. On the day that Governor Morton tendered his ten thousand men, the President issued his proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand volunteers. The proclamation of the President was short and characteristic of the man. It simply said that certain States had formed a combination to resist the execution of the laws, and that the volunteers were called to enforce the laws, and to retake and hold possession of the forts and other public property that had been forcibly seized. Before it had been made public in Indiana Governor Morton had received many tenders of companies from nearly every section of the State.

The whole State was ablaze with patriotism, and men began to pour into Indianapolis, offering their services to the Governor. Meetings were held in every town and village, and the shrill note of the fife was heard everywhere. Such an uprising of a whole people had never before been witnessed. Before this open act of war there had been some predictions in certain sections of the State that Indiana would take no part in any attempt to coerce the Southern States back into the Union, but the outburst of patriotism that followed immediately upon the firing on Fort Sumter hushed all such talk into silence. Public meetings were held everywhere and the work of recruiting went on. Party lines were everywhere obliterated for the time being.

Immediately upon receipt of the President's proclamation, Governor Morton issued a call for Indiana's quota, and began the work of preparing to arm and equip the volunteers. A Quartermaster General and a Commissary General were appointed, and Lewis Wallace was called upon to assume the duties of Adjutant General. The Governor also issued a call for the Legislature to meet in extraordinary session. The State Fair Grounds were taken for a camp for the fast coming volunteers, and within three days twenty-four hundred men were in the camp. In less than

seven days more than twelve thousand men reported at Indianapolis ready to serve the country, while the number called for was only 4,683.

Governor Morton, as well as others, felt that the President had called for an insufficient number, and he at once tendered to Mr. Lincoln six additional regiments, and urged their acceptance. Not satisfied with telegraphing this offer he sent a special messenger to Washington, but the regiments were not accepted. Many felt, also, that the term of enlistment was too short, and, in fact, this call for three months proved a great mistake, and cost many valuable lives. Mr. Lincoln and his cabinet thought that all that was needed was a show of force, and a determination to enforce the laws, when the secessionists would back down. Seventy-five thousand men was an inadequate show of force against a people who could readily put thrice that number in the field. In the existing condition of affairs it would be almost impossible for the government to properly arm and clothe that number of men in three months. let alone drill them and make them effective soldiers. Having stirred up the war all the South had to do was to await an attack by the government, thus remaining on the defensive, and undisciplined soldiers fight a great deal better on the defensive than on the offensive. Had Mr. Lincoln called for 300,000 men for two years, he could have had them as readily as he got the 75,000 for three months, and the war would probably not have lasted the two years. Bull Run not only cost much blood, but there is reason to believe that it prolonged the war two years. Had there been a Union victory at Manassas, the Union sentiment in the South would have made itself heard, but the rout of McDowell encouraged the South, while it scarcely disheartened the North for a moment.

The General Assembly met pursuant to the call of Governor Morton on the 24th of April. A great change had come over its spirit. During the regular session only a few weeks before, it was captious, fault-finding and lukewarm. In his message Governor Morton said:

"We have passed from the field of argument to the solemn fact of war, which exists by the act of the seceding States. The issue is forced upon us and must be accepted. Every man must take his position upon the one side or the

other. In time of war there is no ground upon which a third party can stand. It is the imperative duty of all men to rally to the support of the government, and to expend in its behalf, if need be, their fortunes and their blood. Upon the preservation of this Government depend our prosperity and greatness as a nation, our liberty and happiness as individuals. We should approach the contest, not as politicians, not as ambitious partisans, but as patriots, who cast aside every selfish consideration when dangers threaten their country. The voice of party should be hushed, and the bitterness that may have sprung out of political contests be at once forgiven and forgotten. Let us rise above these paltry considerations and inaugurate the era when there shall be but one party, and that for our country. The struggle is one into which we enter with the deepest reluctance. We are bound to the people of the seceding States by the dearest ties of blood and institutions. They are our brothers and our fellow-countrymen. But if they regard not these tender relations, how can we? If they wage war upon us and put themselves in the attitude of public enemies, they must assume all the responsibilities incident to that position. But while I deplore deeply the character of the contest in which we are engaged, nevertheless we should meet it as men.

"If the rebellious States hope to profit by dissensions in the North, they have erred egregiously, and have wholly failed to comprehend our people. Our divisions were merely political and not fundamental; and party lines faded instantly from sight when the intelligence went abroad that war was being waged against the nation. When the sound of the first gun reverberated through the land, the people of the North arose as one man, and declared that the Government must be sustained and the honor of our flag preserved inviolate at whatever cost. The events of the last ten days are pregnant with instruction and moral grandeur. They present the action of a people who have suffered much and waited long; who were slow to take offense and incredulous of treason and danger; but who, when the dread appeal to arms was made and the issue could no longer be avoided with honor or safety, promptly abandoned the peaceful pursuits of life and devoted themselves to the service of their country. I trust that the force of

this lesson may not be lost upon our erring brethren of the South, and that they will at once perceive they have inaugurated a contest from which they can not emerge with honor and profit."

He then referred to the call of the President for seventy-five thousand men, and the issuance of his own proclamation calling for Indiana's quota. Of this call and the response to it, he said:

"In obedience to this call I issued my proclamation calling for volunteers, and in less than eight days more than 12,000 men have tendered their services, and the contest among the companies has been earnest and exciting as to which shall secure a place within the quota. This response has been most gratifying and extraordinary, and furnishes indisputable evidence of the patriotism of Indiana, and her entire devotion to the Union. Without distinction of party, condition, or occupation, men have rallied around the national standard, and in every part of the State may be heard the sound of martial music and witnessed the mustering of companies into the field. In view of this remarkable response made to the proclamation, on the 20th inst., I tendered to the President for the service of the United States six additional regiments."

While this message was being read to the General Assembly every train was bearing to Indianapolis large numbers of men who were anxious to offer their services, and it is not surprising that this patent evidence of the feeling throughout the State had an exhilarating effect upon the legislators. At that time Indianapolis was a veritable camp. It is true that not many men in uniforms were parading the streets, for in all the State there were but few who had uniforms, but men in squads could be seen marching up and down, singing patriotic songs, and at almost every street corner some orator was heard preaching loyalty and devotion to the Union. It would have been hard for any man to breathe the air then prevailing in Indianapolis, and be disloyal.

The Governor recommended that a militia system be devised and one million dollars be appropriated to put the State on a war footing. The Legislature was in harmony with the feeling existing throughout the State. Partyism was dropped. Horace Heffren, a member of the House

from Washington County, who, during the regular session, had been one of the most outspoken of those who declared against all efforts to coerce the South, and who had said that in case war should come he would leave his native State and cast his lot in with the South, at the opening of the session made a speech advocating "union, harmony and concession, and the protection of our homes," and nominated Cyrus M. Allen, Republican, for Speaker. Mr. Allen was unanimously chosen, and the active work of legislation began.

The General Assembly promptly appropriated two million dollars with which to arm and equip troops, and as there was no money in the treasury the Legislature provided for an issue of bonds. A militia law was also enacted, and everything done that was possible to put the State on a war footing and to uphold the hands of Governor Morton and President Lincoln. Never before had an Indiana legislature displayed such union of sentiment, such enthusiastic devotion to the State and the Nation. On the 27th of April Governor Morton sent Calvin Fletcher, a leading banker of Indianapolis, to the East to purchase arms for the Indiana volunteers, knowing full well that the Government could not supply the demand. On the 30th of the following May he appointed Robert Dale Owen agent of the State to procure arms and equipment. The authority given to Mr. Owen was in the following words:

"The Hon. Robert Dale Owen is hereby appointed agent of the State of Indiana, to visit the Eastern States and Europe in order to purchase arms for the use of the State. He is to exercise his best diligence to purchase arms on the best terms, for military purposes. He is to select the best quality of approved modern arms, rifles, or rifled muskets with bayonets, and carbines. His purchases are not to extend beyond six thousand rifles and rifled muskets, and one thousand carbines. These arms are to be forwarded to this city (Indianapolis) as fast as possible, and the arms purchased in Europe are to be paid by drafts upon the State of Indiana, at the office of Winslow, Lanier & Co., in the city of New York. No arms to be bought until after full inspection and trial as to their fitness for service. Mr. Owen is to proceed to the execution of his mission with all diligence. Original bills and invoices signed by the parties

from whom purchases are made shall be preserved and filed with the Governor for his inspection and information."

The powers of Mr. Owen were afterwards increased until his purchases amounted to—

English and Enfield rifles	40,000
Carbines	2,731
Revolvers	751
Cavalry sabres	797

The effect on the North of the bombardment of Fort Sumter was seen in the breaking down of party lines. Stephen A. Douglas was the leader of the Northern Democracy. He had been an unsuccessful candidate for the Presidency in 1860, but immediately upon hearing of the attack on Sumter he called upon President Lincoln and tendered his services, and publicly announced that he "was prepared to sustain the President in the exercise of all his constitutional functions to preserve the Union, maintain the Government and defend the Federal capital." On his way from Washington to his home in Illinois he made several patriotic speeches and at a meeting of the people in Chicago, on the 1st of May, among other things said:

"That the present danger is imminent no man can conceal. If war must come—if the bayonet must be used to maintain the constitution—I can say before God my conscience is clear. I have struggled long for a peaceful solution of the difficulty. I have not only tendered those States what was theirs of right, but I have gone to the very extreme of magnanimity. The return we receive is war—armies marched upon our capital, obstructions and dangers to our navigation, letters of marque to invite pirates to prey upon our commerce, a concerted movement to blot out the United States of America from the map of the globe. The question is, are we to maintain the country of our fathers, or allow it to be stricken down by those who, when they can no longer govern, threaten to destroy?"

Almost immediately after this speech Senator Douglas was stricken down, but from his dying bed he issued a letter to the country through a political committee, in which

in the strongest terms he urged his party friends to rally to the support of the President in maintaining the cause of the Union and national honor. He said: "A man can not be a true Democrat unless he is a loyal patriot." Mr. Douglas was very popular with his party in Indiana, and his words had great effect upon his followers, causing them to rally to the Union. Thomas A. Hendricks was the leader of the Democrats of Indiana, as Douglas was of those of the North. On the 24th of April, 1861, on the very day the Legislature met, he caused to be published a letter in the Indianapolis Journal, in which he said:

"Since the war commenced I have uniformly said that the authority of the Government of the United States is not questioned in Indiana, and that I regarded it as the duty of the citizens of Indiana to respect and maintain that authority and to give the Government an honest and earnest support in the prosecution of the war, until, in the providence of God, it may be brought to an honorable conclusion and the blessings of peace restored to our country—postponing until that time all controversy in relation to the causes and responsibilities of the war. No man will feel a deeper solicitude in the welfare and proud bearing of Indiana's soldiery in the conflict of arms to which they are called than myself.

"Allow me to add that, in my judgment, a citizen or newspaper is not serving the country well in the present crisis by attempting to give a partisan aspect to the war, or by seeking to pervert the cause of the country to party ends."

Thus it will be seen that in the beginning the leaders of both political parties were calling upon the people to rally, without distinction of party, to the support of the Union. If there was any division of parties on this great question it came afterwards. This spirit of loyalty seemed to pervade all the North, and all the States vied with each other in hastening forward troops.

We have now shown how Indiana and the country were roused by the firing on Fort Sumter, how party lines were destroyed, how all doubt, all hesitation was at an end, how the people of Indiana asked for arms, and how Governor Morton, sustained by a united legislature, used every effort to procure arms in the beginning. It remains now

to show how Indiana honored every call made upon it by the President; how it did more than that; how at the call of Governor Morton the people sprang to arms in advance of calls by the President on more than one occasion; how they poured out their treasure to care for the soldiers in the field, and their families at home.

CHAPTER XXX.

HOW INDIANA RAISED TROOPS.

Had Indiana not won as much fame and glory on the battle field as it did through the courage and discipline of its troops, the remarkable zeal and loyalty of the people in responding to all the calls of the Government would have given the State a foremost place among the loyal and patriotic commonwealths of the Union. It is one of the proudest boasts of Indiana that it was always the first to fill its quota, the first to respond when a call was made. It is true that drafts were resorted to on three occasions, but they were made more to equalize the burdens on the various parts of the State than from a fear that volunteers would not offer, and the number actually drafted was smaller than in any other State of equal population. In addition to all this Indiana defended its own border, and had, perhaps, more difficulties to encounter than any other Northern State. There was more disaffection and open opposition to the war than in any other State. Yet Indiana never faltered, never hung back when a call came, but filled every call, and in addition furnished thirty thousand ninety and one hundred day men not called for, and for whom it never received any credit on calls actually made.

Had the advice of Governor Morton been taken in 1862, or even in 1863, the war would have been ended much sooner than it was, and the loss of life and treasure would have been infinitely less. Many mistakes were committed in the recruiting of troops that might have been avoided. For instance, Indiana organized too many regiments, as did most of the other States. Had the recruiting gone on and the

volunteers been assigned to the old regiments in the field, so as to keep their numerical strength up to the maximum, it would have been much better, as the new men would have been placed with veterans, and would have very soon become good soldiers. Being assigned to new organizations it required time to become disciplined and seasoned soldiers so as to stand their full share of hardship and fighting. Then, too, in nearly all cases, the officers of these new regimental organizations had to be educated as well as the men. All this cost many valuable lives, but mistakes made by those in authority do not militate against the patriotism and loyalty of the people who freely offered themselves for the battle field.

We have already told how the people of Indiana responded to the first call, when fewer than five thousand men were asked for, and how twice that number clamored for the privilege of enlisting. In some places companies were organized and tendered their services, while hundreds did not wait for the formation of companies at home, but rushed to Indianapolis to unite with whatever they could. They went singly and in squads, and meeting at the place of rendezvous others like themselves, soon formed companies. While these men, at a moment's notice, were rushing to camp, the people at home were not idle. They knew the soldiers would need supplies, and that neither the Government nor the State was prepared to meet the demand, and blankets, underclothing, and many other necessities were freely contributed. Bankers and individuals came forward and offered the Governor all the money he would need in advance of the meeting of the Legislature. These offers were not confined to Indiana, but the well-known banking firm of Winslow, Lanier & Co., of New York, offered a loan of \$25,000 without stipulation as to repayment or interest.

On the 20th of April orders were issued for the organization and muster in of the six regiments called for, and on the 27th the field and staff officers were appointed. During the war with Mexico Indiana furnished five regiments, so it was determined to number the regiments organized as beginning with the Sixth. The six regiments were formed into a brigade, with Thomas A. Morris, of Indianapolis, a graduate of West Point, as Brigadier General.

The Eleventh regiment, however, was detached and never served with the other regiments of the brigade.

Governor Morton, convinced that the number of troops called for would be found wholly inadequate, and that other calls would soon be made, and knowing that troops to be effective needed training, and being unable to stop the rush to volunteer, determined to organize six additional regiments and hold them in camp, where they could undergo a probationary training. When the Legislature met it promptly authorized the organization of six regiments of State troops. After the first six regiments had been organized for active service Governor Morton found in Indianapolis twenty-nine companies in excess of those required under the call, while sixty-eight companies had been organized in various parts of the State and reported ready for service, so he had little difficulty in organizing the six new regiments. According to the act of the Legislature the term of service for these new regiments was to be twelve months, the regiments to be divided into infantry, cavalry and artillery, as the public service might demand. The troops were to be at the order of the Governor with power to transfer them to the General Government to fill any future requisition made on the State. These regiments were designated the Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth. Three of them were to rendezvous at Indianapolis, and one each at Lafayette, Terre Haute and Richmond. Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds, of the Tenth regiment, was made Brigadier General.

On the 11th of May the Adjutant General reported five of the regiments as having the full complements of men, and six companies in camp for the sixth and last. This was subsequently filled up with new enlistments. On the 16th of May the President called for four more regiments from Indiana. An order was at once issued transferring three of the regiments already organized to the United States service, and the Seventeenth was completed, and also made one of the four. The question of entering the United States service for three years was submitted to all the regiments, the term called for being three years. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Seventeenth promptly accepted the proposition, although there were a number of

men in each regiment who were unwilling to volunteer for three years. They were at once discharged and their places filled with new recruits. These regiments were immediately mustered into the United States service and sent to West Virginia, under the command of Brigadier General Reynolds.

The Twelfth and Sixteenth remained in the service of the State until the 18th of July, when the Governor procured an order from President Lincoln accepting them for the unexpired portion of their term of twelve months. They were immediately sent to the army in the East. Thus, before the first of August Indiana had twelve full regiments in the service, but the terms of the first three months' regiments had expired. They were brought home and reorganized for the three years' service. Other calls on the State had come and the work of recruiting and organizing went on with amazing energy, until before the end of 1861 fifty-three regiments of infantry, three regiments of cavalry and twelve batteries of artillery had been put in the field. It must be remembered that six of those regiments had been twice recruited, that is, for the three months' service and then for three years. It ought to be said here that most of the volunteers recruited in 1861 reenlisted as their terms expired, and remained in the service until the close of the war.

The results of the war during 1861 were not very encouraging for the Union cause. Bull Run, Ball's Bluff, Big Bethel, in the East; Wilson's Creek and Lexington, Missouri, in the West, overshadowed, in the public mind, the successful campaign in West Virginia and Burnside's expedition to the South. Then, the winter of 1861-2 was one of peculiar hardship, especially in West Virginia, where many of the Indiana regiments were stationed, owing to the extreme cold weather, and the inability of the Government to furnish adequate clothing.

This combination of circumstances greatly retarded enlistments, and by this time the hostility to the war, which had been overwhelmed in the beginning by the great outpouring of the patriotic sons of Indiana, began to manifest itself. Notwithstanding all these discouragements, several regiments were organized in Indiana and put into the field

ready for the spring campaign. January and February brought a gleam of light to the Union cause. General George H. Thomas, in the depth of winter, marched his little army over wretched roads in the mountains and inflicted an unexpected and sore defeat on a Confederate force at Mill Springs in Kentucky. General McClellan had been called to the command of all the armies, and had taken personal supervision of that in and around Washington, known as the Army of the Potomac, but the months had slowly passed and no movement of that grand army had been made. In February, General Grant startled and electrified the whole country by his brilliant capture of Forts Henry and Donelson. His epigrammatic reply to the Confederate commander at Donelson of "unconditional surrender," and "I propose to move immediately upon your works," was like a clarion call to the nation, and volunteering once more became brisk, more men offering than could be accepted.

Just then the Government committed another awful blunder. It really looked as if some evil genius was at work at Washington. The victory at Fort Donelson created an impression that the rebellion would soon be crushed, and an order was issued to stop recruiting. Governor Morton in vain protested, urging that the armies ought to be filled up and kept full until the last blow had been struck; that when victory was with the Union arms was the time to secure volunteers, and that the Government ought to take advantage of the enthusiasm aroused throughout the North by Grant's success. Nothing, however, would change the popular faith that the war would soon be over, and that the government had all the troops it would need. It did not require many months to convince the Government and people that a fearful mistake had been made.

Grant won a brilliant but bloody victory at Shiloh in April, McClellan at last moved in the East, and then disaster followed disaster with alarming rapidity. McClellan was driven back from in front of Richmond, losing thousands of men by disease besides those who fell in battle. Pope was rushed back like a hurricane to the Potomac, his army defeated and almost demoralized. Then it was the Government was forced to the conclusion that the end of the re-

bellion was not yet in sight, and that more men would be needed. The President had called for 500,000 men in January, 1862, and it was the recruiting under that call that had been stopped. In July he issued another call for 300,000. Indiana was to furnish thirteen regiments of infantry and six batteries of artillery. The Twelfth and Sixteenth regiments had completed their terms of one year, and were to be reorganized on the three year basis, while eleven new regiments were to be raised.

It was an unfortunate time to call for troops. The Union armies had met with one disaster after another. Even when they had been victorious in the field their Generals had been out-manuevered, and many began to lose faith in the ability of the Government to put down the rebellion. Then, too, the call was made at a bad time for Indiana. There were no large cities in the State; a large majority of the people were engaged in agriculture, and the farmers were busy harvesting their crops. Governor Morton, however, was not dismayed by the task the Government had set for him, and he threw his whole energy into arousing the people of Indiana. His call to the people rang like a trumpet tone. The closing paragraphs were as follows:

"Again I call upon the loyal and patriotic men of Indiana to come forward and supply the quota due from our State. Up to this hour, Indiana occupies a most exalted position connected with the war. Her troops have been in almost every battle, and have behaved with uniform and distinguished gallantry. Never before has the State held so proud a place in the opinion of the world, and it should be the prayer and effort of every loyal citizen that she may not now falter, and that nothing may hereafter occur to detract from her well-earned honors. But while we are justly proud of the high rank to which Indiana has attained, we should never forget that our allegiance and highest duty are due to the nation, of which Indiana is but a part; that in struggling for our national Government, we are contending for our national existence, honor, and all that is dear to freemen, and that in this struggle we must succeed, at whatever cost; that it is the duty of every State to furnish, promptly, her full proportion of the military force called for by the President, and that in doing so, she

has no right to dictate the terms of his military policy or prescribe conditions precedent upon which such force shall be furnished. To do so would be to recognize the odious doctrine of State rights as it has been taught by rebel politicians for many years, and which is but another name for secession and the cause of all our woe.

"I therefore call upon every man, whatever may be his rank and condition in life, to put aside his business and come to the rescue of his country. Upon every man, individually, let me urge the solemn truth, that whatever may be his condition or business, he has no duty or business half so important to himself and family as the speedy and effectual suppression of the rebellion.

"Those who from age and infirmity can not enter the army, can do much to stimulate others; and I want every man to feel especially called upon to exert himself, and by public and private exhortation, and by every legitimate influence, to encourage the immediate filling up of the new regiments. And to the women of Indiana, whose hearts are so full of love of country, and who, by their labors and contributions, have done so much to relieve the sick and wounded soldiers, let me especially appeal. Emulate the virtues of the Roman matrons—urge your sons, husbands, and brothers to the field. Your influence is all pervading and powerful. And to the maiden, let me say, beware of that lover who, full of health and vigor, lingers at home in inglorious ease when his country calls him to arms."

Notwithstanding this appeal recruiting was slow, when suddenly events in Kentucky gave the people of Indiana an opportunity to show to the world one of the grandest spectacles that has ever lightened the page of history. To thoroughly understand how great the work of Indiana was on this occasion it will be necessary to take a bird's-eye view of the situation in the West.

After the battle of Shiloh Halleck left St. Louis and took personal command of the combined armies of Grant and Buell, and methodically pursued the siege of Corinth, which he maintained until the Confederate commander leisurely evacuated the place. Halleck was then called to Washington as Commander-in-chief, and the two armies of Grant and Buell separated, Buell returning to the neigh-

borhood of Nashville and Grant remaining in Northern Mississippi. Grant at once proposed two or three plans of campaign with his own army, but General Halleck ignored them and began the work of depleting Grant's army, sending some regiments to Buell, and others into Arkansas, where they were out of the way of accomplishing anything of importance.

Bragg had been placed in command of the Confederate forces in Tennessee. General Thomas, who commanded one corps under Buell, became satisfied that Bragg was contemplating some important movement, which he believed was an invasion of Kentucky. But he could not convince his commander that any such movement was in contemplation, or if contemplated, that it could be accomplished. However, General Buell was suddenly startled from his fancied security. Bragg slipped around his flank, and was quickly off on his way for the Ohio River, his army divided into two wings. One, under the command of Kirby Smith, was to aim at Cincinnati, while Bragg himself was to capture Louisville. As soon as Buell became satisfied that his enemy had given him the slip he put his army in motion on a mad race for Louisville.

This invasion of Kentucky caused the wildest commotion, not only in that State, but throughout the North. The Government had no troops anywhere that it could send to reinforce Kentucky, so all hopes hung on Indiana and Ohio, and more especially on Indiana, as it was soon developed that Kirby Smith had Cincinnati for his objective point. Under the call of July, 1862, Indiana's quota was fixed at 21,250, and Governor Morton was using every effort to stimulate volunteering, when on the 8th of August he received a dispatch from Buell, who was at Huntsville, Alabama, stating that a formidable raid was threatened against Kentucky, and urging him to send troops to General Boyle. Governor Morton at once issued an appeal, and by the night of the 11th as many as 20,000 men were gathered in various camps, waiting to be mustered and armed. On the morning of the 13th the Seventieth regiment left Indianapolis, and two days later reported at Bowling Green. This was the first regiment sent from any State to the field under the July call. On the 16th another regiment went forward, and on the 17th still another. The camps were full

of men waiting to be mustered, and others were coming by every train, but the mustering went on leisurely. This did not suit Governor Morton, and he telegraphed the War Department asking for a new and more energetic mustering officer. Colonel Henry B. Carrington was assigned to that duty, and at once reported to the Governor. Full of energy and a tireless worker, he organized and mustered regiments with a rapidity never before known. He organized a "night school" of officers and instructed them how to make out the proper papers. On the very day he reported for duty, before he rested even for refreshment, he mustered into the service the Seventy-first regiment and had it off to the front.

The Government had offered an advanced bounty, but it had not sent to Indiana the funds with which to pay it. The men had expected this money to leave with their families, and did not relish the idea of leaving the State without it. But Governor Morton addressed them, telling them of the urgent necessity for their presence in Kentucky, and promising to send the money after them as soon as it could be obtained. The men gave a cheer, shouldered their muskets, and demanded to know how soon a train would be ready for them.

The next day Governor Morton borrowed, on his own responsibility, from the banks in Indianapolis and Cincinnati, and from private citizens, nearly half a million dollars. On that day and night four regiments were mustered, paid and despatched to Kentucky, and on the 20th three more were on their way to the scene of danger. The money due the Seventy-first was sent forward and paid to the men on the battle field of Richmond, Kentucky.

The demand for troops increased, and men kept pouring in to the various camps. Mustering officers, paymasters, quartermasters and commissaries, worked day and night. From that time for several successive days from one to three regiments were forwarded daily. Three batteries of artillery were also forwarded, and others were in camp waiting for guns and horses. Thus, in a little more than a month, Indiana had organized and sent to the front more than 30,000 troops. No better showing of what Indiana did in those days can be made than by quoting some of the Governor's dispatches:

August 17. I send one thousand men tonight, seven thousand tomorrow and Tuesday.

August 21. I sent another regiment last night; a battery will go tomorrow. The Sixty-ninth has started. The Seventy-fifth leaves at 6 p. m. and the Seventy-fourth at 9 p. m. today for Louisville.

August 23. Will have at least seventeen additional regiments ready for arms this time next week.

August 26. The Seventy-ninth leaves Tuesday; will hurry others. Indiana has put 14,480 men into Kentucky up to Friday last; this will make it 19,296 by Thursday this week. This includes two batteries.

August 27. Another regiment can leave tomorrow. One leaves this evening.

August 30. The Eighty-ninth leaves this afternoon. The Eighty-first and Eighty-second will be armed today. Two regiments will start tomorrow, and five more will be ready next week.

August 31. The Eighty-eighth is at the depot. The Eighty-seventh will be at Louisville tomorrow morning. Two regiments leave today and two more tonight.

This would have been called handling organized troops with amazing rapidity, but when it is remembered that these regiments had to be organized, clothed and armed, and then mustered into the service before leaving, the amount of labor performed and the patriotism of the people of Indiana seem marvelous. One regiment was actually mustered and paid on the cars, as it was hurrying to the front. Morton telegraphed to Stanton about his borrowing money to advance to the troops, and asked that the money be returned at once. To this Secretary Stanton replied: "The most peremptory orders have been given to supply you with funds. If it is not done I will dismiss the officer whose neglect occasions the delay, no matter what his rank."

It was necessary that this energy should be displayed, not only for the salvation of the Union, but for the safety of the State. Had Bragg been permitted to reach Louisville, the Ohio River would not have stopped him, and the scene of war would have been transferred to Indiana. When Bragg slipped past Buell there was no adequate force between him and the Ohio, and the only hope of

saving Indiana was to meet Bragg on Kentucky soil with enough troops to check his advance and hold him until Buell came.

This rapid dispatch of troops to Kentucky did not complete Indiana's great work. Kirby Smith was threatening Cincinnati. On the 6th of September Major General Wright, commanding the department, appealed to Governor Morton for troops. Two regiments, twenty-four pieces of artillery, 3000 stand of arms, 31,136 rounds of artillery ammunition and 3,365,000 musket cartridges were delivered at Covington, Kentucky, opposite Cincinnati, within fifteen hours after the call was received by the Governor. The Mayor of Cincinnati telegraphed to the Governor of Ohio for artillery. The latter replied that if the Mayor would make out a proper requisition, get it endorsed by the commanding general and forward it, it would be duly honored. There was no time for such delay and the Mayor telegraphed to Governor Morton. Governor Morton replied at once: "One battery ready with two carloads of ammunition. Will send another train in two hours."

Ammunition was needed as badly as men, and seven hundred men were put at work at the arsenal, and 300,000 rounds were turned out daily. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Secretary Stanton telegraphed to the Governor, "Well done, Indiana." This work during August and the first few days of September was the wonder of the whole country, and the name of Indiana stood higher than ever. Other States were just as loyal as Indiana, just as patriotic, and were doing herculean work to fill their quotas, but none displayed the terrible energy of Indiana. While all this was being done Indiana's own borders were threatened, and Governor Morton found time to give it attention and make Indiana secure. Thus it was that the two calls of July and August, 1862, for 600,000 men, were met in Indiana. That a draft was made in 1862 is true, but the causes of this are explained in subsequent pages.

The first call for troops in 1863 was made in June, for six months' men. Indiana promptly furnished its four regiments. On October 17 another call for 300,000 men was made. This was followed by calls in February and March,

1864, for an aggregate of 400,000 men. The quotas under these calls were filled by volunteers. In July, 1864, another call was made for 500,000 men, and in December still another call was made for 300,000. These latter calls were mainly supplied by volunteers, but it became necessary also to resort to conscription.

Before taking up these calls and the drafts that were made, it is well to tell the story of the spring of 1864 when Indiana voluntarily offered 20,000 men for one hundred days, as another evidence of the intense patriotism of the State. When 1864 opened, Grant, in command of all the armies, determined upon a persistent campaign of aggression with the two great Confederate armies—that of Lee in the East, and Johnston in the West—as the real objective points. Both Grant and Sherman urged that every able-bodied soldier was needed in the armies for active service. Sherman would have a long line of communications to keep open, requiring a very large per cent. of his available force. The calls of February and March, requiring more than 37,000 men from Indiana, had been filled, and the troops were hurried forward as fast as possible. Twelve thousand veterans had re-enlisted, and had been granted a furlough of thirty days, and they, too, hastened to the front. To show the urgency of the occasion, let this dispatch from General Sherman to Governor Morton be given. It was under the date of April 6:

“The season is advancing and no excuse can be entertained, such as waiting for more recruits. Three hundred men in time are better than a thousand too late. Now is the time every soldier should be in his proper place—the front.”

On the 23d of the same month he again telegraphed:

“The force of ten thousand I sent up Red River was intended to form a part of my force for the spring campaign, but Banks can not spare them and I will be short that number. We can not mount half the cavalry now in the service. If the new cavalry regiments will not serve as infantry, I see no prospect of using them except as dismounted cavalry, which is the same thing. I tell you it is impossible to arm and equip them this season, and even then we could not find horses where we are going. Why not let me use them to guard my roads and relieve other guard troops to

that extent? They would be none the worse cavalry for a few months' service with muskets. I can put them in reserve where drill and instruction could go on quite as well as where they now are, and I can arm them as infantry. When horses and equipments come they can be mounted and equipped, and relieved as soon as furloughed regiments arrive, or as soon as A. J. Smith's command comes out of Red River."

Governor Morton presented this matter to the cavalry regiments, and while there was some measure of disappointment, so eager were the men to serve the country that they cheerfully offered to accept the situation and go forward as infantry for the time.

Practically a great army of well seasoned, veteran troops was required to keep open the communications of Sherman, and he needed every one of those seasoned troops in the campaign he was about to begin. Governor Brough, of Ohio, happened to be in Indianapolis, and Governor Morton broached the subject of some of the Western States furnishing a large number of men for one hundred days, to act as guards. It met Governor Brough's approval, and the Governors of Illinois, Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin were invited to a conference at Indianapolis on the 22d of April. All attended, except Blair, of Michigan, who could not be present, but telegraphed that he would cordially acquiesce in what the others did. A plan was agreed upon. They sent a proposition to the President to furnish him for one hundred days, infantry as follows:

Ohio	30,000
Indiana	20,000
Illinois	20,000
Iowa	10,000
Wisconsin	5,000

The troops so furnished were to be clothed and paid by the General Government, but were to serve without bounty, and were not to be credited upon any call for troops made by the President. They were to be ready within twenty days of the acceptance of the proposition by the President, which was promptly forthcoming. Governor Morton used every exertion but was unable to fill his quota

of 20,000, but did raise and equip about 8000, who rendered valuable service.

On the 4th of August, 1862, a call was made for 300,000 men to serve for nine months. A call made in July for the same number of men for three years had not been filled. The call made in August provided that if the quota of any State had not been filled by the 15th of August the residue should be raised by draft. Indiana's quota under the two calls was 42,500 men. Preparations were made for conscription, but by the 6th of October, when the draft was made, the entire quota under both calls had been filled, with the exception of 3003 men. A draft of that number was made. The truth was the State at that time had furnished, in excess of all calls, before that of August 4, 29,258, a surplus great enough to wipe out that call. The true account between the State and the National Government stood:

Number called for, prior to August 4, 1862.....	64,765
Number furnished	94,023
	<hr/>
Excess	29,258
Number called for August 4	21,250
	<hr/>
Excess over all calls	8,008

At the time Indiana had not received credit for all it was entitled to, but as some localities had furnished an excess of their proportion, while others were short, it was resolved to draft on those localities to equalize the burdens. There were nine hundred and sixty-nine townships in the State. Six hundred and thirty-five were in excess of their quotas, while three hundred and thirty-four were in arrears, and a draft was resorted to in those townships.

A new enrollment act was passed by Congress in the winter of 1862-3. The first call made after the enrollment under the new act was completed in June, 1863, when Indiana's share was four regiments of six months' men, and they were promptly furnished by volunteers. On the completion of the enrollment under the new act the President called for troops from those States in arrears, but the call did not affect Indiana, which had an excess to its credit of

more than eleven thousand men. Between the first of October, 1863, and March 15, 1864, the President issued three calls aggregating seven hundred thousand men. Under these calls Indiana's quota was 45,529. To fill this demand 37,011 volunteered, which, added to the excess of 11,011, still gave the State an excess over all calls of 2493, without resorting to a draft.

On the 23d of April, 1864, a call was made for one hundred day men, and for this Indiana furnished by volunteers, 7,415. On the 18th of July, 1864, another call was made for 500,000, Indiana's quota being 25,662. To meet this, after all volunteers were counted, a draft for 12,476 was made. The last call of the war was made in December, 1864, and was for 300,000. Indiana's quota was 22,582. This was filled by 20,158 volunteers and 2424 drafted men.

Under the first enrollment act it was provided that any person could exempt himself from the draft by paying as commutation \$300. This worked very badly, and in response to the emphatic protest of Governor Morton was repealed, and only those belonging to some religious denomination whose tenets opposed war, were permitted such exemption. In Indiana only seven hundred and eighty-five men took advantage of the exemption clause, and all of those on religious grounds. Of the 208,367 men furnished by Indiana, only 17,903 were drafted, and of these more than 3000 were drafted when Indiana had an excess to her credit, for the purpose of equalizing the various townships. It ought to be said in this connection that Indiana did not draw on other States to fill its quota by enlisting former slaves, as some of the States did.

The system of giving local bounties did not begin in Indiana until 1863. The amount paid out for local bounties reached the enormous sum of \$15,492,876. The system of offering large local bounties brought that disgrace known as the "Bounty Jumpers." These were men of the worst class who would volunteer, receive their bounty and advance pay, desert and re-enlist under another name, and repeat this over and over. Indiana was not so greatly afflicted by this class as some of the other States, where larger local bounties were offered, but still there was a great deal of bounty jumping until it was broken up by the energetic measures of the Provost Marshal. He caused a

number of the offenders to be arrested and imprisoned, and three of the worst, after a trial by court martial, were shot to death at Camp Morton.

Before leaving this subject it ought to be said that 12,433 of Indiana's soldiers "veteranized" and served until the close of the war. The greatest number in any one regiment was five hundred and three, from the Twenty-first. The next highest number was four hundred and sixty, from the Thirty-third. From the beginning to the end Indiana was the first to fill its quota under every call, and most of the time had an excess to its credit. This excess ranged from 2500 to 30,000. In fact, under every call Indiana started in with an excess to its credit. It is believed that no other State can show so clean a record. When it is considered that Indiana was a comparatively new State; that it was on the border; that a large per cent. of its population originally came from the South; that in no State in the Union was the State Government hampered by so many obstacles; that in no State was such pronounced opposition to the war disclosed—its achievements must be regarded as marvelous, and must ever stand as its grandest monument, and for all time to come make the name of Indiana honored by the Nation.

One of the difficulties Indiana labored under in fitting its troops for the field was the dearth of competent officers. There were very few West Point graduates in the State, and having no militia system, there were few who knew anything of the drill, or of the minutiae of camp life. There were still a few who had served a short time in the war with Mexico, but none who had held a higher rank than that of a company officer. Men by the thousands willingly offered themselves, but who was to drill and teach them the duties of soldiers, that they might be fitted to meet an enemy at the best advantage? Then came the trouble of having to avoid political jealousies. Men from all parties had freely offered their services, and it was proper and right that no distinction should be made in the appointment of officers on account of previous political affiliations, or political jealousies would be engendered. Governor Morton realized the necessity of drawing all classes into the active support of the Government, and freely offered commissions to men who had opposed him polit-

ically. Some of those, in fact the great majority of them, rendered the most gallant and effective service, some even yielding up their lives. But a few were wholly incompetent, and a few others, after accepting commissions, showed their lack of sympathy with the Union cause.

Some of these appointments gave great offense to the party friends of the Governor. Especially was this the case with the appointments of Horace Heffren and John C. Walker, and an attempt was made to censure the Governor for making them. The Governor had another trouble to contend with. Men ambitious to serve and command, having some influence at Washington, received permits from the Secretary of War or the President to raise regiments, without reference to what the Governor was doing. This created great confusion, and in some instances did actual harm to the cause.

It was natural that men holding positions in the army should desire promotions, and some of the Colonels of regiments made strenuous efforts through members of Congress to be made Brigadier Generals, without the recommendation of the Governor. The latter sent the following protest to the President: "I learn incidentally that the Indiana delegation has nominated men to be appointed Brigadier Generals. I do not know who they are, and have not been consulted. I have had much more to do with the officers than any member of Congress, and have had much more responsibility in connection with the organization than any of them, and believe I should at least have the chance of being heard before any action is taken." The President promptly replied that the appointments had not been made, and asked Morton to telegraph his recommendations.

Of course some mistakes were made in appointments. The Governor could not know the qualifications of all who asked commissions, and frequently appointments were made on company elections, and it was not always that the men chosen were the ones best fitted to command. But, after all, the record of Indiana officers will compare very favorably with those of other officers. Only a very small per cent. were wholly inefficient. After the war had continued some time Governor Morton, in organizing new regiments, desired to select at least a portion of the officers

from those who had already had experience in the field, and who were worthy of promotion, but this was stopped by an unfortunate order from the War Department. Of the 18,884 men commissioned in Indiana organizations, only 271 were dismissed or resigned for the "good of the service."

Indiana lost in killed or died from wounds or disease during their service: Commissioned officers, 652; non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, 23,704. Thirteen officers and 10,833 enlisted men deserted.

Indiana did not confine its work for the Union to the raising and sending forward of troops. The State authorities knew that troops in the field without ammunition would be of little value, and they knew that the Government would not be in condition to promptly furnish all the ammunition needed. So it was determined to operate an arsenal in the State for the manufacturing of ammunition. At first the intention was only to supply the troops sent out in the first three months' campaign. Among the citizens of Indianapolis was Captain Herman Sturm, who had studied the manufacture and fabrication of ammunition in Europe. He was asked by the Governor to take charge of the operations. The forge of a small blacksmith shop was obtained, and a few hand bullet moulds. The State Quartermaster General furnished the material and Captain Sturm, with a detail from the Eleventh Indiana regiment, began the work of casting bullets. An adjoining room was used for the making of the cartridges. This was the beginning of an arsenal that during the war manufactured millions of rounds of ammunition, and on several occasions was able to supply the western armies in times of great necessity, and when the National Government could not have supplied them.

During the greater part of the war from five hundred to seven hundred persons were employed at the arsenal. There was no law for the establishment of such an institution, but the necessity was so great that the Governor borrowed money and erected buildings. In 1863 he called the attention of the Legislature to the arsenal. At that time the Legislature was extremely hostile to the administration of Governor Morton, and appointed a committee to investigate the operations of the arsenal. The commit-

tee made a thorough examination of the matter and reported that up to that time about 100,000 rounds of artillery ammunition and nearly 30,000,000 rounds for small arms had been manufactured and turned over to the Government. Buildings had been erected out of the profits of the concern, and everything had been done economically and well. The Secretary of War reported that he was able to get a better quality of ammunition and at a less price, from the Indiana arsenal than from any other source.

At the end of the war the accounts of the arsenal were closed, and after all obligations were discharged there remained \$75,000 of a profit, which was turned into the State treasury.

The number of troops furnished by Indiana during the war was as follows:

Infantry	175,776
Cavalry	21,605
Artillery	10,986
Indiana Legion	51,400
Total	<u>259,767</u>

For the various terms of service the numbers were as follows:

For the term of three years.....	165,717
For the term of one year.....	21,642
For the term of nine months	742
For the term of six months.....	4,082
For the term of 100 days	7,415
For the term of three months.....	6,308
For the term of sixty days.....	587
For the term of thirty days.....	11,874
Total	<u>208,367</u>

CHAPTER XXXI.

HOW INDIANA TROOPS WERE CARED FOR.

Another thing that will always stand to the credit of Indiana was the care exercised of its soldiers in the field. No other State took so much pains to see that its soldiers were properly clothed and cared for by the General Government and that the sick and wounded had every possible attention. This active watchfulness began with the war, and the Governor was ever demanding the best equipment that could be had. This called out a notable tribute from the Cincinnati Commercial. In commenting on the passage of the first regiments through that city for the first three months' campaign, the Commercial said: "The Governor of Indiana has out-generaled the Governor of Ohio. The contrast in the condition of the troops of the two States proves this. The former has sent four admirably equipped regiments to the battle field, and has two more ready to march at an hour's notice. The Governor of Ohio has not a single regiment in camp or in field properly equipped for service. The Hoosier troops are all armed with rifled muskets, are uniformed, and furnished with their complement of camp equipments." A few days later, in noticing the passage of other regiments, the Commercial said: "The stout and brawny appearance of the Indiana troops was universally remarked. . . . They were armed with the new United States muskets of the most approved pattern. No Ohio troops have such arms. Whose fault is it?" The State authorities did see to it that Indiana troops were supplied with the best arms obtainable. They knew that the conflict would be deadly, and that if Indiana were to do its full duty, it would be necessary for its troops to be well armed. It has been stated that, early in 1861, Robert Dale Owen

had been sent to the East, and then to Europe, to purchase the best arms that could be had. But it was not alone in seeing that the Indiana troops were well armed, that a watchfulness was exercised over their interests.

In the month of August, 1861, Governor Morton, who was at that time in Washington, learned that the Indiana troops in the mountains of West Virginia were suffering at night for the want of overcoats. He set himself to remedy the matter, and made it rather interesting for the authorities at Washington and various Government quartermasters for a time. He made the most earnest and persistent efforts to get the needed clothing to the men, bombarding the high officials at Washington and elsewhere with telegrams, sending his private secretary to West Virginia, appealing to General Rosecrans and resorting to every method to accomplish his object. But red tape, the negligence and carelessness of some of the officers, and confusion and lack of organization in the quartermaster's department were all to be combatted and it was not until the middle of October that the troops were supplied. In the meantime their sufferings were intense.

By this time Governor Morton had determined to take into his own hands the matter of supplying Indiana troops with overcoats. He at once purchased ten thousand at \$7.50 each, and got the Government to assume the contract. He got from General Meigs an order for ten thousand additional, and in New York purchased nine thousand more, but for five thousand of these he had to pay at the rate of \$9.25 each. He had thus procured twenty-nine thousand coats, which he held at his own disposal. Major Montgomery, the Quartermaster at Indianapolis, refused to pay for those purchased at \$9.25, saying that the Government had prohibited paying more than \$7.75. The Governor curtly informed him that the Indiana troops should be well clothed, it did not matter what it cost, and if the Government would not pay the bill the State would. The Governor then demanded the removal of Montgomery, and he was promptly sent to another field.

Governor Morton would not tolerate anything that looked like neglect, and when a Federal officer failed in doing what the Governor thought was his duty, the War Department was urged to have him removed, and if that

would not accomplish his end, he laid siege to the President and members of the cabinet. Take the case of Major Montgomery. The Governor had complained to the Secretary of War, but it did not appear to accomplish what he aimed at, and he wired to Secretary Seward: "Major Montgomery will not tolerate the least interference on my part, and on all occasions repudiates my authority. One of our regiments was sent to Kentucky in rags, and I am now negotiating with Captain Dickerson, of Cincinnati, for outfits for three regiments. Montgomery is an honest man, but no business man, being very technical and exceedingly jealous of his authority." On another occasion he wired Secretary Stanton: "I have had embarrassments in transacting business with General Ripley from the beginning of the war. On the 7th of August, 1862, Assistant Secretary of War Watson telegraphed that six thousand three hundred Springfield rifled muskets would be sent here. General Ripley cuts them down one-half. Ripley also sends to Simonson a large quantity of Enfield ammunition. He has no place for it, and besides, we have an arsenal here, and large quantities of fixed ammunition of every kind on hand. Colonel Simonson declines having anything to do with the ammunition and arms, and does not know what to do with them. Simonson says he has asked to be relieved from duty here. I hope the request will be granted. He is superannuated, forgetful and slow, and not very much superior to General Ripley as a business man. The amount of business growing out of the new levies is entirely beyond his capacity."

The sending of Robert Dale Owen to the East and to Europe to purchase arms was seriously objected to by Secretary of War Cameron, who complained that so many buyers in the field operated to increase the price. To this complaint Governor Morton replied: "It is the opinion of military men here that it would be little less than murder to send troops into battle with such arms as are a large majority of the muskets altered from flint to percussion locks. While not intending the slightest disparagement to the troops of other States, I feel safe in saying that Indiana volunteers are not inferior in material and discipline to any that have entered the field. All officers from other States who have witnessed their maneuvers are most lavish in

their praises. Their drill is incessant, and no expense has been or will be spared to put them into the best possible condition and equipment. The reputation of Indiana suffered by incompetent officers in the Mexican war, and the determination is that it shall be redeemed, cost what it may. All we ask is a chance."

On the 4th of September, 1862, the Governor telegraphed Secretary Stanton: "The Austrian rifles sent here are of the most worthless character. One regiment to whom they were issued one week ago has already returned over four hundred of them as utterly worthless, and the rest can not be depended upon. Competent men have examined them and say they are not worth \$2 apiece. The men have no confidence in them whatever, and it is a very great hardship to send men into battle with them. I do not want to go into the market and buy arms, but I am unwilling to send our men into the field with such arms."

In this connection, as showing how commanding Generals appreciated Indiana's care for its soldiers, the following two dispatches, one from General Grant, and the other from General Nelson, are given. The Governor had sent an agent to the Sixty-sixth regiment to transact some business, and had asked the co-operation of General Nelson. The General replied: "I will readily give every facility and aid to any one sent on business with that or any other regiment. Would to God that Governors of other States would take the care of their soldiers that you do of those of Indiana."

In October, 1862, Governor Morton asked of General Grant permission to furnish clothing to the Twenty-fifth, Forty-eighth and Fifty-third Indiana regiments, then with him at Jackson, Tennessee. Grant promptly replied: "Glad to have you furnish clothing for the regiments named; also for the Twenty-third and Fifty-second Indiana, if you can. Also would like to have some more Indiana regiments to be clothed."

Several of the new Indiana regiments were in the disastrous battle of Richmond, Kentucky, and were badly broken to pieces. It was proposed by the War Department to force the men of the broken regiments into others to fill them up, placing some of the men even in regiments of other States. Against such action the Governor protested

most vehemently. He sent telegram after telegram to Generals Halleck, Wright and Boyle, finally declaring that the outrage on the men and on Indiana should not be consummated. He fairly deluged the Secretary of War with dispatches on the subject, and then appealed to the President. Secretary Stanton was disposed to be rather overbearing about the matter. The Governor pledged himself that if the regiments were sent to Indiana they would be at once recruited up to the maximum strength and be ready for the field within a very few weeks. He plainly told the Secretary that Indiana would not submit to having its soldiers distributed among the regiments of other States; that many of the men in the broken regiments had volunteered with the express understanding they were to be commanded by certain officers, and that understanding must be kept. In one of his dispatches to Secretary Stanton the Governor said: "The people of Indiana feel very sore over the mismanagement and imbecility which led to the two disasters," referring to the surrender of Mumfordsville and the defeat at Richmond. To this Stanton replied: "I am not surprised at the soreness of feeling which you mention as being felt on account of the imbecility and mismanagement which occasioned the surrenders at Richmond and Mumfordsville, and every loyal and earnest man feels it." Governor Morton had his way. The broken regiments were returned to Indiana, and recruited to their full strength, and did most excellent service during the remainder of the war.

The supplies of blankets and warm underclothing in the country were early exhausted and the Government could not purchase what was needed. Governor Morton issued a proclamation to "The Patriotic Women of Indiana," in which he set forth the inability of the Government to get what was really needed for the comfort and health of the men in the field. He said: "An additional blanket to every man in our army will preserve hundreds to their country and their families. Two or three pairs of good, strong socks will be invaluable to men who must often march all day in the snow, and without them, must lie down with cold and benumbed feet on the frozen ground. . . . Woolen shirts and drawers, too, are a necessity to men exposed to such vicissitudes of weather as soldiers. All these articles

the Indiana volunteers ought to have now, and must have before winter sets in, if we would protect them from exposure and disease. . . . Blankets the Government can not purchase. The stock is completely exhausted." He then urged the women to forward to the State Quartermaster such blankets as they could spare, and to form associations to manufacture such articles as were specifically needed, such as gloves, underwear, etc. This was the beginning of the great Sanitary Commission which did so much to relieve suffering during the war. Thus Indiana had the honor of giving birth to the greatest relief movement ever inaugurated during time of war.

The response to this appeal was so generous that supplies to the value of many thousands of dollars were sent to Indianapolis, consisting for the most part, of blankets, shirts, drawers, socks and mittens, with sheets, pillows, pads, bandages, lint and dressing gowns for hospital use. So liberal were the offerings that the Quartermaster, in the latter part of the winter, gave notice that the supply was sufficient. The supplies having been received, the next thing was to distribute them where most needed, and so that none should be neglected. Agents were appointed and sent to all points where Indiana troops were stationed. Their duties were to seek out the sick or wounded, and relieve them; to find those who were in need of clothing of any kind and supply the deficiencies. Permanent agents were stationed at Washington, Louisville, Nashville, Memphis, Cairo and other places, and buildings were rented for the storage of sanitary goods, all expenses being paid out of the military contingent fund of the Governor. Societies were formed in all parts of the State to solicit contributions of money and supplies.

A general association, on the same plan, was formed throughout the United States, but Indiana maintained its own organization. This created some feeling in the United States Commission, and its officers took occasion to sharply criticise the policy of Indiana, but the result proved the wisdom of it, for it was universally conceded in all the armies that Indiana soldiers were better looked after and cared for than those of any other State. While it was the special duty of the Indiana agents to look after Indiana

soldiers, they never refused aid to the sick or wounded of other States, when they could supply it, and hundreds of instances are recorded where such prompt relief saved suffering and lives. One story illustrative of this is told in Foulke's Life of Morton. It was while the Indiana sick and wounded soldiers were being transferred to the boats after the battle of Shiloh. The story is as follows:

"After all had been collected and the steamers were about to pull off, a Major of a Kentucky regiment, who had a score of wounded men, sought out the Captain in charge, and implored him to take these men also. 'But my orders, sir, allow me only to take Indiana troops,' replied the boat Captain. 'But, damn it, sir,' retorted the Major, 'isn't Morton Governor of Kentucky? If he can care for our State he certainly will protect you in caring for our soldiers.' The wounded were promptly taken on the boat along with the Indiana soldiers."

Governor Brough, of Ohio, in his message to the Legislature of 1864, thus speaks of Indiana's work: "While extending our own operations, I have carefully watched those of our sister State of Indiana, and have found that her system merits the strongest commendation. It is simple in its character. Its central society at the capital, under the immediate care of the Governor, receives all the contributions from the various aid societies."

Local agents and special agents, either in the hospital or in the field, were required to promptly report the condition of the troops and hospitals, and whatever was needed, supplies, surgeons or nurses, was promptly forwarded, under such management as to insure its getting to the right place. Field agents were not only expected to look after the health and comfort of the men, but to write letters, take charge of commissions for them to their families, see to the burial of the dead, and the preservation of their property or relics, keep registers of the names of all men in hospitals, with date of entry, disease or injury, and, in case of death, the date and cause. Local agents were required to make their offices the homes of Indiana soldiers; assist them in getting transportation in returning home, provide them with clothing, when needed, take charge of returning prisoners and otherwise afford relief.

Commencing with the battle at Fort Donelson, as soon as information of a battle being in progress was received, additional surgeons, nurses, and supplies were rushed forward by all available means. For instance, immediately upon receiving word of the terrible battle of Shiloh, the Governor chartered steamers to bring home all the wounded who could be moved, and sent a force of sixty surgeons and more than three hundred nurses to the field. The Governor himself went to the field. General Sherman says of him at that time: "We were short of wagons to bring from Pittsburg Landing the necessary supplies, and he wanted to send to Indiana for one thousand wagons and teams. The idea of war operations being delayed for want of means easily procurable was a thorn in his side, and I believe that, had his advice been heeded, we would have taken Vicksburg that summer and turned eastward to do the work which had to be done two years afterwards. But the time was not yet ripe. We had to endure three more years of bloody battle, and I know that we at the front always felt the more confident because we knew that Oliver P. Morton was at his post in Indianapolis, multiplying his efforts in the days of reverses and cheering us on in success."

It was after this battle at Shiloh that Governor Morton appealed to the Secretary of War for permission to appoint two additional surgeons for each Indiana regiment. As usual, this appeal was at first refused, but the Governor persisted until his efforts were crowned with success. At this point may be recorded his "battle royal" with Secretary Stanton, which took place just after the surrender of Vicksburg. His agents had reported to him that the hospitals were insufficient, and that sick and wounded soldiers could not receive the care they needed. He went to Washington and asked the Secretary to order all the sick and wounded that could be moved sent North for care and treatment. The medical authorities objected, declaring the scheme impracticable, and that the hospitals were able to properly care for them.

Governor Morton denied the reports of the medical authorities, and insisted on his request, saying it would be best for the soldiers and for the Government, as it would save hundreds of lives, and restore thousands of sol-

diers more speedily to serviceable duty. But the Secretary was obstinate. The Governor appealed to the President, who could not, or would not, interfere with Stanton. Finally the Governor declared he would publish the whole matter to the world, that the people might know who stood in the way of relieving the sick and wounded. This threat brought the Secretary to terms, and the order was at once issued. From that time Stanton stood by Morton in all things.

A few days after the battle of Richmond, Kentucky, Indiana agents, under a flag of truce, entered the Confederate lines to look after the wounded. An arrangement was made with the Confederate authorities whereby Indiana was permitted to send supplies to the prisoners at Libby and Belle Isle, and Governor Morton at one time purchased some six thousand dollars' worth of food and clothing for that purpose. Agents were appointed to visit the regiments at payments, receive what money the soldiers wanted to send to their families, and convey it home for them, free of any cost. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were thus brought home to the families of those who were in the field.

The State Sanitary Commission reported that it had received, in donations of cash, \$247,570, and in goods, \$359,000. Boat and train loads of vegetables and fruits were sent to the front and to the hospitals. Just after the siege of Atlanta nearly a thousand barrels of apples and potatoes were sent to the Indiana soldiers with Sherman. At every visit to the field or hospitals the agents gave many barrels of potatoes, onions, apples and dried fruits for the general use of the hospitals.

In addition to what is recorded here vast sums were appropriated by counties and townships for the relief of soldiers' families. This amounted to more than four and a half million dollars.

Indianapolis was on the direct line of travel in sending reinforcements to the armies in the West or Southwest, as it was the principal rendezvous for Indiana recruits. Most of the regiments on the way to the front reached Indianapolis hungry, and frequently brought with them quite a number of sick. The patriotic people of Indiana turned their attention to supplying the wants of those passing

through, and taking care of the sick that had to be left behind. Dr. Hannaman, who had charge of the Indiana Sanitary Commission, first placed agents at the Union station, with directions to furnish meals and lodgings to all who required them, at adjacent hotels, but these accommodations soon proved inadequate and a temporary camp was established, where hospital tents were erected and bedding and rations furnished. But even that was inadequate.

In the latter part of June, 1862, Governor Morton determined to establish a permanent place of rest and refreshment for all troops passing through the city, irrespective of the States to which they belonged, and to add to it, as soon as possible, a hospital department where the sick and disabled could be cared for. The National Government was induced to erect a building 150 feet long and 24 feet wide. The State and Sanitary Commission fitted up one hundred feet of the building as a sleeping apartment, providing it with bunks and bedding. The remainder of the building was used as a dining hall, a kitchen being added by the State, which also furnished the dining hall and the kitchen. The men cared for contributed their rations, but the generous people of the State constantly sent contributions of vegetables, butter, eggs, etc.

This building soon proved too small, and the General Government in the latter part of 1862 erected a new dining hall 250x24 feet. The State supplied this with the needed furniture and fixtures. In this new hall about one thousand men could be fed at once. In 1863 the Government added a third building, 150x24, for a hospital. In 1864 the State erected two more buildings, each 175x28 feet, for sleeping purposes. The cost of the buildings and furniture, about \$4000, was borne by the State. So well was this "Home" managed that it at no time drew all the rations the men were entitled to, and when it was closed it had an unexpended balance of \$50,250 at the commissary department, yet the soldiers were much better fed than if they had been in camp. The incidental expenses, such as payment for help, making repairs and replacing furniture, amounting to nearly \$20,000, were met by a sutler's tax and the sale of kitchen offal and the savings on flour.

During its operation, for a period of three years and ten months, the Home furnished a total of 3,777,791 meals. The daily average in 1864 was 4498. As the war progressed, and sick and wounded soldiers were brought to Indianapolis, or regiments came back to be recruited, many women visited Indianapolis to see their husbands or sons, and numbers of them arrived in the city with little or no money. To relieve their necessities a home was established for them, and several hundred women and children were relieved through its means.

CHAPTER XXXII.

OPPOSITION TO THE WAR.

From 1861 to 1865 there was in some parts of Indiana a very strong opposition to the war. This arose from a variety of causes. In a number of counties were many who exhibited a disposition to side with the South, even before war came. In some localities the majority of the people, or at least a very large minority, were of Southern birth, or of Southern descent, and their sympathies naturally went to that section. In other parts, most of the trade was with the South and the interests of the people were all in that direction. This induced a warm commercial friendship between a considerable element of the population of Indiana and the people of the seceding States. Had a final separation come their natural affiliations would have been rather with the South than with the East. It was believed by many of them that the South would, in any event, win its independence, and would then re-unite the country and restore their political party to power. Doubtless many were wholly governed by partisanship.

This feeling existed to some extent before war finally came, and while it was hushed for a time under the burst of patriotism which followed the bombardment of Fort Sumter, it still remained. Many writers have treated this subject in such a way as to convey the impression that the great Democratic party, the party that from almost the very organization of the State government had controlled the destinies of the commonwealth, sympathized with this opposition. Nothing could be further from the truth. A

very large majority of those who voted the Democratic ticket in 1860 were intensely loyal to the Union, and thousands of them were among those who first shouldered their muskets and offered their services to defend the unity of the nation. Had it not been so Indiana would never have been able to fill the many calls made on it for troops. Most of those who were thus loyal still co-operated, in elections, with their old political associates, not feeling called upon to sever their party relations. Others, under the name of "War Democrats," united at the polls with the Republicans.

This sympathy with the South was not confined to Indiana, but was found in almost every part of the North. Perhaps it was stronger here than elsewhere, however, because of the reasons mentioned. The leaders of the secession movement knew of this sympathy, and no doubt believed it to be much stronger than it really was. It is known that they counted on active help in the North in their efforts to disrupt the Union, and it is also probable that their confidence of receiving such support hastened the acts which culminated in war. Had those leaders been conscious of the real feeling in the North, and realized that when the time came the people would be practically a unit for the preservation of the Union, they would hardly have gone to the extreme of war. They had a very exalted idea of their own prowess, but were too sensible to believe for a moment they could conquer a united North. When defeat and disaster came upon them they loudly charged their supposed Northern sympathizers with having betrayed them; with having, by promise of assistance, led them to begin the war, and then turned against them. The facts are, they were deceived rather by their own hopes than by the people of the North upon whom they relied for active assistance.

There is no doubt that the disloyal feeling in the North operated to prolong the war, and cost the loss of thousands of lives. In Indiana a few went so far as to go South and join the Confederate armies, but such cases were isolated. The opposition in Indiana to the war was manifested in many ways: In discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions, and resisting the draft; in utterances tending to encourage the Confederates and strength-

en their hands; in the formation of secret societies, whose alleged object was to overthrow the State government; in the Legislature, in efforts to embarrass the Governor in administering the affairs of the State. It is proper to state here, however, that not all those who opposed the draft were disloyal. Some of them did so because they believed Indiana was carrying more than its share of the burden of furnishing men, while many were led into resistance through ignorance, and themselves afterward became good soldiers. Some newspapers and public speakers indulged in intemperate language, and such utterances were often given much greater weight than they were entitled to, and thus were magnified until bad results followed, when, if they had been ignored they would have fallen harmless.

Opposition to war was manifested early in 1861, and in some places public meetings were held and intemperate resolutions adopted. Strange to say, in quite a number of instances such resolutions were voted for by men who were among the first to respond to the call to arms when it came. The fact that such resolutions were adopted is remembered, while it is forgotten that they were adopted in the heat of party anger, and were repudiated by many of their supporters when the country was really in danger.

When the clash of arms finally came, so tremendous was the outpouring of patriotism that opposition to the war, for the time being, disappeared. When the South took the aggressive, many who had denounced all attempts at coercion promptly rallied to the defense of the flag and the Union. Had the South remained quiet, and had the North begun hostilities, it is probable that many of them would have continued in their original attitude, but the South becoming the aggressor, they felt there was but one course for them to take, and that was to support the government. With others the opposition was, perhaps, more the outgrowth of party disappointment than anything else, and their love for the Union was much stronger than their disappointment, so they, too, rallied with enthusiasm to the call for troops. These men became as earnest and as devoted to the cause of the Union as were to be found in any party or any State.

All hostility, however, was not destroyed by the out-

burst of patriotism in April, 1861. It was simply hushed. In the early months of 1861 it would have been a very foolhardy man who would have ventured to preach the doctrine set forth by Mr. Heffren in his speech during the regular session of the Legislature, when he declared in substance that one hundred thousand of the sons of Indiana would rise up, and with arms in their hands resist the proposed coercion of the South. As the war lagged, however, and the cause of the Union appeared to make no headway, dissatisfaction began to manifest itself. Bull Run and Ball's Bluff were serious blows to the Union in more ways than one. The long list of dead and wounded was not their worst result. That was found in the spirit of hostility to the Government they encouraged in the North. Terrible as were the disasters which met the Union troops on those unfortunate fields, the staunch friends of the Union did not despair, but only became the more determined to continue the struggle. The Union reverses, however, encouraged and fed the "fire in the rear," that steadfastly increased until Sherman had reached Savannah, and Thomas and Schofield had destroyed Hood.

The failure of McClellan on the Peninsula, and the overthrow of Pope, early in 1862, caused this opposition to burst forth in a lively flame. Many good and patriotic citizens became convinced that the South could not be conquered, and they opposed the further prosecution of the war. Some Indiana newspapers waxed exceedingly bitter in their opposition to it. Public meetings also began to give utterances to similar sentiments, and while this anti-war element comprised only a very small minority of the people of the whole State, it was exceedingly noisy and defiant. Then it was, the leaders of the Union cause made a great mistake. Governor Morton was intensely loyal, and like all intense men, was tyrannical in disposition. He was one of those who can not brook opposition, and through his instrumentality a number of arbitrary arrests were made, the tendency of which was to strengthen the opposition instead of suppressing it. These arrests were not only arbitrary but they were clearly illegal. It is true that in times of war it is sometimes necessary to break over legal forms to save a country or a cause, but at that time there was no

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VICE-PRESIDENT THOMAS A. HENDRICKS.

war in Indiana. There were disturbances on the border, and invasions were threatened, but most of the arrests made were in the central and northern parts of the State, where no war was even threatened.

An election was pending for State officers and for members of the Legislature, and at that time partisanship in Indiana was greatly inflamed, and the arrests only tended to further inflame party rancor. The elections went against the Republicans. Many bitter opponents of the war were elected to office and they made the mistake of believing that every man who voted for them endorsed their opposition, and their violent language against the Government, and thus they were led into greater extremes. The next election, and those which followed for several years, demonstrated how greatly they had mistaken the public feeling.

The Legislature of 1863 was a turbulent body and party feeling ran high. Both the Democratic majority and the Republican minority were guilty of excesses of speech and action which can now find no apologists. From the beginning of the session until it finally broke by the bolting of the Republican members, both the Senate and House were almost daily the scene of disgraceful bickerings. Neither the majority nor the minority seemed anxious to proceed with much needed legislation. There were men of both parties who regretted the scenes of turbulence, and who were desirous of transacting the public business, but when they would apparently get matters into fair working order, some one of the violent members would throw a fire brand that would again start the flame of political animosity.

The trouble began on the very first day of the session. Two members of the United States Senate were to be elected, one for the unexpired term of Jesse D. Bright, who had been expelled in February, 1862, for writing a letter to Jefferson Davis, as "President of the Confederation of States," and one for the full term to begin March 4, 1863. Next to Mr. Bright the most prominent leader of the Democracy at that time was Joseph A. Wright. When the war came he had taken an advanced position in favor of supporting the administration of Mr. Lincoln in carrying on the war, and Governor Morton had promptly appointed him to succeed Mr. Bright. When the Legislature met

about two months of Mr. Bright's term remained. The Democrats, having a majority on joint ballot, were entitled to elect, not only for the unexpired term, but for the full term. Although no formal caucus had been held, it was well known that Thomas A. Hendricks would be elected for the full term. Early in 1861 Mr. Hendricks had issued a public statement of his position, in which he had declared himself in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war, and said that all discussions as to the responsibility for the war ought to cease until peace was secured and the Union restored.

During the campaign of 1862 he had spoken in opposition to the system of arbitrary arrests that was then in vogue, not only in Indiana, but throughout the North. On the first day of the session of the Senate, when there was no occasion for such a display of zeal, the Republicans offered a resolution declaring that the Legislature would vote for no man for United States Senator who was not in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war, and who was not unalterably opposed to the severance of any State from the Union. The introduction of the resolution was a piece of party "politics," and yet the Democrats might readily have voted for it, and doubtless would have done so, had not they recognized it as "politics," and a challenge of their loyalty and patriotism. Therefore they promptly referred it to a committee to be named in the future. The Republicans thereupon withdrew from the chamber, leaving the Senate without a quorum for the transaction of business. This idle and foolish movement was the first exhibition of that turbulence which characterized the remaining days of the session. The Republicans afterward returned, and when the time came the Democrats elected their candidates to the Senate.

While the Republicans were absent from the Senate, sulking over the reference of their resolution, the House organized and requested the Senate to be present in the hall of the House to receive the message of the Governor. The Senate was without a quorum, but was proceeding with routine business. However, because of this absence of a quorum, the Senate declined to accept the invitation of the House. Governor Morton was ready to deliver his message according to the custom that had pre-

vailed since the organization of the State government, but upon the failure of the Senate to appear, the House sent word to him that it could not receive the message at the hour named, nor could it tell just when it could receive it. The Governor thereupon sent a written copy of his message to each house, as the President does to Congress. Both the Senate and House refused to receive the message, or have it read. The House based its refusal on the ground that the constitution required the Governor to deliver his message to the "General Assembly," and as the Senate was not in session there was no General Assembly.

This session of the Legislature was held during the darkest hours of the Republic. The year 1862 had been almost uniformly disastrous to the Union cause. McClellan and Pope had been defeated in Virginia, but there had come a ray of light from the drawn battle of Antietam, which had been hailed with great delight by the North, because it was not a defeat. The President had issued his emancipation proclamation, and that had caused great discontent. In the West Fort Donelson had been captured, the bloody battle of Shiloh fought, and Bragg had invaded Kentucky and been permitted to withdraw, after the indecisive battle of Perryville. After weeks of inaction by the Army of the Potomac the awful defeat at Fredericksburg cast dismay and gloom over the North. On the last day of 1862 was fought another indecisive but bloody battle by the troops in the West at Stone's River. Discouragement was everywhere, and many honest and patriotic citizens were convinced that the cause of the Union was hopeless.

To raise money the Government was levying taxes upon nearly every species of property; the volume of paper currency had been greatly inflated; the price of gold was mounting higher and higher each day; European nations were evincing a disposition to recognize the independence of the South and to interfere in behalf of the insurgent government; Mr. Seward's "little bell" was beginning to send forth its fateful signal; martial law was declared in many of the States, and the civil law was almost entirely superseded. The genuine patriotism of President Lincoln was not then thoroughly understood, and many citizens had grave fears that a military despotism would be set up on the ruins of the Union. In Indiana a number of arbitrary

arrests had been made, and on one or two occasions a kind of military censorship had been established over the press. Secretary Stanton was one who believed that the end justified the means, and Governor Morton was of the same type. All these things had operated to intensify the hostility that had already been exhibited to the war, and to make hundreds lukewarm who had originally been zealous in support of the Union. Many who favored the preservation of the Union were opposed to various measures of the administration, and at that time there seemed to be a lack of vigor in conducting the war, which gave rise to a belief that the administration was not in earnest, and that the war was being prolonged for political reasons. It is true that later history demonstrated that such was not the case, and that the administration was struggling with a thousand difficulties the country knew not of, but at that time much that was afterward made public was not known.

It was not, then, altogether to be wondered at that in the session of the Legislature in 1863, a strong anti-war feeling developed, yet all that did not furnish sufficient excuse for much of the rancor displayed, nor for any of the folly perpetrated. It belongs to the truth of history to say, however, that the friends of the war did not pursue a placatory course. It was possible to have united with those of the majority party who were loyal friends of the Union and thus have placed the Legislature in harmony with the true purposes of the war. But the minority did not adopt such a policy; on the contrary, whenever there appeared a disposition to cease the presentation of hostile resolutions, the minority took such action as to again precipitate the bitter contest. No one, of any party, today reads the record of that Legislature without regret. Indiana had placed its name high among those of the loyal and patriotic States; its troops were wherever fighting was to be done; they had been the first in the field under each call, and the people of the State were justly proud of the record they had made. Had a right disposition been shown by both sides in the Legislature of 1863, there would not have been a blur anywhere on the war record of Indiana.

Resolution after resolution was offered, denouncing the war in general, demanding a cessation of hostilities, and the calling of a convention to agree upon terms of peace,

or condemning certain acts of the administration. Some of these resolutions were adopted by the Senate, others by the House, but most of them were referred to committees, and there permitted to sleep. None of them were adopted by both houses. All were introduced by what might well be called the "fire-brands" of the Legislature, and none would have received the countenance of a majority of either house but for the wild partisanship which dominated both sides. However, their introduction, even when consideration was refused, had a bad effect on the State; operated to intensify party rancor, which had been bad enough before; encouraged popular meetings to pass inflammatory resolutions and send them to the Legislature; but, graver than all these, they gave rise to the belief in the South that Indiana was ripe for revolt against the Federal Government and ready to cast in its fortunes with the Confederacy. The Richmond (Virginia) Whig, of February 11, 1863, said:

"We copy elsewhere an article from an Indianapolis paper, with two sets of resolutions which have been laid before the Indiana Legislature. The paper from which we copy (the Journal) is violently Republican. It pronounces the resolutions an ordinance of secession. They have very much that flavor. They are intensely bitter against the war and the objects for which it is waged, and urge an armistice of six months, and a national convention to settle all difficulties. In one set it is proposed, if the convention is not held, that Indiana shall act for herself. The furious denunciation of the resolutions by the Republican papers constitutes their best recommendation, and argues a redeeming spirit among the people of the Northwest. We of the Confederate States should do what is possible to encourage the growth and ascendancy of that spirit."

Henry S. Foote, Senator from Tennessee in the Confederate Congress, introduced resolutions in that body reciting the proceedings in Indiana, and declaring that the South "sympathized most kindly with those who have brought about this change in the North." The resolutions of Mr. Foote also held out offers of peace to such States as would separate from the Union and unite with the South.

Although none of the resolutions thus referred to in the South were or could have been passed by the Indiana Leg-

islature, or represented its sentiments as a body, or those of any great number of the people of the State, the mere fact of their introduction worked this harm to the credit and reputation of Indiana. Nearly all, if not all, of these violent resolutions were introduced by the least responsible of the members, and did not receive the endorsement of the conservative members of the Democratic majority, who prevented the adoption of any of them. It is to be regretted that those conservative members did not unite to frown down, once for all, every effort of the kind to place the State in an attitude of hostility to the Government, which they would certainly have done but for the violence of the minority, the leaders of which sought in every way to force extreme policies upon this majority. The cordial endorsement of these proposed measures at the South was not the only harmful result of their introduction. During the session of the General Assembly Indianapolis was a great recruiting station for the army, and the city was constantly full of volunteers. Their anger, once aroused, was kept inflamed by designing politicians, and many times serious outbreaks were narrowly averted. Soldiers at home on furloughs were wrought upon, and scenes of lawlessness occurred in various portions of the State. The State authorities were using every effort to fill the calls for troops made by the General Government, and the introduction of resolutions against the war had a tendency to discourage enlistments.

The soldiers at the front heard of the resolutions and were led in turn to adopt resolutions denouncing the members of the Legislature in the most violent terms, some of them even going so far as to threaten to return and wreak personal violence on the General Assembly. It has been claimed that some of the resolutions adopted by the soldiers at the front were prepared in Indianapolis and sent to them. Be that as it may, a feeling of bitterness and strife was engendered that did not entirely subside for several years. Some of the resolutions adopted by the soldiers were couched in very temperate and patriotic language, and several of the higher officers, who were members of the Democratic party, issued a patriotic appeal to the Legislature and the people to lay aside all party differences and unite in a supreme effort to save the Union. The

resolutions of the soldiers, and the address of the officers were referred to the Committee on Federal Relations in the Senate. On March 5 a majority of the committee presented a report, recommending the adoption of the following address:

"To the Regiments Now in the Field from Indiana, and to the Officers and Men Who Compose Them:

"Fellow Citizens:—We have received from twenty-five regiments, and from the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth batteries of artillery, words of counsel and advice in the present imperilled condition of our beloved country. These words were borne to us in the true language of patriotism, and are accepted by the Senate of Indiana with that respect which is due to gallant men engaged in the service of their once peaceful but now distracted country. From no portion of our fellow citizens could these suggestions be more acceptable. But two short years ago you were in the midst of our people, sharing, in the various walks of life, the cares and responsibilities of civil occupations, and enjoying those endearments which make up the sum of human happiness—for man, after all his toils, has nothing left to him 'but wife, children and friends,' the enjoyment of home, and the love of a constitution and government which is to descend to his posterity, it is to be hoped, forever. It is for these that men labor. Beyond these objects, in this world, there is nothing that challenges the constant and persistent effort of our race. For these we all contend in life's short career. You are now in the tented field, and we in the legislative halls of our beloved State—each endeavoring to put down a rebellion, and preserve a constitution—the one hated, the other adored. That each effort may be successful is the prayer of the Indiana Senate!

"We fear, gentlemen, that you have heard much that was untrue in regard to the intention of the General Assembly which convened at this capital on the 8th day of January last. You have heard a great deal that was untrue before that time. For more than a year past there has been a constant effort to mislead your minds in regard to the feelings of a majority of the people of Indiana, and we doubt not that it will be continued. There is an object to be gained. On every account we shall regret its success, because that would do more to ensure 'divided councils,'

which you so properly deprecate, than any one thing else. There should be strict justice meted out to all our people, for each and every man in Indiana has the same interest in restoring the authority of the Government, and bringing all the States back into one harmonious union. The humblest citizen and the proudest in the land should have a common object in view in keeping the States together, and he is no friend of the nation who would divide us up into factions at a time like this, by false representations of the aims and intentions of the great mass of the people of Indiana. The majority of this General Assembly have suffered much from the ungenerous accusations of partisans in and out of office. They have foreborne to repel these charges, as they deserved, for the sake of quiet and peace at home, determined to rely upon their actions as the best and most worthy defense of themselves in your eyes, and the eyes of the great and patriotic people of your State. We have remained comparatively silent, and while the influences which surround the executive chamber of this capitol were used to prejudice this majority, and to make you believe that you had enemies at home, we, and those for whom we act, had sealed their lips, looking forward to the day when truth, and not falsehood, would break in upon the land. The very money which the majority of the people had paid for your comfort and benefit in the hospital and in the sick room, were turned into means of detraction by the agents paid out of that most sacred fund. These agents had access to you, and that privilege was abused to poison the minds of the sons and brothers of those who had willingly taxed themselves for the comfort of the soldier. You have, no doubt, seen those men in your camps, and you have listened to the recitals of those pensioned patriots—pensioned out of the money which ought to have been appropriated for your exclusive benefit. All this has been borne in silence. We now thank you for the opportunity which has been offered to set the true state of the facts before our gallant army. We ask only to be heard for the sake of truth.

“We are accused of encouraging a partisanship in regard to this war, of which we are entirely guiltless. There has been no act or resolution passed, and none endorsed by either house of the General Assembly, which gives war-

rant or color to such a charge. There are measures of policy adopted by Congress and the President to which we have or will enter our solemn protest, as the people of Indiana have done at the election in October. Men who make up and sustain the Government, as you, the people, and ourselves do, have a right to condemn such measures, if, in the exercise of a sound judgment, we regard them as intended to divide the people in the vigorous prosecution of the war. It is for the President to adopt a war policy for the army in the field, and it is the right of the people's representatives in Congress, and in the local Legislatures, to adopt such wise and prudent enactments in regard to the civil administration of public affairs as will most surely bring all the States back into the Union after the war is closed. This power and duty we claim for Congress and the local legislatures, and, without the rightful and free exercise of this power, neither the soldiers in the field nor the citizens at home would have institutions worth fighting or contending for.

"If the President can do as he pleases, and there shall be no limit to his power, then popular elections are a farce, and State Governments a nullity. We know you too well to believe that you would ever consent to the establishment of a doctrine so slavish. The gallant soldiers would be the first victims of such a despotism. The people and the State Governments are your own strong and sure defense against oppression now and neglect hereafter. Give neither up at the bidding of those who would degrade you and your fathers, brothers, neighbors, and fellow citizens to the condition of serfs and the bondage of slaves. Neither the soldiers nor the people are prepared for such political humiliation.

"Let us look to the history of our actions and elsewhere, and the causes which have led to the ascendancy of the majority in this chamber. It was manifest before the adjournment of Congress at the first regular session that the whole policy of the administration in conducting the war had been changed, and that new and startling measures were inaugurated at Washington. This created widespread alarm amongst the people in all the free States, and aroused a sentiment which demanded the convocation of a mass convention of conservative and loyal citizens at In-

dianapolis. That convention was held on the 30th day of July, 1862. It was called to give utterance to its sentiments in regard to the measures to which we have alluded. We can no better define the position of the majority of this Senate than by giving the resolutions adopted by the vast concourse of your fellow citizens which assembled on that occasion. They were as follows:”

The resolutions were set forth in full in the report. They recited that “the democracy of Indiana, with patriots everywhere, have made and will continue to make every sacrifice to the end that the rebellion may be suppressed, the supremacy of the constitution maintained, and the Union under it preserved, but they are unalterably opposed to a war of conquest and subjugation, and they never will consent that the war on their part shall be waged for the purpose of interfering with the rights or overthrowing the established institutions of any of the States.” Among the resolutions were the following:

“That we protest, in the name of ourselves and of our children, and in the name of all that we hold dear in the future of our beloved country, against the mischievous measure of negro emancipation in the District of Columbia, and the payment for such negroes out of the National Treasury; and we further protest against the resolution of Congress pledging the Nation to pay for all negroes which may be emancipated by the authority of any of the Southern states; that we regard such measures, involving as they do an expenditure of two thousand five hundred millions of dollars, as measures of transcendent enormity, and fruitful only of National beggary to the land we love; that we are unalterably and unconditionally opposed to all schemes having for their object, immediate or remote, the taxation of the white man for the purchase of negroes anywhere; that we deny the constitutional right of the President or Congress to adopt a policy which taxes white labor to pay for negroes, or which would make the government or people slave dealers—a policy which, if not arrested by the votes of the people, will entail upon unborn generations of our kindred a debt more overwhelming and appalling than ever cursed any nation of ancient or modern times.

"That, in the language of the resolutions of the conservative members of Congress, the doctrines of the Secessionists and of the Abolitionists, as the latter are now represented in Congress, are alike inconsistent with the constitution and irreconcilable with the unity and peace of the country. The first have already involved us in a civil war, and the others (the Abolitionists) will leave to the country but little hope of the speedy restoration of union or peace.

"That this convention denounces, as unwise and unpatriotic, all organizations, secret or open, having for their object the nullification of, or resistance to, the laws of the State, or of the United States—that oppressive laws and unwise legislation find their proper correction only at the ballot box, where a change of legislators will produce the wished for reform of bad and odious laws, and to that tribunal only will the patriot resort in this hour of his country's trial. We hold sacred and binding every enactment till repealed or declared nugatory by competent authority.

"That the people of Indiana, having inhibited, by the State constitution and law, the entrance of free negroes and mulattoes into this State, and as the present disturbances on our border are likely to bring in an influx of that population from neighboring States, we respectfully ask the public authorities of Indiana to see that the constitution and laws are properly enforced on that subject. When the people of Indiana adopted that negro exclusion clause by a majority of ninety-four thousand votes, they meant that the honest, laboring white man should have no competition in the black race—that the soil of Indiana should belong to the white man and that he alone was suited to her free institutions.

"That we approve of and indorse the resolutions drawn by the Hon. John J. Crittenden, and adopted by the conservative members of Congress on the 22d day of January, 1861, as a clear and just declaration of the objects which ought to be had in view by the American people in the present fearful emergency of their national affairs.

"That we recur with patriotic pride to the bravery and valor of the officers and soldiers of all the Indiana regiments, exhibited in the struggles upon the many bloody fields in which they have been engaged, and that this con-

vention, in behalf of the Democracy of this State, tender to them a united testimony to their valor and devotion to the Constitution of the Union, and offer to the friends and families of those who have fallen in the service of their country its sincere sympathy and condolence, and that we will ever cherish in grateful recollection the willing sacrifice made by the noble sons of Indiana, in exchanging the peaceful avocations of life for the hardships and perils of war."

The committee continued with a long argument in support of the resolutions. With regard to the emancipation policy of President Lincoln, the report said: "If the administration and its advisers desire to keep the people 'united' for the prosecution of this war, why were these measures of negro emancipation and purchase forced upon the nation at a time like this? If they did not know that it would divide the citizens, and make men doubt in regard to the objects of this war, then we can only say that they have too little sagacity to control the affairs of a great nation. But when the proclamation of the 22d of September, 1862, fell upon the people 'like a fire bell in the night,' the wildest confusion was added to the doubts which took possession of the public mind. There stood revealed before the world two measures which invoked the condemnation of the people of Indiana, and they received it! No one dared to defend them. They got no defense. The candidates sustained by the minority stood mute at the giant measures of oppression which they were expected to defend—taxation for the purchase of African slaves, and a horde of free negroes thrown upon the soil of the free West. We, and those with whom we acted, opposed measures of 'transcendent enormity' like these, and those who apologized for them—they had no defenders—went under the wave of popular indignation in Indiana. Was this opposing the war? In defending you and ourselves from oppression and bankruptcy, and keeping the Government within the scope of its constitutional powers, we were only discharging a duty to our great and unfortunate nation. For doing this, we have been denounced to you as traitors, and by men, too, who have followed your camps, not to share your hardships and dangers, but to gather up the crumbs which have fallen from the table provided by the generosity and sense of

justice of the people of our beloved State. We know these men, and whether of high or low degree, have a right to hold them up to the scorn and contempt of all just men, in the army and out of it."

With regard to the demands from the soldiers that the Legislature "give this war a cheerful and hearty support" and "pour out the treasure of the State as our soldiers have poured out their blood to aid the holy cause of restoring the Union of our fathers, resisting the infernal spirit which would waste victory in humiliating compromises and sacrificing everything except liberty and political equality to national integrity," the committee said: "These requests are reasonable. The Senate of Indiana, the House of Representatives, and the people represented by both branches, have given, and will continue to give, a cheerful and hearty support to this war for the restoration of the Union, and the majority which we represent are prepared to contribute even more of the treasure of the State than on any former occasion in aid of the volunteers now in the field from Indiana. . . . There are no disagreements about furnishing the army with all that is deemed essential for its comfort, and large appropriations have already passed this Senate and by a unanimous vote. * * * The majority, while they look to your interest as soldiers, have also an eye to your home interests and the welfare of our fathers, brothers and neighbors. While you fight rebellion and treason in the army, the General Assembly wish to preserve your government at home from being turned into an engine of tyranny, usurpation and merciless taxation. They don't want you taxed to pay for negroes—nor to have the negroes come into Indiana to become hired laborers on the farms of the State—they don't wish to have the people arrested without warrant of law and imprisoned in dungeons without trial. . . . We had no agency in inaugurating this war—none in carrying it on—none in directing its policy—none in the control of its armies, and it is not our design to interfere with it in any improper manner. Our duty is to pay taxes—to take care of the sick and wounded soldiers—to look and wait for the end of this cruel and bitter strife—to take care of our State affairs and to hope that our beloved country will one day emerge from the clouds which hang over her, with

the Union restored as it was, and with all the States existing in harmony under the matchless constitution of our fathers."

The committee proceeded to call attention to the fact that the General Assembly had unanimously passed a bill, recommended by Governor Morton, appropriating two million dollars to provide for the prompt payment of the officers and soldiers in the army of the United States raised and organized in Indiana; a joint resolution of thanks to the soldiers of Indiana and "providing for the registry and preservation of the names of those who have fallen in the service of their country during the present war;" and an appropriation of \$100,000 to be expended in aid of the sick and wounded soldiers of the State. The committee declared that the majority was in favor of, and would pass, joint resolutions asking Congress to increase the pay of private soldiers 25 per cent. and to provide by law for the payment of private soldiers and company officers in gold and silver, or their equivalent in paper money at par, and also for the payment of pensions to wounded soldiers and the widows and orphans of those who died in the service or were killed in battle, in the same mode, and in the same par funds, "in order that those who give their service, their health and their lives to the nation should be placed on the same favorable footing as the banker or capitalist who loans money to the government.

"It is gratifying," continued the committee, "to be able to say to those in the field that whatever differences of opinion may exist in the General Assembly in regard to the State policy of Indiana, and the emancipation measures of the administration of President Lincoln and the Congress just expired, there are none in relation to the duty of Indiana toward the army."

After denouncing as a base and unfounded slander the charge that there was a single member of the General Assembly who wished to carry the State out of the Union and attach it to the Southern Confederacy, the committee concluded in these words:

"We again thank you for your communication, and for the kind manner in which you have expressed your wishes. They shall receive, as some of them have already, the respectful and favorable consideration of this General As-

sembly. You and your fellow-citizens at home have the same great object—the restoration of the Union, and the preservation of our sacred and revered Constitution. While you look after traitors in arms, and overturn and overthrow their serried hosts, we shall take care of violators of the constitution at home, and see that the ballot of a free people is felt in the preservation of your liberties and our own. If rebellion triumphs, it will be no fault of yours. If despotism and anarchy, and the violation of constitutional rights, are attempted in Indiana, it will be for the gallant people of this State to protect and preserve them.”

This report was sustained by the majority, which passed resolutions a day later embodying the substance of it. The resolutions declared “that the union of the States is a necessity and under no consideration or circumstance will we ever consent to surrender it, and that we must be one people, under one government and one flag;” condemned the “flagrant and monstrous usurpations of the administration and the encroachment of abolitionism;” denounced the doctrine of secession as “a ruinous heresy, unwarranted by the constitution and as destructive alike to the security and perpetuity of the government and the peace and liberty of the people;” characterized the emancipation proclamation of President Lincoln as “unconstitutional” and “unwise,” and demanded that it be “immediately withdrawn;” criticised “the system of arbitrary arrests and the suspension of the habeas corpus by the cabinet at Washington as acts of tyranny and usurpation justly alarming to a free people,” and condemned all secret organizations of a political character and all oath-bound military organizations outside of the lawful military bodies, as “dangerous to the liberties of the people and the peace of the community.” These resolutions were adopted by a strict party vote.

Bills were introduced to take from the Governor the control of the militia of the State, and to prevent the passage of one of them the Republican members “bolted” in a body and went to Madison, where they remained until the session ended by constitutional limitation. The bitterness, however, did not end with the session of the General Assembly. No appropriation bills had been passed, and the

Auditor and Treasurer of State refused to furnish the Governor with money to pay the expenses of the State Government or to discharge the interest on the public debt. It is quite generally agreed that the State officers, in refusing to pay the interest on the debt, were in the wrong, for it had been uniformly held that for such a purpose no appropriation was necessary, but under the then existing laws they had no authority to pay out money for any other purpose without an appropriation.

The aftermath of the session of the General Assembly of 1863 was an increase of turbulence and violence in nearly every section of the State. In some sections this turbulence amounted almost to a reign of terror. In some places Union men were driven from their homes and their property destroyed, and in several instances they were murdered. In other places deserters were concealed, and their arrest resisted by armed force. In still other places newspapers were mobbed and rifled by soldiers, and a number of editors were arrested and their papers suppressed by military authority.

In Crawford and Orange counties an organization existed consisting of about three hundred men. The ostensible object of the organization was to resist the draft, to prevent drafted men from being forced into the army, and to conceal deserters or rescue them when arrested. But robbery and pillage were the real designs of the leaders. Many robberies were perpetrated, and so great became the reign of terror that a regiment of State militia had to be sent to that section. About one hundred members of the organization were arrested, but all except a few leaders were released, it appearing that they had been ignorantly led into the scheme. It developed that the actual leaders were guerrillas and bushwhackers from Kentucky, whose real object was to steal horses for the Southern cavalry. These men escaped into Kentucky when the organization was broken up. Many arrests were made of the participants in these scenes of violence, but few were punished. In Morgan County an intoxicated man shouted for Jeff. Davis. He was shot and killed by a returned soldier. The soldier went back to the army and no arrest was made. In Dearborn County some young men were shouting for the South, when a citizen fired at them, killing one. He was arrested, tried

and acquitted. In Brown County opposition to the war was most pronounced. For months it was in a state of lawlessness. Property was destroyed and men were driven from their homes and compelled to conceal themselves for weeks at a time in caves among the hills. On the 18th of April, 1863, the Union men attempted to hold a meeting in the County. Lewis Prosser, one of the leaders of the opposition, attended, accompanied by one or two others, all armed with rifles. Prosser shot and killed a soldier by the name of Daniels, and in turn was shot by Captain Cunning. Prosser died from the wound. A number of other shots were fired, but no others were injured.

These scenes of turbulence continued until near the close of the war, accompanied with more or less bloodshed. Especially was 1864 signalized by outbreaks of violence. It was the year of the Presidential election, and party bitterness arose to the highest pitch. From the close of the session of the Legislature of 1863 Governor Morton had been conducting the affairs of the State without regard to the other State officers. The Legislature had failed to make appropriations, and the Governor, without authority of law, had borrowed money, established a financial bureau of his own, and paid the expenses of the State Government and of raising and equipping troops, and the interest on the public debt. It was an absolute necessity to him to secure a Legislature that would ratify these actions and make appropriations to repay his loans. This added to the excitement of the campaign.

The State was full of returned soldiers. Some of them were home on what was known as "veteran furloughs." The President, for the purpose of inducing as many as possible of the experienced soldiers to re-enlist for the war, had promised all who would do so a furlough of thirty days. A large number of Indiana troops had "veteranized" and many of them were at their homes during the summer of 1864. Thousands of other soldiers, who could be temporarily spared from service, had been furloughed to give them an opportunity to vote. The presence of these soldiers in the State aroused the opposition to more bitterness than ever, and it was freely charged that they had been brought home for the purpose of intimidation. The Democratic cam-

paign committee issued an address to the people in which it was declared to be their intention to maintain by force, if need be, the freedom of the ballot box, and the people were called upon to organize for that purpose.

Personal encounters occurred almost daily. Speakers were mobbed, and in some instances driven from the platform. On election day there was much rioting in many parts of the State. Many wild rumors were set afloat, and it was openly charged that in Indianapolis and other places large bodies of armed soldiers—some of them from other States—were marched to the polling places and cast illegal votes for the Republican ticket, while a counter-charge was made that in many localities the opposition seized upon the ballot-boxes, or openly banded together to prevent Republicans from casting their ballots. Happy it was for the State that the war soon after came to a close.

At many times during 1863 and 1864 it looked as if Indiana would be plunged into a civil war. During those years many arbitrary arrests were made by military authority, which added to the flame of opposition to the war, and several times the State was secretly visited by officers of the Confederate army, who used every effort to bring about armed strife. While it is true that all sections of the State were the scenes of more or less turbulence, the greatest violence occurred in the central and southern parts.

During 1864 the Union arms were almost uniformly successful. Sherman marched and fought his way from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and then to the sea; Sheridan was gloriously victorious in the Shenandoah Valley; Lee was bottled up in Petersburg, where it was felt he could not escape, and Thomas and Schofield destroyed Hood. It was seen that the end of the Confederacy was near at hand. All this caused active opposition to the war to cease, but partisan rancor and bitterness remained. The Legislature of 1865 met before the end of the war. The Republicans were in the majority, and the Democrats had refused to return the "fire-brands" of 1863, so the session was reasonably harmonious. Had further help for the army been needed, it would have been voted with practical unanimity.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE KNIGHTS OF THE GOLDEN CIRCLE.

The "Sons of Liberty," or, as more commonly known, "The Knights of the Golden Circle," had much to do with the opposition to the war that was manifested in Indiana from 1861 to 1865. The inception of this order dates back some time before the outbreak of the Civil War, when secret societies were organized throughout the South having for their principal object the furthering of the secession movement. The idea of ultimate secession had been bruited in the South for many years. Among many of the leaders in that section it had long been a favorite dream to establish on the Gulf of Mexico a great Southern Empire, founded on slavery. It had been a dream with them even before the annexation of Texas, and they favored that annexation to further their scheme. To foster this project the Knights of the Golden Circle were first organized. It was a secret order and none were taken into it who were not believed to be heart and soul in favor of the scheme of empire.

The plan of these leaders was more extensive and far-reaching than that of Aaron Burr in 1805. At the most he only contemplated the severance from the Union of Louisiana, to which he was to add Texas and Mexico, while the project of the Southern visionaries contemplated a severance from the Union of all the slave-holding States, and the conquest of Mexico and Cuba. The first step in the programme which it was hoped to carry out was to be the purchase of Cuba by the United States, by which means the

South would get the island without the cost and trouble of conquest. If this could not be brought about, however, Cuba was to fall into the hands of the South by the force of arms. As early as 1858 work was begun in Mexico with a view to bringing about a revolution in that country.

It was not thought that the North would fight to retain the South in the Union, when the time came for secession, and therefore the Southern leaders did not contemplate a war of independence. When South Carolina seceded, just after the election of Mr. Lincoln, some of the leaders of the secession movement in that State openly declared that it was no sudden movement; that it was not caused by the election of Mr. Lincoln; that the movement was thirty years old, and that they had been working for it all that time; that the election of Mr. Lincoln was only a pretext, seized upon to draw others into the scheme of separation. The movement was thoroughly understood by prominent office-holders, and Floyd, Secretary of War, had shipped thousands of stands of arms and tons of ammunition into the South. The leaders did not believe they would need those arms to secure their independence from the Union, but that they would want them for the conquest of Mexico and Cuba. This dream of a great slave empire was a dazzling one, and readily caught the fancy of the Southerners, hence the order of the Knights of the Golden Circle grew rapidly.

Before the outbreak of the war the order had been extended, in a limited degree, to some of the Northern States, not for the purpose of taking the Northern States into the scheme, but to make sure of friends and sympathizers who, when the time came for the secession of the Southern States, would prevent the Government from undertaking any coercive measures. As has been said, the Knights did not contemplate war with the North. But all the Southern secessionists were not in the secrets of the Knights and many of them believed that war would be necessary to force Virginia, Maryland and the other border States to cast in their fortunes with the new Confederacy, so they suddenly plunged the two sections into hostilities by attacking Fort Sumter. This caused an entire change in the object and purposes of the Knights of the Golden Circle. The order at once became the fiercest and most implacable

advocate of war, and devoted its energies to recruiting for the Southern armies, and to making proselytes in the North. In short, the Knights became the Jesuits of the Southern cause.

Just when the order was first introduced into Indiana is not certainly known, but before the war opened it had at least five hundred members in the State. Dr. William A. Bowles was among the first, if not the first, to propagate the order in Indiana. Bowles lived at French Lick. In the war with Mexico he had commanded the Second Indiana regiment and had given the order for the regiment to retreat at the battle of Buena Vista, an act which brought disgrace on the State and humiliated the regiment. Dr. Bowles was an active sympathizer with the South, and when the war came acted as its recruiting agent in Indiana. In a letter to his wife, written in the summer of 1861, he boasted that he had already sent a number of recruits to the South, and would send many more. The defeats of the Union armies in 1861 and the early months of 1862 caused the disaffection that was smoldering in Indiana to assume a more threatening form, and the Knights of the Golden Circle rapidly multiplied in numbers, and by the spring of 1862 they numbered about fifteen hundred. Prior to 1862 the order did not contemplate engaging in any armed movement, but was intended only to recruit for the South, and, as opportunity offered, to embarrass the National Government. Dr. Bowles, however, became more ambitious, and he saw, or thought he saw, that a time would come when the order would have to defend itself, or, if occasion arose, take arms to bring about a revolution in Indiana, hence the work of collecting arms was secretly carried on. At the same time some of the members of the order were formed into military companies, and were frequently drilled at their "castles," or at some secret place in the neighborhood. Other members were assigned to the work of encouraging desertions from the Union armies and of shielding the deserters from capture.

Early in 1862 the military authorities in Indiana learned of this organization and its purposes. In May of that year the Grand Jury of the Federal Court at Indianapolis investigated the matter, and reported that the Knights at that time numbered about 15,000. There were a num-

ber of "lodges" in different parts of the State, and they were increasing. Only a small part of the members knew of the military feature of the order, but it was represented that all were sworn to encourage desertions from the Union armies. The members of the Grand Jury were instructed in the signs and signals of the order, and some of them visited Camp Morton, where the Confederate prisoners were held, and, making the secret signs, were recognized by the prisoners, and the signals answered. The report of the Grand Jury was made public in August, 1862, and created alarm among the Knights, as they feared arrest by the Government. This early expose of the order prevented it from accomplishing very much, but the leaders soon rallied. As the ritual, signs and passwords had been made public, an entire change was made, and a new order organized, which was first known as the "Order of American Knights." It developed that agents of the Governor were among those who formed the order and of course its secrets were known to him at once. It soon dissolved and another organization took its place. This time the name of the "Sons of Liberty" was assumed, and it was under this name the order accomplished the greatest harm in Indiana, and counted thousands among its membership.

In this new order there were two organizations, one within the other. One was a political organization entirely, to which all belonged. Thousands joined this organization who never knew or dreamed of the ulterior purposes of the other organization, which was entirely military in its character and object. Hundreds of those who joined the political part of the order afterward went into the Union army and served gallantly to the close of the war. Many of its members, however, were opposed to the war, and sought to bring about a cessation of arms, while some of the others really sympathized with the South. Hundreds of men were induced to join the order, believing it to be wholly political, and that its principal, if not its only object, was to bring about a party triumph at the polls. When they learned something more of the objects of the order they withdrew from it.

The inner or military part of the order was made up altogether of those who were hostile to the Government.

It was organized like an army, with Major Generals, Brigadier Generals and other subordinate officers. It is with the doings of that part of the order that history is concerned, for the civil, or political wing, was not connected, as an organization, with any of what were classed as treasonable attempts, except as individuals, some members joining in resistance to the draft and in the rescue of deserters. The State was divided into four grand divisions, with William A. Bowles, Lambden P. Milligan, Andrew Humphreys and John C. Walker as Major Generals. Walker had formerly been Colonel of the Thirty-fifth Indiana regiment, but had been dismissed from the army by General Halleck.

Under the military officers companies were recruited and drilled, and in some cases armed. A large amount of money was raised for the purchase of arms, and as early as March, 1864, it was claimed that the military branch of the order had, in Indiana, six thousand muskets and more than sixty thousand revolvers. To aid in the purchase of arms Confederate Commissioners sent to Canada by Jefferson Davis furnished more than \$200,000. The arms were mainly purchased in Europe, but some were bought in the Eastern cities, and were secretly sent into Indiana. On the 20th of August, 1864, Governor Morton received the following letter, written by a lady in New York, and dated August 17:

"Dear Sir:—The facts here stated have come to my knowledge in a manner and from a source such as to leave no doubt, in my mind, of their reliability. The Copperheads of Indiana have ordered and paid for thirty thousand revolvers and forty-two boxes of fixed ammunition, to be distributed among the antagonists of the Government for the purpose of controlling the Presidential election. On August 5 the steamer Granite State landed in New York forty-two boxes of revolvers and ammunition; on August 6, the steamer City of Hartford landed twenty-two boxes of ammunition destined for Indianapolis. Thirty-two boxes of the above have been forwarded to J. J. Parsons, Indianapolis, via Merchants' Despatch, and marked 'Sunday School Books.' The balance is stored at No. — street, New York, waiting for the Copperheads to pay for the same before shipping."

Governor Morton acted at once upon the information

thus given. The freight depots were searched, but nothing found. A drayman, on being questioned, stated that he had taken some "Sunday School Books" to the printing office of Harrison H. Dodd & Company. This Harrison H. Dodd was the Grand Commander of the Sons of Liberty. A detail of soldiers was at once sent to the office of Dodd and captured thirty-two boxes, containing four hundred navy revolvers and one hundred and thirty-five thousand rounds of ammunition. They also found some other very important material, consisting of the Great Seal of the Sons of Liberty, an official list of the members of the order, several hundred copies of the ritual, and the private correspondence of Dodd. This correspondence contained some very compromising letters from Jesse D. Bright, formerly United States Senator from Indiana; John C. Walker, and Clement L. Vallandigham, of Ohio.

John C. Walker was at the time Agent of the State of Indiana at New York. He wrote to Governor Morton, claiming the arms and ammunition to be his own private property, purchased for personal friends in Indiana. He demanded the return of the revolvers and ammunition. There is little doubt that Walker purchased these arms with the money of the State that had been placed in his possession for the payment of the interest on the bonds of the State, for in one of his letters to Clement C. Clay, Confederate Commissioner in Canada, he claimed that he had spent seventy-five thousand dollars in the purchase of arms and urged Clay to send him the money, saying: "It has been very difficult for me to arrange with the funds in my office to prevent trouble. I shall expect you to send me a draft to Indianapolis. . . . My reputation is involved in this, and I trust that you gentlemen in whom I have confidence will not leave me to suffer."

The military branch of the Sons of Liberty was controlled by a secret committee of thirteen, appointed by the Grand Commander. The work of organizing and arming this military branch went on for several months. The Government had several intelligent and active spies in the order and was kept well informed of what was being done. The plan finally agreed upon for operation by the Sons of Liberty was to have an uprising in Indiana, Illinois and Missouri, on a fixed day. The members of the order in In-

diana were to assemble at Indianapolis, carrying concealed arms; and those of Illinois were to meet at Chicago. The date fixed was the 20th of July, 1864. The meeting at Indianapolis was to be in a grove not far from Camp Morton, where the Confederate prisoners were confined. The prisoners, having been previously warned, were to co-operate with them. At a given signal the Sons were to seize their arms, march suddenly on Camp Morton, overpower the guards by the assistance of the prisoners, and then the Sons of Liberty and the released prisoners were to march on the arsenal and seize it. The railroad to Jeffersonville was to be seized and all were to escape to Kentucky and there unite with a Confederate force which was to invade that State for the purpose of co-operation. The State Government was to be overthrown, Governor Morton captured or killed, and Secretary of State Athol installed in his place. A committee of ten was appointed to "get away" with the Governor.

From several causes the uprising failed to materialize on the day appointed. In August, Michael C. Kerr, of New Albany, a Democratic candidate for Congress, by some means became aware of the object of the organization. He hastened to Indianapolis, called a meeting of some of the leaders of his party, informed them of the conspiracy and declared his purpose of giving information to the Government unless the whole thing was abandoned at once. Walker and Dodd contended long, but finally promised to abandon the enterprise if Kerr would not divulge the information he possessed. This was only a few days before the capture of the "Sunday School books."

The Government having secured enough evidence, as was believed, to convict the leaders of treasonable conspiracy, about the last of August caused the arrest of William A. Bowles, Lambden P. Milligan, Stephen Horsey, Andrew Humphreys, Horace Heffren and others. It was decided to try them before a Military Commission. The defendants and their friends insisted that they were entitled to civil trials, but this was denied them. The Commission was composed of Colonel Silas Colgrove, of the Twenty-seventh Indiana; Colonel William E. McLean, of the Forty-third; Colonel John T. Wilder, of the Seventeenth; Colonel Thomas J. Lucas, of the Sixteenth; Colonel Charles B. Mur-

ray, of the Eighty-ninth; Colonel Benjamin Spooner, of the Eighty-third; Colonel Richard P. DeHart, of the One Hundred and Twenty-eighth, and Colonel Ambrose A. Stevens, of the Veteran Reserve Corps, with Major H. L. Burnett as Judge Advocate.

The prisoners were placed on trial on five charges: 1. Conspiracy against the Government of the United States. 2. Affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States. 3. Inciting insurrection. 4. Disloyal practices. 5. Violating the laws of war. Dodd was brought to trial first, on the 22d of September. Important testimony was elicited as to the fact of the conspiracy and its warlike character. Evidence was adduced that Bowles had declared the plan to be: "Illinois was pledged to forward 50,000 men to concentrate at St. Louis to co-operate with 30,000 to be furnished by that State, and join 20,000 rebel soldiers under Price, the whole to hold Missouri against any Federal force that could be sent against them. Indiana was to furnish from 40,000 to 60,000 men to co-operate with others that might come from Ohio, and all were to be thrown on Louisville, there to unite with whatever force Jeff Davis might be able to send into Eastern Kentucky."

There was also evidence that the murder of Governor Morton was to be accomplished, and that a committee of ten had been appointed for that purpose, and that the Confederate prisoners at Camp Morton were to be released. Testimony was given that steamers and Government stores had been destroyed by fire by members of the order. While the trial was progressing Dodd escaped from the room in the Post Office building, in which he had been confined, and fled to Canada.

At the trial of the others the Commission was increased by the addition of Colonel Ansel Wass, of the Sixtieth Massachusetts; Colonel Thomas W. Bennett, of the Sixty-ninth Indiana; Colonel Reuben Williams, of the Twelfth Indiana, and Colonel Albert Heath, of the One Hundredth Indiana. Colonel Wilder was relieved from duty with the Commission.

On the 21st of October the trial of Bowles, Milligan, Horsey, Humphreys and Heffren was begun. Heffren, William H. Harrison, the Grand Secretary of the order, and Joseph J. Bingham were released from arrest and

made witnesses for the Government. The trial lasted until in December. The evidence taken was voluminous. It was partly made up of the reports of the Government spies who had become members of the order, but material portions of it were furnished by members of the order, such as Heffren, Bingham, Harrison and Wilson, who was Adjutant on the staff of Bowles. The trial resulted in the conviction of Bowles, Milligan, Horsey and Humphreys. The first three were sentenced to death, and the last to imprisonment for life. General Hovey, in command of the District, approved the sentences of Bowles, Milligan and Horsey, but reduced the punishment of Humphreys from imprisonment to restraint within a limited area in his own county during the continuance of the war.

The death penalty as affixed by the Commission could not be carried out without the approval of the President, but President Lincoln took no action, leaving the three men in confinement. A short time after the accession of President Johnson he approved the sentences and ordered the execution of the three men. The war was over and Governor Morton interested himself in the matter, and sent John U. Pettit, of Wabash, to Washington to confer with the President and secure from him a recall of the order of execution. A reaction had set in, and there was a general feeling that the sentences had not been fully justified, and that the proceedings had been illegal; and Governor Morton and all the Republican leaders were most averse to having the sentences carried out and very fearful of the consequences should this be done. Mr. Pettit's appeal to President Johnson was successful and a day or two before the time fixed for the execution the sentences were commuted to imprisonment for life in the Ohio penitentiary.

The prisoners had applied to the United States court at Indianapolis for a writ of habeas corpus, which had been denied, and an appeal had been taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. It was there argued in 1866 by a great array of legal talent, the Government being represented by Attorney General Speed, Henry M. Stanberry, of Ohio, and General Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts. Joseph E. McDonald, of Indiana; General Garfield, of Ohio; Jere Black, of Pennsylvania, and David Dudley Field, of

New York, represented the prisoners. The court released the prisoners on the ground that they were civilians, and not being in the military or naval service of the United States could not legally be tried before a military court while the civil courts of Indiana were open and untrammelled in their operations. Thus ended the famous Indiana treason trials.

Although the membership of the inner, or military section of this order was comparatively very small, it was active and created much trouble. In a number of instances deserters were concealed for weeks at a time by members of the order, and on several occasions they were defended from capture by armed bodies, and there were also several attempts to rescue them with arms after capture. The most notable case of this kind occurred in Morgan County. A squad of cavalymen had gone into the county to arrest several deserters. On their return they were ambushed by members of the order, and a brisk fight took place, in which several persons were wounded.

In October, 1862, at the time of the first draft, the Commissioner's box in Blackford County was seized and destroyed. On the 12th of June, 1863, the enrollment of Johnson County was resisted by armed men. On the 15th of the same month fifty armed men attacked the residence of James Sill, the enrolling officer of Marion township, Putnam County, and demanded the enrollment papers. This being refused they fired many bullets into his house. In Jefferson township in the same county, at the same time, the enrollment and books were seized and destroyed, and during the same week the books and papers for Cloverdale township were stolen.

On the same day the enrolling officer at Whitestown, Boone County, was resisted by armed men. On June 18th, Fletcher Freeman, enrolling officer, Cass township, Sullivan County, was murdered by concealed men while in the performance of his duty. On the 11th of June the enrolling officer of Waterloo township, Fayette County, was fired at and badly wounded while in the discharge of his duties. On the 20th of June J. Frank Stevens, while acting as assistant enrolling officer in Walker township, Rush County, was shot and killed near Manilla. Mr. Craycraft, the enrolling officer who was with him, was badly wounded. On

the 30th of June the enrolling papers of Indian Creek township, Monroe County, were destroyed. On the 3d of October, Captain Eli McCarty, while serving notices on drafted men in Daviess County, was murdered by concealed assassins. His body was thrown into the river and not found for several days.

As has been said, the two branches of the order were entirely separate and distinct. No one could be a member of the military branch who was not a member of the civil or political branch, but none were taken into the military branch except such as were extreme in their opposition to the Government, and were willing to go almost any length to embarrass the Government and aid the South. Few of those in the civil branch alone knew of the purposes of the military branch, and thousands of them did not even know of its existence.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

WORK OF THE INDIANA LEGION.

When the war came in 1861, it was by no means certain that Kentucky would not follow the other States and attempt to secede. In fact, it was highly probable such would be the case. The Governor, most of the State officers and ex-Vice President Breckinridge, were known to be endeavoring to take the State out of the Union. Had that State seceded the war would have been brought to the very doors of Indiana, and in any event, so large an element of the people of Kentucky was known to sympathize with the South that Indiana was always more or less in danger of invasion. The protection of the borders of the State demanded the immediate attention of Governor Morton, even while he was so deeply engaged in preparing troops for the National armies.

As has been said in a previous chapter, when the war came Indiana neither had a militia system nor arms with which to equip a militia. The Legislature, at the special session in May, 1861, enacted a militia law. It was full of imperfections, but the Legislature had had no experience in such matters. Defective as the law was, under it was organized the Indiana Legion, which did such good work in defending the State from raiders, and in keeping down internal disorders. The scarcity of arms prevented the putting of the militia on a war footing until September, 1861. In that month Major John Love was appointed Major General of the militia, and John L. Mansfield, Brigadier General. From time to time other general officers were appointed.

During the first few months of its organization the militia was little more than an efficient recruiting engine for the national service. Hundreds of members of the militia, having imbibed the military spirit, changed their State muster for one under the United States, and at the front, in many a hard fought battle, and on many a tiresome march, proved efficient and gallant defenders of the Union. The militia, however, was kept filled and there can be no doubt that it saved the State from a number of invasions by marauding bands from Kentucky. The militia proved its efficiency in putting down the disorders in Orange and Crawford counties in October, 1864.

In each of those counties from the very first there was a strong hostility to the war, and it increased as the war continued. By the fall of 1864 a strong combination was formed from the disloyal and criminal element, numbering more than three hundred men, including a number of deserting drafted men, and several Kentucky guerrillas. This combination was formed ostensibly to resist the draft, but in reality for robbery. The outrages and robberies perpetrated by these men at last became so frequent that a reign of terror existed in Orange and Crawford counties, and it became necessary to use the Legion for their suppression. More than ninety arrests were made, and as the prisoners were responsible to military law, and their trial before a military court was a thing they had not contemplated, the organization soon disbanded.

Several times raids were threatened from across the river and the militia was hastily called into active service. The river counties of Kentucky were full of marauders, who only waited an opportunity to cross into Indiana and raid the farms and towns. Rumors of threatened incursions were frequent during 1863-4, and kept the Legion always on the alert.

The first invasion of the State by an armed force occurred on the 18th of July, 1862. At that time there existed in Western Kentucky a band of marauders, under one Adam Johnson. They were not Confederate soldiers, but guerrillas, banded together for robbery and plunder. Johnson was a man of such character that he was feared all through that section of Kentucky, and many crimes were laid at his door. At Newburg, a town on the Ohio, in

Warrick County, a hospital had been established, which, in July, 1862, at the time of the raid, contained about ninety sick and wounded soldiers. Two companies of the Legion had been formed there, and their arms and accoutrements, with those of the sick and wounded soldiers, were stored in the hospital building, together with quite a quantity of military stores, consisting, among other things, of seventy-five sabres and one hundred and thirty revolvers and their holsters.

Johnson was informed of the property stored at Newburg and the defenseless condition of the town. Early on the morning of the 18th of July his camp, which was just across the river, was visited by a resident of Newburg, and arrangements were made to surprise and capture the town. While most of the citizens of the town were at their mid-day meal, Johnson suddenly appeared, with thirty of his men, on the opposite bank of the river, and seizing a large ferry boat, he concealed his men and crossed the river to the Indiana shore.

As soon as the boat touched the landing the raiders made a dash for the warehouse, in which were stored the sabres and other material, which were seized. Pickets were thrown out, and Johnson told the startled citizens that he had a battery stationed on the opposite side of the river, with orders to shell the town if resistance was offered. The soldiers in the hospitals were compelled to sign paroles, and the houses and stores of the town were pillaged. A number of horses were taken, and with all the stores that could be carried away, were loaded on the ferry boat. The marauders remained in the town four or five hours, and then departed with their plunder. After they left, the citizens seized two men, H. H. Carney and Elliott Melford, who had been officious in pointing out to the marauders property that could be taken, and shot them to death.

The news of this raid soon spread throughout the southern counties and the Legion was hastily summoned, but the robbers had escaped to Kentucky. At that time a large part of Western Kentucky was overrun by marauding bands and Union men were plundered and killed, or driven away from their homes. Henderson was occupied by a Confederate force under the command of Johnson, and Joh:

Morgan was making one of his great raids through the State. These things kept the border counties of Indiana in a constant state of alarm.

Governor Morton, upon receiving the news of the raid on Newburg, determined to assume the offensive, and clear the western counties of Kentucky of the marauding bands. He asked authority of General Boyle, commanding Kentucky, to invade that State with the Indiana militia and punish the guerrillas. The authority was willingly given, and a plan of campaign was at once adopted. Governor Morton called for volunteers for this service. The first to respond were six hundred men from Decatur county, recruited in a few hours by Colonel James Gavin, of the Seventh Indiana, and Colonel John T. Wilder, of the Seventeenth, who were at home on furlough. In reporting these enlistments Colonel Gavin wired the Governor: "These men want to fight. I want to take them where there is danger. They are fighting men. Please arm them and send them off at once, where they can do active duty. They are better men than you can get." The Governor ordered them to report at Indianapolis, to be sent to Evansville. Arriving at Indianapolis they were mustered into the United States service for thirty days. At Evansville they were organized into six companies, and were joined by two companies from Terre Haute, and two from Lafayette. They were formed into a regiment, and numbered the Seventy-sixth. Gavin was made Colonel, thus being Colonel of two regiments at the same time—the Seventh, three years, and the Seventy-sixth, thirty days. He was ordered to invade Kentucky, drive the Confederates from Henderson and from the neighboring counties, "shooting down all guerrillas in arms and all making armed resistance." The order closed: "They must be shot. Nothing else will do. I do not want such prisoners."

General Love remained a week at Henderson, scouring the country and chasing the marauders far into the interior. Several skirmishes occurred, and quite a number of the enemy were captured. The Fourth regiment of the Legion was called at six different times to defend Owensboro, Kentucky, from threatened raids, and at one time occupied the town for ninety days. On the 19th of September a small force, commanded by Colonel Netter, was attacked

by the enemy and driven into a dangerous position. Hugh Hales, a member of the command, swam the Ohio River, taking the news to Rockport. The militia was at once called out and Hales was sent back to tell the men to hold out, as relief would speedily be on the way. Colonel Crooks soon crossed the river with about five hundred and fifty men and drove the Confederates from the town. That night Lieutenant Colonel Wood, of the Seventh cavalry, arrived and assumed command. Learning that the enemy was encamped on Panther Creek, about eight miles from the town, it was determined to make an attack, and with about four hundred of the men Colonel Wood at once began the march. They arrived about daylight and an engagement ensued, lasting about an hour, when the Legion made a gallant charge, scattering the enemy in great confusion. The Union loss was three killed, thirty-seven wounded, and eight captured, while the Confederates lost thirty-six killed, double that number wounded, and sixteen prisoners. The Legion captured twelve horses, one hundred and forty small arms, and the camp equipage of the enemy.

In August, 1864, Indiana troops again invaded Kentucky to punish the guerrillas and give peace and quiet to the border counties. In July of that year guerrillas to the number of seven hundred to twelve hundred made their appearance in the neighborhood of Henderson. This force was under the command of Adam Johnson, and began a rigid conscription, seizing every man capable for military duty, and forcing him into the rebel ranks. General Alvin P. Hovey was at that time at his home in Mount Vernon, and he proposed, if a sufficient force was raised and placed under his command, to cross the river and drive out the enemy. At that time parts of the Thirty-second and Forty-sixth Indiana regiments were in the State. The men at once offered their services, and within three days seven hundred and fifty men, well armed and equipped, were at Mount Vernon, consisting of the members of the two regiments mentioned, and parts of several companies of the Legion. They thoroughly scouted the country, driving the guerrillas in every direction.

The second raid into Indiana occurred in May, 1863. Captain Thomas H. Hines, one of John Morgan's officers,

was in Western Kentucky and concluded to try his fortunes by raiding Indiana. On the 17th of June he crossed the river with sixty-two men, about eighteen miles above Cannelton. His object seemed to be to pick up horses for Morgan's cavalry. He made arrangements with the persons that had ferried him across the river to meet him again in three days, and then started into the interior. With cunning audacity he announced that he and his men belonged to the Union forces and had been sent into Indiana by General Boyle to capture deserters. He obtained a number of horses, giving orders on the Federal Quartermaster at Indianapolis for payment. On the second day of his raid his true character became known, and the militia began assembling to capture him. Near Paoli, in Orange County, he encountered a small force of fifteen armed citizens, whom he captured, mortally wounding one of them.

Hines now saw that he was in imminent danger of being surrounded and captured, and sought to return to the river. He was in great need of a guide through the hills, and Mr. Bryant Breedon offered his services, which were accepted. Mr. Breedon was a warm Union man, and determined to so pilot the invaders as to make their escape impossible. By this time the Legion was in hot pursuit, and Hines hastened to the Ohio River. Breedon led him to a place opposite an island, where the water between the Indiana shore and the island was shallow and easily fordable, but that between the island and Kentucky was deep and rapid. Hines and his men easily got to the island, but there they found between them and Kentucky a Union gunboat, and when they turned back toward the Indiana side they found the shore lined with the Legion. Fire was opened upon them and three or four killed. Hines and two men escaped by swimming the river, but the others were captured, together with all the plunder they had gathered.

In July of the same year occurred the great raid into Indiana. Bragg was contemplating another attempt on Louisville and Cincinnati by an invasion of Kentucky, and had sent Morgan in advance to prepare the way. Morgan suggested that he could cross the Ohio and penetrate Indiana, but Bragg would not agree to it. Morgan was a bold, headstrong, reckless man, disliking subordination, and

never inclined to take counsel from any one. So, having succeeded pretty well in his mission to Kentucky, he determined to invade Indiana. He had with him about four thousand mounted men, all seasoned troops, as brave and as reckless as himself. Such an adventure was one they would delight in, and Morgan knew there would be no hesitancy on their part. On the 7th of July he seized two steamers at Brandenburg, Kentucky, and thus obtained the means for crossing the river as soon as his main column should arrive.

The seizure of the steamers soon became known on the Indiana side and hasty preparations were made to resist his crossing. On the morning of the 8th Morgan began preparing to cross the river. By this time the Legion had succeeded in getting a small six-pounder in position opposite Brandenburg, supported by about one hundred men. As soon as it was seen that the Confederates were embarking a fire was opened from the six-pounder. The first shot struck the steamer and the Confederates hastily fled. Soon afterward they got their artillery in position and the Indiana troops were driven back from the river, losing two men killed.

Morgan then succeeded in crossing the river with about 2,400 men and six guns. His command at once started in the direction of Corydon, the militia skirmishing with his advance all the way. The invaders plundered every house they came to and burned a mill. Four miles south of Corydon they induced the Rev. Peter Glenn, by a flag of truce, to come out of his house, and then murdered him and burned his house and barn.

Governor Morton had been informed of Morgan's raid into Kentucky and had promptly sent to that State every available soldier in Indiana, and the Union commanders in Kentucky hastily sent troops in pursuit of the raider. Morgan had the advantage of them, as being in advance he could always get fresh horses, leaving his jaded and worn out animals behind. There was a woeful lack of reliable information in Kentucky as to the real whereabouts of Morgan, and it was not until he had crossed into Indiana that Governor Morton could obtain any accurate intelligence. Then it was that his energy and the patriotism of the people of Indiana were again illustrated. Volunteers were

called for, and they were freely offered from every section of the State. Orders were sent to the river counties to head off the raider, or if he had passed, to pursue and annoy him at every step of the way, so as to harass his movements until a sufficient force could be gathered to capture him.

In less than twenty-four hours after the Governor called for volunteers fifteen thousand were on their way to Indianapolis. Within two days 20,000 were actually mustered into the service and 45,000 more were ready, making a total of 65,000 raised in forty-eight hours. It was in the busiest season of the year, as the farmers were in the midst of their harvesting, but emulating the men of 1775 they left their fields to take care of themselves, while they hastened to defend their State. It was at once supposed Morgan's great object in crossing the river was to capture Indianapolis, with all its great stores of military equipments, and then release the Confederate prisoners confined at Camp Morton. At New Albany and Jeffersonville were military stores valued at about \$4,000,000. His object might be to capture these two places and, by burning railroad bridges, greatly cripple the Government in sending supplies to Rosecrans; then to escape into Kentucky. As there was an uncertainty as to what direction Morgan would take, it was necessary to be ready to meet him at all points.

Colonel Lewis Jordan, of the Legion, collected about four hundred men near Corydon to do what he could in delaying Morgan's march toward New Albany and Jeffersonville. There were troops at Louisville, and they were asked for. They were promised but not sent. As Morgan advanced, Colonel Jordan, with his little force, fell slowly back, skirmishing all the time, until he reached a point about one mile from Corydon. Here he hastily threw up some rude defenses and formed a line of battle. At this point a spirited engagement occurred, both sides losing several killed and wounded. The enemy outflanking Jordan he was compelled to retreat. He fell back to Corydon, where his force was surrounded and finally compelled to surrender.

Morgan marched into Corydon and plundered the town. Under threats of destroying three mills by fire, the owners

were compelled to hand over \$2,100. Five hundred horses were taken in Harrison County. During the afternoon of the 9th Morgan left Corydon, throwing out detachments to the right and left, for the purpose of pillaging the inhabitants over as wide a stretch of territory as possible. Paoli, Palmyra and Greenville were all plundered, and the entire command reunited at Salem. There he burned the railroad bridge, plundered all the stores and private houses, and levied contributions on the mills. General Duke, one of his officers, afterward wrote a history of Morgan's cavalry. In it he draws this graphic picture of the depredations through Indiana:

"The disposition to wholesale plunder exceeded anything that any of us had ever seen before. The great cause for apprehension which our situation might have inspired seemed only to make the men more reckless. Calico was the staple article of appropriation. Each man who could get one tied a bolt of it to his saddle, only to throw it away and get a fresh one at the first opportunity. They did not pillage with any sort of method or reason. It seemed to be a mania, senseless and purposeless. One man carried a bird cage with two canaries in it two days. Another rode with a chafing dish, which looked like a small metallic coffin on the pommel of his saddle, until an officer forced him to throw it away. Although the weather was intensely warm, another still slung seven pairs of skates around his neck, and chuckled over his acquisition. They pillaged like boys robbing an orchard. I would not have believed such a passion could have been developed so ludicrously among any body of civilized men."

As graphic as this picture is, it is not overdrawn, and establishes that, whatever might have been the object of Morgan, his men were only robbers. By this time Morgan, discovering that his further progress toward Indianapolis was too hazardous, and that the men of the State were gathering by thousands in every direction, began to think more of flight than of plunder. Only the most rapid flight could save him. General Hobson, who had been following Morgan through Kentucky, by this time had crossed into Indiana, and was again hot in pursuit. Morgan left Salem in rapid flight, giving his men but little time for plunder. Repeatedly he turned toward the Ohio River, but each

time found his way blocked, and he continued on eastward.

On the morning of the 11th he left Lexington for Vernon, but upon reaching the neighborhood of that place found preparations had been made to receive him and moved off toward Dupont. At that place he destroyed the railroad for a short distance and burned two large bridges. Again a scene of plunder occurred. A pork house was robbed of 2000 hams. All the horses that could be found were taken and many wheat fields were fired and burned. Morgan was so pressed that he could give his men but little rest, and the rapid flight began to tell on them, many stragglers falling behind.

Leaving Dupont a rapid dash was made on Versailles, where three hundred militia were captured and paroled, and the county treasury robbed of \$5,000. The militia labored under great disadvantage, as they were pursuing, or attempting to intercept, mounted men, while they were on foot, but still at every point Morgan began to feel the pressure. He proceeded to Sunman Station, burning bridges and tearing up the railroad track at every opportunity. At Sunman he met a strong body of militia, and not daring to attack he moved off again to the east. By this time he was near the Ohio line, and soon after left Indiana. He was pursued by the troops into Ohio, and his entire command either killed or captured.

A most lamentable occurrence happened just after the remnant of Morgan's band left the State. Colonel Gavin, with two regiments, was at Lawrenceburg. He received information that Morgan had turned back into Indiana, and was advancing on Lawrenceburg. He ordered one of his regiments, the One Hundred and Fifth, to take a position, and while it was marching in the night, a sudden curve in the road threw the advance on a parallel line with the rear. The rear, mistaking it for the advance of the enemy, fired. The fire was returned, and before the error was discovered five men were killed, one mortally and eighteen seriously wounded.

Soon after the raid was concluded Governor Morton took steps to have returns made of the property destroyed or impressed by Morgan, or taken by officers in pursuit. The claims were divided into four classes: 1. Taken under orders of United States officers. 2. Taken under orders of

State officers. 3. By the Confederates. 4. Orders unknown. The following table shows the number of claims filed, amounts, and amount allowed:

Counties.	Number Claims.	Amount Claimed.	Amount Allowed.
Harrison County	477	\$ 86,551.72	\$ 81,710.90
Floyd	65	30,291.61	11,188.71
Washington	375	100,668.92	85,613.33
Scott	254	45,479.63	42,031.43
Jefferson	180	53,438.17	47,388.31
Jennings	350	63,270.61	59,187.66
Jackson	7	792.50	792.50
Ripley	324	46,638.28	40,609.25
Dearborn	205	70,217.76	43,415.42
Marion	1	50.00	1,661.97
Total	2238	\$6,497,399.21	\$413,599.48

CHAPTER XXXV.

INDIANA IN THE FIELD.

It has been shown that Indiana's record in raising and equipping troops for the great war was a proud one; that the President, the Secretary of War, General Sherman, and the leading newspapers of the country did ample justice to its patriotism; how Indiana cared for its troops in the field, and followed them from camp to battle field with loving care and tender watchfulness; how it poured out its treasures in supplying the sick and wounded; how its sons watched over its own borders, and when the invader came, left their fields, their shops and their factories to chase the daring enemy from its soil. And now we begin the record of what Indiana troops did in the face of the enemy for four long and bloody years; how they marched, how they bivouacked in storm and heat and cold; how they were the first to bear the brunt of battle, and the last to leave the field; how their blood reddened the soil of every one of the eleven seceding States, and was poured out like water, in Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland and Pennsylvania. It is a record that in some respects stands unmatched by that of any other State.

It will not be claimed that Indiana soldiers were braver than those of its sister States, for such a claim would not be true. But it will be claimed that Indiana troops during the great war of the rebellion never faltered or hung back, when those of any other State stood steadfast. Indiana's position during the war was in many respects unique. It had troops in every army. They went with Burnside down the Atlantic coast, and with Butler to New

Orleans; they followed Banks up the Red River; they were with Steele in Arkansas, and Canby at Mobile; they fought with McClellan on the Peninsula and at Antietam; they poured out their blood at Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg; they plunged into the wilderness with Grant, and followed him to the crowning glory at Appomattox; they fought with Banks, with Shields, with Milroy and with Sheridan in the Valley; with Thomas they helped to win the first victory of 1862, and were with Grant at Donelson, Shiloh and Vicksburg; with Buell at Perrysville, and with Rosecrans at Stone's River and Chickamauga; they climbed Lookout Mountain with Hooker, stormed Tunnel Hill on the left with Sherman, and led the charge up Missionary Ridge in the center; and then they followed and fought with Sherman from Chattanooga to Atlanta, from Atlanta to Savannah, from Savannah to Bentonville, and then to the grand review at Washington, where they were the proudest among all that victorious host.

The first Indiana soldier to fall on the field of battle in that great struggle was John Hollenbeck, of Company B, Eleventh Indiana, who fell at the battle of Kelley's Island, June 26th, 1861. The last Indiana soldier killed in the war was John J. Williams, a member of Company B, Thirty-fourth regiment, and he was the last man to fall on the Union side. He was killed at the engagement of Palmetto Rancho, Texas, May 13th, 1865, the last engagement of the war. On the 4th of July, 1866, the flags of the various Indiana regiments were presented to Governor Morton, to be deposited in the State House at Indianapolis. The presentation address was made by Major General Lewis Wallace. In that address, speaking of the deeds of Indiana soldiers, he said in part:

"Three of our regiments took part in the first battle of the war, while another, in view of the Rio Grande, fought its very last battle. The first regiment to land under Butler at the wharf at New Orleans was the Twenty-first Indiana. The first flag over the bloody parapet at Fort Wagner, in front of Charleston, was that of the Thirteenth Indiana. The first to show their stars from the embattled crest of Mission Ridge were those of the Seventy-ninth and Eighty-sixth Indiana. Two of our regiments helped storm

Fort McAllister, down by Savannah. Another was among the first in the assaulting line at Fort Fisher. Another, converted into engineers, built all of Sherman's bridges from Chattanooga to Atlanta, from Atlanta to the sea, and from the sea northward. Another, in line of battle, on the beach at Hampton Roads, saw the frigate Cumberland sink to the harbor's bed, rather than strike her flag, and, in looking from the same place, the next day, cheered as men never cheered, at the sight of the same Merrimac beaten by a single gun in the turret of Worden's little Monitor. Others aided in the overthrow of the savages, red and rebel, at Pea Ridge, Missouri. Three from Washington, across the peninsula, within sight of Richmond evacuated, to Harrison's Landing, followed McClellan to his fathomless fall. Five were engaged in the salvation of Washington, at Antietam. Four were with Burnside at Fredericksburg, where some of Kimball's Hoosiers were picked up lying nearer than all others to the pitiless embrasures. Five were at Chancellorsville, where Stonewall Jackson took victory out of Hooker's hands, and carried it with him to his grave. Six were almost annihilated at Gettysburg. One, an infantry regiment, marched nearly ten thousand miles, literally twice around the rebellion, fighting as it went. Four were a part of the besom of destruction with which Sheridan swept the Shenandoah Valley. Finally, when Grant, superseding Halleck, transferred his headquarters to the East, and began the last grand march toward Richmond, four of our regiments, joined soon after by another, followed him faithfully, leaving their dead all along the way—in the Wilderness, at Laurel Hill, at Spottsylvania, at Po River, at North Anna River, at Bethesda Church, at Cold Harbor, in front of Petersburg, down to Clover Hill—down to the final halt in the war, in which Lee yielded up the sword of rebellion.

"But, sir, most of the flags returned to you belonged to regiments whose theater of operations can not well be territorially defined; whose lines of march were backward and forward through fifteen States of the Union. If one seeks the field in which the power of our State, as well as the valor of our people, had the finest exemplification, he must look to the West and South. I will not say that In-

diana's contributions to the cause were indispensable to final success. That would be unjust to States more populous and wealthy, and equally as devoted. But I will say that her quotas precipitated the result; without them the war might still be in full progress and doubtful. Let us consider this proposition a moment. At Shiloh Indiana had thirteen regiments; at Vicksburg she had twenty-four; at Stone's River, twenty-five; at Chickamauga, twenty-seven; at Mission Ridge, twenty; in the advance from Chattanooga to Atlanta, fifty; at Atlanta Sherman divided them so that exactly twenty-five went with him down to the sea, while twenty-five marched back with Thomas and were in at the annihilation of Hood at Nashville. What a record is thus presented! Ask Grant, or Rosecrans, or Sherman, if from the beginning to the end of the operations there was a day for which they could have spared those regiments? No! Without them Bragg might yet be on Lookout Mountain; or Sherman still toiling, like a Titan, among the gorges of Kenesaw and Resaca; or, worse yet, Halleck, that only one of all our Generals who never even saw a battle, might be General-in-Chief, waiting for the success at Vicksburg to reduce him to his proper level—chief of a nameless staff."

The gifted orator said nothing of the record of Indiana's "boys in blue" that was not just, but he could have said more, without telling all that might have been told of their gallantry and devotion. Indiana troops left their dead in seventeen States and one Territory. Wherever an enemy was to be met, or a battle fought, Indiana soldiers were always to be found, and always ready for any duty. Even under the most adverse circumstances they fought, and fought well. Every General under whom they served has borne willing testimony to their courage and devotion.

In the cities and towns along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers were quite a number of men who believed that secession would make a rich harvest for them, and as soon as the war became certain, by the attack on Fort Sumter, they began loading boats with provisions and sending them down the river to supply the needs of the South. One of the first duties assigned to an Indiana regiment was the stoppage of all such boats, and the Eleventh, a day or two

after its muster into the service, was sent to Evansville for that duty.

The most important work, however,* of the first three months' volunteers from Indiana was in Western Virginia. Virginia had decided on secession, but a large majority of the people in the western portion of that State were loyal to the Union. The leaders of the Confederacy knew this, and to preserve that section to the South, they hastily sent troops into the Kanawha and Cheat River valleys. The Federal Government determined that West Virginia should be protected, and Indiana and Ohio troops were ordered there, and it was there the Indiana soldiers earned their first laurels. They were the first to cross into that section, Ohio following a few days afterward. Five of the six regiments of Indiana troops had been formed into a brigade and Thomas A. Morris appointed Major General. At that time the States appointed all the general officers as well as those of the regiments. General Morris was a graduate of West Point, and versed in the science of war. He at once began making the Indiana troops efficient. Joseph J. Reynolds, another graduate of West Point, was made a Brigadier General. General George B. McClellan, of Ohio, was placed in command of all the troops in West Virginia.

It is not intended, in fact it would be impossible in such a work as this, to follow out the history of each regiment of the State. To do so would multiply volumes beyond the reader's endurance, and much of it would be but a repetition of descriptions of battle scenes and marches. The design is to tell, as succinctly as possible, the part played by Indiana troops in the various campaigns and battles, giving only so much of the general detail as is necessary to make the narration clear. The five regiments sent to West Virginia under General Morris were the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth. These regiments left Indianapolis, one by one, and became a part of the forces under General McClellan, which fought the first half dozen engagements of the war.

Phillippi, Bealington, Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford were each victories for the Union troops, and in each engagement two or more of the Indiana regiments partic-

ipated. Before the close of the campaign the regiments already there were joined by the Thirteenth, which took part in the battle of Rich Mountain. The West Virginia campaign, when compared with those of other years, was a small and insignificant affair, yet it had great effect on the country. The uniform success of the Union troops set the Northern heart on fire, stimulated recruiting, and proved to the South that the North was in earnest in its determination to maintain the Union intact.

The campaign seasoned the men and officers, and made veterans of them. No better officers for an army were found than those who had served with these first three months' troops. Many a future line and field officer, who won distinction in after years of the war, was among the enlisted men of that first campaign, and nearly every officer of those six regiments made a name before the close of the war. It was a great school. Other campaigns made the soldiers and people look upon that three months' service as a "picnic," and while it had few of the hardships that were known during the remainder of the war, and had many appearances of an "outing," yet it was the introduction of hitherto peaceful citizens to the stern duties and realities of war, which gave promise of a victorious issue to the struggle. It was followed by many dark days, many disasters, many discouragements, but the historian must ever place it as a bright picture of auspicious promise for the final result.

The Eleventh regiment took no part in this campaign, but had one of its own. It was the first of the six regiments to perfect its organization, and as has already been noted was first sent to Evansville to watch for contraband trade. It was soon found that local militia could do that work equally well, and the services of the Eleventh were more needed in other fields. It was ordered to Cumberland, Maryland, where it was stationed by itself, some distance away from any other troops. At that time it was the "crack" regiment of the State. It was mostly made up of companies that had existed before the outbreak of the war, and had been pretty thoroughly drilled. In this it had an advantage over the other five regiments. It had adopted

the Zouave drill, and the picturesque uniform used by Zouave companies in France.

Arriving at Cumberland it at once began the work for which it had been sent to that point. At Romney, some thirty or more miles away, was a Confederate camp. The very night after the arrival of the regiment at Cumberland Colonel Wallace took it to New Creek, and then began a march to surprise the enemy at Romney. A skirmish followed in which the Eleventh was successful, driving the enemy out, and capturing the town and quite a quantity of stores. One of the duties of the regiment was to guard the bridges on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and this duty was well performed.

A little band of thirteen members of the regiment, acting as mounted scouts, had one of the most gallant engagements of the war, at Kelley's Island. This little band was under the command of Corporal David Hay. While scouting, a Confederate cavalry company was reported some distance in advance. Without stopping to "count noses" the scouts plunged after them, and overtaking them began a spirited engagement, killing and wounding a number, and capturing several horses. In this preliminary fight Corporal Hay was wounded. The scouts started to return to camp, and while resting on Kelley's Island, in the Potomac River, they were charged upon by the Confederate cavalry, now largely reinforced. The boys fought until they had used up their last cartridge, and then scattered, and all arrived safely in camp except John Hollenbeck, of Company B, who was slain. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded numbered more than forty, of whom twenty-five were killed, among them being Captain Ashby, the commander. This brilliant little affair gave great eclat to the Eleventh.

In July the regiment was ordered to join Patterson at Martinsburg, where he had been sent to watch Johnston at Winchester, and prevent him from uniting with Beauregard at Manasses, where it was proposed that the Union troops, under McDowell, should attack the Confederates. Patterson did not watch Johnston, but after moving up to within sight of Winchester, turned off toward Charleston and Harper's Ferry.

All of the six regiments returned to Indiana, on the completion of their terms, and at once reorganized for the three years' service. At the conclusion of the West Virginia campaign both General McClellan and General Morris issued addresses to the troops, and they are inserted here more to show the flamboyant style of our commanders in the early days of the war than for any other object, yet they tell, in a brief way, what had been accomplished. General McClellan said:

"Soldiers of the Army of the West:

"I am more than satisfied with you. You have annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their leisure. You have taken five guns, twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms, one thousand prisoners, including more than forty officers—one of the two commanders of the rebels is a prisoner, the other lost his life on the field of battle. You have killed more than two hundred and fifty of the enemy, who has lost all his baggage and camp equipage. All this has been accomplished with the loss of twenty brave men killed and sixty wounded, on your part.

"You have proved that Union men, fighting for the preservation of our Government, are more than a match for our misguided and erring brethren; more than this, you have shown mercy to the vanquished. You have made long and arduous marches, often with insufficient food, frequently exposed to the inclemency of the weather. I have not hesitated to demand this of you, feeling that I could rely upon your endurance, patriotism and courage.

"In the future I may still have demands to make upon you, still greater sacrifices for you to offer; it shall be my care to provide for you to the extent of my ability; but I know now, that by your valor and endurance you will accomplish all that is asked.

"Soldiers! I have confidence in you, and I trust you have learned to confide in me. Remember that discipline and subordination are qualities of equal value with courage.

"I am proud to say that you have gained the highest

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PRESIDENT BENJAMIN HARRISON.

*

reward that American troops can receive—the thanks of Congress, and the applause of your fellow citizens.”

This address was modeled quite closely upon those issued from time to time by the great Napoleon to his soldiers. The address of General Morris was somewhat more modest. He said:

“The term of service for this brigade in the army of the United States having expired, and the relations of officers and soldiers being about to be dissolved, the General, in relinquishing his command, deems this a fit occasion to express his entire approbation of the conduct of the brigade, whether in the camp, on the march, or on the field of battle. The General tenders to all his thanks for the soldierly bearing, the cheerful performance of every duty, and the patient endurance of the privations and fatigues of campaign life, which all have so constantly exhibited. Called suddenly by the National Executive from the ease and luxuries of home life to the defense of our Government, the officers and soldiers of this brigade have voluntarily submitted to the privations and restraints of military life, and, with the intelligence of free Americans, have acquired the arts of war as readily as they relinquished the pursuits of peace. They have cheerfully endured the fatigue of long and dreary marches by day and night, through the rain and storm; they have borne the exhaustion of hunger for the sake of their country. Their labor and suffering were not in vain. The foe they met, they vanquished. They scattered the traitors from their secure entrenchments in the gorges of Laurel Hill, stripped of their munitions of war, to flee before the vengeance of patriots.

“Soldiers! you have now returned to the friends whose prayers went with you to the field of strife. They welcome you with pride and exultation. Your State and country acknowledge the value of your labors. May your future career be as your past has been, honorable to yourselves and serviceable to your country.”

The campaign in West Virginia had another very important effect. At that time General Winfield Scott was the Commander-in-Chief of the Federal armies. He was very old, and the burden and strain of the war were too great for him. Many of the leading officers of the old army

had resigned and cast in their fortunes with the South. The campaign on the Potomac, ending in the fatal battle of Bull Run, demonstrated that a new leader of the armies was necessary, and General McClellan, who had nominally been in command in West Virginia, was chosen. McClellan went to Washington, leaving the troops in West Virginia under the command of Rosecrans, Morris having returned to Indiana.

This campaign had another result, which must be regarded by Indianians as unfortunate. As has been noted, General Morris was an educated soldier, of a high order of ability, and had he continued in the service would have risen to a high command. But, unfortunately, on a question of precedence, he permitted himself to retire from the service at the close of the campaign, and the country was denied the further benefit of his talents and experience.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

INDIANA AND KENTUCKY.

At the very beginning of the war the attitude of Kentucky caused great uneasiness to Indiana. The principal officials of the State leaned toward the South. When President Lincoln called for 75,000 troops, the Governor declared the State would not furnish its quota, and at once began the organization of a State militia, ostensibly for purposes of defense. He also announced that Kentucky would remain in an attitude of "armed neutrality."

Governor Morton felt that this only meant real rebellion against the authority of the Government, and realized that if Kentucky was permitted to go into rebellion it would transfer the war to the borders of Indiana. He was very greatly concerned over the situation, and on the 21st of May, 1861, at his instance, a meeting was held in Indianapolis, at which Governor Yates and Senator Trumbull, of Illinois; Governor Denison, of Ohio; Governor Morton and General McClellan, were present. The meeting united in a communication to the President, in which it was said:

"We concur in the opinion that the United States should, at an early day, take possession in force of prominent points in Kentucky, such as Louisville, Covington, Newport, Columbus, etc., and the railroads crossing from the same, south. If Colonel Anderson and others who are loyal to the Government can raise regiments of loyal men in Kentucky to occupy these points in the first instance, and the Government has the means of arming them, it would be advisable to have them thus occupied. If Ken-

tuckians can not be found for this purpose, United States regulars would be the next best for the purpose, but in our judgment they should be occupied at an early day, if it has to be done by volunteers from the adjoining States. We believe this course will save Kentucky to the Union, otherwise that in the end secessionists will control her. If these suggestions are approved, Major General McClellan should be advised and clothed with the necessary authority.

"It is important that the plan of the campaign in the West should be fixed upon, and that the Major General of the division should be furnished the means, and be instructed to shape the military movements of his department so as to carry it into effect at the earliest period. We also think that the force called out in Major General McClellan's department should be materially increased. Before any movement south takes place, the loyalty of Kentucky should be secured, which can be done this summer, before troops are moved to the more Southern States."

From a variety of causes, the Washington Government dallied for months with Kentucky, although several loyal regiments were raised in the State, some having their recruiting places in Indiana, others in Ohio, and still others in Kentucky. During the same time recruiting went on just as zealously for the Southern army. Several times during the summer of 1861 Governor Morton urged upon the Government the importance of taking possession of Kentucky and ending the anomalous position of that State. On the 30th of August he telegraphed the Secretary of War: "I earnestly hope the Government will not lose a moment in preparing for the crisis in Kentucky. A large force should be concentrated at Evansville, and another at such point that it can readily be thrown into Louisville in a few hours, that it may move from that point into the interior of Kentucky."

Three days later the Governor wired the President: "At the risk of being considered troublesome I will say the conspiracy to precipitate Kentucky into revolution is complete. The blow may be struck at any moment, and the southern border is lined with Tennessee troops ready to march in on the instant. Is the Government ready to meet them? If we lose Kentucky now, God help us."

General J. T. Boyle and J. J. Speed, of Kentucky, were in Indianapolis at the time, and they joined in the following dispatch to the President: "Kentucky desires that Governor Morton be authorized to send at once to the Ohio River five regiments and two batteries, including Colonel Wallace's regiment. This is also the desire of General Anderson. We are here representing the views of the loyal men of Kentucky to the Governor of Indiana."

The next day Governor Morton received the following dispatch from the Government: "At the instance of Kentucky, the President desires that you send, without delay, five regiments, including Colonel Wallace's, to such points on the Ohio as General Anderson may be supposed to approve." This was all Governor Morton desired and within forty-eight hours the neutrality of Kentucky was broken, Indiana troops were on its soil, and the State was saved to the Union. But Indiana's anxiety about Kentucky did not end when its position of neutrality was broken. Governor Morton and other prominent Indianians kept a watchful eye over the neighboring State. There never was a commander in Kentucky, from Anderson and Sherman to Buell and Rosecrans, who did not burden the wires and mails with calls upon Indiana for aid, and not until Rosecrans was placed in command, and the war finally drifted from Kentucky farther South, were matters handled across the river in a manner satisfactory to the Governor or the people of Indiana. The conditions in Kentucky continued so unfavorable that a number of prominent Indianians, including Colonel Richard W. Thompson, Senator Henry S. Lane, John A. Matson, Jesse J. Brown, Bishop Ames and several others, impressed with the bad management over there, joined in a letter to the President, asking him to put Kentucky under the control of Governor Morton. It was dated August 29, 1862, and was as follows:

"To our minds it is clear that the defense of Kentucky must be made mainly by Indiana, and that if the State is to be kept in the Union, we must do it. This creates a positive necessity for placing these States in the same military district and under the same military command. This has recently been done, but not, as we frankly state, under such circumstances as to insure the confidence of the

people. This, we beg to assure you, does not arise out of any want of respect for you, or any diminution of their confidence in your motives or integrity, but from the fact the Major General placed in command of the new division is as unknown to them as he is to military fame*, however excellent and estimable he may be in other respects. We have no desire to impair your own or the public confidence in him, but a sense of duty to the country requires us to say, in perfect candor and frankness, that the remedy for this state of things lies in the request we now most respectfully and earnestly make, that the States of Kentucky and Indiana be placed in a single military district, and that Governor Morton should, by some means to be adopted by yourself, be permitted to have control of the military operations of the district. We do not ask that he shall be made a Major General, for that would, under our constitution, vacate his office of Governor; but it is clearly competent for you to give him authority over the military affairs of the district without interfering in any way with the civil affairs of Kentucky, or with his duties as Governor of this State. Our troops and our people have the greatest possible confidence in him, and so have the troops and people of Kentucky. We need not point out how during the war he has won that confidence. The fact has become historical. If such authority were given him, its effects would soon be seen in the expulsion of every rebel soldier from Kentucky. That State and Indiana could do it, or, if Kentucky faltered, Indiana could do it alone."

The question thus suggested was earnestly canvassed by the President, but no way could be found to make the change proposed, that would not vacate the office of Governor of Indiana. Within a few days after this letter was written General Bragg slipped by Buell and invaded Kentucky. This invasion, to which reference has been made in a previous chapter, was disastrous to Indiana troops. Several regiments were captured at Mumfordsville by the "incompetence and mismanagement" of Buell, according to Secretary Stanton. Other regiments were hurried onto the battle field of Richmond, Kentucky, within ten hours after they first had arms put in their hands, and were

*General H. G. Wright.

butchered and almost destroyed; still other Indiana regiments were almost decimated by the hardships of the march from Tennessee to the Ohio, and in the unfortunate battle of Perryville, and there was much excitement and indignation in this State in consequence.

Morton telegraphed the President, early in October, 1862: "An officer just from Louisville announces that Bragg has escaped with his army into East Tennessee, and that Buell's army is countermarching to Lebanon. The butchery of our troops at Perryville was terrible, and resulted from a large portion of the enemy being precipitated upon a small part of ours. Nothing but success, speedy and decided, will save our cause from utter destruction in the Northwest. Distrust and despair are seizing upon the hearts of our people." Bishop Ames, one of the most ardent supporters of the Union, wired to a friend in Washington: "Unless prompt and right action is taken by the President all is lost in Kentucky. A man must this day be put there who is known to the country, and in whom the people have confidence. For Heaven's sake make Mr. Lincoln see this. We are drifting into anarchy with fearful rapidity."

So imperative was the necessity for the removal of Buell believed to be that Governor Yates, of Illinois, and Governor Morton arranged to go to Washington together to urge such action upon the President. Just as they were to start they were advised that Buell had been superseded by Rosecrans, and wired the President as follows:

"We were to have started tonight for Washington to confer with you in regard to Kentucky affairs. The removal of Buell and the appointment of Rosecrans came not a moment too soon. The removal of Buell could not have been delayed an hour with safety to the army and the cause. The history of the battle of Perryville and the recent campaign in Kentucky has never been told. The action taken renders our visit unnecessary, although we are very desirous to consult with you in regard to the general condition of affairs in the Northwest, and hope to do so at no distant date."

Governor Morton's views upon the situation at that time were quite fully set forth in the following letter, which he addressed to President Lincoln just after the fall

elections of 1862: "The importance of this letter, and the deep interest I feel in it, must be my apology for intruding it on you. The fate of the Northwest is trembling in the balance. The result of the late elections admonishes all who understand its import that not an hour is to be lost. The Democratic politicians of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois assume that the rebellion will not be crushed, and that the independence of the rebel confederacy will, before many months, be acknowledged. Starting upon that hypothesis they ask the question, what shall be the destiny of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois? Shall they remain attached to the old government, or shall they secede and form a new one—a Northwestern confederacy—as a preparatory step to their annexation to the government of the South?

"The latter project is the programme, and has been for the last twelve months. During the recent campaign it was the staple of every Democratic speech that we had no interests or sympathies in common with the people of the Northern and Eastern States; that New England is fattening at our expense; that the people of New England are cold, selfish, money-making, and through the medium of tariffs and railroads are pressing us to the dust; that geographically these States are a part of the Mississippi Valley, and in their political associations and destinies can not be separated from the other States of that Valley; that socially and commercially their sympathies and interests are with those of the people of the Southern States, rather than with the people of the East and the North; that the Mississippi River is the great artery and outlet of all Western commerce; that the people of the Northwest can never consent to be separated politically from the people who control the mouth of that river; that this war has been forced upon the South for the purpose of abolishing slavery, and that the South had offered reasonable and proper compromises, which, if they had been accepted, would have avoided the war.

"In some of these arguments there is much truth. Our geographical and social relations are not to be denied, but the most potent appeal is that connected with the free navigation and control of the Mississippi River. The importance of that river to the trade and commerce of the Northwest is so patent as to impress itself with great

force upon the most ignorant minds, and requires only to be stated to be at once understood and accepted. I give it here as my deliberate judgment that should the misfortune of arms or other causes compel us to the abandonment of the war, and the concession of the independence of the rebel States, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois can only be prevented, if at all, from a new act of secession and annexation to those States, by a bloody and desolating civil war. The South would have the prestige of success, the commerce of the world would be open to feed and furnish her armies, and she would contend for every foot of land west of the Alleghenies, and in the struggle would be supported by a powerful party in these States.

"If the States which have already seceded should succeed in their rebellion our efforts must then be directed to the preservation of what then is left; to maintaining in the Union those States which are termed loyal, and the retention of the Territory of the West. May God grant that this contingency may never happen, but it becomes us as men to look it boldly in the face. Let us take security against it, if possible, especially when by so doing we shall be pursuing the surest mode for crushing the rebellion in every part and restoring the Union to its former limits. The plan which I have to suggest is the complete clearing out of all obstacles to the navigation of the Mississippi River, and the thorough conquest of the States on the western bank between the State of Missouri and the Gulf of Mexico. On the western bank are the States of Arkansas and Louisiana. Arkansas has a population of about 325,000 white citizens and 110,000 slaves, and a very large percentage of her white population are in the rebel army, and are serving east of the Mississippi. Of the fighting population of western Louisiana not less than fifty per cent. are in the rebel army and east of the river.

"The river, once in our possession and occupied by our gunboats, can never be crossed by a rebel army, and the fighting men now without those States could never get back to their relief. To make the conquest of these States thorough and complete, your proclamation should be extended in every county, every township, and upon every plantation. All this can be done in less than ninety days, with an army of less than 100,000 men. Texas would then

be entirely isolated from the Southern Confederacy and would readily fall into our hands. She undoubtedly has a large Union element in her population, and, with her complete separation from the people of the other rebel States, could make but a feeble resistance. When this shall be accomplished a glance at the map will show what immense advantage will have been obtained. The remaining rebel States, separated by the river, would be cut off effectually from all the Territories and from the States of Mexico. The dangers to be apprehended from French aggressions in Mexico would be avoided. The entire western part of the continent now belonging to the government would be secured to us, and all communication between the rebel States and the Pacific entirely stopped.

"The work of conquest in Arkansas and Louisiana would then be easy and certain, and the presence of our gunboats in the river would effectually prevent any large forces from crossing from the east to the relief of these States. The complete emancipation which would and should be made of all the slaves in Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas would place these States on a very different footing from any other rebel territory which we have heretofore overcome. But another result to be gained by the accomplishment of this plan will be the creation of a guaranty against the further depreciation of the loyalty of the Northwestern States by giving the assurance that whatever may be the result of the war the free navigation and control of the Mississippi River will be secured at all events."

The wisdom of the policy thus outlined by Governor Morton was seen when the Government did at last wake up to the necessity of reclaiming the Mississippi. When Vicksburg fell the doom of the Confederacy was sealed.

Governor Morton had at one time seriously contemplated going into the army himself, and had he done so, there is little reason to doubt that he would have ranked as one of the most successful volunteer Generals. On the 9th of August, 1861, he wrote the following letter to President Lincoln:

"Indiana will soon have 37,000 men in the field, infantry, cavalry and artillery. The last 10,000 I desire to organize into a complete army corps and command them

myself in the Southwestern expedition. I intend it to be the most complete volunteer army that ever took the field on this continent. Schools of instruction will be opened for the officers, and the privates practiced at shooting at the target. No labor or pains will be spared to make officers and men most efficient. Lieutenant Colonel Wood, of the United States Army, who is the mustering officer in this State, is an able and highly accomplished officer, and I desire that he may be made Brigadier General and appointed to a command in this corps."

CHAPTER XXXVII.

CONDITIONS AFTER FIRST CAMPAIGN.

Before the three months' campaign was closed it was seen that the war was not to be ended at once, and the Government became willing to accept more troops, and for a period of three years, although few believed the war would last that long. Indiana was ready with six regiments already in the service of the State, in anticipation of an increased demand from the National Government, and some of those regiments were in the field before the first six had been discharged. By this time the greatest activity was displayed in Indiana and other loyal States. Kentucky was still occupying its attitude of armed neutrality, but Missouri was calling for troops, as well as the East. The battle of Bull Run had been the last effort of the three months' campaign. It ought not to have been fought, and would not have been, had the troops been enlisted for a longer term of service. The term of nearly all the regiments in McDowell's army was about to expire, and it was felt that something must be done before they were sent home to be mustered out, so they were hurried into battle, and a rout followed.

McClellan had been transferred to the East, and at once began the organization of a grand army. He demanded that extraordinary efforts be made to increase his army. The campaign in Western Virginia was still going on, under the command of General Rosecrans, and matters in Missouri were assuming an interesting phase. Regiment after regiment was being recruited in Indiana and hurried to the field, wherever it seemed they were most needed. In

Government circles all appeared to be at sea. Generals in the field thought they must call on Governors of loyal States for reinforcements, and order troops to their departments from any source whatsoever. Hence great confusion existed. Nobody seemed to know what to do, so far as carrying on a campaign was concerned. In the East all the troops were sent to Washington, while Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and the other Western States were supposed to look after matters in the West and Southwest. "Fuss and feathers" appeared to be the rule with the commanding Generals. Gorgeously appointed staffs were organized, and the "pomp," if not the "circumstance" of glorious war prevailed everywhere in the field, while in the loyal States every energy of the authorities was bent toward raising and equipping the troops called for. Had the Generals been half as earnest in prosecuting the duties right before them, as they were in trying to get their powers enlarged, the war would not have lasted out the year 1862.

Let us now look at the condition of affairs at the close of the first campaign. In Missouri the majority of the people were loyal, but the Governor and the State authorities were in sympathy with the Confederacy, and sought, by every means in their power, to precipitate the State into rebellion. Fortunately for Missouri and the country, at the outbreak of the war Captain Nathaniel Lyon was in command at St. Louis. He was an ardent patriot and a man of great energy and executive ability. He seemed to know what ought to be done, and had the nerve and courage to do it. He seized upon the Government arms in the arsenal, just in time to prevent their being captured by the Confederate element; he dispersed the "State Guards," which had been organized for the purpose of forcing the State into secession; he gave the people emphatically to understand that he would tolerate no disloyalty, and as soon as he could gather a sufficient force he began driving the various bands of secession troops from the State. He infused his own ardent patriotism and restless energy into every one about him.

The Confederates, under Polk and Marmaduke, invaded the State, and united with troops raised for the Southern army by Sterling Price. They seized Lexington, Boonville and other places. Lyon prepared to drive them out. With

what few troops he could command he rushed like a whirlwind upon them at Lexington and Boonville, drove them in confusion into the southwestern part of the State, and then pursued them thither. Wherever they went Lyon went also. He was ever at their heels, giving them no time to rally.

The Confederates tried to concentrate in the southwestern part of the State, where they were joined by McCulloch with his Texans. Colonel Franz Sigel had been sent by Lyon into that part of the State. Sigel's force was largely outnumbered, and was compelled to retreat. Lyon left Boonville on the 3d of July, with less than 3000 men and four pieces of artillery. On the 13th he joined Sigel at Springfield. His march was one of the most remarkable of the war. The combined Confederate force opposed to him was about 20,000, yet Lyon bravely determined to meet it and try the fortune of battle. On the 1st of August, with 5500 infantry, 400 horse, and eighteen guns, he started toward Cassville. At Dug Springs they met a large Confederate force under General Rains. A battle almost immediately opened, when one of those chance circumstances occurred which are both heroic and decisive. The Union cavalry, about one hundred and fifty strong, was in advance, opposed to some five hundred Confederates. Suddenly a subordinate officer in the Union cavalry shouted "Charge," and twenty-five of the cavalry followed him in a headlong attack on the Confederate line. They rode through it, cutting right and left with their sabres, when the Confederates broke and fled in confusion, before the little band could be supported by its fellows.

This little affair caused consternation among the Confederates, and McCulloch wanted to retreat into Arkansas. General Polk, however, ordered an advance. The advance was made with about 23,000 men, and on August 9th they encamped on Wilson's Creek. Lyon had only about 5000 men, but he determined to attack. It is not necessary to describe the battle which followed. Although it ended in the defeat of the Union troops and the death of the gallant Lyon, it was a glorious day for the Federals, and served as an object lesson to both North and South.

Just about this time General John C. Fremont assumed command in Missouri. His appointment awakened great

enthusiasm throughout the country, especially in the West, but he proved a disappointment. The Confederates, encouraged by their success at Wilson's Creek, again overran a great part of Missouri. Instead of meeting them as Lyon had done, Fremont seemed to be lost in a maze of uncertainty and doubt, giving no heed to the information sent him by officers and loyal citizens. It appeared that he was planning a "great campaign," in which he was to march from St. Louis to New Orleans, cleaning up things as he proceeded. He burdened the wires with appeals for reinforcements. Day after day, and sometimes three or four times a day, he would wire Governor Morton begging for troops, making large promises of what he would do if troops were furnished him. The Governor replied that he had the men, and would send them forward as soon as he could get arms and clothing, and horses for the artillery. Finally Fremont appealed to the President, and Mr. Lincoln telegraphed the Governor on the 15th of August:

"Send your four regiments to St. Louis at the earliest moment possible. Get such harness as may be necessary for your rifled guns. Do not delay a single regiment, but hasten everything forward as soon as any one regiment is ready."

Fremont had said time and again to Governor Morton that he had plenty of arms and clothing at St. Louis, and could arm and equip the regiments and furnish horses for the batteries. On receiving this order from the President the Governor hastened forward the troops without arms or uniforms, or equipment of any kind, and the batteries without horses. When they arrived at St. Louis they found that Fremont did not have a single musket, blanket or uniform. He then reprimanded the Governor very strongly for sending him unarmed and unclothed men. He even went so far as to angrily order Captain W. W. Frybarger to return to Indianapolis with his battery until horses could be procured. The Captain refused, and under instructions from Governor Morton procured what equipment was needed at St. Louis.

Two of the Indiana regiments thus sent forward suffered considerably for several weeks until they could be supplied from Indianapolis, and Governor Morton had finally to procure arms for them and send to them. All this

time Fremont was sending long letters to the President, telling him what ought to be done in the other departments. Colonel Jeff C. Davis, in command of the Twenty-second Indiana regiment, was sent to Jefferson City, where he was placed in command of all the troops at that place. Price had advanced into the State and threatened to besiege Lexington, where Colonel Mulligan had a small force. Fremont was notified of the danger. He had several thousand soldiers at St. Louis. Davis was at Jefferson City with about 10,000 men, but was held there by positive orders from Fremont. Price moved up slowly, and Mulligan, after a most heroic defense for seventy-two hours, was forced to surrender. Then Fremont woke up, and prepared to move against the enemy.

He moved out with a large army, and finally drove the Confederates from all Northern Missouri, and confined them to a section in the extreme southern and southwestern part of the State. He was then relieved of his command, and General Henry W. Halleck succeeded him. About the time this change of commanders was made, General Pope, commander of one division of the army in Missouri, learned that a considerable force of Confederates had collected near Milford, and he ordered Colonel Jeff C. Davis, in command of a brigade, to disperse them. Davis' brigade consisted of the Eighth, Eighteenth, Twenty-second and Twenty-fourth Indiana regiments, and the Twenty-seventh Ohio, with two regiments of cavalry and two batteries of light artillery. The gallant Indianan promptly moved out, attacked a bridge guarded by a strong force, carried it and captured 1300 prisoners, eight hundred horses and mules, one thousand stand of arms, and seventy wagons loaded with camp equipage, with all the tents and supplies of every kind.

Before this expedition an unfortunate occurrence had deprived the Twenty-second of its Major, and the country of a most gallant and meritorious officer. While at Jefferson City, Colonel Davis was ordered to send an expedition up the Missouri River to break up some Confederate camps. On the 18th of September, 1861, he sent three steamers, bearing the Twenty-sixth Indiana, and portions of the Twenty-second and Twenty-fourth. At Boonville they were met by the remaining companies of the Twenty-sec-

ond, under Major Gordon Tanner, and another steamer was added to the expedition. Colonel Wheatley's regiment was bound for Lexington, and the Eighteenth and Twenty-second for the vicinity of Glasgow. Late in the evening of the 19th six companies from the two last named regiments were landed under Major Tanner, about five miles below Glasgow, to surround the place, it having been reported that a number of Confederates were there. Unknown to Major Tanner, or Colonel Hendrickson, Colonel Wheatly, of the Twenty-sixth, had landed a small party to act as pickets, he having tied his boats to the bank for the night. The two parties meeting in the darkness, and mistaking each other for enemies, a brisk musketry fire began. Before the mistake was discovered and the firing stopped, three of the Eighteenth and one of the Twenty-second were killed, and seven or eight wounded, among them being Major Tanner, who died a few days later.

Under the hurry calls for troops from Fremont, the following Indiana organizations had been sent to Missouri: Eight companies of the First cavalry, the Eighth, Eighteenth, Twenty-second, Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth infantry, and the First, Second and Third batteries. On the 16th of October, Colonel Conrad Baker, in command of the First Indiana cavalry, and a part of the Twenty-first Illinois cavalry, administered a severe defeat to Jeff Thompson at Fredericktown, chasing the Confederates more than twenty miles. Just before Fremont's removal from command he had ordered General Grant, at Cairo, to make a movement toward Columbus, Kentucky. Grant was not the man to wait after receiving an order, or even permission to move, and the battle of Belmont followed.

At the end of 1861 the situation in Missouri stood: Halleck in chief command, with a force of nearly 100,000 men under him, the Federals holding all the northern and one-half of the southern part of the State. Guerrilla bands roamed here and there, robbing and pillaging, while Price had a considerable Confederate force in the southwestern section, where he could invade other portions of the State, or retreat into Arkansas, as circumstances might require.

Let us turn now to Kentucky. On the 6th of September, 1861, General Grant had secured Paducah; the Confeder-

ates, under General Polk, occupied and fortified Columbus about the same time, while Zollicoffer held Cumberland Gap. Buckner soon after occupied Bowling Green. General Robert Anderson was at first placed in command in Kentucky, but owing to failing health was soon relieved and was replaced by General William T. Sherman. Sherman, with the true prescience of a soldier, saw at once the magnitude of the task before the Government, but at that time was very excitable, and like all the other early commanders of departments, was easily led away by the extravagant rumors which floated around so freely. So, like Fremont, in Missouri, he clamored for troops. Governor Morton seemed to be the recipient of most of his calls. One moment Sherman would wire the Governor that the Confederates, many thousand strong, were only a few miles from Louisville; an hour or two later he would send word that a force, far exceeding his own, had appeared in another direction, and unless help speedily reached him he would be forced to abandon the State. Before night he would wire that the information which had so alarmed him had proved to be unreliable.

General George H. Thomas had also been assigned to duty in Kentucky. He was anxious to take the offensive and drive the Confederates from Eastern Kentucky, and thereby relieve the Union men of that part of the State, and, also, of Eastern Tennessee, but he was held back. After the breaking of the neutrality assumed by Kentucky the necessity for sending to that State a very large force was apparent to all, and Ohio, Indiana and Illinois were called upon to urge forward their regiments. On the 20th of September, 1861, the Sixth regiment, having been reorganized for the three years' service, entered Kentucky. Before the close of the year Indiana had the following organizations in Kentucky:

Infantry—Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twenty-third, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty-first, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fourth, Thirty-fifth, Thirty-sixth, Thirty-seventh, Thirty-eighth, Thirty-ninth, Forty-second, Forty-third, Forty-fourth and Forty-sixth regiments; left wing of the Third cavalry and the Fifth and Sixth batteries of artillery.

Until the close of 1861 the service in Kentucky consisted chiefly of making hard marches, here, there and every-

where, as rumors would be received of advances by the Confederates. Let us take the experience of the Thirty-third as a sample of the whole, although this may not be entirely just, as the Thirty-third suffered more than any other Indiana regiment in Kentucky during those months. But its experience ought to be recorded. It was first sent to Camp Dick Robinson, situated about thirty miles south of Lexington. Within a day or two after its arrival about 10,000 troops had collected there, the Thirty-third being the only regiment having anything like a supply of equipage. General Sherman at that time was so discouraged about the condition of the troops that he wrote: "We are moving heaven and earth to get arms, clothing and money necessary in Kentucky, but McClellan and Fremont have made such heavy drafts that the supply is scant." The demands from different points of the State were so great that Sherman wrote to a leading Kentuckian that it would require 300,000 men to fill half the calls.

It was not long until the Thirty-third was sent to the neighborhood of Crab Orchard. In October the regiment made a hasty march over wretched roads to reinforce Colonel Garrard at Wild Cat. On the morning of the 21st of October the Confederates, under General Zollicoffer, attacked the troops at Wild Cat, and a battle lasting two hours followed. Four companies of the Thirty-third were on the skirmish line, and at the first fire, Private Lewis G. McFaren, of Company D, was killed, being the first Union soldier killed in battle in Kentucky, as John Hollenbeck had been the first in Virginia. This was the first battle of what afterward became the famous Army of the Cumberland, and so highly was the conduct of the Thirty-third regarded that it was made the first regiment of the first division of that army. The regiment lost two killed and fifteen wounded, one of whom subsequently died. W. D. Bicknell, correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial, an eye witness of the battle, in his account of it said: "The chief credit of the fight belongs to Colonel Coburn and four companies of the Thirty-third Indiana, their officers, and Adjutant Durham. The Seventeenth Ohio did important service, and would have fought gallantly had the Hoosiers not whipped the rebels before the Buckeyes got a fair show." This battle was not a great one, but it had very important

results. It prevented Zollicoffer from invading Kentucky and establishing Confederate headquarters at Lexington, as he had designed.

The Thirty-third regiment went into camp at London for a short time, and had begun making preparations for the winter when it was ordered back to Crab Orchard. Of this march, and the subsequent experience of the regiment at Crab Orchard, John R. McBride, historian of the regiment, says:

"Thus was ordered the march from London back to Crab Orchard, which march for wretched management was not excelled during the war, resulting, as it did, in wrecked constitutions and the loss directly of many valuable lives. The order was not promulgated to the Thirty-third Indiana until 3 o'clock p. m. of the 13th, but the preparations were made with alacrity, and before the afternoon had lost itself in the darkness which followed, the regiment was ready and waiting the order to move. It was not, however, until about 10 o'clock at night that the regiment moved out. Shortly afterward a cold, dreary rain began to fall in torrents. The road soon became almost impassable, and the mountain streams were swollen in volume to and beyond their banks. All nature seemed angry, and every conceivable object apparently operated against the success of the movement.

"The march continued all through the night, and when daylight came a most deplorable scene presented itself, which gradually assumed more aggravated form. Wagons were stuck in the mud, and the mules had given way to sheer exhaustion. There was no attempt at organization now. Owing to the difficulties of the march the different commands were broken up altogether. The men had become exhausted, and in a state of desperation many of them threw away their knapsacks. The Tennesseans were especially overwhelmed with sorrow and indignation, as they had been assured that the rescue of Cumberland Gap, as an objective point, would be pushed to an issue. They became sullen and threats of mutiny were heard in their midst. The rain continued to pour down, and the march, as applied to the men, did not end till the night of the 15th. There was no need of haste in the movement as there was no positive evidence of immediate danger.

"The Thirty-third Indiana, when the march began, was in the rear of the entire command, and consequently the recipient of all stragglers. It reached Rockcastle River at daylight, and owing to an insufficient ferry the south bank was lined by a confused mass of soldiers. When it was discovered that the ferry arrangements were too limited, the general officer should have restored order by separating the commands, but he did not, and probably knew nothing of the confusion at the time. The troops were new, and for that reason, probably, they were the more unmanageable, but it is clear now that General Schoepf was not equal to the emergency, in failing to look after his command. The confused condition of the ferry increased as the day advanced. In the absence of the General in command Colonel Coburn did everything possible to restore order and to get the Thirty-third across the river. Sometimes it was almost a fight for the boat, which, however, by the direction of the Colonel, Captain Wellman, of Company A, took charge of and managed very well.

"In crossing the river the Fourteenth Ohio lost two wagons and contents, including about thirty thousand rounds of ammunition. The Seventeenth Ohio lost a wagon and twenty-six thousand rounds of ammunition. The Tennesseans lost two wagons and contents, with three horses, and the Thirty-eighth Ohio lost one wagon. The loss of this property to the army at that time was no inconsiderable amount, but how insignificant it appears when compared with the unnecessary loss of so many human lives. Less than two months in the army, and five or six regiments of stalwart men almost entirely stricken down by a blunder!

"When the Thirty-third Indiana left London one hundred and eighty-nine men were on the sick list, and contrary to the remonstrance of Colonel Coburn and Surgeon McPheeters, they were taken from the hospitals, placed in open wagons, and moved with the army. Many of the sick were unable to endure the discomforts of the march, and had to be left at Mount Vernon—some of them to die—and two days later, when Crab Orchard was reached, the sick numbered two hundred and fifty, as well as a like number in each of the Fourteenth, Seventeenth and Thirty-eighth Ohio regiments."

The town of Crab Orchard contained vacant school houses, churches and public buildings, and Colonel Coburn wanted to house his men in them, but they were sent four miles to camp in the woods, exposed to a continuous down-pour of rain, until their wagon train, which contained their tents and all their cooking utensils and other camp equipment, which was delayed several days, arrived. Of the further experience of this regiment, Lieutenant McBride says:

"The rigid enforcement of the order to camp in the woods till the wagon trains had arrived exposed the men to an incessant rain, day and night, for nearly a week. The use of fence rails for firewood was forbidden, and in the absence of axes the forest of trees defied the men, so that the facilities for keeping dry and warm, and for cooking rations, were very meager. The result of this exposure was that in less than a month five hundred and eleven of the Thirty-third Indiana were sick and in the hospitals, and of that number sixty-two died. Not a day passed, from the time of our arrival at Crab Orchard until the holidays, but that the mournful notes of the 'Dead March' announced the demise of one or more comrades.

"Within the following sixty days from the 13th of November, when the march began, sixty-two of the regiment died, an average of one a day, twenty more than died from disease in the regiment during the next two succeeding years, 1862 and 1863, and nineteen more than died during the year 1864 and the first six months of 1865."

It is doubtful if there was another regiment in the entire army during the war that suffered a like fatality in the same length of time. This story of the march from London is given as an example of what the soldiers had to endure in the early months of the struggle, from the ignorance or carelessness of the officers in command. In this case both Generals Thomas and Sherman were certainly at fault. General Sherman had been alarmed by one of those thousand stories of "reliable information" that his line was threatened by a strong force of rebels, and ordered Thomas to concentrate for his assistance. Thomas did not believe the information reliable, but ordered the hasty concentration. The result was that even had Sherman been in danger, this fine brigade was so reduced by the march and exposure that it could not have rendered him any assistance.

A member of the Fifty-seventh thus describes a foolish march that regiment was called upon to make on one occasion:

"Of all the marches ever made, perhaps the most senseless, as well as the most painful, was that to Altomont. This small hamlet was perched away up among the mountains, and was a place of no importance in any sense of the word, but a rumor came into camp that two regiments of rebels were stationed there. Had there been any rebels there no greater harm could have befallen them than leaving them in that out of the way place. The smallest particle of military sense upon the part of those in command would have satisfied them that there could be no foundation for the rumor, for rebel troops in such a place could neither hurt us nor help themselves, but the rumor was enough, and a plan was matured to capture them. Up the mountain we toiled under an August sun, the artillery being assisted by details of men. No water was to be had, and the road was of deep sand, that filled the shoes of the men and blistered their feet. After the march, occupying nearly the whole day, we reached the place only to find that no rebels were there. But our sufferings were not over, for still we had no water, and none could be obtained nearer than the camp we left in the morning. So back we turned, to wade through six miles of sand and then down the mountain. We would have given all the world for a cup of cold water."

The main force of the enemy in Kentucky was at Bowling Green, and many a wild rumor went forth as to the number there concentrated and the terrible plans that were being concocted to overthrow the Union forces. General Sherman had given place to General Don Carlos Buell. He reorganized the army and brought some sort of order out of the chaos that had previously reigned. By December he had a force of 100,000 or more well equipped soldiers in the field, but was slow in making a forward move. The southern force at Bowling Green was estimated all the way from 40,000 to 200,000, and these mere rumors of great strength operated to hold our Generals in check. President Lincoln was once asked how many men the Confederates had in the field, and with a twinkle of the eye, promptly replied, "From 1,200,000 to 1,500,000." When this esti-

mate was doubted, he said that he knew the Union had 600,000 men in the field, and as every one of the Union Generals was confronted by more than double his own numbers, the enemy must have at least the number given. It was demonstrated afterward that never at any time were there 40,000 Confederates at Bowling Green. It is rather humiliating to think that on mere rumor such a force could hold in check for months an army that could have concentrated 100,000 within a week.

In December, however, Buell determined to make an advance, and on the 9th General Johnson's brigade moved forward to Green River. A few days later the Thirty-second Indiana had a brilliant engagement at Rowlett's Station with a part of the Confederate forces. The regiment had constructed a bridge across the river, and four companies had passed over, when they were attacked by cavalry and infantry. Colonel Willich sent over four more companies, and the eight companies repulsed several charges, and finally drove the enemy off the ground. The Thirty-second lost in this engagement thirteen killed and ten wounded.

During the latter part of 1861 Indiana had in Western Virginia the Seventh, Ninth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Seventeenth regiments of infantry, and the right wing of the First cavalry. Rosecrans was in command, and General Robert E. Lee commanded the Confederates. It was a mountainous country, but being a part of the "Old Dominion" the Confederates were very anxious to whip it back into allegiance, while the Government was determined that it should be defended. On the 1st of September the situation was as follows: Floyd and Wise were at Greenbrier, with 16,000 men, as was supposed, watched by Cox with 3000; Rosecrans was at Clarksburg, watching Lee, while Reynolds and Kimball held possession of the passes. On the 3d Rosecrans slipped away from Lee with the object of joining Cox and falling upon Wise and Floyd. Lee was shut up in the valleys, and in rather a precarious condition should the Union forces be combined against him. Reynolds had with him the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Indiana regiments, and Bracken's Indiana cavalry, two Ohio regiments and some West Virginia troops. He held the line from Webster to the summit

of Cheat Mountain. On the 10th of September Rosecrans had a brisk engagement with the enemy at Carnifax Ferry, the victory remaining with him.

By this time Reynolds had been joined by the Seventeenth Indiana. Lee manœuvred to throw his force between Reynolds and Kimball, who was guarding Grand Pass. On the 11th, he was at Elkwater with about all his force. Reynolds saw the danger to Kimball, and determined that he should not be sacrificed. The attack on Kimball was made, but was repulsed, and late the next day Lee withdrew, having been completely baffled.

General Reynolds, being reinforced by the Seventh and Ninth Indiana and some other troops, determined to take the offensive against the Confederate position at Greenbrier. A brisk engagement followed without any decisive results, but a few days later the enemy retired. In December General Milroy, with the Ninth and Thirteenth Indiana, had an unsuccessful engagement at Buffalo Hill.

It remains now to consider the condition of affairs on the Potomac where Indiana had the Twelfth, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-first regiments, with the Twenty-seventh, and the right wing of the Third cavalry, in Maryland. The great army of the Government was being assembled and organized on the Potomac. As the months rolled away and no movement was made by that army the people began to grow impatient, but General McClellan was not to be moved by their clamor. During the summer, autumn and the early winter many regiments were added to his forces; batteries were organized, great stores of war munitions accumulated, and the work of perfecting the army went on.

While McClellan was organizing his great army to operate against Richmond and the center of the Confederacy, expeditions were prepared for work along the Atlantic coast in maintaining a blockade. Unless the Government could prevent the running in of supplies to the South from Europe, the war was certain to continue indefinitely and probably to end at last in the triumph of the Confederacy. It was designed to seize upon several places along the Atlantic seaboard, which offered unusual facilities for blockade running. Among those places was Hatteras Inlet. It

had been taken possession of by Federal troops with the co-operation of the navy.

Among the Indiana troops sent to the East was the Twentieth regiment. It had a very hard introduction to war. It was ordered to Hatteras Inlet and arrived there on the 27th of September, 1861. It was sent up Pamlico Sound, and landed at a settlement called Chicomacomico. It was a dreary place, but the regiment prepared to make the best of it. On the 2d of October the men were eagerly watching for the arrival of the steamer that was to bring them supplies, of which they were very short. The steamer was seen approaching, and when about two miles away it ran aground and was captured, with all its supplies of food and ammunition. On the morning of the 4th a Confederate fleet made its appearance and shelled the regiment. The commanding officer at Fort Hatteras sent orders for the regiment to retreat to Hatteras Light House. It was a terrible march over hot, white sand, and for the first ten miles without any water. The Light House was reached about midnight, the regiment having marched twenty-eight miles, suffering greatly from thirst. Here it camped on a narrow neck of land. About 4 o'clock on the morning of the first of November the men were awakened by cries from the sentinels that the sea was coming over the neck of land. The men fled to the little fort, the waters all around them, washing away their tents, clothing and all they had. They escaped with their lives, but that was all.

Events as a whole during 1861 had been favorable to the Union. The Federal soldiers had met with some repulses and two great disasters—Bull Run and Ball's Bluff—but otherwise they had generally met with success, and the situation looked hopeful. Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri had been held true to the Union; the Confederates had been nearly driven from Missouri; in Kentucky they held a line stretching from Cumberland Gap to Columbus, but they had not been able to make any material headway, and were confronted by Buell with more than 100,000 men, well armed and equipped. Halleck had about 100,000 men in his department, which included besides Missouri, Cairo, Illinois, and Paducah, Kentucky. In the East McClellan had assembled an army nearly 200,000 strong. Part of it was under Banks, in the Shenandoah Valley, but all ready

for a forward movement. In West Virginia the Federals had been uniformly successful, and that section was almost wholly in their hands. In addition the blockade of the Southern ports on the Atlantic coast was daily being tightened.

There was dissatisfaction among the people that more had not been done. They could not be made to understand why McClellan had not made a forward movement in the East, and why Buell and Halleck had been so quiet in the West. They had sent thousands of men to the front to fight, as they, as well as the soldiers, believed. But different counsels had prevailed. Thus ended 1861.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

OPENING CAMPAIGN OF 1862.

The winter months of 1861-2 dragged slowly along, the people anxious and impatient, the Generals in command of the armies inert. Buell in Kentucky and Halleck in Missouri were demanding more men, while the latter at the same time was beseeching the President to put Buell under his orders, promising if that was done "to end the rebellion in the West in thirty days." McClellan on the Potomac was declaring that he could not move until spring; that it was impossible to make a winter campaign, and that he needed at least 50,000 more troops. The only man who seemed anxious to do something was Grant at Cairo, and he was in a subordinate position. He repeatedly wrote Halleck that if permitted he could take Forts Henry and Donelson in ten days. Those two forts controlled the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, and were both strong positions. Grant even went so far as to make a trip to St. Louis, to urge the matter on Halleck, but said that he was cut off so short that he returned to Cairo quite crestfallen.

I have said that Grant was the only one anxious to move. Grant was the only one that asked permission to move, but there was another quite as ready and willing to move when orders came, and that was George H. Thomas. General Thomas had been placed in command of the first division of Buell's army, with headquarters at Lebanon. The Confederates were encamped at Mill Springs, on the Cumberland. On December 29th, 1861, General Buell instructed Thomas to drive the Confederates out. Thomas at once gave orders to concentrate his army, and set about

the work assigned him. General Crittenden had assumed command of the Confederates and thought to overwhelm and destroy Thomas before all his troops could get together. Just about daylight, on the morning of the 19th of January, 1862, the cavalry pickets announced the approach of the Confederates, and Colonel Manson, of Indiana, commanding the first brigade, which was in advance, promptly threw forward his own regiment, the Tenth Indiana. General Thomas was notified of the presence of the enemy and hurried to the front, and it was not long until a fierce battle was raging.

It resulted in a decisive victory for Thomas. The Confederates were repulsed in every assault made, and that night retreated toward Tennessee. The results of the victory were the capture of twelve guns, a large number of small arms, a large amount of ammunition and stores of all kinds, and more than a thousand horses and mules, with one hundred and fifty wagons. General Zollicoffer, the Confederate commander, was among the killed.

This was the first important victory of the Union troops during the war, and renewed confidence throughout the North. It demonstrated that General Thomas was right when he assured Buell that he could break the Confederate line if given the opportunity. Zollicoffer for weeks had been permitted to raid the country, and at one time strongly threatened a Union brigade at Somerset. Thomas wanted to send reinforcements, but Buell had denied the request, saying that he did not intend "to be diverted from more important operations" by the annoying affair at Somerset. Finally the Confederates became so aggressive that he was forced to give permission to Thomas to move, and the result was the victory of Mill Springs. Indiana had but one regiment in the battle, the Tenth, but it did its duty nobly, and was highly commended by General Thomas.

Indiana had in Buell's army the following regiments and batteries: Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty-first, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fourth, Thirty-sixth, Thirty-seventh, Thirty-eighth, Thirty-ninth, Fortieth, Forty-ninth, Fifty-first, Fifty-seventh and Fifty-eighth regiments, and the Fifth, Seventh and Tenth batteries. Before a forward movement was made, however, the Thirty-first and Thirty-fourth were

sent to join Grant in front of Fort Donelson. Some of these regiments were left in Kentucky, and the work they performed will be related hereafter, while the others went with Buell, first to Bowling Green and Nashville, and later to the aid of Grant at Shiloh. But before taking up the further movements of Buell's army it will be necessary to devote some attention to Grant, as Buell's movements depended upon those of Grant.

Grant was at Cairo with fifteen or twenty thousand men, fretting because he could not obtain the consent of Halleck to attack Forts Henry and Donelson. At the same place was Commodore Foote, in command of a fleet of gunboats. Grant interested the Commodore in his plans, and at last was authorized to move. Permission was all Grant wanted and he sprang at his foe. Grant received orders on the 1st of February, and at once seized all the steamers then at Cairo and embarked about one-half of his men, who were started for Fort Henry, convoyed by the fleet. The troops reached the vicinity of the fort on the 4th and were disembarked, and the steamers sent back for the others. On the 5th Grant made a reconnoissance and found he would have to land his troops some distance below the fort. While he was hurrying his other troops forward, confident that he could take the fort, Halleck became alarmed and telegraphed in every direction for reinforcements. In one of his dispatches to McClellan Halleck said that unless reinforcements were sent to him at once he would probably fail in taking Fort Henry, but if 10,000 additional troops were given him he would capture the fort, cut the enemy's line and "paralyze Columbus," and if given 25,000 he would capture Nashville. However, the fleet, without anything more than a demonstration by Grant, captured Fort Henry after a short bombardment.

Then Halleck seemed to be more apprehensive than ever. He ordered Grant to "entrench himself strongly" at Fort Henry, but Grant started across the country to Fort Donelson. On the 10th of February Halleck wired McClellan: "Do send me more troops. It is the crisis of the war in the West." Grant moved out against Donelson on the 12th. On the 15th Halleck wired McClellan: "Garrison at Fort Donelson 30,000. I must have more troops. It is a military necessity." On that very day Grant had practically taken

the Fort with all its garrison. The garrison had attempted to cut its way out, but had been driven back, and the next morning surrendered.

Indiana had with Grant the Eleventh, Twenty-fifth, Thirty-first, Forty-fourth and Fifty-second regiments. In the second division, commanded by General C. F. Smith, were the Twenty-fifth and Fifty-second regiments. In the third division, commanded by General Lew Wallace, were the Eleventh, Thirty-first and Forty-fourth. On the 13th the Twenty-fifth was sent to charge the Confederates in front of the line, drive them back, and thus enable the investing army to perfect its line on that portion of the field. The Confederates were strongly defended by a battery, and the regiment had a hard fight. It was under fire for two hours, and fourteen men were killed and sixty-one wounded before it was finally withdrawn.

On the 14th Colonel Cook's brigade, to which the Fifty-second belonged, skirmished nearly the whole day with the enemy, the fighting sometimes being very severe. It finally succeeded in getting a position within six hundred yards of the Confederate works. It held the position thus won during that night and the next day. This victory materially assisted in the final capture of the stronghold.

During the three days, the 13th, 14th and 15th, Grant had succeeded in getting up his whole force, amounting to about 22,000 men. The weather had been terrible, the nights cold and stormy, and the men were without shelter, and so close to the works they could not light fires. Hence their suffering was extreme, but they were anxious to fight it out. On the night of the 14th the commanders inside the Fort held a stormy council, and it was determined that the garrison should cut its way out. Early the next morning the movement began, the Confederates coming out in force. McClellan, with his division of Illinois troops, was across their only line of retreat, and on him the blow fell. It came suddenly and heavily, but the Union troops proved themselves equal to the occasion. McClellan's men fought until their ammunition was exhausted. General

Grant was some distance away when the battle began, consulting with Commodore Foote, who had been wounded. He hastened to the field. Wallace was next to McClernand, and when that officer found he would be unable to hold his line without help, Wallace, without waiting for orders, sent him Cruft's brigade, in which were the Thirty-first and Forty-fourth Indiana regiments.

Their guide deserted them before they got into position, and while the brigade was hunting a place to get into line it was hotly attacked by the enemy. They formed their line while under this fire and repulsed the enemy. The troops of McClernand being driven back left Cruft's brigade without support, and it had to withstand several assaults, which it did with great success. This brigade, with that of Morgan L. Smith, in which was the Eleventh Indiana, was now to undertake the work of driving the enemy from the line they had taken. General Grant ordered an advance along his whole line, and the duty of Wallace's division was to recover the ground from which McClernand had been driven after desperate fighting. The enemy was in force on the hill, heavily protected by woods. Through these woods the Eighth Missouri and the Eleventh Indiana charged. The fighting was at very close range. Sometimes a skirmisher from the Union army would be on one side of a tree, and one from the Confederates on the other. The Forty-fourth followed the road up the hill, while five companies of the Thirty-first went up the hill on the extreme left, the other five companies being ordered to outflank the enemy and get in the rear. The fight was of the hottest character, but Wallace's two brigades were not to be turned from their purpose, and drove the enemy back inside their works, Wallace occupying a position within one hundred and fifty yards of the Confederate works.

The Fifty-second Indiana and the Second Iowa led the advance of Smith's division and quickly drove the enemy back, and the Second Iowa entered the Confederate breastworks. Colonel Lauman, in whose brigade was the Twenty-fifth, went to the support of Cook and captured the batteries which had been doing such deadly execution, and that

regiment also entered the works. The next day the fort surrendered. The losses to the five Indiana regiments engaged were:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Eleventh	4	29	33
Twenty-fifth	16	75	91
Thirty-first	9	52	61
Forty-fourth	7	35	42
Fifty-second	4	48	52
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Aggregate	40	239	279

Immediately after the capture of Donelson General Grant sent word to Halleck that he should proceed at once to take Clarksville, and then Nashville. Halleck had been so persistent in urging that Buell should either come to his relief, or make a demonstration in favor of Grant, that Buell began a forward movement in earnest. It was supposed that the main Confederate force was at Bowling Green, and it had been variously reported as to strength. Sometimes it was said to be 160,000 strong, and at other times it was rated at sixty or seventy thousand, and Buell had been held in check by these exaggerated reports. On the 13th of February General Buell gave orders for an advance on Bowling Green for the purpose of preventing the Confederates there from sending reinforcements to Fort Donelson. General Ormsby M. Mitchell's division was selected to lead this advance movement. He had three brigades, in one of which was included the Thirty-seventh Indiana. This brigade was commanded by Colonel J. B. Turchin. General Mitchell was one of that class of officers, so seldom found in our army during the first years of the war, who believed in celerity of movement, and in this instance he surprised the enemy, and electrified the North. His movement was a revelation to both armies.

Turchin's brigade was given the advance, with forty-eight miles to march over the worst possible roads, but made it in thirty hours. Bowling Green is situated on the west bank of Barren River, and is surrounded by hills, which had been extensively fortified by the Confederates. They had been anticipating an advance by Buell, and at the

first information of it began the work of evacuation. They did not dream of such rapidity, and were not looking for the Federals, when, to their amazement, about midday on the 15th, a shell dropped in the little town as from the clouds. That shell spread consternation far and wide. The Confederate rear guard was seen to fly in the wildest disorder, after hastily destroying immense quantities of valuable stores. The bridge across Barren River had been destroyed and an unfordable river was between Mitchell and the town, yet the Confederates fled in dire confusion.

At length a loyal citizen informed General Mitchell that some two miles below there was an old flat-bottomed boat, and Turchin's brigade was sent to seize the boat and cross the river. The night was dark, the road exceedingly rough, and the approaches to the river dangerous, and the banks were very precipitous, but by daylight Turchin had succeeded in crossing most of his brigade, and hastened to the town. There a scene of desolation met him. The people had deserted the place. The Confederates had fired the railway station and the residences of several Northern sympathizers. Vast piles of corn and other stores were slowly burning.

This rapid advance of Mitchell prevented the sending of reinforcements to Fort Donelson, compelled the Confederates to abandon one of the strongest points in their line, and carried dismay throughout the South, coming as it did on the heels of the fall of Fort Donelson.

Mitchell began the work of repairing the bridge, and he did that with the same rapidity that he had made his advance. Although the rain poured in torrents, the bridge was completed by the 21st. On the next day he started for Nashville, seventy-five miles away. The roads were in bad condition, but Mitchell believed that victory lay in the legs of his soldiers, and he pushed the enthusiastic men forward almost on the run. On he went, through Franklin, Mitchellsville, Tyree, and on the evening of the 24th reached Edgefield, opposite Nashville. The advance cavalry had reached Nashville the evening previous, and had partially restored order, but still there was great confusion. The Confederates had destroyed the great suspension bridge and large amounts of other valuable public and private property.

Just before the fall of Fort Donelson, Pillow, the commander, sent out a dispatch stating that Grant had been repulsed, and was rapidly retreating northward with his forces in close pursuit. This dispatch was received at Nashville and was at once placarded all over the city, causing much jubilation. The next day being Sunday, the people assembled in their churches to give praise for this "glorious success of the Southern arms," when the news came that Donelson had fallen, that its garrison were prisoners, and that Mitchell was rapidly advancing on the city. There was not a fort, not a Confederate soldier between Nashville and the victorious army of Grant, or the advancing Mitchell, and dire consternation seized upon all. The churches were deserted in the twinkling of an eye, and everybody began trying to get out of the city. The Governor and his Legislature hastily left for the South, and the merchants, believing that everything would be confiscated, threw open their stores and told the people to help themselves. Buell and the rest of his army soon arrived, as did the advance of Grant. Grant was as restless and energetic as Mitchell, and had no sooner captured Donelson than he sent a part of his forces to Clarksville; taking that place they pushed on to Nashville, only to find Mitchell ahead of them.

With Turchin's brigade, which had the advance of Mitchell, was the Thirty-seventh Indiana, and it participated in the hard marching, and had the satisfaction of seeing the Confederates fly in such consternation, showing at all times the discipline of veterans, and the willingness to undergo hardships so characteristic of the American soldier. In this connection it will be proper to follow out the further movements of Mitchell and his division, for it was one of the most remarkable episodes of the war, and had it been sustained by those above him, and attended by the display of similar energy and military genius in other sections of the country, the war would have ended in 1862.

Halleck and Buell had agreed upon a combined movement against Corinth, and Buell was to unite with Grant at Savannah. This was early in March, and on the 28th Buell set out for the Tennessee, to join Grant. He left Mitchell behind, with work cut out for him. Mitchell was to protect the left flank of Halleck, or rather of Grant, and

taking advantage of the concentration of the Confederates at Corinth, was to penetrate as far south as possible. Mitchell left Nashville, and from that time until he was finally halted in front of Chattanooga his blows fell with such rapidity and suddenness as to carry consternation and dismay even to the very doors of Richmond. His first stroke was at Murfreesboro. There he had to stop a while, as the Confederates had destroyed all the bridges in the vicinity, and they had to be rebuilt before he could be supplied with munitions of war for his further march. So rapidly did his men work that they built twelve hundred feet of heavy bridges in ten days. On the 4th of April he was at Shelbyville, and on the 7th started on a rapid march for Fayetteville. He hardly paused there, but pressed on, and in the evening of the 10th arrived at a point within a few miles of Huntsville. A few hours' rest was given the exhausted troops, and at midnight they were on the march again. About dawn of the 11th they entered Huntsville. The people were not dreaming of danger. They had no idea that an enemy was near, and they could not have been more astonished had the army dropped from the clouds. At Huntsville a number of locomotives and cars and a vast amount of stores were captured.

The rapidity of the marching of the division had never been excelled, even on good roads. But over the roads of Southern Tennessee and Northern Alabama, it was more than wonderful. Turchin's brigade always had the advance. General Mitchell did not rest. He had other work to do. Other blows were to be struck. With the captured locomotives and cars he sent troops east and west as fast as steam could carry them, and before the North and South had realized the importance of the capture of Huntsville, Stevenson to the East, and Decatur and Tusculumbia to the West, had fallen into Mitchell's hands, and he had extended his front more than one hundred miles. His restless activity did not permit him to stop, but as soon as Decatur was reached a force was sent still further southward and occupied Russellville. He had thus placed his army midway between Nashville and Corinth, and controlled the navigation of the Tennessee River for more than a hundred miles.

Having done this much Mitchell did not want to stop, and urged that reinforcements be sent to him so that an

advance might be made on Knoxville and Chattanooga. Negley's brigade, in which was the Thirty-eighth Indiana, was sent him, but he was ordered to retire across the Tennessee River. His movements had seriously alarmed the Confederate authorities, and Kirby Smith was gathering a force to contest his further advance. On the 23d of April his line extended from Tuscumbia to Stevenson, but the gathering of the Confederate forces and his failure to receive reinforcements were about to thwart his plans. He wanted to strike a fatal blow at the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, in the rear of the enemy, but the roads, made almost impassable by the incessant rainfall, prevented the movement with the force at his command, and on the 27th of April he withdrew to the south bank of the Tennessee, occupying Stevenson in force.

Three days later, by a forced march and a daring movement, Mitchell attacked the troops of Kirby Smith at Bridgeport, and worsted them. He again urgently asked for reinforcements, especially of cavalry, but Halleck, although he had a large force of cavalry with him in front of Corinth that he did not need, failed to respond. As the Comte De Paris well says, in his "Civil War in America," had Mitchell been given that idle cavalry force he could have struck Gadsden, with all its stores, and Rome, with its extensive cannon foundry, and destroyed the Chattanooga & Atlanta Railroad, thus inflicting incalculable damage on the Confederacy.

On the 14th of May General Negley reached Florence, and preparations at once began for a movement on Chattanooga. On the 1st of June the movement began, and on the 7th the cannon of Negley were thundering at the Chattanooga fortifications. Mitchell was anxious that Buell should assist him, and persisted in his declarations that if he was forced to fall back the door would be left open for the enemy to attack Nashville, or enter Kentucky, just what Bragg did a few weeks later. Buell moved very slowly. He was needlessly alarmed by the Confederate demonstrations against Murfreesboro, and failed to extend the aid so urgently demanded by Mitchell. Negley was forced to fall back, and the golden opportunity was lost. When Buell finally joined Mitchell he was urged to march into Eastern Tennessee, by way of Chattanooga and Cleveland,

and thus relieve the Union inhabitants of that section, but he remained inactive and Bragg slipped away from him. Thus the good results of Mitchell's campaign were lost, and the South regained confidence, while the North lost heart for the time being.

There is no doubt that had Halleck promptly and efficiently reinforced Mitchell when he first occupied Huntsville the Confederacy would have been penetrated to the Gulf. Or, had Buell moved with more alacrity, Chattanooga would have fallen and the invasion of Kentucky with its consequent battles of Richmond, Perryville and Stone's River would not have taken place. At that time the Army of the Ohio (as it was then called), could have marched southward to Mobile, or eastward to the rear of Richmond, with hardly an enemy to have obstructed its way.

A few words ought to be said in regard to General Mitchell. Up to 1863, whenever any Union officer exhibited a disposition to fight the Confederates as if he meant to whip them, serious charges were at once preferred against him. Thus Sherman was charged with being crazy, and Grant with neglect of duty, after the fall of Donelson, and with being drunk at Shiloh, and Mitchell with robbing the people and speculating in cotton. In making these charges against Mitchell the word of Confederates was freely taken by a portion of the Northern press, and by the War Department. General Mitchell always believed that the science of war was to live, if possible, off the enemy, and to fight. Hence he fought whenever he got a chance, and fought hard, and when he needed anything for the subsistence of his troops, or to help them in their warfare against the enemy, he took it. For instance, he once wanted money; the Government could not furnish it; he captured cotton, sold it, and applied the proceeds to the use of his army. At another time when he wanted to cross a river and had no pontoons, he took cotton bales from a Southern fort, and with them made a floating bridge. For these things he was severely censured by certain Northern journals, so tender were they of the enemy's property.

One of the regiments engaged in this expedition suffered disgrace because of incompetent officers—a regiment that when well officered fought as bravely, and as persistently against odds, as any regiment ever fought.

Athens had been captured by Turchin's brigade, and on the 1st of May was occupied by the Eighteenth Ohio, under Colonel Stanley. Mitchell was preparing to move on Chattanooga, and skirmishes were of daily occurrence. On the 1st of May a small Confederate cavalry force attacked the guards stationed at a bridge near Athens. Colonel Stanley with all haste began loading his stores on a train preparatory for running to Huntsville. Finally the Confederates opened on the town with three small howitzers, and without waiting to defend the town, or even to ascertain the strength of the enemy, Stanley hurried off his train and rushed his wagons and men out of town, abandoning his tents and a large quantity of stores. While the fight with the pickets was going on, General Mitchell came up on an engine from Huntsville. He sent word to Stanley to keep up the fight and he would soon bring reinforcements. Nothing, however, could hold Stanley in Athens. After one of his trains had started on its way to Huntsville, some of the Confederates living in the vicinity sawed the timbers of a bridge, so that the second train was wrecked, and forty thousand rations destroyed.

The next day the other regiments of the brigade again took possession of the town. The men were incensed at the way the inhabitants had acted the day before in joining the enemy and firing upon the men of the Eighteenth Ohio, and they began to pillage the town. When the train was wrecked at the bridge where the timbers had been cut, one of the Federal soldiers was caught in the wreck and slowly burned to death, the citizens refusing to make any effort to rescue him, and driving away negroes who offered their help. For this the men of the brigade wanted to destroy the town but were prevented. Mitchell moved on until his advance reached Chattanooga.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

President Lincoln had grown impatient at the delays everywhere on the part of those in high commands, and early in 1862 issued orders to them to begin, each for himself, a forward movement against the enemy on the 22d of February. Grant was not in chief command, but was subordinate to Halleck, at St. Louis. It has been seen how he made a movement, and won a great success, without waiting for the spur of the President, but everywhere else there seemed no disposition to move, even after the President had issued his order. Grant, however, had proceeded up the Tennessee River, in the direction of Corinth, and Buell had been ordered to unite his forces with those of Grant, and about the latter part of March began his forward movement for that purpose. We have seen what Mitchell was doing while Buell was operating, first with Grant, and then with Halleck. It now remains to consider the operations of another part of Buell's army.

General Morgan was sent to seize Cumberland Gap, at the same time that Mitchell was sent out against the Memphis & Charleston Railroad south of Nashville. With Morgan were two Indiana regiments, the Thirty-third and Forty-ninth. Morgan reached Cumberland Ford and at once moved over the mountains. It was a march of extraordinary difficulty, as the men had to drag the cannon up almost impassable roads. Morgan's force, 12,500 strong, had hardly got into Powell's Valley, when he received word from Buell to "be cautious." In those days a commander could not be left to his own discretion and to guide himself

by such information as he could get on the ground, but somewhere, away off, some one in higher authority had to interfere, and undertake to give instructions without knowing anything of the circumstances. It was so in this case.

Morgan, receiving this word, marched his army back again across the mountains over the roads it had so laboriously traversed, and had to abandon, or did abandon, some of his stores. He had hardly reached the Kentucky side when he got word that the enemy was evacuating Cumberland Gap, and for the third time the men were called upon to climb the mountain, dragging their artillery with them. Once more reaching the valley they found that the enemy had evacuated the Gap. Morgan took possession and began to fortify his position.

In August Kirby Smith, in his movement on Kentucky, in conjunction with Bragg, appeared before the Gap and began a siege which lasted thirty-two days, when Morgan found his flank turned, just as he had turned the Confederate flank before, and he was compelled to give the order to retreat. The stores were destroyed, the magazine blown up, and all the heavy guns thrown down the mountain side. It was now a race for the Ohio River, the men marching, fighting and starving, and being required to throw away all their clothing except what they had on their backs. The following extract from the report of Captain Foster, chief of artillery, shows the frightful difficulties encountered in the three crossings of the mountains:

“Preparations were made as extensively as possible in this section of the country, where it was very difficult to find machinery of any kind, and doubly difficult for the movement of a heavy train and ordnance connected with a siege battery of Parrot rifled guns. Machinery for the movement of this battery over steep ascents and descents consisted of about eight hundred feet of one-inch rope, one hundred feet of one and one-half-inch rope, three large and two small snatch blocks, one single and one double tackle-block. This was all the tackle of any kind that could be obtained in time to be of any use to move without hindrance to the forces of this division. To move this battery to a distance of forty miles over the Cumberland Mountains

performed by the Indiana troops. To do this it will be necessary to mention some of the events which preceded the battle, and the positions occupied by the various divisions of the army when the battle opened.

The battle field was a plateau on the west side of the Tennessee River, heavily wooded in some places, but with open fields in others. It was intersected by numerous ravines. Lick Creek protected the plateau on the left, and Owl Creek on the right. Sherman and Prentiss held the most advanced parts of the line, the right of Sherman being on Owl Creek, about two and a half miles out from the river. Prentiss was on his left, with his left flank on Lick Creek, about a mile and a half from the river. It will be seen that the line thus formed was at an acute angle with the river, facing nearly south. McClernand was fully a quarter of a mile in the rear of Sherman, while W. H. L. Wallace was still closer to the river, in fact fully two miles in the rear of Sherman. Hurlbut was a mile in the rear of Prentiss and half a mile to the left of Wallace. The line was practically a close one from Lick Creek to Owl Creek, with one brigade of Sherman's division detached from him and placed on the Hamburg road, about one mile to the rear of Prentiss. In view of the proximity of a strong force of the enemy this position of the troops was extremely faulty, as they were not within supporting distances, and Sherman's division was so separated that he could not have that personal supervision so necessary in battle. Lew Wallace, with his division, was at Crump's Landing, about five miles away.

Johnston, when he was forced out of Bowling Green and Nashville, had collected his forces at Corinth, and had been joined by Beauregard from the East. They had managed to gather between fifty thousand and sixty thousand men. Grant was awaiting the arrival of Buell to attack this force at Corinth. If Johnston was to fight at all outside of his entrenchments at Corinth, it behooved him to do so before Buell could unite with Grant, and that was his intention, when he came out. But he had delayed too long, for Buell was able to reach the battle field with a large part of his force before the battle was over.

Suddenly, on the morning of the 6th of April, when

they were not expected, strong masses of the enemy were seen debouching from the woods, and they threw themselves with terrible fury on Prentiss. Within a short time the battle raged all along the front of both Prentiss and Sherman. Never did the Confederates attack with more determination to succeed than on that morning in April, and they had taken the Federals at a disadvantage, but both Prentiss and Sherman fought with equal determination. Hurlbut rushed to the aid of Prentiss and McClelland hastened to assist Sherman, while W. H. L. Wallace led his division to the scene of strife.

Prentiss was driven back by the first onrush of the enemy, but rallied his men and fought them on the right of Hurlbut, while Sherman clung with tenacity to his line. Some regiments broke to the rear without firing a shot, and hundreds of stragglers from other regiments soon crowded the river bank.

General Grant arrived on the field and passed from one part of the line to another, making dispositions and rallying the troops. One assault after another was made on the Union lines, and they were gradually driven back toward the river. Prentiss and his command, after fighting nearly the whole day, was compelled to surrender, while the division of W. H. L. Wallace was so broken by the death of its heroic commander that its organization was lost, and Sherman and Hurlbut were terribly shattered, but were still fighting. Near the Landing was a ridge separated from the tableland by a deep ravine. In front, toward the Confederates, tangled underbrush formed a natural abatis. Timber behind this natural fortification furnished cover for the troops. On this ridge Colonel Webster, of Grant's staff, gathered all the guns he could find, made up of the remains of some field artillery, and some heavy guns which had been abandoned earlier in the day. He succeeded in massing about fifty guns and manned them by runaways from the front. Behind these guns the Federal army took refuge. Two Federal gunboats were able to bring their heavy guns to bear against the enemy. It was now nearly night, and the Confederate attack had lost much of its impetus. The advance of Buell's forces had reached the Landing, and hastily

formed in line of battle. Webster's guns and Buell's advance pushed back the Confederates, and night having come the battle ended for the time.

In this terrible first day's battle, the Twenty-fifth, Thirty-first and Forty-fourth regiments and Sixth battery took part from its opening to its close. About 7:30 in the morning General Hurlbut received word from Sherman that he was heavily attacked on his left, and Hurlbut at once ordered Colonel Veatch, of the Twenty-fifth Indiana, in command of the second brigade of his division, to take his brigade to the assistance of Sherman. In his report General Hurlbut says it was not ten minutes after the order was issued until the brigade was in rapid march, and was soon heavily engaged. The brigade formed in line of battle in the rear of the troops already engaged, but those troops soon broke and rushed through Veatch's line, causing terrible confusion. The brigade, however, stood manfully to the test, until the two regiments on the right were forced back, leaving the Fourteenth Illinois and the Twenty-fifth Indiana to bear the brunt alone. These two gallant regiments met the attack with great firmness, returning so deadly a fire that the Confederates were checked for some time. To meet the enemy the regiments were compelled to change front while under a destructive fire. This they did in the most gallant style. Finally, on being forced back, these two regiments joined the line of McClernand, and amid all the changing scenes of the day fought with determination, falling back only when ordered to do so, to prevent being surrounded.

The Thirty-first and Forty-fourth were in Lauman's brigade of Hurlbut's division. Soon after Colonel Veatch with his brigade was sent to the help of Sherman, a call came from Prentiss, and General Hurlbut took personal command of his two remaining brigades and hastened to the aid of Prentiss. As he neared the lines of Prentiss they broke and drifted in masses through Hurlbut's two brigades. Lauman formed his brigade in line of battle, and when the Confederates approached to within about one hundred yards, opened so destructive a fire that he not only checked them, but compelled them to change their line of march. The brigade was then sent to support a

battery, and maintained its line against all assaults until about four o'clock in the afternoon.

At one time during the battle of Sunday that part of the line held by the Thirty-first was assaulted, the enemy getting within ten yards of the regiment, but the latter's fire was so steady and destructive that the enemy was driven back in confusion. Four assaults were made on this part of the line. The Thirty-first was compelled twice to replenish its cartridge boxes, firing over one hundred rounds per man. Major Arn and Captain George Harvey were among the killed of Sunday. The Forty-fourth held the front line of Lauman all that day, losing heavily in killed and wounded. The Sixth battery was in all the fight of Sherman, serving with great credit.

But one Indiana regiment of Buell's army, the Thirty-sixth, was in the fight of Sunday. It was a part of Nelson's division, and was the first regiment of Buell's army to reach the battle field. Immediately on debarking it formed a line of battle, charged a Confederate battery, captured and held it. Wallace's division was not engaged in the fight of Sunday, as will be explained.

The condition on Sunday night was not very cheering for the Union cause. Grant's army had been terribly depleted by killed, wounded, captured and stragglers, and had been driven back practically to the river. It had lost in men and guns. The enemy had been severely punished, but still the successes of the day had been with them. It is not proposed here to speculate as to what might have been the outcome had Buell's army not reached the field, further than to say that while he had been worsted Grant was not whipped when night came. He did not lose his head, but prepared at once to renew the fight as soon as daylight came. Wallace, with his division, had reached him, making good the losses of the day, while the Confederates would not receive any reinforcements. During the night other divisions and brigades of Buell's army reached the field and were assigned to their proper places, and the order went out for an attack all along the line at daylight the next morning. Wallace, with his fresh division, held the extreme right of Grant's line. In his front was a Confederate battery supported by infantry. Wallace opened

the battle of Monday, and his division moved forward in splendid style. Steadily, all day long, it moved forward, never backward. Sometimes it was compelled to halt for a while, awaiting support on its flank, but when the support came it moved forward again. When night came Wallace had retaken Sherman's deserted camp of the day before, and was farther to the front than any division of either army.

In this division the Eleventh, Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth did gallant service. Among the killed of the Twenty-fourth were Lieutenant Colonel Gerber, Captain McGuffin and Lieutenant Southwick.

Buell's army held the left of the Union line. The Thirty-sixth Indiana and the Twenty-fourth Ohio opened the battle on this part of the line, where they fought until their ammunition was exhausted; then slowly retired until a new supply was obtained, when they again advanced.

The Sixth was in Rousseau's brigade. That brigade, after an exceedingly hot contest which lasted forty minutes, captured several guns, besides recapturing a battery Sherman had lost the day before. The Ninth was a part of Hazen's brigade, and was so hotly engaged during the battle of Monday that it lost more men in killed and wounded than any other regiment in the Army of the Ohio. During the heat of the battle General Nelson, commanding the division, rode to the head of the regiment and thanked it for its steadiness and gallantry.

The Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth regiments belonged to Kirk's brigade of McCook's division, and took part in all the movements and contests of the brigade. Colonel Sion S. Bass, of the Thirtieth, was mortally wounded. The Thirty-second and Thirty-ninth regiments formed a part of Gibson's brigade. The Thirty-second was complimented by Sherman and Wallace and all the other officers who witnessed its steadiness. At one time it deployed out of the woods to the support of Wallace, when it began to waver a little. Colonel Willich halted the regiment, put it through the manual of arms, ordered it to fix bayonets, and it then charged the Confederates in gallant style. In regard to the Thirty-ninth General Gibson said in his report: "To the Thirty-ninth Indiana too great praise can not be awarded."



VICE-PRESIDENT SCHUYLER COLFAX.

The Twenty-fifth Indiana, of Veatch's brigade, was held in reserve on Monday, until in the afternoon, when the brigade was ordered by General Grant to charge the enemy. This was done in gallant style. The brigade charged through the deserted camps of the day before and far into the woods beyond. Colonel Veatch had one horse killed under him and another wounded. General Hurl but spoke in high terms of Veatch's skill. The Thirty-first and Forty-fourth had suffered terribly on Sunday, but joined in the fight of the next day, again losing heavily. The losses in the Indiana regiments were as follows:

Regiment.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Sixth	4	36	40
Ninth	17	153	170
Eleventh	11	51	62
Twenty-third	7	35	42
Twenty-fourth	6	45	51
Twenty-fifth	21	115	136
Twenty-ninth	4	72	76
Thirtieth	12	115	127
Thirty-first	21	114	135
Thirty-second	10	86	96
Thirty-sixth	9	36	45
Thirty-ninth	2	34	36
Forty-fourth	24	174	198
Fifty-seventh	44	4
Sixth battery	1	5	6
Ninth battery	1	5	6
Total	150	1080	1230

The total killed and wounded in the Army of the Ohio was 2048. The Indiana regiments in that army lost 598, or more than one-fourth the entire number.

The division of General Lew Wallace was not in the battle of Sunday and soon after the battle charges were freely circulated, and were given wide currency, which did great injustice to that gallant Indiana soldier. From time to time since the close of the war these charges have been revived. In the accounts of the battle, printed in

some of the newspapers of the day, he was accused of having deliberately taken the wrong road when ordered to the battle field, or of having got lost, and of having disobeyed orders. In the text of General Grant's Memoirs the impression is clearly given that he did take the wrong road. What are the facts? Wallace's headquarters were at Crump's Landing, about half way between Savannah and Pittsburg Landing. His division consisted of three brigades—one at Crump's Landing, one at Stoney Lonesome, about two and a half miles out from the river, and one at Adamsville, two miles further out.

Most of the stores of the army were at Crump's Landing, and Grant believed that if any attack was made it would be on Wallace, but he was strong in his belief that no attack at all would be made, and that he would have to go to Corinth. Under the direction of General Wallace the men of his division had repaired an abandoned road from near Stoney Lonesome to a bridge on Owl Creek, on the right of Sherman's line. They had also repaired this bridge. General Wallace had done this work without any direction of General Grant, but that officer knew of it. It was done to facilitate the movement of reinforcements and expedite communication between his headquarters and those of Sherman.

On Sunday morning, as soon as he heard the opening guns of the battle, without waiting for orders, he ordered his three brigades to concentrate at Stoney Lonesome, where they would be about five miles from Sherman's right, and about the same distance from Pittsburg Landing. He knew that General Grant was at Savannah, and while his brigades were concentrating he waited at Crump's Landing to meet Grant. On his way up the river General Grant stopped his boat at Crump's Landing, and after conversing with Wallace for a minute or two ordered him to hold his division ready to move at a moment's notice in any direction required. Wallace informed him his division was then concentrating at Stoney Lonesome and he immediately went to that place to wait for orders. The sound of the battle grew louder, and the division became impatient, as the men felt that their comrades were being sorely pressed, but no order came. The

division was ordered to eat a hasty dinner, and then the long expected order came.

The time when this order was received, as well as its contents, has been a matter of dispute. Wallace and all his brigade and staff officers say that it was after 11:30 o'clock. General Grant, in his report, puts the time at 11 o'clock, and in a note on the report Wallace says it was delivered not later than 11 o'clock. About a year after the battle General Wallace became aware that certain reflections on his actions were being circulated through the papers, and he asked from General Halleck a court of inquiry. That officer referred the communication to General Grant, who called upon some of the members of his staff for their recollection of the issuing of the order, and of its contents. Three responded, but did not agree either as to the time the order was issued, the circumstances under which it was issued, or the exact wording. In fact there was a very material difference in their statements. As to the time of the delivery of the order the weight of the evidence is with Wallace. It should be borne in mind that General Grant's report was made two days after the battle, when all was fresh in his mind, and in that report he fixed the time as 11 o'clock, and doubtless he had his information from the staff officer who carried the order.

In his "Memoirs" General Grant says that soon after he arrived at the battle field, he sent one of his staff back to the river with instructions to send Captain Baxter to Wallace and order him to Pittsburg Landing by the lower, or river road. About a mile out from Stoney Lonesome the road divides, one branch going to Shiloh church, where the right of Sherman was resting when the battle opened, the other to a bridge across Snake Creek, near the junction of that creek and the river. It was this latter road General Grant says he wanted Wallace to take. Captain Rawlins, the staff officer who went back to Pittsburg Landing, says he gave the order to Captain Baxter, who asked that it be reduced to writing; that they went on board the boat, procured pen, ink and paper, and that he (Rawlins) dictated the order which was written out by Baxter, and that the order was for Wallace to come up the river road, and form in the rear of the camp of General Charles F. Smith, "on

the right of the army." The camp of General Smith was two miles in the rear of the center of the army.

General Wallace says that the order was first delivered verbally; that it was then handed to him in writing, unsigned; that it was written with pencil on a dirty scrap of paper, bearing heel marks; that he called the attention of the staff officer to the fact that the paper was unsigned, when that officer replied that fearing he might not give the order correctly, he had written it out on his way down the river; that the order was for him to move at once and join the right of the army, and did not specify the road, or say anything about forming in the rear of the camp of General Smith, and in all this he is corroborated by all his brigade and staff officers, as they each saw the order.

In the morning, when the battle opened, the right of the army was at Shiloh church, near the bridge across Owl Creek, about three miles out from Pittsburg Landing. General Sherman, in his "Memoirs," says that at about ten o'clock General Grant came to him at Shiloh church and said he had ordered Wallace up on his right. When Sherman received this information he ordered a section of a battery to the bridge across Owl Creek, to protect it until Wallace could get up. Immediately on receiving the order General Wallace put his division in motion, marching on the road his men had repaired to the right of Sherman. His advance had nearly reached the bridge over Owl Creek when he was overtaken by a staff officer, who informed him that Sherman had been driven back, and the road he was taking would lead him to the rear of the Confederate army, and that General Grant wanted him at Pittsburg Landing. The staff officer said nothing about Wallace being on the wrong road, or on a road not intended by General Grant, but that the right of the Union army was then near the bridge across Snake Creek.

On receipt of this information General Wallace immediately countermarched his division to a cross road. This road was through the woods and was almost impassable. Another staff officer came and urged him to send his division into the battle by brigades, but this Wallace refused to do, holding that if the Union army was in as bad a con-

dition as reported, a brigade could not stem the tide of disaster, and would be overwhelmed with the others. The division marched as rapidly as could be done over the roads through the woods, and arrived on the field of battle about six o'clock p. m., having marched about fifteen miles since noon. It is true that General Wallace reached the field too late to take any part in the fight of Sunday, but he had his division of veterans intact ready for the battle of the next day.

It is evident that at the time of the battle neither General Grant nor any one else thought that Wallace had taken the wrong road, either through ignorance, or in wilful disobedience of orders, for in his report, made two days after the battle, General Wallace said that the order he received was to march his division to the right of the army. In that report he gave the time of receiving the order as 11:30 o'clock. In forwarding the report General Grant made a memorandum giving his understanding of the time the order was delivered, but said nothing about the wording of the order. It is hardly admissable that General Grant would have corrected so unimportant a part of the report as half an hour's difference in the receipt of the order, and neglected a much more serious error, had Wallace given the wrong wording of the order. A half an hour's difference in time might have been a serious matter, but it was not so in this case; but the moving off a whole division, in time of battle, twelve or more miles from where it was ordered, would have been a most grave offense—so much so as to have demanded the most severe punishment.

Historical writers have been practically unanimous in disregarding the statements of Grant's staff officers, both as to the time of the delivery of the order, and as to its wording. The Comte de Paris says:

“Wallace, apprised of the situation of his commander, has been under arms since morning. The instructions of Grant, however, who feared an attack on that side, have detained him until 11:30 at Crump's Landing. At last he is ordered to cross Snake Creek to take position on the right of the Federal line. . . . But Grant's dispatch did not indicate the road he was to follow, nor did it in-

form him that, the Federal line having been repulsed, he had to look for it near the mouth of Snake Creek."

In nearly all the early writings of the battle Owl Creek and Snake Creek are confounded, all the writers speaking of them as but one stream. At the opening of the battle the right of the army was on Owl Creek and not on Snake Creek. General M. F. Force, in his volume, "From Fort Henry to Corinth," says:

"Captain Baxter wrote and gave him (Wallace) the order to march to the Purdy road, from there on to Sherman's right, and then act as circumstances should require."

The road Wallace did take joined the Purdy road mentioned by General Force, near the bridge across Owl Creek. General Grant, himself, finally admitted, or practically admitted, that his staff officers were wrong. In a note in his "Memoirs," he speaks of receiving information that Wallace had constructed the road from Stoney Lonesome to the bridge across Owl Creek, near the right of Sherman's line, and then says it was natural that Wallace should take that road "in the absence of orders to move by a different road." He further says in this note that the "only" mistake Wallace made was by pursuing his march on the road to Sherman's right, after the firing had receded to his rear.

When the news of the final defeat of the Confederates at Shiloh reached General Halleck at St. Louis, that officer determined to take command himself of the combined armies of Grant and Buell. The Confederates had retreated in great confusion to Corinth, which, at that time, was of great strategic value. General Grant desired to follow them as soon as he had buried his dead and replenished his ammunition, believing that if vigorously pressed they would speedily abandon Corinth and move farther South. Grant, however, was overruled by Halleck, who decided upon a siege. Halleck divided the great army now under his command into right wing, center and left wing. He had been joined by General Pope, with what was known as the Army of the Mississippi. General Thomas, who had been with the Army of the Ohio, was transferred with his division to the Army of the Tennessee, and placed in command of the right wing, composed of all of

that army except the divisions of McClernand and Lew Wallace. These two divisions were placed in reserve under the command of McClernand. Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, was put in command of the center, and Pope, of the left wing, composed of the Army of the Mississippi. General Grant was named as second in command, but was given no power to control the movement even of a single brigade.

Then began one of the most ridiculous campaigns of that or any other war. The Confederates were entrenched at Corinth, and Halleck proposed to take the place by regular siege. He had strength enough to drive the enemy out of the works in short order, but a siege seems to have been Halleck's strong point, and he began the siege miles back from where the Confederates were. When Grant wanted to take Fort Donelson he moved his army up close to the works, and enclosed them on all sides that were open for a retreat of the garrison. Halleck, however, undertook to besiege Corinth on one side, leaving three sides open for a leisurely retreat of his enemy. At a point several miles from Corinth, Halleck began throwing up breastworks, as if he was to stand a siege. He then moved his army about half a mile a day, intrenching himself at each stopping place. Grant fretted under his enforced idleness. Sherman fumed at the slow movements of Halleck, and repeatedly told his superior that he felt Corinth could be easily taken by a bold push. But nothing could make Halleck hasten his movements.

This pseudo siege of Corinth lasted from April 11 until May 30, when Halleck woke up one morning and found that the enemy, having grown tired of his delay, had quietly gone further south, taking all the stores, guns and ammunition. The only thing left for Halleck to capture were about a dozen "Quaker" guns, which had been left in the intrenchments. These "Quaker" guns were large logs, painted black and made to look like huge cannon. During the siege several heavy skirmishes took place between the opposing forces. The Confederates frequently came out from behind their intrenchments and attacked one part or another of the Union lines. On more than one occasion the commanders on the parts of the lines thus attacked could

have driven the enemy back and followed them into Corinth, but Halleck's orders were positive that under no circumstances should a general engagement be brought on, so the golden opportunities were lost. Finally, when the Confederates left their stronghold, and word was sent to Halleck that they were rapidly retreating, instead of ordering a vigorous pursuit he stopped his advance, saying that in retreating the enemy was doing just what he wanted them to do.

In this siege Indiana had the following organizations: Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twenty-second, Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty-first, Thirty-second, Thirty-sixth, Forty-first, Forty-fourth, Forty-fifth (left wing), Forty-eighth, Fifty-first, Fifty-second, Fifty-third, Fifty-seventh, Fifty-eighth and Fifty-ninth regiments, and the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth and Fourteenth batteries. All of these took part in the labor of building Halleck's entrenchments, and most of them were engaged in some of the skirmishes which took place.

CHAPTER XL.

AFFAIRS IN THE EAST.

In and around Washington had been gathered more than 200,000 men, well equipped, composing the great Army of the Potomac. Such an army for equipment and discipline could not have been duplicated in any European country. It was supplied with the best arms that could be procured, and for months had been drilled until it had become a perfect fighting machine. The men believed in themselves, and in McClellan, their commander. This is not the proper place to enter into a discussion of the differences which had grown up in Washington as to the proper plan of campaign. McClellan had for several months been commander-in-chief of all the armies, but as he proposed to take personal command of the forces that were to be directed against Richmond, he was relieved from his other duties. His plan of campaign was to transfer his army to Fortress Monroe and then to the peninsula between the James and the Pamunkey Rivers, and operate against Richmond from the South.

Such a plan had many things to recommend it. When once debarked his troops would have but a short distance to march to reach Richmond, and would have water communication for supplies, and so far as was known at that time the Confederates had not extensively fortified Richmond on that side. The main Confederate force was still around Manassas, and if McClellan could slip away from Washington without its knowledge he might be able to capture the prize before they could intervene, but success depended upon rapidity of movement. The story of how that

grand army was compelled to fritter away its time before Yorktown; how it fought at Williamsburg, Mechanicsville and Fair Oaks, almost in sight of Richmond; how its men died with fever amid the swamps of the Chickahominy; how it fought at Gaines' Mill, and throughout those seven awful days of retreat, and how, finally, at Malvern Hill, it administered fearful punishment to Lee, belongs to a general history of the war.

Indiana had but one regiment with McClellan—the Twentieth. It fought at Fair Oaks, Gaines' Mill, The Orchards, Glendale and Malvern Hill. Let us go back a little in the history of that regiment to record a part it took in one of the most remarkable fights in all history. When we last saw the Twentieth it was battling with the waves of the ocean at Hatteras Inlet. From there it had been brought back to Fortress Monroe. Gathered around Fortress Monroe were a number of the best ships of the navy at that time. Strange and alarming rumors had been floating around for several weeks of a mysterious craft the Confederates were building at Norfolk. At Norfolk before the war had been one of the principal navy yards of the Government, supplied with all machinery and appliances for constructing vessels. At the docks were a number of ships, some ready for sea, some undergoing repairs, and others on the stocks. There were hundreds of guns of all sizes, and an immense quantity of war munitions. Just after the breaking out of hostilities the commander of the yard became panic stricken and attempted to destroy some of the stores, and the vessels that could not be hurried away, but his work was negligently done, and when he abandoned his post all the cannon and stores fell into the hands of the Confederates, together with several ships.

The captors began at once to make use of what they had thus obtained, and to put the vessels into order for battle. Among them was one known in the navy as the Merrimac. She was a sister ship to the Minnesota, and classed as one of the best vessels of the navy. The Confederates changed the vessel very materially and armored it with iron. It was the stories of what this new and terrible engine of war could accomplish, and was expected to accomplish, that had been disturbing the peace of the navy officers at Fort-

ress Monroe and of the Government at Washington. A little after noon on the 8th of March, 1862, the dreaded monster, convoyed by a fleet of small gunboats, was seen turning into the James River in the direction of Newport News. Several vessels were there lying at anchor, but they hastily prepared for battle. Among them was the frigate Congress. The new iron-clad first rammed and sank the Cumberland before attacking the Congress. The Congress made the best fight she could against the great odds, and it was not until she was on fire in several places, and her commander, with a large number of her crew, was dead, that she hauled down her flag. It was then that the Twentieth regiment came into play. It was on the shore watching the fight. While two of the Confederate gunboats were alongside of the Congress after she had hoisted the white flag, the regiment on shore opened fire, and drove the hostile vessels away. Captain Parker, who was in command of the Confederate gunboat Beaufort, thus describes the occurrence:

"The firing was from artillery as well as small arms. At the first discharge every man on the deck of the Beaufort, save Captain Smith and Lieutenant Pendergrast (officers of the Congress), was either killed or wounded. Four bullets passed through my clothing, one of which carried off my cap cover and eye glass, and another slightly wounded me in the left knee. . . . Lieutenant Pendergrast now begged me to hoist the white flag, saying that all his wounded men would be killed. I called his attention to the fact that they were firing on the white flag, which was flying at his mainmast head, directly over our heads. . . The Lieutenant then requested permission to go on board the Congress with Captain Smith and assist in getting the wounded down. This I assented to; in the first place I was glad to have their assistance; and secondly, I would not have been willing to confine them in my cabin at a time when the bullets were going through it like hail—humanity forbade it; I would not have put a dog there.

"I now blew the steam whistle, and my men came tumbling on board. The fire of the enemy still continuing from the shore, I cast off from the Congress and steamed ahead so that I could bring my bow gun to bear. I had no

idea of being fired at any longer without returning it, and we had several deaths to avenge. We opened fire, but could make little impression with our single gun upon the large number of men firing from entrenchments on shore. The sides and masts of the Beaufort looked like the top of a pepper box from the bullets which went in one side and out the other."

When the Beaufort was driven off by the fire of the Twentieth, the officers and crew of the Congress escaped to the shore. The Confederate naval authorities set up a claim that at least Captain Smith and Lieutenant Pendergrast were prisoners of war, and could not serve again until exchanged. Against this Captain Parker, of the Beaufort, protested. He claimed that at one time they were prisoners on board his vessel; that he had permitted them to return to their own ship, and after that they had no opportunity to return on board of the Beaufort; that the Beaufort had been driven away from the Congress by the enemy, and that therefore officers and crew, having escaped, were entitled to serve. Lieutenant Pendergrast was afterward taken prisoner and the Confederate authorities talked of holding him for having served without being duly exchanged. Captain Parker at once wrote, completely exonerating Pendergrast from any unofficer-like or improper conduct, and justified his action in every particular. The action of the Twentieth did not save the Congress, for she was on fire in several places, but it did save the officers and crew from being retained as prisoners.

From this digression let us return to the movements of the armies in the East during 1862. General McClellan had gathered on the Potomac the largest and finest army ever raised in America, and with it he was expected to capture Richmond. Divided counsels prevailed at Washington and resulted in the dispersion of responsibility by the multiplication of departments and commands. Fremont was in the mountains of West Virginia, Sigel and Banks and Milroy and Shields in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and McDowell across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. All this caused confusion and lack of co-operation, when McClellan, with his great army, went down the Potomac to operate against Richmond from the South. At

last, after much confusion and many disasters, Pope was called from the West and placed in command of everything in the East not directly under McClellan, and Halleck was put over all. It is not our province to say why McClellan failed, why Pope was overthrown and driven back into Washington, nor recount the stories of the battles fought on the Peninsula, or around Manassas, only so far as they concern Indiana troops.

The Twentieth regiment, after taking part in the capture of Norfolk and witnessing the destruction of the Merrimac, the vessel that had wrought such wide ruin in Hampton Roads, joined McClellan on the 8th of June, and was assigned to Jamieson's brigade of Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps. On the 25th of June the regiment took an active part in the "Battle of the Orchards." It was the first of the series of the seven days' battles which took place during McClellan's retreat from before Richmond. The force engaged on the Union side was small, but the Twentieth lost one hundred and ninety-two men killed or wounded in about twenty minutes. The regiment with its brigade was then made the rear guard while the army marched for its change of base. On the 29th occurred the battle of Fraser's farm.

In this battle and the succeeding one at Malvern Hill, the Twentieth bore an honorable part. Being with Phil. Kearney it was sure to be in the thickest of the fighting, if Kearney could get there. Brave and impetuous, he was never a laggard. There is a great deal of confusion, with many contradictory statements, in the reports of the various commanders under McClellan in the Peninsula campaign and it is difficult to trace what each division, still more what a single regiment, did in any one battle. Even the report of McClellan himself is very confusing. It is known that General Kearney's division was never backward when a battle was on. Other division and corps commanders might move with deliberation, and often with provoking slowness, but Kearney never. The sound of a hostile gun was music to his ears, and when he heard it he hastened toward it as soon as permitted, and chafed when the permission did not come soon enough to meet his impatient spirit. So, even in the absence of reports, it may

be accepted as a fact that every regiment in his division was sure to be in the thickest of the fighting, for he imbued every regiment and every individual under his command with his own lofty impetuosity.

In the Eastern armies, in the campaign of 1862, Indiana had the Seventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-seventh regiments of infantry and the Sixteenth battery of artillery. The armies of the East, at the beginning of that campaign, were divided among several commanders, and there was a lack of cohesion and co-operation that wrought disaster only. The government tried to remedy this by appointing General Halleck commander-in-chief of all the armies, and placing General John Pope in command of the "Army of Virginia," to consist of the corps of McDowell, Fremont and Banks. Fremont did not like serving under a junior in rank and asked to be relieved, and his corps was assigned to Sigel. While Lee was confronting McClellan, Jackson, with a strong force, invaded the Shenandoah Valley. The Seventh, Thirteenth and Fourteenth were with Shields in the Valley, and took part in the battle at Kernstown, sometimes called Winchester Heights, on March 22. It was a hotly contested engagement, and resulted in the withdrawal of the Confederate force then threatening Winchester. All was uncertainty, all was doubt, and no one knew what to expect. All this was prior to the movement of McClellan to the Peninsula, and before the assumption of the command of the army by Pope.

When McClellan took his army to the Peninsula it was intended that McDowell's corps should co-operate with him by moving overland from Fredericksburg, where he was covering the front of Washington. To form the junction, McClellan sent Porter with his corps to Hanover Court House, and he and McDowell were only about thirty miles apart when Jackson made another sudden irruption into the Valley. The lack of full co-operation between Fremont and Banks gave Jackson a good start, and McDowell was hastily called back from Fredericksburg. However, two divisions of his corps were sent to McClellan.

Stonewall Jackson was one of the most aggressive and daring of the Confederate commanders, willing at all

times to take risks that others would shrink from, and to do the thing that military books said ought not to be done. Thus his movements were always a puzzle to those opposed to him, and they could never tell where he would strike until the blow fell. Early in March he had made an irruption into the Shenandoah Valley, and striking first here and then there, caused widespread alarm. He advanced on Winchester and was met by a part of Banks' command at Kernstown, and although checked for a time, the next day he was at Winchester. The fighting did not begin until nearly noon, when Colonel Tyler's brigade opened the battle. The Fourteenth Indiana was ordered to its support. It promptly charged with the bayonet on Jackson's own famous brigade and drove it back in disorder. The Federals thought the whole line of the enemy was retreating and rapidly followed. It was not long until they ran against a line posted under cover of a hill, when the fighting became very fierce. Then the Thirteenth Indiana was sent to support the Fourteenth and the remnant of Tyler's brigade, when they all charged together and finally drove the enemy from the field. In this charge the Fourteenth captured a piece of artillery, which was presented to the regiment by General Banks.

Notwithstanding this check Jackson had thoroughly alarmed the authorities at Washington, and then he hastened away to the help of Lee in the battle of Gaines' Mill. While Lee was still confronting McClellan on the Peninsula, Jackson was again sent to the Valley. This was to check the movement of McDowell from Fredericksburg, which seriously threatened Richmond. It was then that Pope was placed in command of all the troops in front of Washington and operating in the Shenandoah Valley. When he took command he found his army disposed as follows: Fremont in the Valley at Cedar Creek, on the right of Banks, who was guarding the Valley from Strasburg Turnpike to Front Royal; one division of McDowell's corps near Manassas, while the other was at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg; Cox was on the Kanawha, and Sturgis was near Washington. Pope still thought to carry out the original plan and move to unite with McClellan, but Jackson spoiled all such schemes. He suddenly ap-

peared on Pope's flank. Pope was ordered to hold the line of the Rappahannock, and at once began concentrating his scattered forces. He had contemplated seizing Gordonsville, and had sent an expedition in that direction, but it was too slow in its movements, and found Jackson ahead. Jackson so manœuvred as to give the impression that he was once more bound for the Shenandoah Valley.

The seven days' battles having been terminated to the serious disadvantage of McClellan, Lee determined to throw a supporting force to Jackson and overwhelm Pope, following himself with the greater part of his army. Pope determined to concentrate at or near Culpepper, and a part of his force was sent toward Cedar Mountain. Banks arrived at Culpepper on the night of the 8th of August, and the next morning was ordered to move his corps toward Cedar Mountain, where one brigade, that of Gordon, was already in front of the enemy. There was some confusion and doubt as to the orders given to Banks, and this brought on a disastrous battle at Cedar Mountain.

It is not necessary here to discuss where the blame should primarily rest, but it will be sufficient to say that Banks and his men were chafing under the impression that Pope had slandered them by intimating they did not want to fight. Banks took a strong position, and had he held to it he would have effectually checked all movement by Jackson, and the result of the campaign would very likely have been wholly different. With all his faults Pope was an enterprising and really able General, and his dispositions were the proper ones to make, and had all things gone as he intended Jackson would have been destroyed. The Twenty-seventh Indiana was in Gordon's brigade. Soon after Gordon arrived he suggested that the crest of a hill to the front ought to be taken and held, and offered to seize and hold it with his brigade. Being given permission to do so, he formed his men with the Twenty-seventh on the right, and the Sixteenth Indiana battery in front of the right flank of the regiment, and they soon had possession of the crest. By this time Banks had a very strong position and could have held it against all the force Jackson could have sent, but Jackson delaying the attack, Banks determined to assume the aggressive.

The Confederates were moving forward, and suddenly, a little before six o'clock in the afternoon, a terrific fire of musketry broke on the air. General George L. Andrews, who at the time commanded the Second Massachusetts, in a paper read before the Historical Society of Massachusetts says of this outburst of the battle: "It was not preceded by scattering shots, but at once became a steady roar." During the battle the Third Wisconsin and the Twenty-seventh Indiana were ordered forward. Of this movement General Andrews, in the paper referred to, says:

"Owing to the nature of the ground the Twenty-seventh Indiana had some difficulty in getting into position, so that its right wing came into action before the left wing got into line. As soon as they appeared in sight of the enemy both regiments were under a heavy fire, the Twenty-seventh Indiana being so placed as to both receive a direct and a slant fire. A report that we were firing on our own men caused the fire of a portion of the Twenty-seventh to cease; but Gordon, riding forward in the direction of the supposed friends, drew such a fire as to remove all doubts as to their real character. The fire of the enemy became heavier, the crash of musketry was continuous. Soon, in spite of all that Colonel Colgrove could do, the regiment gave way and fell back to the rear of the wood. Here it was rallied and again moved forward to the field. But it had fired only one or two rounds when the enemy was discovered advancing against its right. Pender's brigade was on its flank. Colonel Colgrove attempted to change front to meet this new attack, but it was too late. No skirmishers were out on the right, and the advancing enemy had not been discovered in time. This, however, considering the overwhelming force of the enemy, doubtless made no difference in the result. The regiment again fell back to the rear of the wood, whence it retreated to its original position."

This battle was the prelude to the various engagements which were to take place between the armies of Pope and Lee. In the terrible conflicts of the 28th, 29th and 30th of August the Nineteenth and Twentieth took an active part. The Nineteenth was in Gibbon's brigade. Colonel William L. Brown, of the Twentieth, was killed on the

29th. Pope was driven back into the defenses of Washington, and McClellan was once more put in command of the army. It may be well to follow the fortunes of that army until it again changed commanders, before taking up the operations in other parts of the country.

In the maneuvering between Pope and Lee, on the 27th of August, McDowell moved hastily to Gainesville. The next morning King's division, in which was the Nineteenth Indiana, the brigade being commanded by General Gibbon, moved at an early hour and marched steadily until about 4 o'clock p. m., when it halted for rest. Not long after the column had resumed its march the enemy was discovered. General Gibbon was ordered to charge with his brigade, but he soon found he was engaged with largely superior numbers. Doubleday, with his brigade, consisting of three small regiments, was sent to assist Gibbon, and a furious conflict followed, the Confederates rushing forward heavy reinforcements. Six brigades charged upon the two of Gibbon and Doubleday, which, by this time, had taken position in an orchard. The Comte de Paris says of this fight:

"Stuart's brigade of Taliaferro's division, supported by the fire of three batteries, advanced first as skirmishers; but the Federal guns soon silenced those of the Confederates. The other divisions, supported on the left by two of Ewell's brigades, came up to restore the fortunes of the fight. Gallantly led by their chiefs, the six brigades rushed furiously upon the two Federal brigades of Gibbon and Doubleday, posted in a large orchard. Both sides defended their positions with great stubbornness; the two Confederate division commanders were severely wounded. Ewell lost a leg, while charging at the head of his soldiers. The latter, however, despite their efforts and numerical superiority, could not succeed in dislodging their adversaries. Night alone put an end to the battle."

The Nineteenth Indiana was on the extreme left and received the full force of Taliaferro's flank attack. Colonel Meredith's horse being killed fell upon him, and he was badly injured.

After defeating Pope in the series of engagements which took place in the neighborhood of the old battle field of Bull Run, Lee conceived a great campaign. He had

driven McClellan from his attempt to besiege Richmond, and forced him with his great army to seek shelter on the James River; he had then turned and driven back the other Union army which was threatening Richmond, administering to it several severe defeats. He concluded the reverses it had met with had demoralized not only the army with which McClellan had invaded the Peninsula, but the army Pope had commanded, and if he could make a sudden invasion with his victorious forces into Maryland, reach the vicinity of Washington and there win a great victory, he could dictate terms of peace. He believed that the North would be so disheartened by such a series of disasters that it would readily agree to a peace based on the independence of the Southern Confederacy. He misconceived the temper of the North and the tenacity with which it held to the idea of perpetuating the Union. Had he won the victory he so confidently anticipated he would still have been far short of peace. He did not win the victory, but was himself compelled to retire into Virginia with the loss of a very large part of his army.

The restoration of McClellan to the command of the Army of the Potomac after Pope had been driven back into the defenses of Washington was due to the alarm of the Federal authorities. In point of fact, McClellan had retained the command of that army and was not restored to the position of Commander-in-chief, which had been taken away from him when he assumed personal command of the Army of the Potomac, but to that army was now added the Army of Virginia, which Pope had commanded. "Little Mac," as he was popularly called, was intrusted with the duty of driving Lee back into Virginia, and at once set about the task. Lee's design was a comprehensive one, and the first part of his plan was carried out with a success he could hardly have believed possible. At Harper's Ferry had been gathered great stores of munitions of war, and a garrison of more than 10,000 men was placed there. During the war, until Grant became Commander-in-chief, great importance was, for some reason, attached to the possession of Harper's Ferry, and a large garrison was kept there that in the field might have been of some service to the Government. Harper's Ferry was a position

easily turned, and hard to defend against any considerable force, and was of little importance at any time. The Confederates could not have held it if captured, so a garrison of one hundred men was as good as one of 10,000.

Lee planned not only to capture the garrison at Harper's Ferry, but to seize and destroy the stores that had been collected at that point as if for the sole purpose of inviting an attack. As his instrument in this undertaking he selected Jackson, his most trusted lieutenant. No commander could move more expeditiously or with greater certainty than Jackson. His movements were always eccentric and were especially so on this occasion, but never did fortune work in the interest of a commander more signally than it did on this occasion in the interest of McClellan. However, he lost one of those golden opportunities which he repeatedly left unimproved. He knew that Lee was moving to the invasion of Maryland, and possibly Pennsylvania. McClellan had soon, as Mr. Lincoln quaintly expressed it, "whipped the defeated army of Pope into shape," and had begun his march for the purpose of intercepting Lee. McClellan always moved slowly. He was the very extreme of method and caution. He was endeavoring, through his cavalry and by other means, to discover the exact whereabouts of Lee, when fortune placed in his hands the information not only as to the exact position of his antagonist, but as to the location of each of his corps, and exactly what was expected of each of them. In fact it was the complete plan of Lee, describing in full the movements each corps was to make, the direction in which it was to head, and the number of miles it was to march.

This was the celebrated "lost order" of Lee. On the 9th of September Lee issued his general order, prescribing the movements of each division of his army, and directing Jackson to proceed against Harper's Ferry. It was very explicit and defined the line of march of Jackson. On the 13th, early in the day, this order fell into the hands of McClellan. In all the history of war, according to General Longstreet, no commander had ever received such valuable information at a time so momentous. He gives the credit of finding this "lost order" to Colonel Silas Colgrove, of the Twenty-seventh Indiana regiment. However, the honor

really belongs to B. W. Mitchell, a private of Company F of that regiment. The order was wrapped around three cigars, which had evidently been lost from the pocket of some officer. The Twenty-seventh had the advance of the corps on the march from Cedar Mountain to Maryland, and it entered Frederick just as the Confederate rear guard was leaving. Private Mitchell was very glad to find the cigars, and as he took off the wrapping he saw it was an order of some kind, and, with the intelligence characteristic of the American soldier, realized that it might be of the greatest importance. He took it at once to his Colonel, and within less than an hour it was in the hands of McClellan. General McClellan, in his report, says the order reached him late in the afternoon, although in a dispatch to the President, dated at noon, he says: "I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency."

However, it was not to be. General Pleasanton had pushed the Confederate cavalry back into the mountains long before night of the 13th. He could have seized and held Turner's Pass had he been informed of its necessity. Jackson was permitted to pursue his way unmolested, capture more than 11,000 of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, the Fifteenth Indiana battery being part of the garrison and continued to fire on the enemy long after the fort had been surrendered) without loss to himself, and then march to aid his chief at Antietam. McClellan changed the direction of some of his columns, but they were not impressed with the importance of speed. General Lee was early informed of this change of direction, without having the least suspicion that it was caused by the finding of his full plan of operations, and he at once sent a part of his force to seize South Mountain. McClellan moved his army toward South Mountain, Reno having the left and Hooker the right. When the advance of the Union forces reached Turner's Pass they found it in the possession of the Confederates, and a fierce struggle at once began. Cox, with the Kanawha division, was leading the left. He was not only a brave man but a skillful commander, and he attacked the enemy with great impetuosity. Although the advantage was with him from the start, so strong was the Confeder-

ate position that Cox was compelled to wait for reinforcements. The Confederates well understood the importance of holding this pass through the mountains until their work at Harper's Ferry was completed, and at the first sound of battle pushed forward reinforcements. The battle continued all day. With what occurred in front of Cox and Reno, we have nothing to do in this history, as no Indiana troops were engaged on that part of the field. On the right, however, under Hooker, were two of the most gallant regiments Indiana had sent to the field—the Seventh and Nineteenth. They were both in Hatch's division, the Seventh being in Doubleday's brigade and the Nineteenth in that of Gibbon.

The fight had been going on for several hours when Hatch was directed to advance with his division. It was about five o'clock when the Iron brigade was ordered to move forward. It had hardly got started when it fell under a murderous fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, and from two or three batteries, but the brigade pushed on and was soon pressing the enemy back. Of this advance of Hatch's division, Lieutenant General D. H. Hill, of the Confederate army, in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," says:

"The advance of Hatch's division in three lines, a brigade in each, was as grand and imposing as that of Meade's division. Hatch's general and field officers were on horseback, his colors were all flying, and the alignment of his men seemed to be perfectly preserved. General Hooker, looking at the steady and precise movement from the foot of the mountain, describes it as a beautiful sight. From the top of the mountain the sight was grand and sublime, but the elements of the pretty and picturesque did not enter into it. Doubtless the Hebrew poet whose idea of the awe-inspiring is expressed by the phrase, 'Terrible as an army with banners,' had his view of the enemy from the top of a mountain.

"There was not a single Confederate soldier to oppose the advance of General Hatch. I got some guns from the reserve artillery of Colonel Cutts to fire at the three lines; but owing to the little practice of the gunners and to the large angle of depression, the cannonade was as harmless

as blank cartridge salutes in honor of a militia general. While these ineffective missiles were flying, which the enemy did not honor by so much as a dodge, Longstreet came up in person with three small brigades, and assumed direction of affairs."

Each of the contending parties desired to reach and hold a certain stone wall, the possession of which would have given those who held it a tremendous advantage. It was to prevent Hatch from seizing this point of advantage that Longstreet hurried forward his reinforcements almost at a run. The contest for this stone wall was exceedingly sharp, and Hatch won, but was himself wounded. This fighting was mainly done on the Union side by Gibbon's brigade, in which was the Nineteenth Indiana. General Hill thus describes the contest over the stone wall:

"But now, Gibbon was putting in earnest work on the pike. He had a choice brigade, strong in numbers and strong in the pluck of the men, all from the Northwest, where habitually good fighters are reared. He had pushed forward cautiously in the afternoon with the Seventh Wisconsin regiment, followed by the Sixth on the north side of the pike, and the Nineteenth Indiana, supported by the Second Wisconsin, on the south side. The ten imaginary regiments of the Lost Dispatch retarded his progress through the woods; but at one time, believing that the Seventh Wisconsin was about to be turned on its right flank, he sent the Sixth to its assistance. There were only a few skirmishers on his right, but the Lost Dispatch made him believe otherwise. About 9 p. m., the stone wall was reached, and several gallant efforts made to carry it. When each repulse was followed by the 'rebel' yells, the young men on my staff would cry out: 'Hurrah for Georgia! Georgia is having a free fight!' The Western men had met the Twenty-third and Twenty-eighth Georgia regiments, as brave as themselves and far more advantageously posted. Colonel Bragg, of the Sixth Wisconsin, says in his report: 'We sat down in the dark to wait another attack, but the enemy was no more seen.' At midnight Gorman's brigade, of Sumner's corps, relieved Gibbon."

The character of that fight may be seen from the losses suffered by Gibbon's brigade—318 men killed and wound-

ed. General Gibbon held the ground he had taken, and during the night the Confederates withdrew.

Lee had taken a strong position at Sharpsburg, and was concentrating his army at that point. Hill marched there from South Mountain, and Jackson was to proceed in the same direction as soon as his work at Harper's Ferry was done. All this was thoroughly understood by the various Confederate commanders, and they were not apt to be behind time. McClellan followed, but when he reached the banks of Antietam Creek he found Lee strongly fortified. Then followed the terrible battle of Antietam, the bloodiest single day known in American history. The battle has given rise to a great deal of criticism. McClellan has been blamed for not fighting on the 16th, at a time when Lee had only about 25,000 men with which to fight McClellan's whole army, or nearly the whole army. As it was, during the whole battle the Federals largely outnumbered their enemy, but that enemy had the choice of position and McClellan was very cautious, and delayed until Lee was able to get his whole army together once more. There never was any fault to find with the fighting qualities of the Army of the Potomac, and notwithstanding it had just undergone a series of defeats while commanded by Pope, it was eager to measure itself against the Confederates once more. All it asked was the opportunity, and all during the day of the 16th it chafed at being held back. When the battle did open it raged with the utmost fury during the whole day, first on one flank and then on the other. It must be confessed that the Union army fought something after the manner of a team of balky horses, thus giving the enemy opportunity to transfer troops back and forth to meet the attacks as they varied. First a division or a corps would contend against Hooker on the right, and then against Burnside on the left. McClellan in his report censures Burnside for his delay in carrying a position in his front, but Burnside and his friends claimed his delay was mainly due to McClellan himself.

Late on the afternoon of the 16th McClellan perfected his arrangements for battle. Hooker with his division was sent to the right to gain a position in front of the left flank

of Lee. This was won after a severe fight, when night put an end to the conflict. The morning of the 17th of September opened and Hooker at once began the battle with the dash and energy so characteristic of him, but during the night Jackson had come up from Harper's Ferry, and Lee was in much better shape for resistance. McClellan had also been strengthened by the arrival of belated divisions, and still held a large preponderance in numbers, and in artillery. Hooker attempted to drive the Confederates from a piece of woods they held. The possession of this coveted position was resisted with great spirit, and the losses on both sides were enormous. It took an hour of desperate fighting to drive the enemy from the woods, and the ground was covered thick with the dead and wounded of both armies.

Hooker had won a decided success, and followed closely on the heels of the retiring Confederates. He soon encountered fresh troops, and being without shelter, he was compelled to fall back. Happily for him Mansfield's small division, in which was the Twenty-seventh Indiana, was near, and when the first line of the Federals was broken under the murderous fire which poured in on it from every direction, he hastened to the rescue. The Comte de Paris says: "It was seven o'clock in the morning. The reinforcements were opportune, for Hooker's corps was melting away visibly. Its chief, however, would not give up hopes of victory. He reformed his shattered line, recalled Hart-suff to the center, with the best brigade of Doubleday, and returned to the charge. He reached once more the edge of the wood; but there again all his efforts failed. Mansfield resumed the offensive—it was high time—and deployed his two divisions in a semi-circle in the center of the clearing. On the left, in the woods adjoining it to the east, Green, with one of these divisions, attacked Hill's troops, who were sustaining the combat against Ricketts. On the right, Williams, resting against the Hagerstown turnpike, quickly crossed it and tried to carry the woods and the hill which stretched to the west, in order to flank and thus take in reverse the defenders of Dunker church. Jackson's troops gave way before this new attack. They had witnessed the fall of their two division commanders, Starke

and Lawton, who had recently been called to this post of honor and danger, where the succession was very rapid. The first was killed, the second wounded. Many other Generals and nearly all the Colonels had also been wounded. Some brigades had left one-third, others one-half, of their effective force on the ground. Jackson's corps was annihilated for the time.

"The Federal loss was equally heavy. Mansfield had been killed at the beginning of the action. His two small divisions, composed partly of soldiers who had only enlisted within a few days, had already lost a considerable portion of their number on the march. Exposed to a very violent fire, they paid dearly for their success. On the right, along the slopes of the hill which commanded the wood, Williams had found wall fences, and in the wood itself ridges of rock, affording an easy shelter to the enemy's sharpshooters, and obstructing his march.

"Lee, in the meanwhile, feeling all the importance of the struggle that was going on in that direction, and wishing to sustain his left at all hazards, did not hesitate to strip his center entirely, and sent D. H. Hill with the rest of his division to Jackson's assistance. Hood, who had been held in reserve since the day previous, joined him, and these two generals resumed the offensive, Hood against Williams, Hill against Green.

"The remnant of Hooker's corps were fighting in line of battle with Mansfield's two divisions, but before this new attack the Federals were obliged to abandon the open ground they occupied, and retired as far as the wood from which a few hours before they had dislodged Starke's division. Hooker was severely wounded and carried off the battle field where he had fought so gallantly. Hartsuff and Crawford had fallen as well as he. The soldiers, deprived of nearly all their commanders, grouped at random to resume from behind trees a musketry fire against the enemy. The artillery, that arm for which the volunteers of the North always displayed a peculiar aptitude, sustained the battle with great stubbornness; there was a moment when a single battery was sufficient to cover the whole of Hooker's center. On the left, however, Green had not quitted his hold, but maintained himself in the

woods, which extend from that side as far as Dunker church. But the exhausted combatants on both sides were waiting for reinforcements to resume the offensive, for it appeared that the fate of the battle was to be decided within this narrow space of ground."

We have been thus particular in describing this part of the great battle, for it was here that the Seventh and Twenty-seventh fought, the first in Doubleday's division of Hooker's corps, and the other in Williams' division of Mansfield's corps. It was during this desperate contest that the Twenty-seventh, by its rapid firing, had fouled its muskets so that many of them could not be used. They were thrown away, and those of their dead and wounded comrades taken in their place. When ammunition got short, the officers of the regiment ran about the field, gathering cartridges from the boxes of those who could use them no longer, and distributed them to those who still stood in line. The Twenty-seventh in this great battle lost forty-one killed or mortally wounded, and one hundred and sixty-eight wounded. Among the wounded was B. W. Mitchell, the intelligent soldier who found the famous "lost order."

Let us now see what two other Indiana regiments were doing on this ensanguined field—the Fourteenth and Nineteenth. The Fourteenth belonged to French's division of Sumner's corps, and its brigade won from General French on that day the title of the "Gibraltar Brigade." It has been claimed for this brigade that it was the only one engaged on that day, that never gave back, but steadily advanced. Whether this is absolutely correct or not, it is true that the brigade fought with the most conspicuous gallantry. Colonel Kimball was in command of the brigade. Sumner's corps had crossed the creek at day-break and followed Hooker, and marched rapidly in the direction of the sound of the cannon which told that Hooker was heavily engaged. While Green and Williams, of Mansfield's corps, were stubbornly endeavoring to hold their own near the Dunker church, Sumner reached the field. It was nine o'clock and Sumner renewed the fight on the right, where there had been a lull after the last effort to drive Green from his position had failed. Sedg-

wick's division had the advance and was closely followed by French.

Sedgwick entered the large clearing on the east side, passed beyond Green, who was still clinging to his position, and then passed beyond Williams. He swept before him Hood's two brigades, and reached the Hagerstown Turnpike, crossed this, and entered the woods which both Hooker and Mansfield had so unsuccessfully attempted to penetrate. Sumner led the advance himself, moving in front of the line, with his head bared, and gained the name of the "Old Bull of the Woods." Of this attack by Sumner, with Sedgwick's division, the Comte de Paris says:

"Nothing could arrest Sedgwick—neither the thickness of the forest, nor the rocks which formed so many natural fortifications under the trees; and he quickly reached the opposite border of the clearing, on the side of Sharpsburg; Dunker church was occupied, as well as the intersection of the two roads, and the Confederates were driven in disorder across the wide open fields extending beyond. The success of the Federals seemed decisive; the position they had thus gained was the key to the battle field; but it was far in advance of the Federal line, and in occupying it Sedgwick had exposed his flanks."

The Confederates realized that this new and successful attack on the key to their position must not only be met, but must be driven back. They rushed forward all the troops they could spare, and a desperate battle was fought. Sedgwick was three times wounded, and finally was compelled to abandon the church he had so gallantly won. Williams, with the second brigade of his division, under Gordon, returned to the charge and once more penetrated into the woods, but was soon compelled to retire again to avoid being surrounded and captured. Sumner had seen the disaster which threatened Sedgwick, and hurried forward the other two divisions of his corps. French was marching in three columns, the left formed of Weber's brigade, the center by that of Morris, and Kimball's on the right. Having reached the cross roads near the church, he made each of his brigades wheel to the left in line of battle, and thus formed in three lines he pressed around

the extremity of the woods. Morris formed the second line. His brigade was composed of new recruits. Being exposed to an enfilading fire they were thrown into confusion. Kimball passed them and formed on Weber's left. On a commanding position was the house of Dr. Piper, and it was around this house the struggle was to be renewed. Lee sent another division, that of R. H. Anderson, to oppose French and Richardson, who had formed on his left. While Anderson was thus fighting French and Richardson in front, McLaws, who had just driven back Sedgwick, threw himself on the right flank of French, but failed to crush it.

The Confederates massed all the forces possible, and renewed the efforts to drive back French and Richardson, but all in vain, and the Federals resumed their advance. The range of hills on the Roulette farm was captured, but French could not dislodge the Confederates from the hollow way between the range of hills. He was stopped by the batteries which had been placed in the vicinity of the Dunker church. He could not advance, nor could the Confederates drive him back. Kimball's brigade had been under fire four hours, hotly engaged almost every moment, and here as on other parts of the field the officers gathered cartridges from the dead and wounded and distributed them to the fighting line. The loss of the Fourteenth was more than half of the number taken into the battle.

The Nineteenth was in Gibbon's brigade of Doubleday's division of Hooker's corps, and as it was Hooker who opened the fighting and gained the first great success of the day, all his divisions were in the very thickest of the fight. The Nineteenth, with its brigade, advanced through the woods. The enemy was threatening to turn the flank of the brigade when the Nineteenth, with the Seventh Wisconsin, was ordered to cross the pike and defeat this flanking movement. Receiving support the two regiments succeeded in driving back the attacking column. The Confederates then made desperate efforts to capture a battery on the right of the brigade, but could not withstand the fire, and broke in confusion. The Nineteenth, having changed front, poured a fire into the flying Confederates that completed their confusion. Lieutenant Colonel Bachman, who

commanded the regiment, seized this opportunity to order a charge, and the regiment captured a number of prisoners. On the crest of a near by hill were two cannon, and on these the regiment charged, capturing them and the hill, but Colonel Bachman gave his life in attempting to hold the hill. The Nineteenth lost one-half the men it took into battle and was soon withdrawn from the front.

In "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Charles Carleton Coffin, in a most graphic description of the various phases of this historic battle, draws the following picture of the attack on "Bloody Lane," by French's and Richardson's divisions, French's division being led by Kimball's brigade, in which was the Fourteenth Indiana. Mr. Coffin's view of that part of the battle was from McClellan's headquarters:

"It was a commanding situation. The panorama included full two-thirds of the battle field, from the woods by the Dunker church southward to the hills beyond Sharpsburg.

"The Fifth corps, under Fitz John Porter, was behind the ridge extending south toward the bridge, where the artillery of the Ninth corps was thundering. Porter, I remember, was with McClellan, watching the movements of the troops across the Antietam—French's and Richardson's divisions, which were forming in the fields east of the Roulette's and Mumma's houses. What a splendid sight it was! How beautifully the lines deployed! The clouds which had hung low all the morning had lifted, and the sun was shining through the rifts, its beams falling on the flags and glinting from gun barrel and bayonet. Upon the crest of the hill south of the Dunker church I could see Confederates on horseback, galloping, evidently with orders; for, a few minutes later, there was another gleam in the sunshine from the bayonets of their troops, who were apparently getting into position to resist the threatened attack of French and Richardson.

"Memory recalls the advance of the line of men in blue across the meadow east of Roulette's. They reach the spacious barn, which divided the line of men as a rock parts the current of a river, flowing around it but uniting beyond. The orchard around the house screens the move-

ment in part. I see the blue uniforms beneath the apple trees. The line halts for alignment. The skirmishers are in advance. There are isolated puffs of smoke, and then the Confederate skirmishers scamper up the hill and disappear. Up the slope moves the line to the top of a knoll. Ah! what a crash! A white cloud, gleams of lightning, a yell, a hurrah, and then up in the cornfield a great commotion, men firing into each other's faces, the Confederate line breaking, the ground strewn with prostrate forms. The Confederate line in 'Bloody Lane' had been annihilated, the center pierced."

A great victory was then in McClellan's reach, but he failed to seize it. The description of the close of the great battle by Mr. Coffin is so graphic that it is worthy a place in every story of Antietam:

"With the falling back of the Confederates I went up past Roulette's house to the sunken road. The hillside was dotted with prostrate forms of men in blue, but in the sunken road, what a ghastly spectacle! The Confederates had gone down as the grass falls before the scythe. Words are inadequate to portray the scene. Resolution and energy still lingered in the pallid cheeks, in the set teeth, in the gripping hand. I recall a soldier with the cartridge between his thumb and finger, the end of the cartridge bitten off, and the paper between his teeth when the bullet had pierced his heart, and the machinery of life—all the muscles and nerves—had come to a standstill. A young lieutenant had fallen while trying to rally his men; his hand was still firmly grasping his sword, and determination was visible in every line of his face. I counted fourteen bodies lying together, literally in a heap, amid the corn rows on the hillside. The broad, green leaves were sprinkled and stained with blood.

"The close of the battle presented a magnificent spectacle as the artillery of both armies came into play. The arrival of A. P. Hill had a stimulating effect upon Lee's veterans, while the carrying of the bridge and the work accomplished by French's and Richardson's divisions in the center gave great encouragement to the Union army. It was plain that Lee was economical in the use of artillery ammunition. In fact, he had a short supply. The engage-

ments at Gainesville, Groveton, Bull Run, Chantilly, Harper's Ferry and South Mountain had depleted his ammunition chests, and supply trains had not reached him from the west side of the Potomac.

"Far up on the Union right, as well as in the center, the Union batteries were pounding. I recall a remarkable scene. The sun was going down, its disc red and large, as seen through the murky battle cloud. One of Sumner's batteries was directly in the line toward the sun, on the crest of the ridge north of the smoking ruins of Mumma's house and barn, and there was one piece of which the gunners, as they rammed home the cartridge, seemed to be standing in the sun. Beyond, hid from view by the distance, and the low hanging branches of the oaks by the Dunker church, the Confederate guns were flashing. Immediately north of Sharpsburg, and along the hill in front, now the National Cemetery, Longstreet's cannon were in play. Half-way up the hill were Burnside's men, sending out a continuous flame, with A. P. Hill's veterans confronting them. All the country was flaming and smoking; shells were bursting above the contending lines; Burnside was asking for reinforcements. How quickly Porter's eleven thousand could have rushed across the Antietam bridge with no Confederates to oppose them, swept up the hillside and forced themselves like a wedge between Longstreet and A. P. Hill—but McClellan had only Miller's battery to send him! The sun went down; the thunder died away; the musketry ceased, bivouac fires gleamed out as if a great city had lighted its lamps."

We have not treated of the battle on the left where Burnside fought so long and desperately, as no Indiana troops were engaged in that part of the field. It will be sufficient to say that the advantages of this bloody day remained with the Federals, and that on the next day soldiers and officers wanted to renew the conflict and crush Lee, but McClellan decided otherwise, and two days later Lee crossed again into Virginia. Once more the people of the North were sorely disappointed. They were more disheartened by the failure of McClellan to complete his victory than they had been by the rout of Bull Run.

CHAPTER XLI.

SOME MINOR MOVEMENTS.

Before we return to the West, where the greater number of the Indiana regiments were employed, let us follow the fortunes of one more regiment that had begun its service in the East—the Twenty-first—and glance at some other side movements. At an early stage of the contest the importance of gaining possession of New Orleans was recognized and an expedition for this purpose was organized under command of General Benjamin F. Butler. To this expedition the Twenty-first Indiana was assigned, and on the 4th of March, 1862, sailed for the mouth of the Mississippi. How Farragut ran past the batteries of Forts Jackson and St. Philip has often been told. His success terminated the Confederate occupation of New Orleans. The first Union troops to touch the wharf at New Orleans were a portion of the Twenty-first Indiana. On the 1st of June the regiment was sent to Baton Rouge, and on the 5th of August took a very prominent part in the battle which followed the attempt of the Confederates to retake Baton Rouge. For more than three hours it fought a Confederate brigade, losing one hundred and twenty-six in killed and wounded. Of this battle, and the action of the Twenty-first, Lossing, in his "History of the Civil War," says:

"The battle raged fiercely for two hours, and in the hottest of the fray the Twenty-first Indiana was grandly conspicuous. It lost all of its field officers before the end of the action. Seeing this General Williams placed himself at its head, exclaiming, 'Your field officers are all gone. I will

lead you?" They gave him hearty cheers, when a bullet passed through his breast and he fell dead."

In a former chapter we have seen something of the effort the Confederates made to get possession of Missouri, and how they were foiled. But they did not despair, and made many other attempts before the final collapse of the Confederacy. At the opening of 1862 the main encampment of the Union army in the Southwest was at Cross Hollows, Arkansas. This was at the intersection of the road from Springfield to Fayetteville, and the road running to Bentonville. This force was under command of General Curtis. The Confederates under Van Dorn were about fifty miles south. In January, anticipating an attack, General Curtis concentrated his forces at Cross Hollows. On the first of March General Sigel, commanding the first division, took position near Bentonville; the third division, under Colonel Jeff C. Davis, of Indiana, occupied the heights of Pea Ridge; while Carr's division remained at Cross Hollows.

Hearing that the Confederates were advancing, General Curtis decided to concentrate at Sugar Creek, where Davis was partially intrenched. On the 6th, while Sigel was marching to this new position, his rear guard was suddenly attacked by the enemy, but he successfully defended himself. Van Dorn had been reinforced by McCulloch and McIntosh, and his forces largely outnumbered the Federals. During the night of the 6th Curtis was compelled to change his line. On the morning of the 7th Colonel Osterhaus, with some cavalry and artillery, was ordered to make a demonstration on the Confederate line, and was to be supported by the Twenty-second Indiana regiment. Osterhaus permitted himself to fall into a trap that was set for him, and found himself in a very dangerous position, when Colonel Davis was ordered forward with his entire division to his rescue. Osterhaus lost two of his guns before Davis arrived. Davis at once threw one of his brigades to the front to check the advance of the Confederates. This not being enough, he sent the Eighteenth and Twenty-second Indiana regiments to make a flank movement. This was successfully accomplished, but not without a severe engagement. By its energy of attack the

Eighteenth held the Confederates in check long enough for Colonel White to re-form the line of his brigade; then the Eighteenth pushed forward, driving the enemy in rapid retreat.

While the Eighteenth was thus engaged, the Twenty-second was having all it could do to defend itself from an overwhelming force of Arkansas troops, aided by the Indian regiment. During its bayonet charge the Eighteenth recaptured the two guns that had been lost by Osterhaus, and turned them upon the enemy, improvising artilleryists from the members of the regiment. Davis bivouacked on the field of battle. While this battle was going on near Leetown, Colonel Carr's division was fighting at Elkhorn Tavern. That night each party rested on their arms ready to renew the fight the next day. Curtis changed his lines somewhat. The battle on the 8th opened with artillery. In this the Union artillery had the best of it. The infantry kept moving forward slowly, and Davis's and Carr's divisions were ordered to make an advance in earnest. The Confederate line began to yield and finally broke in confusion. Davis turned the left flank of the enemy, and a charge was ordered all along the line. This completed the rout of the enemy. In this battle the First Indiana battery played a conspicuous part, its fire being especially effective. Five companies of the Eighth Indiana were with Colonel Carr in his fight of the 7th at Elkhorn Tavern, and lost thirty-eight men in killed and wounded. The other five companies were with Davis in all his movements and fighting.

The Confederates suffered heavily in their contest with Curtis, General McCulloch and General McIntosh being among the killed. Curtis followed Van Dorn. Five thousand of his men had been called back by Halleck to reinforce the army in front of Corinth, and thus Curtis was seriously crippled in his movements. On the 25th of June he started for Jacksonsport to meet the Federal gunboats, but the gunboats failed to reach that place. He proceeded so far that he soon found himself in a bad way, being out of supplies, and the country destitute. He could not return, and it looked as if to advance would only bring destruction. He resolutely turned to the East in an endeavor

to reach the Mississippi. He pushed on to Helena, arriving there on the 13th of July. He was practically out of the fight for the remainder of the summer.

Missouri was now practically at the mercy of any band of guerrillas that might make a raid. When Halleck took command of the army in front of Corinth he left General Schofield in command in Missouri. Several bands of guerrillas from Arkansas invaded the State and united with others already there, but Schofield was so energetic and so full of resources that he met all their movements in such a manner that they accomplished little. General Hindman was in command of the Confederate forces in Arkansas, and finally assembled forty thousand men, with whom he determined to invade Missouri. Schofield, who had about 15,000 men, more than half of them being mounted, determined to meet Hindman and defeat him before he could perfect his arrangements for the invasion of Missouri. Leaving a part of his force to guard Springfield and protect his long line of communications, he took the field with about 10,000 men. General Schofield's army, although small, was well disciplined and well commanded, and he soon drove the Confederates back into Arkansas, capturing many of them, together with their cannon. Schofield managed finally to increase his army to about 17,000, but was taken sick, and gave the direction of the future movements to General Blunt, of Kansas. This army, however, was divided, one part being near Springfield, and the other at Fayetteville. Hindman was in command of a superior force, and prepared to assume the offensive. Blunt was willing for the encounter and telegraphed General Herron at Springfield to join him at once. That energetic officer put his men to a forced march, and was able to unite with Blunt before Hindman could intervene. Hindman had interposed, it is true, but Herron determined to hold him in check until Blunt could come, and notwithstanding he only had a part of his army with him, he made a series of impetuous charges. But the fight was desperate, and he began to think he was to be overwhelmed when suddenly about two o'clock he heard cannon shot away off to the right. It was the advance of Blunt, who was hastening to the help of his lieutenant. At Rhea's mill he had

heard the rumbling sound of cannon, and knew that a fight was on, and he hastened toward the sound. He struck the flank of the Confederate column, and the battle soon became general again, as Herron and Blunt were able to join their lines. The battle ended when night came, and during the night Hindman hastily retreated. Thus the battle of Prairie Grove ended in a complete triumph for the Union troops. The only Indiana organizations in this battle were the Twenty-sixth regiment and the First battery. The Twenty-sixth lost heavily, being one of the leading regiments in the charge of the Confederate line. Thus by the end of 1862 Missouri was once more practically clear of organized Confederate forces.

All the movements in Missouri and Arkansas, and at New Orleans, were parts of the great drama, although they were far from the centers of military interest, which were, in the East, around Washington and Richmond, and in the West, in Tennessee and Kentucky, where Buell commanded, and in Mississippi where Grant was fretting because not permitted to be actively aggressive. In this history the movements on the outer circle of the conflict have a place, because in all of them Indiana troops played conspicuous parts. Following the movements in Missouri to the close of the year 1862 has taken us away from other and far more important scenes. Let us take up the thread again in the West, where we left the combined armies of Grant and Buell at Corinth, under command of Halleck.

CHAPTER XLII.

BRAGG INVADES KENTUCKY.

We have seen how Halleck slowly laid siege to Corinth, until Beauregard leisurely prepared to evacuate the place and move to a new line. Pope was sent in pursuit, and urged that the retreating enemy be followed closely and pressed to the utmost, but he was recalled by Halleck with the strange statement: "The enemy will continue his retreat, and that is just what I desire." It was an admission that he, with a hundred thousand excellent troops, was willing to let an enemy of half his numbers escape, if he would just go far enough so as not to molest him.

Notwithstanding the escape of Beauregard the capture of Corinth was of great moment to the Union cause. The Confederates had early recognized the political importance of the Mississippi River, and had begun its fortification at various points. Grant seems to have been the only Federal commander who saw that the easiest way to recapture the Mississippi was by "turning its flank," so to speak. Thus by the capture of Fort Donelson he had rendered the Confederate position at Columbus untenable, and it had to be hastily abandoned. This gave the Mississippi to the Federals to New Madrid and Island No. 10. The capture of Corinth compelled the abandonment of Fort Pillow and Memphis, and as Pope had captured New Madrid and Island No. 10, the Federals controlled the great river to Vicksburg. Possession of the Mississippi River by the Union forces was to cut the Confederacy in two, isolating all the States west of the River, whence the Confederates drew a

great part of their supplies. So important were the results which would flow from an undisputed possession of this great waterway that the wonder is that it did not at once engage every effort of those who were directing the armies of the Union. But Halleck could not be made to see it.

At that time Vicksburg was not elaborately fortified, and could easily have been captured by the navy had it been supported by a land force. Halleck had more than 100,000 men, flushed with the victories of Donelson and Shiloh, and the fact that they had driven Beauregard from Corinth. He could have sent 20,000 by rail to Memphis, and then down the river, and Vicksburg could have been taken with small loss of life, but it was not to be. At that time there were two important lines of movement open to the victorious Federals, and success on both lines was in easy reach of the Union commander. This would have practically terminated the war in the West. The mountain fastnesses of Chattanooga commanded Eastern Tennessee, and all the avenues by which a Southern army could invade either Tennessee or Kentucky. With Chattanooga in our hands, it would be almost impossible for the Confederates to reinforce their armies in the West.

Halleck had an army strong enough to win success upon both lines of operations. With one hand he could grasp Vicksburg and with the other seize Chattanooga, but to win success needed rapid movement, and rapid movement was contrary to the nature of that commander. Having lost Donelson and Corinth, Columbus and New Madrid, the Confederates early saw that they must hold Chattanooga and Vicksburg, or their cause would be lost. They were at a disadvantage, and all it needed on the Federal side was boldness and rapidity of action.

The situation after the capture of Corinth was this: Beauregard had with him 50,000 men; Kirby Smith was at Knoxville with 12,000; at Chattanooga was a garrison of 2000. Halleck had at Corinth 100,000 troops. General Morgan was at Cumberland Gap with 9000, watching Smith at Knoxville, and that enterprising officer, General Mitchell, was at Huntsville with 7000, watching the garrison at Chattanooga. Mitchell had a front of more than one hundred miles to watch, and therefore was too weak to

take Chattanooga. He had asked for reinforcements, but they had been denied him. Halleck could easily throw 40,000 men under Buell to the aid of Mitchell and thus make sure of the important strategic point at Chattanooga, and still have 60,000 with whom to crush Beauregard and move on Vicksburg. Or he could readily send 20,000 to Memphis to move down the river to Vicksburg and still have 80,000 for the other movement.

On the 10th of June Buell was started with 40,000 men, but instead of being pushed forward rapidly he was required by Halleck to proceed slowly, rebuilding, as he went, a railroad that when rebuilt would be of no benefit to anybody but the enemy, as it was within easy reach of small raiding parties, who could capture trains or burn bridges at will. Halleck remained at Corinth idle, with 60,000 men. Beauregard was replaced by Bragg, who left 15,000 men under Van Dorn to watch Vicksburg and prevent any demonstration against it, while he hastened with 35,000 to Mobile and then by rail to Chattanooga, which he reached in advance of Buell. Bragg now had the advantage. Buell had been compelled to leave nearly one-half his force to guard and protect his long lines of communication, and had only about 27,000 for the field, while Bragg, by calling Smith from Knoxville, could confront him with 47,000. Halleck had to send 20,000 to reinforce Buell, leaving only 40,000 at Corinth, and in front of this force Van Dorn had been able to collect 32,000.

Halleck was called to Washington and made Commander-in-chief, leaving Grant in command at Corinth. This was well for the Union army in Mississippi, although Halleck undertook to control its movements from Washington. He paralyzed all the efforts of Grant, and came near destroying Buell and his whole army. Bragg was a very active commander, and was not long in perfecting a counter-stroke against the Union lines. Buell had his forces in and around Nashville. Suddenly Bragg sent Kirby Smith to turn the flank of Cumberland Gap, while he slipped around Buell and started on a race for the Ohio River, expecting to pick up hundreds of recruits in Kentucky as well as to get possession of a vast amount of stores. Buell had been warned by Thomas that Bragg was contemplating

some such movement, but believed his own information was better than that of his great Lieutenant, and paid no heed to the warning until Bragg had gained two or three marches on him; then he, in turn, started for the Ohio River as fast as he could push his men.

This campaign was peculiarly disastrous to Indiana, and for that reason, and because it enabled Indiana to make the grandest display of energy witnessed during the whole course of the war in any State, and emphasized the loyalty and patriotism of its people in a most remarkable degree, it demands detailed attention in these pages. Slipping away from Buell, Bragg crossed the Cumberland at Gainesville, and pushed rapidly to Mumfordsville. A small garrison had been kept at that place, but on the 8th of September it had been reinforced by the Seventeenth Indiana, under Colonel Wilder, who took command. On the 13th the advance of Bragg reached that place, and a demand was made for the surrender of the fortifications, which was refused by Wilder. Early the next morning an assault was made, which was repulsed with considerable loss to the enemy. The next day Colonel Dunham, with seven companies of his regiment, arrived from Louisville, and two regiments and a battery from Lebanon Junction, all Indiana troops. On the 14th another demand for surrender was made, the enemy having been largely reinforced, and it was again refused.

All this time there was an open door for the garrison to retreat, but from some cause it was not taken advantage of. It was known that Bragg and his whole army were in the vicinity, and it would be utterly impossible to hold the place, yet Colonel Dunham, who was now in command, determined to fight it out. In fact the movement of Dunham's regiment from Louisville and the regiments and batteries from Lebanon Junction was a blunder, for it only added to the disaster which was bound to come. On the 16th an attack was made and the fighting became quite severe, but no effort to storm was made. On the 17th, however, the garrison surrendered to the overwhelming force that had been brought against it, but was accorded the honors of war, the men being at once paroled. By this surrender Indiana lost the Seventeenth, Fiftieth, Sixtieth, Sixty-sev-

enth, Sixty-eighth, Seventy-fourth, Seventy-eighth and Eighty-ninth regiments, and Thirteenth battery. Nearly all these regiments had just entered the service, and had been rushed forward to the defense of Kentucky, as detailed in a former chapter.

Mumfordsville was an important point for the defense of the railroad against guerrilla bands, but of no importance whatever as against such a force as Bragg was then moving into Kentucky, and ought to have been abandoned on the first approach of the enemy. Yet the delay of Bragg gave Buell time to overcome at least a part of the advantage the former had gained by his earlier start in the race for Louisville, but this delay was not worth the sacrifice of so many regiments.

When Buell was at last forced to the conclusion that Bragg was aiming at an invasion of Kentucky, he pushed his troops to their utmost speed, either to head him off, or to hang so closely on his rear as to neutralize his efforts. Seldom, if at all, during the entire war, did the soldiers suffer more than on this rapid march. The weather was intensely hot, the roads were bad, the dust stifling, and water could hardly be obtained. Thousands sank down by the roadside exhausted, many of them being captured or killed by marauding bands of the enemy. Others finally followed their comrades and rejoined their regiments, but with broken constitutions. Thus it was that Buell's army suffered a much greater depletion than it would have sustained had it fought a great battle. Buell won the race to Louisville, and there met large reinforcements.

We have already told in some detail how General Morgan seized Cumberland Gap, and how he was flanked out of that position by Kirby Smith, in the invasion of Kentucky in conjunction with the movement of Bragg, and of the hard march his men were compelled to make to reach the Ohio River. But that disaster was only an introduction to another and more terrible one, in which the honor of the Nation suffered, and which cost Indiana heavily. When the news of this double invasion of Kentucky reached the North it created widespread consternation, and the Governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and the other Western States were urgently called upon by the Govern-

ment to hurry forward troops as fast as they could be recruited. All the States responded nobly, but it was the honor of Indiana to send the first, and by far the greatest number of soldiers to the rescue. From one to five regiments a day were recruited, armed, mustered into the service and hastened forward. Major General Lewis Wallace was at home at the time, and, among others, offered his services. He was sent to Kentucky at the head of the Sixty-sixth Indiana regiment, and General Boyle placed him in command of all the troops at Lexington, where he began preparations to hold Kirby Smith in check. The troops at his disposal were all new, many of them never having had arms in their hands until they reached him. He began the work of organizing them for the struggle that was to come, but, unfortunately for the troops and the country, just on the eve of meeting the enemy he was superseded by General William Nelson, who had been sent by Buell. Of this removal, the Comte de Paris, in his "Civil War in America," says:

"General Lewis Wallace, extremely popular in that country, had hastened to Louisville with a regiment from Indiana. The important point of Lexington, the principal intersection of the railways of the State, had been entrusted to his care, and he had soon gathered around him some Ohio regiments which came over from Cincinnati, and the Unionists of Kentucky, who swelled the ranks of the troops raised in that State. His forces amounted to about 10,000 men at the utmost, to whom he had imparted his own ardor, but as they had only been eight days together they had neither experience nor cohesion. The removal of Wallace deprived his soldiers of the only incentive that could have sustained them—confidence in their chief."

General Wallace rendered important services at another point during that campaign. After he had been relieved by Nelson he was called to Cincinnati and placed in command of that city, which was threatened by Kirby Smith. He at once proclaimed martial law, ordered the citizens out, and within seven days so crowned the Kentucky hills, opposite the city, with fortifications, as to defy the whole Confederate force. Into this work he threw all his energy, and the patriotic people of Cincinnati worked willingly un-

der his directing hand and the inspiration of his enthusiasm.

General Nelson was an officer in the navy, and there had won the name of "Bully" Nelson, from his domineering ways. He was a Kentuckian by birth, and was intensely loyal. At the outbreak of the war he was sent to Kentucky, where he raised several regiments for the Union army, and was made a Brigadier General. He was brave, and displayed great energy on several occasions, but was insulting to his inferiors. A few days after the unfortunate battle of Richmond he grossly insulted General Jeff C. Davis, of Indiana, at the Galt House in Louisville, and was shot and killed by that officer.

The troops at Lexington were formed into three brigades, with Generals Manson, Cruft and Jackson as commanders. General Manson, with his own brigade and that of General Cruft, was ordered to advance to Richmond. On the 29th of August his scouts reported that the enemy was approaching in strong force. This information was at once sent to Nelson at Lexington. In the afternoon Manson, with his own brigade, advanced to meet the enemy, leaving Cruft in Richmond. About a mile and a half from the town he took position on a high ridge and formed his troops in line of battle on each side of the road, placing his artillery on the flanks so as to command the road and the open country. A sharp skirmish took place with the advance of the enemy, lasting about an hour, when the enemy retired, Manson following to Rogersville, and sending his cavalry in pursuit.

Early next morning Manson ordered Cruft to his support, and moved forward about half a mile, where he took position on a wooded knoll. The Fifty-fifth and Sixty-ninth Indiana regiments were in the front line, with the Seventy-first in reserve, but the Sixteenth Indiana coming up was placed on the left of the Fifty-fifth. The enemy attacked in strong force on the left, and the Seventy-first Indiana was ordered to its support. In making this movement Lieutenant Colonel Topping was killed, and Major Conkling mortally wounded. The battle was hotly contested, when the arrival of General Cruft with the advance of his brigade materially strengthened the Union line. One

of his regiments was ordered to make a charge on a Confederate battery, and in doing so was thrown into disorder, and the right of Manson's line was pressed from its position. His left was also turned and driven back. The disorder was great, and although the troops were new and under fire for the first time, they behaved with much gallantry and marked steadiness. The Twelfth and Sixty-sixth Indiana were formed on a high knoll some distance to the rear, and on this line the broken troops rallied. This not being deemed a strong position General Manson formed a new line, the enemy attacking with great fury, and the fight was again stubbornly contested. The line was gradually forced back and at last broke in considerable disorder to Richmond, where General Nelson appeared and undertook to form a new line, but the troops soon broke once more. The loss to the Union troops was more than two hundred killed, and seven hundred wounded, with 2000 captured. Nearly all this loss fell on the Indiana troops.

The battle of Richmond left the way open for Kirby Smith to march on Louisville, but the story of how he frittered away his time, and moved toward Cincinnati, where he was met by Wallace, and eventually lost the campaign does not belong to this narrative. We must turn once more to Buell, who had outrun Bragg and reached Louisville in time to save it from capture. All the Western States had been pouring into Louisville fresh regiments, and Buell began the work of reorganizing his army. Before Buell reached Louisville General Wright, who had been in command, had promoted Captain Gilbert to a Major Generalcy and placed him in command of a corps, and he was left in that position by Buell. General Buell did not tarry long but soon made an advance against Bragg for the purpose of driving him back into Tennessee.

There was a good deal of looseness about the movement, and on the 8th of October Bragg thought he saw an opportunity to strike and crush one corps of the Union army, but actually found himself fighting two corps at Perryville. This was one of those singular battles so common during the first two years of the war, in which the men seemed to fight almost without commanders. The battle of Perryville was a magnificent opportunity for

Buell, but he failed to grasp it. He had massed three corps, aggregating more than 50,000 men, within easy supporting distance. In front of him Bragg had less than 25,000. Bragg had no knowledge of the superior force of the Federals, but thought by a bold attack to prevent the concentration, which had already been made. Buell was not on the field and did not know of the battle until after it was all over. Nearly all the fighting on the Union side was done by three divisions, Rousseau's, Mitchell's and Sheridan's, and all this within easy hearing and supporting distance of two corps.

The attack first fell on the division of Rousseau, and was almost wholly unexpected. The battle at once assumed a very determined character, and McCook sent for aid, but Buell was some distance off, and no one felt authorized to move without his orders, so the battle went on. The right of Rousseau's line was driven back, but getting a new position held the enemy in check. While the fighting was hottest, help came, and McCook thus speaks of it in his report:

"Near this point I met Captain Hoblitzell with a brigade of General Robert B. Mitchell's division, coming to reinforce us. This brigade was commanded by Colonel Gooding, of the Twenty-second Indiana, and consisted of his own regiment, the Fifty-ninth and Seventy-fifth Illinois, and the Fifth Wisconsin battery. I ordered the posting of his infantry, and then placed Captain Pinney's battery in position near the cross roads. Gooding's attack, assisted by Pinney's battery, drove back the enemy and re-occupied the position of Russell's house. In this attack Colonel Gooding's gallant brigade lost in killed and wounded four hundred and ninety-one men, almost one-third of his force."

General Rousseau, in his report, thus speaks of the coming of this timely reinforcement: "The reinforcements were from Mitchell's division, as I understood, and were 'Pea Ridge men.' I wish I knew who commanded the brigade, that I might do him justice; I can only say that the brigade moved directly into the fight like true soldiers, and opened a terrific fire and drove back the enemy. It was a gallant body of men." Lieutenant Colonel Keith fell in

this battle. Other Indiana organizations in the same battle won commendations from the officers. The Thirty-sixth, Thirty-eighth, Forty-second, Eightieth, Eighty-first and Eighty-eighth regiments, and Bush's, Harris's and Simonson's batteries, were especially commended.

CHAPTER XLIII.

GRANT IN NORTHERN MISSISSIPPI.

One division after another had been taken from Grant to reinforce Buell until Grant was left with less than 50,000 men, with whom to hold all the territory that had been won by the capture of Corinth, and under Halleck's orders he was required to guard a long line of railroad that was of little or no use. He was anxious to take the offensive, and had submitted several plans to Halleck, but his plans were not approved. All this time the Confederates had been strengthening Vicksburg until they had come to refer to it as the "Gibraltar of America." By the middle of October, 1862, Grant began to feel that he could at last make a move on Vicksburg. While Bragg had been invading Kentucky, Price and Van Dorn had been ordered to move so as to prevent any reinforcements from Grant to Buell. Grant was watching the movements of the enemy in his district, and early in September made some changes in the disposition of his forces. He moved Hurlbut's division from Memphis to Bolivar, Ord from Bolivar to Corinth, and Rosecrans from Iuka and Tuscumbia to the vicinity of Corinth.

On the 15th Grant learned that Price had occupied Iuka in force, and at once made arrangements to attack him. Price was expecting Van Dorn, but Grant knew that the junction of the two forces could not be made in less than four days, and determined not to delay his attack. Rosecrans was ordered to move with about 9000 men until he was opposite Iuka, then turn northward and attack on roads leading to Jacinto and Fulton. Ord, with about 6000,



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was to move along the road to Burnsville, and attack on the northwest of Iuka. Grant went with Ord's column. He reached within three or four miles of Iuka on the 18th, and waited for Rosecrans, the attack to be made at 4:30 the next morning. About midnight he received word from Rosecrans that his march had been delayed, and he would not be able to join in the attack before one or two o'clock the next afternoon, and Grant ordered Ord not to attack until he heard the guns of Rosecrans.

Rosecrans reached Iuka about 4 p. m. of the 19th, and at once opened the battle, but the wind was in such a direction that Ord did not hear his guns, and hence did not join in the attack. Rosecrans had not been able to push his force over to the Fulton road, and Price, taking advantage of this, rapidly retreated. Price was punished severely, losing in all nearly 1500 men. Had Grant known of Rosecrans's battle and been able to join him, Price would have been destroyed. Rosecrans and Ord returned to Corinth, while Price and Van Dorn were able to form a junction.

On the 28th of September Price and Van Dorn, with about 22,000 men, started northward from Ripley. The design was to attack Corinth. If successful this would force Grant back to Kentucky, and thus restore to the Confederates all the territory that had been lost by the capture of Fort Donelson and Corinth. Price arrived in front of Corinth on the morning of October 3d, and immediately formed his line of battle. Rosecrans had with him four divisions, two belonging to his own army of the Ohio, and two from the Army of the Tennessee. His position was well defended by a line of intrenchments within a short distance of the town, and an outer line two miles in advance. Van Dorn made a dashing attack on the 3d and penetrated the Union line.

The next morning the attack was renewed, but the enemy was repulsed at all points, and that evening Van Dorn retreated. Rosecrans did not pursue. Grant was hurrying forward with reinforcements, and General Ord struck the retreating army and administered another punishment. The losses were heavy on both sides for the number engaged, Rosecrans reporting a total loss, in killed, wounded and missing, of 2359. He took 2268 prisoners and the Con-

federates lost in killed and wounded fully as many more. Among the Union killed was General Pleasant A. Hackleman, of Indiana, one of the most gallant soldiers of the war. In the battle of Iuka, Indiana had two regiments, the Twenty-third and Forty-eighth, and in that of Corinth, the Forty-eighth and Fifty-ninth.

At the battle of Iuka, the Forty-eighth Indiana was in the front line, and fought desperately until Eddy, its Colonel, fell. Eddy was killed at the moment when his regiment was being assailed by a largely superior force, and the regiment for a time gave way, but rallied and kept up the fight.

The defeat of Van Dorn left Grant free to assume the aggressive, and he began looking once more to a move against Vicksburg. By the end of October his army consisted of 7000 men at Memphis, under Sherman; 19,200 at Bolivar, under Hurlbut; 17,500 at Corinth, under Hamilton (who had succeeded Rosecrans, the latter having been sent to Kentucky to replace Buell), and 4800 at Columbus, under Dodge; in all, 48,500 men. It was expected that he would be largely reinforced from the new levies then being raised. Under Halleck's orders his forces were scattered in several directions, but Grant expected early permission to move according to his own plans. Opposed to Grant was Pemberton, who had succeeded Van Dorn, with about 37,500 men. On the 26th of October Grant wrote to Halleck, proposing to abandon Corinth after destroying all the railroads around it, and to concentrate his forces at Grand Junction. When the Confederates occupied Corinth it was a point of great strategic value, but with the Mississippi opened to Vicksburg it no longer had any value, and the movement proposed by Grant would cover it as well as if he had an army behind its fortifications. Halleck did not reply, but Grant, on his own motion, gathered about 30,000 men at Grand Junction. Grant's plan was to approach Vicksburg in the rear, from the north, just as he did a few months later from the south, when the Confederates had made the route from the north impossible. His strategy was to move along the Mississippi, and parallel to it, and thus render Vicksburg of no account to the Confederacy.

Grant fully recognized the impossibility of sustaining

an army so as to make it successfully aggressive, if it had to maintain long lines of supplies either by rail or wagons, where the lines were open to continual attacks from raiding bands. But moving parallel with the river, and in easy reach of it, he could afford to abandon railroads and depend upon the river, where the gunboats could effectually convoy the transports. He wanted to make Memphis his base of supplies and not Columbus. He then would care nothing for the long railroad, and its destruction by the Confederates would only be an injury to themselves. It took quite a while to convince Halleck, and obtain even a limited discretion in his own movements. At last, however, Grant was told to take his own course, and he at once conferred with Sherman and planned an expedition against Vicksburg. Sherman was to descend the river from Memphis, and make a landing just north of the city. Grant was to move in force on Jackson, and he felt perfectly able to handle any army that might get in his way. Pemberton was reinforced from Bragg, and then occurred one or two of those incidents which upset well matured plans. Bragg sent Forrest on one of his raids, and he succeeded in cutting the telegraph wires and destroying the railroads to such an extent that from the 19th to the 30th of December Grant was so isolated that he could not communicate even with Sherman.

This was not the only mishap which befell Grant at that time. He had gathered large quantities of stores and munitions at Holly Springs, preparatory to working out his part of the joint plan between himself and Sherman. Holly Springs was commanded by Colonel Murphy, who had been warned of danger by Grant, and instructed to defend the post to the last extremity. Pemberton ordered Van Dorn, with all the cavalry of his army, to make a raid on Grant's rear. He made a dash on Holly Springs. Murphy permitted himself to be surprised, and surrendered the town with his whole force of 1500 men without a show of resistance. Van Dorn burned all the stores, and thus placed Grant in such a condition that he could not make the move in support of Sherman, and what was worse, the cutting of the telegraph prevented him from warning Sherman of the difficulty. Thus Sherman was left to make an assault by him-

self and to meet with a terrible repulse. This attack of Sherman will be treated in considering the further movements against Vicksburg in 1863.

Let us now return to Buell, who, after his battle at Perryville, slowly followed Bragg into Tennessee, until he was removed and Rosecrans placed in command of his army. A. K. McClure, in his "Lincoln and Men of War Times," says: "The clamor for Buell's removal grew more imperious, and all the partisan rancor of that time was thrown into the scale against Buell as a military commander. His command was composed largely of Illinois and Indiana troops, and Governors Morton and Yates pursued him with intense ferocity because he enforced discipline in his army and would not permit his soldiers to plunder private homes."

John Fiske, in his "Mississippi Valley in the Civil War," on the same subject says:

"Unfortunately for Buell, however, he had made two powerful enemies in Oliver P. Morton, Governor of Indiana, and Andrew Johnson, whom President Lincoln had appointed Military Governor of Tennessee. Morton's services to the Union cause were so great that he stood high (and deservedly so) in the favor of President Lincoln. At the same time he was a man of relentless and domineering temper, and could never be made to understand that the Indiana troops in Buell's army owed obedience primarily to their General and not to the Governor at Indianapolis. He would send staff officers into the army to look after the interests of the Indiana men, exchange their arms without the knowledge of their commanders, and keep up a communication concerning various matters which were none of their business. Buell was not the man to endure such infringements of discipline, and when he suppressed them he incurred the deadly hostility of the passionate Morton."

Some other writers have made the same, or similar statements. It is true that Morton did send agents to look after the soldiers from Indiana, and for this he received the thanks and commendations of every General commanding Indiana soldiers, with, perhaps, the exception of General Buell. He did change their arms in some instances, but it

was with the full knowledge and consent of the President, of Secretary Stanton, and of Halleck, the Commander-in-chief. When Bragg outgeneraled Buell and invaded Kentucky, Buell, the President, Stanton and Halleck, each in turn, filled the wires with urgent messages to Morton to hurry troops forward to save Buell, to save Kentucky, and he sent regiment after regiment, arming them with whatever guns he could obtain, at the same time protesting against putting men into battle with such inferior arms. He purchased, through his own agents, arms of the best class obtainable, and when they reached him, sent them to the troops for which they were intended. He had been taught a severe lesson of army methods in the first few months of the war. He had purchased, and procured from the Government, several thousand overcoats and uniforms for Indiana soldiers, and when they reached the front they were given to other troops. At another time he had procured and forwarded improved arms for one of his regiments, and without authority they were distributed to a regiment from another State. So, after that, when it came time to distribute arms or clothing he had purchased or procured, he sent his own agents to see that they reached the men for whom they were intended, rather than trust army quartermasters.

Governor Morton was never opposed to the strictest discipline. He did not, however, believe in permitting troops to suffer from cold while there was plenty of fuel at hand, and that fuel belonging to those who were in arms against the Government. Yet that is what thousands of soldiers under Buell had to undergo, or suffer punishment if they took a rail from a fence. Indiana troops were not given to plundering private houses. In the instance cited by Mr. McClure, the burning of Athens, the only Indiana regiment with that command did not participate, and yet even a fair excuse can be given for the actions of the soldiers at Athens. They had captured the town, and a few troops had been left to guard it. The enemy being reinforced drove out the garrison, and set fire to a train, burning some of the soldiers to death, the citizens standing by and refusing to assist the soldiers from the burning wreck.

Governor Morton insisted that neglect had caused the

capture of several Indiana regiments at Mumfordsville, and he placed the responsibility of that affair on Buell. He also claimed that the slaughter of so many Indiana troops at Richmond, Kentucky, and the capture at that place of so many more, were needless, and he charged that those two disasters were due to "imbecility and mismanagement." At Richmond parts of several Indiana regiments were captured, and General Buell proposed to take the remnants of the regiments, which had escaped capture, and scatter them around in regiments from other States. Against this Morton protested, promising that if the men were sent back to Indiana he would promptly recruit the regiments to their full quota and return them to the field. Buell refused to consent to this and the Governor appealed to the President and won his point.

Morton undoubtedly believed Buell was not equal to the emergency. Bishop Ames and others made an earnest effort to have a new commander appointed in his place. In October, 1862, Governor Morton was in Washington, and on his return he was told that it had been reported he had tried to have Buell removed. On this he telegraphed to General Boyle, in command of Kentucky, and characterized the story as "wholly false." When, however, Bragg escaped into Tennessee, after the drawn battle of Perryville, the Governor wired the President:

"An officer just arrived from Louisville announces that Bragg has escaped with his army into East Tennessee, and that Buell's army is countermarching to Lebanon. The butchery of our troops at Perryville was terrible, and resulted from a large portion of the enemy being precipitated upon a small part of ours. Nothing but success, speedy and decided, will save our cause from utter destruction in the Northwest. Distrust and despair are seizing upon the hearts of our people."

That Governor Morton favored Buell's removal is doubtless true, but it does not appear that he was instrumental in bringing it about, at least to the extent that McClure and Fiske assert. The retirement of Buell was due to his failure to follow Bragg, after Perryville.

CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER.

After Bragg's escape Buell moved his army to Nashville and it was there when Rosecrans assumed command. Bragg had concentrated his forces at Murfreesboro. He was very active with his cavalry, an arm of the service in which Rosecrans was sadly deficient. Bragg was thus able to annoy Rosecrans by breaking up his communications, and it became an absolute necessity to give battle. This was also demanded by the Government. The people of the North were growing disheartened at the slow progress of the war. In the East one disaster after another had occurred, and in the West no real advance had been made since the reduction of Donelson and Corinth. The day after Christmas in 1862 Rosecrans began his advance from Nashville. Public pressure in the South had been as strong on Bragg for active operations as that in the North had been upon Rosecrans, and as soon as he was informed that Rosecrans was preparing for a forward movement he made arrangements to meet him and contest for the supremacy.

Murfreesboro is a station on the railroad about thirty miles southeast of Nashville. Near it runs Stone's River, a sluggish tributary of the Cumberland. In the battle which followed Indiana had thirty-two regiments and three batteries. By following the movements of the brigades and divisions to which they belonged, it will be seen what part they took in the contest, which lasted three days. The Indiana troops were distributed as follows:

McCook's Corps—Davis's division, Post's brigade, 22d; Woodruff's brigade, 81st; Johnson's division, Willich's brig-

ade, 32d and 39th; Kirk's brigade, 29th and 30th; Baldwin's brigade, 6th regiment, and 5th battery; Sheridan's division, Sill's brigade, 4th battery.

Thomas's Corps—Rousseau's division, Scribner's brigade, 38th; John Beatty's brigade, 42d and 88th; Negley's division, J. F. Miller's brigade, 37th; Fry's division, Walker's brigade, 82d.

Crittenden's Corps—Wood's division, Hascall's brigade, 58th regiment and 8th battery; Wagner's brigade, 15th, 40th and 57th regiments and 10th battery; Harker's brigade, 51st and 73d; Palmer's division, Cruft's brigade, 31st; Hazen's brigade, 9th; Grose's brigade, 36th; VanCleve's division, Sam Beatty's brigade, 79th; Fyffe's brigade, 44th, 86th regiments, 7th battery; Price's brigade, 35th.

Almost at the very threshold of his movement Rosecrans felt the enemy in opposition, and persistent skirmishing began, and sometimes it was so heavy that it amounted almost to a sharp engagement. It was evident that Bragg was determined to give battle, and Rosecrans was as eager as his enemy. On the night of the 30th of December the two armies were in line, close to each other. Bragg occupied a line at an acute angle to Stone's River, and to the westward, with Breckinridge's division across the river to guard the town of Murfreesboro from a flank attack. Hardee's corps occupied the extreme left of Bragg's line, with Polk in the center, his right resting on the river. The Union army took a position in front of Hardee and Polk, but its line ran in a sort of zig-zag fashion.

McCook's corps held the right. This corps consisted of three divisions, Johnson's, Davis's and Sheridan's. Johnson held the extreme right, resting on the Franklin turnpike. This position was extremely faulty, as his right flank was refused, and faced almost south. Johnson had one brigade in reserve, but it was more than a mile in the rear of his line. Davis's division was to the left of Johnson, and then came Sheridan. Thomas commanded the center, with the divisions of Negley and Palmer in the front line, Negley being next to Sheridan, and Rousseau's division in reserve. Crittenden's corps held the extreme left of the Union line, resting on the river. McCook's attention was called to the faulty arrangement of Johnson's division, but he would not change it.

Both Bragg and Rosecrans had plans of battle, and they were nearly identical. It was the intention of Rosecrans to begin the battle with his left, crossing the river with the divisions of VanCleve and Wood at an early hour of the morning, turning Bragg's left flank, and thus cutting him off from his only line of retreat. The battle was then to be taken up by the other divisions in turn, until Bragg should be driven against this flanking column. Bragg also designed to begin the battle with his left, each division joining in an attack on the front, as Rosecrans' right should be driven back. Thus, as the battle would be taken up by each one of his divisions, those on the flank of the Union army would join in, crushing each part of the Union line in turn. In short, it was to be a continual wheel, pivoting on his right. As has been said, the right of the Union army was in an awkward position. Bragg had still another advantage. He got the start of Rosecrans, and opened his battle first. To render things worse for Rosecrans, Johnson, who commanded his right division, had his headquarters a mile and a half in the rear, where his reserve brigade was posted. And to add to the misfortunes of the occasion, at the time the blow fell, Willich, who commanded the right brigade, was with Johnson at his headquarters, so that there was no one at the front to command. In fact Willich was taken prisoner while attempting to rejoin his brigade.

Never was grosser negligence exhibited by commanders in front of an enemy, and when the storm of battle might fall at any moment. The guns of Johnson's division were poorly guarded, and when the blow came some of the artillery horses were off at some distance being watered. Bragg did not make the mistake of opening his battle with a weak force. He sent two strong divisions, led by two of his ablest division commanders, Pat Cleburne being one of them, to fall on the extreme right, held by Willich's brigade. Willich was away and his men were taken by surprise, and when the enemy came rushing like a torrent upon them, the two brigades in front were driven in sad disorder from the field, losing eleven guns. The brigade in reserve endeavored to get into line to assist the others, but it was too far away, and before it could even form for an aggressive movement the disaster had occurred.

The breaking of Johnson's division uncovered the right of Davis, and upon this the victorious Confederates charged in heavy masses, striking it at once in front and flank, the next division of Bragg joining in the front attack, in pursuance to the plan of battle. Davis was a different commander from Johnson. He was not a mile and a half in the rear and he was prepared for the attack. Twice was Cleburne driven back by a murderous fire, but Davis was not strong enough to hold his lines against the force in front and flank. He piled the ground with the dead and wounded assailants, but finally was driven across the Wilkinson turnpike, but not in confusion, such as had characterized the retreat of Johnson's division.

Now it was Sheridan's turn. The retreat of Davis had uncovered his right, and he had three divisions to fight, two on his flank and one in front. It was a terrible moment for the Union army. Two divisions had been routed, and the cedar thickets in the rear of Sheridan were full of fugitives from the divisions of Johnson and Davis. McCook had promised to hold his position against all odds for three hours. One hour had not gone by, and two of his divisions had been routed, and the last was to receive the attack of nearly half of the Confederate army. The Confederate center had been silent, but it was now its turn to join in the awful fray. It opened with a heavy fire on Sheridan and Negley, while their victorious left was hurled upon Sheridan. With Sheridan driven from the field, as Johnson and Davis had been, nothing but rapid flight could save the Union army. But Sheridan was not to be easily driven from his position. The stubborn resistance of Davis, when taken at a disadvantage, had taught the Confederates that the Union troops would fight, and Sheridan had more time to prepare than had Davis. He was a man of wonderful resources in the heat of battle. When he found his flank uncovered by the forced retreat of Davis, he withdrew his own right to form a new line at right angles with the old, and to gain time for this he ordered his left to drive back the enemy at the point of the bayonet. Colonel Roberts, at the head of an Illinois brigade, threw himself on the enemy with such fury that he drove them back in great disorder, and made them more cautious in their future movements.

Sheridan had got his new line formed, and it took two hours of hard fighting to make him leave it, when, finding himself being again outflanked, he once more changed front, until his division and that of Negley formed something like a semi-circle, and for another two hours he held the enemy at bay. Bragg, knowing that he must break this line or fail in his battle, massed his entire left and center against these two divisions, but three times they were driven back with terrible slaughter. By this time every one of Sheridan's brigade commanders was dead, and more than half his division were killed or wounded. His cartridge boxes were empty, but the stubborn Sheridan would not retreat without striking one more blow. He made a desperate charge with the bayonet and drove the enemy back again, and before they could recover he had withdrawn his troops to the new line that was formed by Thomas and Rosecrans. He had saved the day.

Now let us look to the left of the Union line. Van Cleve had been ordered to cross the river and open the battle according to the plan of Rosecrans. He was to be supported by Wood. Two of his brigades had crossed, and the third was in the act of crossing when Rosecrans learned of the disaster on his own right, and that the Confederate cavalry was in his rear capturing his train. Van Cleve was hastily withdrawn, and a part of his division was sent to save the trains. Rousseau's division was sent to Sheridan's support, but was also driven back. The retirement of Sheridan had uncovered the flank of Negley, and he was obliged to retreat. On a new line chosen by Rosecrans the divisions of Johnson and Davis were being formed when Sheridan retired. Sheridan was joined by Van Cleve and Wood, with 12,000 fresh men, and on the crest of a knoll Rosecrans gathered his artillery in heavy masses.

To gain time for all this Thomas had to hold his line, and he proved there, as he did later at Chickamauga, that he could stand firm as a rock, and that nothing could drive him from a position he had once taken. He rallied the divisions of Negley and Rousseau, and Van Cleve sent one brigade on a run to assist him. The hottest fighting of the day was now to take place. Four times, with all their usual gallantry, the Confederates charged on this line, and

were compelled to fall back baffled of their prey. One of Rousseau's brigades lost twenty-six officers and six hundred and eleven men out of a total of 1566. So stubborn was Thomas, and so firmly did he cling to his position, that Rosecrans was able to form his new line so strongly that Bragg was still far from the victory he had felt sure of only a few hours before. He tried a new tack. Palmer's division, on the extreme left of the Union line, had become so much enveloped that Bragg hoped to break through and on the left accomplish what he had planned to do on the right. Palmer was made of stern stuff, and his men were all fighters. He held a small grove known as the "Round Forest." It was the key of the position, and for the possession of this little forest the Confederates made one desperate assault after another. One of their regiments lost 207 men out of 402, and another lost 306 out of 425, but their valor was all in vain, for Palmer still held his position.

At two o'clock Bragg felt forced to call upon Breckinridge, and the latter sent four brigades to join in the assault on the Round Forest. But again they failed. At four o'clock they rushed forward in a last determined effort. Rosecrans was there at the time and ordered a bayonet charge, which broke the Confederate line, and they gave over the effort to get possession of the Federal position. Bragg then attempted an assault on the front of the new line Rosecrans had established, but such a hurricane of shot and shell assailed his columns that the Confederates sought shelter in the woods, and the battle ceased for the day.

Of this part of the battle, Colonel G. C. Kniffin, in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," says:

"The movement of Crittenden's left and center divisions upon Bragg's right wing having been arrested, Wood's division was in position to cross at the upper ford. Wagner's brigade was at the river bank. Hascall was in reserve, some distance to the rear of the opening between Wagner's right and Hazen's left. The withdrawal of Negley from Palmer's right precipitated the attack of Donelson's and Chalmer's brigades against the right and Adam and Johnson against the left. Chalmer's attack was made with great fury. His men had been confined, without fires,

in their rifle pits for forty-eight hours, and finally when the order came at 10 o'clock to 'up and at 'em,' they came forward like a pack of hounds in full cry. Cruft recoiled from the attack in the open field between the Round Forest and the wood in which Negley was engaged, and, falling back, met the charge at the time Negley was moved to the rear. Now Cruft's right was in the air and exposed to attack by Donelson following Negley. Cruft repulsed Chalmers in his front, but Donelson, pouring in his rear, threatened to envelop him. Grose, from his position in reserve, faced to the right, and soon after to the rear, and bore back the charging columns, enabling Cruft to withdraw.

"When Chalmers's assault first fell upon Palmer's right, Hazen faced his two right regiments, the Sixth Kentucky and Ninth Indiana, to the rear, where the impetus of Chalmers's assault upon Cruft had borne him, at the same time retiring the two left regiments, the Forty-first Ohio and the One Hundred and Tenth Illinois, some fifty yards to the left of the pike, and engaged to the front, the Fortieth Indiana having fallen back. A burnt brick house in the immediate front of the Round Forest afforded cover to the enemy, and in the steady, persistent effort to force back the front of Hazen's line the action became terrific. All of Hascall's brigade, and two regiments of Wagner's, being engaged on the right of the Sixth Kentucky, and Wagner's remaining regiments being in position at the ford, some distance to the left, the assault on the left was borne by Hazen, whose brigade was thought by Polk to be the extreme left of the Union line. Upon this point, as on a pivot, the entire army oscillated from front to rear for hours. Hazen's horse fell, shot square in the forehead. Word came that the ammunition of the Forty-first Ohio was nearly exhausted. 'Fix bayonets and hold your ground,' was the order. To the One Hundred and Tenth Illinois, who had no bayonets, and whose cartridges were exhausted, the order was given to club their muskets but hold their ground. The Ninth Indiana now dashed across the line of fire from a battery in front, to the left, to relieve the Forty-first Ohio. Cannon balls tore through their ranks, but they were rapidly closed up, and the men took their places in the front line, the Forty-first retiring with

thinned ranks, but in excellent order, to refill their empty cartridge boxes. An ominous silence succeeded, soon followed by the charge of Donelson's fresh Confederate brigade and the remains of Chalmers's. The time had been occupied by the readjustment of Palmer's line. The Twenty-fourth Ohio, commanded by Colonel Fred Jones, and the Thirty-sixth Indiana, shorn of half its strength in the previous assault, were sent to Hazen's support. Parson's battery was posted on the left. The Third Kentucky, led by McKee, dashed forward and took position on the right of the Ninth Indiana across the turnpike. The terrible slaughter in this regiment attests its courage.

"While Hazen and Wagner were thus gallantly defending the left of the line from 9 o'clock in the morning until 2 in the afternoon, the fight raged not less furiously on their immediate right. Here a line was formed, composed of two brigades of Palmer's division, and Hascall's of Wood's, filled out by the remains of Sheridan's and Negley's divisions, who, after they had replenished their ammunition, formed behind the railroad embankment at right angles with Hazen's brigade, which alone retained its position on the original line. Farther to the right was Rousseau with Van Cleve, Harker and Morton on his right. At this supreme moment the chances of victory were evenly balanced. The undaunted soldiers of the left and center had swept past the crowd of fugitives from the right wing, and now in strong array they stood like a rock-bound coast, beating back the tide which threatened to engulf the rear."

During the night Rosecrans perfected his line, and during the next day little was done. Bragg made several efforts to see if Rosecrans was holding his line, or was preparing to retreat. During the afternoon and evening Rosecrans ordered Van Cleve to cross the river, seize the heights on the east side, and plant batteries there. This was done without opposition, but on the afternoon of January 2, Breckinridge was ordered to assault and drive the Federals from this position, which seriously threatened Bragg's communications. At first Breckinridge was successful against Van Cleve, assaulting Price's and Grider's brigades with such fury that he drove them back to the river. On

the high ground on the west side of the river Hazen's and Cruft's two brigades, of Palmer's division, and Negley's division, with their batteries, were massed. The movement of Breckinridge was perceived, and Rosecrans soon had fifty-eight guns bearing on the enemy. When Grider's and Price's brigades were compelled to give way, leaving only the brigade of Samuel Beatty in line, these guns opened on Breckinridge and before their murderous fire he recoiled. Now occurred one of those inspirations that win battles when least expected. Colonel John F. Miller, of Indiana, commanding a brigade in Negley's division, charged with his brigade, without orders. He disregarded an order from a general officer, not his immediate commander, and dashed over the river and fell with fury on the foe. He was followed by a part of Stanley's brigade. He charged upon and captured a battery. First one brigade after another, seeing the success of Miller, followed him, until Breckinridge was completely crushed. Van Horne, in his "Army of the Cumberland," thus speaks of the charge of Colonel Miller:

"Colonel Miller's movement had great prominence, in utterly defeating General Bragg's object in this engagement, which was to secure the heights commanding his lines across the river. General Rosecrans, being as yet on the defensive, had no thought of aggression from any point of his line, and hence it is not improbable that, had not Colonel Miller moved promptly to charge Breckinridge's forces, and had he not followed them in rapid pursuit, they might have re-formed on their objective and held it. As it was, Miller drew after him such a combination as prevented Breckinridge from holding the coveted heights, who, having been carried beyond the hills by his success at first, lost them altogether, his failure costing, in the various forms of casualty, an aggregate of two thousand men."

During the night of the 3d Bragg retreated, and confessed his defeat. Now let us follow, somewhat in detail, what part the Indiana troops played in this great drama of battle. The first blow of the battle, on the morning of the 31st, fell on Willich's and Kirk's brigades. With Willich were the Thirty-second and Thirty-ninth regiments, and with Kirk the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth. They were

involved in the first disaster and swept from the field losing many men, the Thirty-ninth losing 231 by capture. These two brigades promptly rallied and helped to form the new line established by Rosecrans, and aided in repulsing the last charge of Bragg. In the attack in the morning the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth had for some little time withstood the assault of a Confederate brigade and when compelled to fall back, did so with good order firing as they retreated, doing considerable injury. Colonel Baldwin, with his brigade, which was in reserve, in which the Sixth served, did not know of the overthrow of the other two brigades until the fugitives came toward him. The Sixth promptly moved to a rail fence, with a section of Simonson's battery on the right. Scarcely had the line been formed when the Confederates rushed to the assault. The Sixth and the First Ohio fired with such energy and precision that the Confederate line staggered and then fell back, but being reinforced, outflanked this little line, and it was compelled to hastily retreat to avoid capture. In this retreat Simonson lost two guns.

Colonel Post's brigade held the right of Davis's line and was uncovered by the retreat of Johnson's division. The Twenty-second, with the Fifty-ninth Illinois, tried to stem the tide that was sweeping over them, and fought with conspicuous gallantry, but finally the whole brigade was compelled to retreat. The foe now fell with great strength on Carlin's and Woodruff's brigades, the Eighty-first being with Woodruff. The two brigades made a desperate fight to hold their ground, being somewhat protected. It was only after a full brigade charged upon these two regiments that they were compelled to give way. Bush's battery played a conspicuous part in the gallant and stubborn fight made by Sheridan. When the battle reached General Palmer's division he ordered Colonel Grose to change front to his right and rear, which was done on the double quick. Grose sent the Sixth Ohio and the Thirty-sixth Indiana, about two hundred yards in advance, into the cedars. These two regiments stood manfully to the work assigned them. They were temporarily thrown into disorder by the Fifteenth and Sixteenth infantry breaking through their lines, but straightening out they held the enemy in check

until the commanding officers of both regiments had fallen, when they slowly retired.

When General Negley's division retired, the Thirty-eighth Indiana and Tenth Wisconsin were sent to their aid. The Thirty-eighth took position and fought, losing heavily, until the whole line fell back. The Thirty-first was with Cruft, and took active part in all the fighting of that gallant brigade, repelling two assaults. Scribner's brigade, with the Thirty-eighth, and John Beatty's, with the Forty-second and Eighty-eighth, were in Rousseau's division, and took part in the fighting when that division was sent to the relief of Sheridan. It was the desperate fighting of these two brigades that saved the center, when the withdrawal of Sheridan left a gap between him and Negley.

When the center, under Thomas, became involved in the fight, regiments and brigades were hurried so rapidly, first in one direction and then in another, to support threatened places in the line, that it is almost impossible to follow the movements of regiments. It was the three brigades of Cruft, Hazen and Grose which held the Round Forest against all the assaults of the enemy, and so punished them that when they made their attack upon the new line of Rosecrans, the men were so disheartened that the attack lacked the fire and energy necessary to give it even a show of success. In those three brigades were the Ninth, Thirty-first and Thirty-sixth regiments. The Thirty-first, of Cruft's brigade, held the point of the woods, and at one time was assailed on three sides. It held its ground for forty minutes and saved the battery, which had but sixteen rounds of ammunition left. Colonel Grose's brigade was compelled several times to change front. Of this brigade General Palmer said: "Grose was fighting with apparently great odds against him. All were acquitting themselves nobly, and all were hard pressed. I could see that Grose was losing a great many men, but the importance of Hazen's position determined me, if necessary, to expend the last man to hold it."

The Fifteenth, Fortieth and Fifty-seventh regiments were in Wagner's brigade of Wood's division. In the various movements of the battle nearly half of Wagner's brigade had been sent to support other parts of the line.

He, in turn, became severely engaged on the extreme left of the line, on the bank of the river. Wagner was ordered to cross the railroad and post his battery (Cox's) on the left, and hold the position at all hazards. The battery was soon in position and hotly engaged. The Fifty-seventh was moved to the edge of the woods, and lay down near the battery. The Confederates made several fierce charges on the battery, but so well was the battery served that the enemy were driven back without having to call upon the infantry support until it had exhausted its sixteen hundred rounds of ammunition. The Fifty-seventh was moved forward so as to protect the battery and was subjected to a severe shelling by the enemy. As the Confederates were preparing for another charge the Fifteenth and Fifty-seventh poured in such a fire as to compel them to recoil in great confusion. Once more the Confederates prepared to charge, but General Wagner determined to meet them by a counter charge, and the Fifteenth and Fifty-seventh were ordered to fix bayonets and, with a rush, they dashed against the enemy far in advance of the main line, and were so successful as to break the Confederate column in pieces. In this charge the Fifteenth captured all the men of one entire regiment that were not killed or wounded. For ten hours the three regiments of this brigade were under fire. Their loss was very heavy.

The Fifty-first and Seventy-third were in Harker's brigade, of Wood's division. When Rosecrans was endeavoring to stay the onward sweep of the enemy, he placed Harker's brigade west of the cemetery. The Ninth Kentucky and the Nineteenth Ohio were in the front line, and bravely did they attempt to drive back the charging enemy. The fight was sharp and quick until their ammunition was about giving out, when General Rosecrans gave orders for the second line to advance to the help of the first. With a loud hurrah, the Eleventh Kentucky and the Seventy-ninth Indiana rushed forward and drove the enemy some distance. This was about ten o'clock in the morning. Harker, Beatty and Fyffe all moved forward, but in the movement Harker, noticing that his line was in danger of being flanked, moved to the right, thereby leaving a gap between him and Fyffe. The Confederates were quick to seize

this opportunity and rushed at the gap. The Forty-fourth Indiana and the Fifty-ninth Ohio were the first to feel the shock, and were soon forced back on the Eighty-sixth Indiana and the Thirteenth Ohio. The Confederates were then driven back. At last, however, Fyffe was compelled to fall back in turn. This left Samuel Beatty's brigade in a dangerous position.

The three brigades of Van Cleve's division were sent across Stone's River on the evening of the first to seize the heights and threaten Murfreesboro, and it was against them Breckinridge directed his assault on the afternoon of the second. As the enemy approached, the Thirty-fifth and Seventy-ninth regiments were ordered to lie down and remain concealed. The Thirty-ninth had a bloody fight and lost heavily. The losses of the Indiana regiments and batteries, in this bloody struggle, were as follows:

Sixth Regiment	104
Ninth	109
Fifteenth	188
Twenty-second	64
Twenty-ninth	135
Thirtieth	213
Thirty-first	87
Thirty-second	167
Thirty-fifth	137
Thirty-sixth	134
Thirty-seventh	150
Thirty-eighth	112
Thirty-ninth	380
Fortieth	85
Forty-second	132
Forty-fourth	91
Fifty-first	50
Fifty-seventh	78
Fifty-eighth	114
Seventy-third	111
Seventy-ninth	121
Eighty-first	69
Eighty-second	5
Eighty-sixth	195

Eighty-eighth	78
Third Cavalry	25
Fourth Battery	26
Fifth Battery	23
Tenth Battery	5
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Total	3211

This loss was nearly one-fourth of the entire loss of the army and shows that the Indiana regiments were in the thickest of the fight.

CHAPTER XLV.

THE CAMPAIGN OF FREDERICKSBURG.

The year 1862 was not to close without a terrible disaster to the Union arms in the East. The people and Administration were dissatisfied at the way in which Lee was permitted to escape across the Potomac without further punishment after the battle of Antietam. It is true that he had failed in his great design of forcing a peace on the Washington Government, had lost a very large part of his army and had finally withdrawn into Virginia, but he had caused great damage to the Union forces by the defeats he had administered to Pope, and by the capture of Harper's Ferry. He had gathered vast supplies which he had been able to send safely across the Potomac, and when he retired in the same direction with his army intact, it caused profound gloom in Washington and throughout the country. There was cause for disheartenment. In April everything had looked bright and promising. Grant had pierced one line of the Confederacy at Donelson, and by that victory had caused the evacuation of Columbus and other strongholds. At the time the real significance of his victory was not understood. The people and the Government only saw the 17,000 prisoners he had taken, but the capture of the prisoners was the least important part of his victory, as it compelled the Confederates to practically withdraw from Tennessee. The fall of Corinth had also caused the fall of Memphis, and thus opened the Mississippi River to Vicksburg. Everywhere in the West the victory had been with the Unionists, except the one failure of Sherman in his assault at Haines's Bluff. Even Perryville was a victory, although it was denominated a drawn battle.

In the East, however, a succession of disasters had occurred. Notwithstanding the valor displayed by the troops in the series of battles on the Peninsula, that expedition had proved a lamentable failure. In the last and most desperate battle of the series, that of Malvern Hill, while immediate success attended the Army of the Potomac, the defeat of Lee was barren of any good results. Antietam had been a tactical victory only. There is no better time of the year for the movements of armies in Virginia than the months of September, October and November. The Army of the Potomac had recovered from whatever demoralization it had suffered under Pope, and was in excellent trim for an aggressive campaign. It was numerically largely superior to Lee's army. The people of the North knew all this and they grew impatient when the days and weeks rolled away without a forward movement. The cost of the war was enormous, and the Government had not yet won so decided a success as to preclude the interference of foreign nations. This troubled Mr. Lincoln greatly, and he urged McClellan to move.

When McClellan finally began a movement against Richmond, by the way of Culpepper, the administration, being dissatisfied with his plans and progress, removed him finally and absolutely. McClellan's friends throughout the country, whose name was legion, believed that he was the victim of a political conspiracy; that he never had had the cordial support of the administration at Washington, and that it was necessary to destroy him, as he threatened to be a formidable presidential candidate in 1864. What foundation, if any, there was for this feeling, it is not within the scope of this work to inquire. But McClellan's removal at this juncture, when many believed a great victory was within his grasp, undoubtedly made him the presidential nominee of the Democracy at the next election. Ambrose E. Burnside, a native of Indiana, succeeded McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac. He had been graduated from West Point and had served in the army some years. Resigning, he had made his home in Rhode Island, and by that State, at the beginning of the war, had been made a Brigadier General. He was a brave and capable officer, but not competent to handle so large an army

as that of the Potomac. He accepted the place with great reluctance, and found himself at once hampered by the jealousy of some of the higher officers of the army. They did not respond, on all occasions, readily and cheerfully to the demands he made upon them, and to this he attributed the defeat which overtook him, which, however, was brought about largely by his own lack of generalship.

Upon assuming command he took some time to decide upon a plan of campaign. He finally chose the one giving the most promise of success, and had it been carried out with energy it would have gloriously succeeded. Burnside proposed to move on Richmond by way of Fredericksburg. It was the shortest line, and the one by which his communications would be more readily made secure, while at the same time it covered Washington. The first requisite for success was to secure the heights around Fredericksburg, between Lee and Richmond, and on Lee's line of communications, which would compel the latter to fight on ground not of his own choosing. Burnside could throw his whole force on Lee and crush him, or could, with a part of his army, hold him in check. He could then spare a large force to push on and take Richmond.

He failed in the initial movement. He had divided his army into three grand divisions, one commanded by Franklin, one by Sumner and the third by Hooker. He sent Sumner to seize Fredericksburg. At that time there was only a small Confederate force at that place, and a single regiment could have displaced it. Between Sumner and Fredericksburg was the Rappahannock, a stream that was unfordable in the immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg. This fact was known to Burnside and he called on Halleck at Washington for pontoons, which were promised, but not sent. So when Sumner arrived at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, he found himself unable to cross the river. Instead of seeking a ford he waited for the coming of the promised pontoons. A ford did exist only a short distance away, and had he sent his cavalry by it he could have gained possession of the heights, and thus made success reasonably sure. Lee was not long in discovering this movement and the danger there was in it to him, and hastened to take possession of the heights back of the town,

thus barring the way to Richmond and preserving his communications. When the pontoons arrived Burnside could only use them in the face of an enemy strongly fortified.

Sumner had arrived at Falmouth on the 17th of November, but it was not until the 12th of December that Burnside was in a condition to attempt to cross the river, and then all the heights around the town were frowning with batteries, and Lee had his whole army within easy reach. It is true that Jackson was at some distance, but still he was within call. Burnside planned for Franklin, with the left grand division of the army, to throw three bridges across the river, and crossing, make a demonstration against the right of the Confederate forces, while Sumner was to cross in the immediate front of Fredericksburg and attack the heights in the rear. Other portions of the army were to move in connection, but with them we have nothing to do, as no Indiana troops were concerned. With Franklin were the Seventh, Nineteenth and Twentieth regiments. Neither of these regiments was very actively engaged, as there was not much fighting on Franklin's line, except by Meade's division. The Nineteenth was in Meredith's brigade of Gibbon's division, and formed the extreme left of the army. When it moved to cross the river it had a sharp fight to dislodge the enemy from a wood which sheltered them, and this was done in gallant style, quite a number of prisoners being captured. The regiment, with its brigade, moved back and forth in support of other divisions, but there was little infantry fighting where it was. When Burnside recrossed the river, the Nineteenth was the last regiment to move. The enemy was so close that some of the men had to cross the river in skiffs.

The Twentieth, although not actively engaged, had another opportunity to display its promptness to respond to any call made upon it. A part of Meade's forces had captured the first line of rifle pits, and then had received such a fire that they were compelled to retreat. This retreat endangered the Federal batteries. The Twentieth was just coming up the hill. Bayonets were fixed, and without firing a shot the Twentieth charged on the advancing enemy with an impetuosity that could not be resisted, and the three endangered batteries were enabled to withdraw in safety.

The Fourteenth Indiana was in Kimball's brigade, French's division of Sumner's corps. The task of taking the heights in the rear of the town had been assigned to Sumner, for which he had chosen French's division, supported by that of Hancock. It had been the design to fight the battle on the 12th, but it was not until late in the afternoon of that day that Sumner was able to cross the river. The position that was to be assaulted is thus described by General Longstreet:

"At the west end of the ridge where the river cuts through is Taylor's Hill (the Confederate left), which stands at its highest on a level with Stafford Heights. From that point the heights on the south side spread, unfolding a valley about a mile in width, affording a fine view of the city, of the arable fields, and the heights as they recede to the vanishing limits of sight. Next below Taylor's is Marye's Hill, rising to half the elevation of the neighboring heights and dropping back, leaving a plateau of half a mile, and then swelling to the usual altitude of the range. On the plateau is the Marye mansion. Along its base is a sunken road, with retaining walls on either side. That on the east is just breast high for a man, and just the height convenient for infantry defense and fire. From the top of the breastwork the ground recedes gradually till near the canal, when it drops off three or four feet, leaving space near the canal of a rod or two of level ground."

On the crest of the heights Lee had massed his artillery. In the sunken road he had placed some of his best infantry. Neither Burnside nor any of the Union officers knew of this sunken road. All they could see was the slope leading up to the heights, and the crest of the plateau. On the plateau behind the batteries were great masses of infantry. To see the batteries and the shining bayonets of the infantry was enough to reveal to the column preparing for the assault the deadly nature of the conflict before it, but not a man wavered. Grimly they prepared for the work before them. Kimball's brigade was chosen to lead, the other brigades following in supporting distance. Of this attack the Comte de Paris says:

"These columns, emerging by the way of the cemetery, were obliged to defile over the two or three bridges that

still remained in order to cross the large draining ditch, and to deploy afterward on the other side under the murderous fire of all of McLaw's batteries. The cannon balls committed a fearful ravage among those deep and almost immovable masses. They were not, however, staggered, and as soon as the line was formed, Kimball's brigade, followed at a short distance by two other brigades, advanced against the stone wall adjoining the road, behind which were posted the Confederate brigades of Cook and Cobb. For the space of six hundred metres, over which these troops had to pass, every step in the advance was marked by dead bodies; they closed their ranks without stopping. When within two hundred metres of the enemy, they were received by discharges of musketry, every shot of which, aimed at leisure, made sure of a victim.

"Hunt's artillery had vainly endeavored to silence the batteries posted on Marye's Hill; the distance was too great. They disdained to reply to him, devoting all their attention to the assailants, and Hunt himself was obliged to intermit his fire for fear of killing more friends than foes. The field pieces of Couch's corps could not accompany their infantry; they would have been dismounted in an instant. French's soldiers, however, were pushing forward, but at fifty paces from the wall, the first line, which was reduced to a handful of men, halted and began to skirmish. The two brigades that were following could not pass beyond this fatal point, and after a single discharge they retired, leaving one-third of their comrades on the ground. Hancock immediately took their place. This brilliant officer, who had always inspired his soldiers with the ardor by which he was himself animated, was in command of well-tried troops. The sight of the massacre of their companions, and the formidable positions which rose before them, did not cause them to hesitate for a single instant. Three flags, planted by French's soldiers, within eighty or one hundred metres of the enemy's line, floated amid the cannon shot and musket balls alone above the dead bodies that surrounded them.

"They seemed to call for new combatants, or rather new victims. Meagher's Irish brigade was the first to rush forward. A portion of French's troops, who had felt reluc-

tant to leave the vicinity of this field of carnage, joined it, and the rest of Hancock's troops followed close. All the Generals were on foot at the head of their soldiers. Howard's division came out of the town for the purpose of following in the track of Hancock should the latter meet with any success. On the left Wilcox had deployed the Ninth corps in front of Pickett's Confederate division; the divisions of Sturgis and Getty extended from Hazel Run to Deep Run, while that of Burns was on the other side of the latter stream, near Smith's corps. The embankment of an unfinished railroad covered Hancock's left to within a certain distance of the stone wall; his center as well as his right was utterly unprotected. Nevertheless, his whole line reached and passed beyond the flags planted by French; but when within twenty or twenty-five metres of the wall, it also halted, and all those who had gone beyond were instantly struck down."

The Comte de Paris is wrong in stating that Hancock's troops went beyond the flags planted by French's soldiers. He leaves the impression that the flags were planted at the farthest point reached by Kimball's brigade, which is not the case, but were some fifty paces in the rear of that point. Eleven brigades followed that of Kimball, but none reached where his advance paused. His dead, among them being many of the Fourteenth Indiana, were nearer the terrible stone wall than were the dead of any other brigade. General Palfrey, in "Antietam and Fredericksburg," says that some of Kimball's brigade were killed within twenty-five paces of the Confederate line, but he erroneously places the brigade in Hancock's division, while it belonged to that of French. General Darius Couch, who commanded the Second corps at the battle of Fredericksburg, in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," thus describes the charge led by Kimball's brigade:

"A few minutes after noon French's division charged in the order of Kimball's, Andrew's and Palmer's brigades, a part of Kimball's men getting into the cluster of houses in the fork of the road. Hancock followed in the order of Zook's, Meagher's and Caldwell's brigades, the two former getting nearer to the stone wall than any who had gone be-

fore, except a few of Kimball's men, and nearer than any brigade which followed them.

"Without a clear idea of the state of affairs at the front, since the smoke and light fog veiled everything, I sent word to French and Hancock to carry the enemy's works by storm. Then I climbed the steeple of the court house, and from above the haze and smoke got a clear view of the field. Howard, who was with me, says I exclaimed: 'Oh, great God! see how our men, our poor fellows are falling!' I remember that the whole plain was covered with men, prostrate and dropping, the live men running here and there, and in front closing upon each other, and the wounded coming back. The commands seemed to be mixed up. I had never before seen fighting like that, nothing approaching it in terrible uproar and destruction. There was no cheering upon the part of the men, but a stubborn determination to obey orders and do their duty. I don't think there was much feeling of success. As they charged the artillery, fire would break their formation, and they would get mixed, then they would close up, go forward, receive the withering infantry fire, and those who were able would run to the houses and fight as best they could; and then the next brigade coming up in succession would do its duty and melt like snow coming down on warm ground.

"I was in the steeple hardly ten seconds, for I saw at a glance how they were being cut down, and was convinced that we could not be successful in front, and that our only chance lay by the right. I immediately ordered Howard to work in on the right with the brigades of Owen and Hall, and attack the enemy behind the stone wall in flank, which was done. Before he could begin this movement both Hancock and French had notified me that they must have support or they would not be responsible for the maintenance of their position. Sturgis, of Wilcox's corps, who had been supporting my left, sent the brigades of Ferrero and Nagle to the fruitless charge."

General Kimball was a man of lofty courage, and possessed the faculty of filling his soldiers with a terrible earnestness, and on the 13th of December, 1862, they gave another and convincing evidence that they were entitled to the name bestowed upon them by General French at Antie-

tam. It is unnecessary to follow this fatal battle farther. It resulted in a terrible loss to the Union army, but Lee failed to reap the full fruits of his success. Lee was always ready and prompt to give battle, but, whether victorious or defeated, stopped when the battle was over. Hence his victories were practically barren of results for his cause, except to prolong the war.

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.

The year 1863 opened with little to cheer the hearts of the supporters of the Union. Except in the West the armies of the Government had made little advance. The Army of the Potomac was still on the Rappahannock, but it was torn with jealousies and dissensions. Its fighting material was still excellent, and the men were ready at any time to go into battle, but there was such want of concert among the officers that any movement which might be made was likely to end in disaster. In Tennessee Rosecrans was still confronting Bragg, while Grant was preparing to take Vicksburg. Halleck was still in Washington, like an incubus on all the armies. The President and his active supporters among the Governors were doing all they could to keep the people from totally desponding. The elections of 1862 had generally gone against the administration, and this increased the difficulties of the President and of the Governors in several of the States. But notwithstanding the terrible losses of 1862 the people of the North were not ready to quit the contest. They nerved themselves and sent volunteers to take the places of those who had fallen.

Early in the year President Lincoln began urging his Generals to an aggressive movement. Burnside asked to be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, which was given to Hooker. Among the officers who had criticised both McClellan and Burnside the most severely, Hooker was prominent. He had impressed himself on the army as a fighting man. Wherever he commanded, his men were enthusiastically ready to follow him. His selection in

place of Burnside gave great satisfaction to the army. No one doubted the intense loyalty of Burnside, but his inability to cope with Lee was generally recognized in the North. Hooker began at once to plan for a forward movement. Like Grant, he needed no spur to urge him on. President Lincoln once said of Grant that he was the only one of his Generals who never troubled him with demands, or gave him cause for uneasiness, but always took whatever the Government could give him, or did give him, and with that did the best he could. The Army of the Potomac was reinforced until it once more largely outnumbered that of Lee, and then Hooker prepared for his advance.

The great object of the Army of the Potomac was the capture of Richmond. Lee's army stood in the way, and had to be reckoned with before any Union army could enter the capital of the Southern Confederacy. Hooker conceived an admirable plan. Instead of assailing the heights against which Burnside had pounded out the life of his army, he proposed to turn them and compel Lee to come out from behind his intrenchments and fight where Hooker's great preponderance of strength would enable him to crush the Confederate army. His plan gave evidence that Hooker was really a great General. He maneuvered his army so as to completely outwit Lee, and before the Confederate commander had any idea that a hostile movement was on foot, Hooker had fully 60,000 men on his flank, threatening his only line of retreat toward Richmond, while he still held an equal force directly in Lee's front. And all this was done while Lee's army was divided by more than thirty miles. Had the execution of the plan equaled its conception, nothing that Lee could have done would have saved his army from utter overthrow.

Why Hooker failed in his combinations has been discussed by every historian of that battle, both North and South. It is not proposed here to enter into the discussion, but only to give some of the details of the battle, which raged for three days, so that the reader may understand what part was taken by Indiana troops. Indiana had only five regiments in that battle, but it will be seen that each performed all that was required of it. One of them, the Twentieth, was in Ward's brigade, of Birney's division of

Sickles's corps, and that brigade, with the Twentieth in the lead, was called upon several times to save points that were being overwhelmed by the enemy, and each time was successful. Writers have frequently called Hancock's corps under Grant, "The Hammer of the Army of the Potomac," so, in this battle of Chancellorsville, especially on the first two days, Ward's brigade was the shining lance that Sickles hurled first here and then there, and wherever he hurled it, it pierced the Confederate host, and drove it back in confusion.

Without stopping to tell how Hooker passed a greater part of his army across the river and placed it on the flank of Lee, let us begin our story with Friday, the first day of May. Early on that morning Hooker was in easy reach of a grand success. All he had to do was to put out his hand and grasp it. Possession of Banks's Ford would have put Hooker in easy communication with the rest of his army, still on the opposite side of the river, and he thus could have called all his army to his aid, if needed. But he stopped just short of that important point, and from some mysterious cause called his troops back into the wilderness around Chancellorsville. Two of the Indiana regiments were in Reynolds's corps, and both in Wadsworth's division, the Seventh being in Cutler's brigade, and the Nineteenth in that of Meredith. The Fourteenth was in Carroll's brigade, French's division, Couch's corps; the Twentieth in Ward's brigade, Birney's division of Sickles's corps, and the Twenty-seventh in Ruger's brigade, William's division of Slocum's corps.

Howard's corps had the extreme right of Hooker's army, with his flank in the air. Lee had called Jackson to him, and that energetic officer promptly suggested that he could move his corps and fall upon the exposed flank of Howard and crush it, and was at once given permission to make the experiment. Sickles was on the left of Howard. While Jackson was marching with the intent of falling on Howard, Sickles made a reconnoissance, feeling sure that the movement that had been noticed presaged some evil to the Union army. At the Furnace he struck a part of Jackson's corps. Jackson with the main body had already passed, but seeing the movement of Sickles had left the

Twenty-third Georgia to hold the Federals in check. Ward's brigade had the advance and swooped down on the Georgia regiment, the Twentieth Indiana capturing nearly the whole regiment. Other Confederate forces came to contest the road with Birney, and quite a spirited fight ensued. Jackson, however, pursued his way. Birney and Sickles each sent word to Howard and Hooker of the movement of Jackson, but Howard would not be warned, and Hooker, in his self-confidence, insisted that it was only the beginning of a retreat of the whole Confederate army, and ordered Sickles to attack.

Sickles was always ready for a fight, and at once made preparations to pursue, in connection with Pleasanton's cavalry, and to make matters worse Hooker weakened Howard by sending one of his brigades to co-operate with Sickles. Before he could form his corps for this movement, Jackson suddenly sprang from the woods upon Howard's corps, and in an hour annihilated it. Hundreds were killed, thousands captured, and the rest of the corps dispersed in the woods, in the wildest confusion. Here a brigade, and there a regiment, attempted to make a stand, but to no effect. Sickles, upon hearing this terrible news, hastened to bring back his two divisions to the positions they had occupied only a few hours before, and where the most of his artillery was stationed. Fortunately for Sickles, fortunately for Hooker, fortunately for the whole Army of the Potomac, just as Jackson was winding his way up the slopes of Fairview, to a position that would have given him practically the opportunity he was seeking to strike the whole Federal army in reverse, Pleasanton was returning from a reconnoissance, with one brigade of his cavalry. He had taken a position along the slopes of Hazel Grove. He had with him one battery of light artillery. The sudden sound of Jackson's battle on Howard reached him, and then came a swarm of fugitives rushing wildly in the darkness.

Few men in the Union army were quicker of perception than Pleasanton, and his energy and determination made him one of the marked men of the Army of the Potomac. He at once realized the danger which threatened the whole army, penetrated instantly the whole design of the

enemy, and saw what must be done to thwart that design. He had two regiments with him, regiments of which every member was a hero. It took him but a moment to decide what to do. He sent the Eighth Pennsylvania at a gallop by a wood road with instructions to rush upon the lines of the enemy, rightly judging that such a sudden attack would delay Jackson at least for a time, during which he would be able, by the aid of his other regiment, to get a position in the rear, and plant some batteries. Rushing through the darkness and the woods, the heroic Eighth Pennsylvania, fully understanding that it was to sacrifice itself for the safety of the army, struck the Confederate line with such fury and suddenness as to stagger the whole line. The Confederates had seen nothing before them but fugitives, and this sudden onslaught so confused them that they could not tell how strong the force was that was thus assaulting them, and they staggered back before the assault. It was some time before they found how few in number were the assailants, and when they did make the discovery, the little band of heroes fought with such determination that the whole Confederate movement had to be stopped to shake them off.

When the Confederates, having almost annihilated the devoted regiment, emerged from the woods, they were received by a storm of grape-shot from twenty-two pieces of artillery Pleasanton had been able to get together and turn against them. These guns were only supported by Pleasanton's remaining regiment of cavalry, and a few men he had rapidly gathered. These were placed behind a stone wall. The little light that was prevailing led the Confederates to believe that the artillery was strongly protected and supported, and they paused to re-form their lines for an assault. It was then that Sickles came rushing back with Birney's and Whipple's divisions, and the remainder of his artillery. Ward's brigade was in advance. It saw the need of haste, and at once threw itself into position to receive the enemy. Sickles soon had his two divisions deployed, but still there was great danger. Happily, there was help near. Ruger's brigade, of Slocum's corps, was not far away. Sickles saw the Twenty-seventh Indiana standing firm, notwithstanding the rush of Howard's fugitives

through its lines, and dashing up to it he told the men of the danger to his artillery and to the army, and asked them if they could hold their ground. He was assured that they not only could but would, and they redeemed their pledge. The enemy attempted to capture the position taken by Sickles and Pleasanton, but all their assaults were defeated, and the battle ceased for a while.

Sickles sent to Hooker and asked permission to attack the Confederates in turn, and began to prepare his corps for the work he designed. Birney advanced his skirmishers. They soon perceived in the road a company of mounted men, and opened fire upon them. It was Jackson and his staff endeavoring to reconnoiter the Union position preparatory to renewing the conflict at daylight. Jackson and his followers hastily retired, when they were met by a fire from one of their own regiments, and most of them fell dead or wounded, among the latter being Jackson himself. He was carefully picked up and carried away. It was the fire of the skirmishers of Ward's brigade which thus drove Jackson to his death. Sickles massed Birney's division on the border of the woods along the turnpike, with Whipple in support. Slocum brought all of Williams's division with most of his guns. He posted his guns on Fairview and sent Williams to support Sickles. It was 11 o'clock at night when Sickles gave Birney the signal to attack. Ward's brigade was the first to penetrate into the thicket. Ward deployed his four regiments in a single line. All the officers dismounted to lead their men on foot. The Comte de Paris thus describes this night battle of Sickles:

"Scarcely has this brigade disappeared in the woods than the other two, breaking into companies, follow in their turn. Sickles's order is to go forward, driving back whatever may be encountered, until the causeway is reached along which aid may be given to Berry. The first line proceeds for some distance without encountering anybody, listening for the least noise and looking for the enemy behind each tree. But suddenly the few isolated shots, which, like funeral knells, had resounded in the distance, are followed by a furious discharge of musketry which burst at once in every corner of the wood. Unionists and Southerners, who are looking for each other in the dark, are sud-

denly brought face to face. One soon hears the cheers of the battalions that are charging upon one another; in one place the assailants are victorious, at another point they are repulsed. Although Birney's troops, who have attacked Rodes, are still separated from the road by a ravine and a dense thicket, the Federal artillery, at the sound of the musketry, advances along that road and penetrates into the woods, supported on the right by a portion of Berry's infantry. But the remainder of this division, finding the left of the Confederate line strongly posted on the wooded slopes which rise northwest of Fairview, does not venture to go after it. In the meanwhile the Federal artillery, having boldly planted their pieces within less than one hundred yards of the Confederate battalions, open a terrific fire upon them. The grape-shot which sweeps the right line of the causeway carries death and confusion not only to Lane's brigade, but to the remainder of Hill's division, which has not yet been completely formed into line, the largest portion of which is massed in column upon that causeway. General Hill is wounded, and one of the men who is carrying Jackson is struck at the same time; the aides-de-camp of the latter place him in the ditch by the roadside, and lay themselves alongside of him in order to avoid the shower of projectiles which has caused the Confederate column to disperse in an instant. The soldiers have scattered right and left into the wood, and the road which but a while ago was so full of life, would have been entirely deserted if the Federals had not been seen approaching within a short distance. In order to get away from them, Jackson makes another effort to walk across the wood, but he is exhausted by the loss of blood, and has to be laid once more upon a litter; and again the bearers, stumbling in the dark, fall to the ground with him. The unfortunate wounded General, rolling over upon his shattered arm, receives then, it is said, some internal injuries which proved to be the ultimate cause of his death. His sufferings did not prevent him from giving his attention to the battle which was raging around him, and on General Pender coming to inform him that his soldiers, all in confusion, can no longer maintain themselves in their position, he replies with his wonted firmness of voice, "They MUST re-

main in it.' Notwithstanding all the precautions taken to conceal from the troops the loss of their chief, Jackson has been recognized, and before he has reached the ambulance near Wilderness Tavern, where he finds at last some rest, the news of his wound has already spread from mouth to mouth.

"In the meantime disorder reigns supreme among all the combatants, who are running against each other at haphazard in the thickness of the woods. The Confederates, having been surprised while marching in a single line, have lost ground. The two divisions which have borne all the brunt of the battle have fallen back upon the works captured from Schurz in the clearing near Dowdall's Tavern; Hill's division, which has relieved them, is still fighting in the wood; but the Federals have recaptured the entrenchments lying across the forest, as well as several pieces of cannon belonging to Whipple's division, which has been abandoned a few hours before near the road. When the original order of proceeding is abandoned on either side, it is impossible to recover it; the army corps becomes divided into brigades, regiments, companies, and finally into small groups, which wander about as chance directs them, each fighting on its own account. In this way many prisoners are taken on both sides; it frequently happens that two friendly parties encounter each other abruptly, and are on the point of coming to blows. But by degrees the combat languishes, and finally dies away, both sides thinking only of recuperating and re-forming their ranks. The woods are strewn with the dead and wounded. It is past midnight. From time to time firing is suddenly renewed; it is some Federal battalion which has unexpectedly run against the enemy's line. One of these partial engagements causes the Confederates to take up arms again about two o'clock in the morning. But soon everything falls back into stillness; for the time being the serious struggle is ended, and it is necessary to prepare for the conflict of the morrow.

"South of the road Birney has freed the approaches of the ridge defended by Pleasanton, and driven the enemy from the heights opposite to Fairview—positions the importance of which will soon be seen—but at the north Ber-

ry has not been able to approach Jackson's left on the slopes which it occupies. On the Confederate side the officers are busy in getting their shattered battalions together and in re-forming their line. Hill's division, commanded by General Heth, has received a timely reinforcement by the arrival of two brigades which had been left at the Furnace in the morning. But Jackson is no longer there to direct; his army corps is without a recognized chief."

A still more graphic picture of this midnight battle is drawn by Major General De Trobriand, who at that time commanded the Fifty-fifth New York, a part of Ward's brigade, Birney's division of Sickles's corps, in his "Four Years with the Army of the Potomac":

"The brigade commanders were called to General Birney to receive their instructions. When Ward returned the Colonels assembled around him. We learned that a night attack had been determined upon. The plan was to charge into the woods with the bayonet, striking down the enemy where we found him, and, marching right before us, to join Berry's division on the turnpike. The troops were disposed as follows: Ward's brigade deployed in the first line without intervals between the regiments; Graham and Hayman's brigades in the second line, breaking by the right of companies in advance. It was expressly forbidden to reload the muskets after the first fire.

"The colonels communicated their orders in a low voice to their company officers, the latter to the sergeants, and on to the soldiers. The preliminary dispositions were made without noise. The higher officers were on foot behind the file closers. When everything was ready and nothing was stirring along the line, the signal was awaited in a silence so profound that one could have heard the flight of a night-hawk. The moon looked on with its usual serenity.

"After a few minutes of waiting, which appeared long, a movement ran along the line. General Ward had, in a steady and measured tone, ordered 'Forward!' which was repeated in low murmurs from one to another. We started at a quick step, gun on shoulder, neither hurried nor loitering.

"There were perhaps two hundred yards to pass over

before reaching the woods, whose dark line appeared in front of us. All eyes vainly sought to penetrate the silent obscurity. Every one instinctively hurried his step, and we could distinguish the outlines of the intrenchments sketched out by us in the morning. Each one said to himself: 'They are there taking aim, with the finger on the trigger. They are letting us come near, to be more sure of their fire. At twenty paces they will fire their volley. But those of us not struck down will be upon them before they can reload their guns, and then—'

"The nearer we approached, the lower dropped the point of the bayonets of the front rank.

"At a distance of twenty steps there was no sign of movement. Well, it was said, the contest will be at the bayonet's point; so much the better.

"In such moments one has an excessive delicacy of hearing. A crackling of branches and a footstep on the dead leaves were heard on our right. It was the Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania, which was advancing into the woods without encountering any one. In an instant we were there in our turn. The enemy—I do not know why, even now—had neglected to occupy the border of the woods. He was further back, in a line of intrenchments more complete and on higher ground. Perhaps, also, we surprised him in the midst of some movement preparatory for the next day's battle. However that might have been, profiting by the fortunate accident, without seeking the cause, we continued to advance through the thicket, but not in as good order.

"We had moved forward about fifty yards, and my regiment was crossing a rough and muddy ravine, when a voice cried out, 'Halt! who goes there?' Nearly at the same time one shot, then ten, twenty, a hundred; the word 'Forward!' was heard on all sides; a loud hurrah responded, and the bloody contest commenced.

"The ground on which we found ourselves was not only very wooded, but also very rough. There were unequal little hillocks and small winding ravines, at the bottom of which crept or stagnated the water from springs or from rainfall. The trees grew very irregularly, scattered here high, there bushy, and covered with thorns. The line of

the brigade was broken in an instant; the left of the Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania was thrown over into my right. The Third Maine, on the other hand, was separated from my left. My regiment itself was divided into two parts. We ran to one side to re-establish order, and on the other the companies dashed forward on the run. Some carried the intrenchments before them without firing a shot; others recoiled before a deadly fire. The defense was as confused as the attack. Terrible at some points, at others it was a mere nothing. But instead of ceasing, the fire redoubled on our side. In spite of orders, the men reloaded their pieces, some while marching, others posted behind trees.

"The second line, entering in its turn into the woods, carried away by the noise of the firing, began to fire also. A hundred voices were immediately raised above the noise of the tumult: 'Stop firing there below! You are firing on us!' A few men fell, struck from the rear. Then all dashed forward, pell-mell, as they were able. The enemy, broken already at several points, did not await the shock. They disappeared, running, leaving not a man in the intrenchments."

The confusion became extreme. Regiments were broken up, and even companies became divided, but the horrid din of battle went on, the woods and ravines being one blaze of musketry, while artillery shells were bursting in every direction. Officers lost sight of their commands, and the men continued to fight without direction, but pushing forward as best they could in the labyrinth of trees and ravines. So great was the confusion that a New York company saw the flashing of a battery of artillery and conceived the idea of capturing it. They reached the battery unperceived by the cannoneers, and one of the men jumped into the battery. He wore on his cap the red lozenge, the distinguishing mark of the First division, Third corps. It was recognized. The battery belonged to Slocum's corps. Another company ran into what was supposed to be the line of the enemy, and the captain was about to surrender his sword, when he found it was a line of friends.

If there was confusion in the lines of the attacking Federals there was greater among the surprised Confederates. They were far from expecting a return from an army they

looked upon as beaten, routed, and just ready to retreat. The surprise had been complete, and the success greater than was at that time known. Several lines of rifle pits were captured, and the whole Confederate line on that part of the field thrown back. When the firing at last ceased it was difficult to gather together the broken regiments in the darkness.

In all this midnight struggle the Twentieth Indiana was among the foremost. It was in Ward's brigade of Birney's division. The Twenty-seventh also participated in the attack. Williams's division had been fighting at the Furnace until it was called to support Sickles in this night attempt to throw back Jackson. This attack of Birney drove the right of Jackson's corps back some distance. Jackson, great as had been his success, fell short of accomplishing all he hoped. It is true that when he began his movement his only design was to crush Howard and double the Eleventh corps back on the other parts of Hooker's line, but his first success had been so complete, and so easily obtained, that a new design sprang into existence, and that was to turn the flank of the whole of Hooker's army and cut it off from its line of retreat. In this he failed, owing to the promptness and energy of Pleasanton, and the fearless fighting of Sickles.

On the morning of May 3d, Stuart, who succeeded Jackson, was in a position of great danger, and it was possible for Hooker to practically annihilate him. But then came one of Hooker's fatal errors. He abandoned the heights which had been so gallantly defended by Pleasanton, and they were at once seized by Stuart. This gave him, without a contest, all the advantage Jackson had expected to achieve. Hooker ordered Birney to abandon the positions he had retaken in the night fight, and Birney was in the midst of this retrograde movement, leaving only one brigade in the works, when Archer, commanding one of the divisions of Jackson's corps, suddenly threw his force on this small brigade. Birney at once sent Ward's brigade to the help of his assaulted troops, and the battle raged. After a sanguinary struggle, in which Graham's and Ward's brigades defended themselves, foot by foot, Birney's division was able to take a new position. Archer attacked

it in this new position, and the struggle was long and deadly, ending in the repulse of the Confederates. Ruger's brigade, of Williams's division, aided in this last repulse of Archer.

Sickles's new line was formed with Whipple's division near the Fairview cemetery, Birney in advance and on the left along the slopes of the hill, and Berry on the right, behind some abatis. Williams's division of Slocum's corps was south of the road and somewhat in advance of Whipple. The Confederates in strong force moved against this line. In some places they met with success, but one part of the assaulting line was checked, when Sickles again hurled Ward's brigade on the flank and the Confederates on that side were driven back into the wood. We again quote from Comte de Paris:

"North of the road the struggle is the more desperate that the fighting is carried on in a thick undergrowth. The Unionist General Hays is taken prisoner. But French comes to his assistance with the Second brigade, which he brings from Chancellorsville, thus changing the aspect of the fight. The left wing of the Confederates is repulsed with loss and thrown into confusion. Heth is compelled to retire in his turn; the whole of Stuart's line is staggering and disorder is beginning to creep into its ranks, while the officers are being killed in fruitless attempts to get their soldiers to follow them. But at this moment the other two lines come to take part in the battle. North of the road Nicholls and Iverson, who form the extremity of these two lines, face to the left alongside of Thomas, thereby checking French's movement upon the flank of the army. During this time Paxton, crossing to the right of the road, hastens to the assistance of Lane and McGowan; O'Neal follows him closely in order to support Pender and Brockenbrough. The arrival of these two brigades is the signal for a new effort to cross Lewis's Creek; but south of the road the Confederates are immediately repulsed, and may consider themselves fortunate that Birney's division, decimated and exhausted, is no longer in pursuit of them."

The enemy had the advantage of position by the abandonment by Hooker of Hazel Grove, but Sickles makes a desperate fight, and if he could have received help

the day would have ended in disaster to the Confederates. Berry's division of Sickles's corps was maintaining a fight against great odds on the slopes of Fairview, and although Ward's brigade had been in the fight from the start the day before, and in the night fight, and again on that morning, he called upon it to make another effort and sent it to support Berry's right, and again the Confederates recoiled from before that redoubtable brigade.

The right of the third Confederate line had been battling with French's division. French had fallen upon it in the woods, but the Confederates, being reinforced, were able to resist his attack. But it was not long until they were driven back. While French was thus holding his own the battle raged on the heights of Fairview, occupied by Whipple's division of Sickles's corps, and Williams's division of Slocum's. There the Confederate assault was so determined and so well supported that Whipple was driven into the intrenchments. Then the two lines were within short range of each other, and one of the most stubborn contests of the day took place, neither side yielding a foot. A Confederate brigade at last almost succeeded in getting in the rear of Whipple. Sickles saw it and hastily launched Ward's brigade against this new enemy, and once more the enemy gave way. The Confederates could not renew the attack, but they kept up a furious cannonade. A breathing time was allowed, and Sickles sent in vain for help; his men were exhausted, his ammunition nearly all gone, but no help came. He and Slocum were left to fight it out alone. The Confederates combined for a final effort. They made a break in the Federal line and Sickles once more sent for Ward's brigade, but he could not reach the break in time to close the opening, and to save themselves the Federals were forced to fall back, but did this with so much coolness that they were able to capture a number of prisoners at the time.

Thus the battle was lost, while Hooker had fully 30,000 excellent soldiers who had taken no part in the fight. Neither Reynolds nor Meade, with the two excellent corps commanded by them, was in the fight, and a part of Slocum's corps was not engaged. In the fight on May 3d, Howard's corps took no part. Sedgwick, over in front of Fred-

ericksburg, made a splendid fight after he got to work, and had it not been for the contradictory orders he received might have won a decided success. The battle was lost, not from the want of bravery, nor of hard and persistent fighting by the troops engaged, nor by the misconduct of any officers, but by Hooker himself, who lost his courage and confidence when the burden of battle was upon him. It was a terrible slaughter on the part of the Federals. Sickles's corps performed prodigies of valor, as did Slocum's. No call was made on them that they did not cheerfully and gallantly respond to. On the night of the 2d they stood firm when Howard's broken and disorganized troops were rushing past them, and then threw themselves with impetuous valor on the advancing and victorious legions of Jackson, and brought them to a standstill; and then, when called upon to take the offensive in the middle of the night, they sprang at the foe with the same impetuous valor, grappled with him, pushed him back, and finally hurled him torn and bleeding from the positions he had captured in the early twilight. And on the next day, when Stuart, commanding Jackson's corps, attempted to once more wrest from them the positions their valor had won, they repulsed him time and again, and only yielded when the enemy grew stronger, when their own ammunition was exhausted, and when they were refused the reinforcements they had asked for.

CHAPTER XLVII.

THE CAPTURE OF VICKSBURG.

We have seen how Grant had planned the capture of Vicksburg in the autumn of 1862, by a combined movement of a part of his forces from Holly Springs, under his own command, and another part from Memphis under Sherman, and how the plan was upset by Van Dorn taking Holly Springs and destroying the stores collected there. Grant knew that he could only take Vicksburg by a movement from the rear. The plan of campaign he preferred was to make Memphis, instead of Columbus, his base, but Halleck had ordered that the railroad from Memphis to Grenada should not be repaired. Grant was thus driven to the alternative plan of dividing his army. Van Dorn prevented him from carrying out his part of the combined movement, and Sherman, not knowing that Grant had been detained, made his assault on the works at Haines's Bluff, and met with a bloody repulse.

Grant, having at last received permission to move in his own way, took command of all his forces and moved to the vicinity of Vicksburg, in January, 1863, and made his headquarters at Young's Point. How to take such a stronghold as Vicksburg, situated on high bluffs, and protected on the north by numerous bayous, was a perplexing problem. It was necessary for Grant to get in the rear, but how was that to be done? The failure of Sherman, in 1862, had demonstrated that he could not reach the rear from the north, unless he could get so far away as to turn the extremity of the works at Haines's Bluff, and this was impossible from the nature of the ground. Two plans presented themselves

to Grant's active mind, and he began at once testing them. One was to find a passage by a canal, or otherwise to pass vessels with supplies south of Vicksburg, without coming within range of the formidable batteries that had been erected. If he could do this he could move his army on the west side of the river to a point below Vicksburg, cross the river, and thus approach in the rear, on ground suitable for the maneuvering of an army. Another was to find, if possible, a passage available for gunboats through the bayous to the north, so that he might secure a foothold beyond Haines's Bluff. It is not necessary to give in detail the story of how he attempted to dig a canal around Vicksburg, or how he attempted to open the bayous to the north. Another plan was considered, that of opening bayous until he could finally reach the Red River, and thus again reach the Mississippi. Much work was done on the proposed canal, while expeditions were sent out to attempt the passage of the bayous, and it was not long until Grant became convinced that success was not possible by any such means. Then he determined upon a plan so novel and daring that it upset all theories of warfare, and stamped Grant as the military genius of the age.

This new plan involved running past the batteries of Vicksburg by gunboats and a fleet of transports, carrying supplies, while he moved his army down the west side of the river. On the 2d of February the ram, *Queen of the West*, ran the blockade, and was followed on the 12th by the *Indianola*. This established the fact that the batteries could be passed. The two vessels, however, met with misfortune. On the 14th the *Queen of the West* attempted to run past a battery on the Red River, when a shot cut her steam pipe and she became unmanageable. The crew escaped, but did not destroy the vessel, and it fell into the hands of the enemy. It was repaired, and, accompanied by several other Confederate vessels, chased the *Indianola* up the river, finally capturing her.

The *Indianola* was badly damaged in the fight and the Confederates began the work of repair, when they were stampeded by a grim joke of Admiral Porter. While they were at work on the *Indianola* information was received that one of the monitors had succeeded in running past

Vicksburg, and was coming down on them. They soon saw the monster approaching, belching black smoke as she advanced. The Confederate vessels fled in haste, and never stopped until they reached the mouth of Red River, more than a hundred miles below. The men at work on the Indianola set fire to her and escaped. The fearful monitor was nothing more than a dummy. Porter had taken an old coal barge and built a wooden turret and painted it black. For a smoke stack he had piled up some pork barrels, emitting clouds of smoke from a mud furnace underneath, and had set this craft to float by the current past the Confederate batteries.

Grant saw that the plan most likely to succeed was to run the batteries, but he was met with another question—how was he to feed his army until he could establish a new base? Port Hudson prevented any supplies from New Orleans, and he could not expect to be able to establish a new base for at least three or four weeks after recrossing the river. He solved this problem, as he did the others, by taking the boldest course. His men could carry five days' rations on their persons, and he determined to make those last twenty days, by living off the country.

It was a daring project in more ways than one. He would not only cut himself loose from his own base, in an enemy's country, but would have to meet a force superior to his own, if that force could be united. He had two other alternatives. One was to cross in front of Haines's Bluff, and attempt to take it by storm, but that meant almost inevitable destruction. The other was to go back to Memphis, and resume his first plan of approach through the interior of Mississippi. That was the plan favored by Sherman, but it would seem like a retreat, and the country was in no mood to look patiently upon anything resembling a retreat. Hence Grant determined to defy fortune, to throw to the winds all the written theories of how war should be conducted, and trust to his own generalship to prevent the enemy from concentrating against him.

In Vicksburg and the neighborhood Pemberton had 50,000 men. Grant differed very materially from other Federal commanders of those days in this, that he never overrated the strength of his enemy, but was given rather to

underestimating it, so he put Pemberton's force at about 30,000. He knew that another Confederate army was being gathered to the east and north of Jackson, but had no information as to its strength. It would be necessary for Grant to put his army between those two forces and beat them in detail, and he had absolute reliance on his ability to accomplish that, if once he could cross the river below Vicksburg. At that time Grant's army was divided into three corps, commanded respectively by McClernand, Sherman and McPherson. His force for the proposed campaign was less than 50,000, but with that he determined to make the venture.

Admiral Porter asserted his ability to run the batteries with his fleet, and Grant took advantage of the occasion to send down ten transports loaded with provisions. This enterprise was completely successful. A few nights later more gunboats and transports were sent down. He still did not have enough and a few days later he sent another fleet of transports and barges loaded with rations. He was now ready to cross the river. He moved his army through the swamps on the west side of the river to Hard Times, opposite Grand Gulf. Grand Gulf was an outpost of Vicksburg and was strongly fortified. Admiral Porter attempted to silence the batteries but failed. So he ran past them with his fleet and the transports, and Grant marched still farther down the west bank. It was intended to go to Rodney, but a negro informed the General that from Bruinsburg there was a good road to Port Gibson, and Grant decided to cross there. By reaching Port Gibson the flank of Grand Gulf would be turned, and its evacuation by the Confederates would become necessary.

General Bowen was in command at Grand Gulf, and on the evening of April 30 discovered McPherson moving on the road to Port Gibson. He marched out to attack him, and early next morning the two forces met, and a battle began which lasted all day. The victory remained with Grant. He rapidly pursued the enemy to Hankinson's Ferry on the Big Black. Thus Grant had scored the first point in the game, but still final and complete success was not assured. He had to wait until the rest of his army crossed the river. Grant had sent General Grierson on a



SENATOR DANIEL W. VORHEES.

cavalry raid, and that excellent officer, with a force of little more than 1000 men, made a tour of 600 miles through Mississippi, cutting railroads, destroying telegraphic communications, and isolating Jackson from communication with the outside. This bold raid confused the enemy. It made them doubtful as to where Grant would strike his blow. It might be aimed at Port Hudson and a junction with Banks. General Joseph E. Johnston had been placed in command of the Confederate forces in Mississippi, and was at Jackson trying to organize a large army at that point.

Now Grant's genius shone forth. History had no record of an army trying to live off an enemy's country, the men carrying only such provisions as they could get into their haversacks. If all his plans were successful he could accomplish the end aimed at, but if one should miscarry, and he should meet with a single defeat before he could make a new base on the Mississippi, the destruction of his army would be almost certain. It required a bold and self-reliant General to assume the risk. Grant knew that only rapidity of movement could save him. By May 7th he was ready to begin his forward movement, and then he threw his army around in such an amazing fashion as to completely bewilder his antagonists. He sent small detachments to threaten Vicksburg and keep Pemberton in that vicinity. McClernand was sent up the eastern bank of Black River toward Edward's Ferry. Sherman was headed toward Bolton, while McPherson was hurried toward Jackson by the way of Raymond. Grant's design was to meet Johnston and force him back, so he could not interfere with his plans until Vicksburg could be invested. On the 12th of May McPherson met the Confederates in a strong position at Raymond, but he attacked with his usual impetuosity and drove them back to Jackson. Pemberton supposed Grant's intention was to get the position at Edward's Ferry, and he advanced to meet him at that place. But Grant did not purpose to strike Pemberton at that time, and he turned McClernand and Sherman eastward upon Clinton to support McPherson. This movement was more confusing to Pemberton than ever.

Johnston was at Jackson with only 6000 men, but reinforcements were hastening to him, and in a few days he

would have more than 20,000. But Grant did not propose to wait until Johnston had obtained that addition to his force. On the 14th McPherson fell upon Johnston, overwhelmed him, and captured all his cannon, driving him from Jackson and far out of the way of again interfering with Grant, at least for some weeks. Of course Pemberton learned of this movement against Jackson, and he thought to take advantage of it by seizing what he supposed was Grant's line of communication, and cut him off from his base at Grand Gulf. But Grant had neither base nor line of communications. Thus Pemberton lost a day in marching toward Raymond. Grant left Sherman in Jackson to burn the bridges, factories and arsenals, and tear up the railroads for twenty miles in every direction, while he faced the rest of his army toward Vicksburg. Johnston had retreated to Canton, thirty miles from Jackson, and had no way of getting back, save by marching.

Pemberton had discovered his mistake in regard to interfering with Grant's communications, and had taken a strong position at Champion's Hill. He had with him about 18,000 men. Hovey's division was the first to meet the enemy and skirmished for about two hours, until it could be got into shape to drive the enemy, and then a hotly contested battle was fought, lasting nearly four hours. Pemberton was defeated with a loss of more than 3000 in killed and wounded, and had one entire division cut off so that it never did rejoin him. This was the decisive stroke of the campaign. The next day McClellan's corps reached the bridge across the Big Black River, and found that Pemberton had placed 5000 men there to dispute the passage, but in less than an hour this force was scattered, losing eighteen guns. Before retreating the Confederates set fire to the bridge and destroyed it. This delayed Grant a day, and gave Pemberton time to get into the works at Vicksburg. As soon as the bridge was built Grant again advanced, McPherson and McClellan moving straight on Vicksburg, while Sherman moved in the direction of Haines's Bluff. This movement caused the Confederate garrison to hastily evacuate that stronghold, and so hurried was their departure that they failed to destroy anything. Thus this strongly fortified place, with all its stores and

guns, fell into the hands of Sherman. It commanded the Yazoo River, and all the northern approaches to Vicksburg. Winning it Grant had a new base of supplies on the Mississippi, and was in the rear of Vicksburg. He at once drew his lines around the doomed city. It was just eighteen days since Grant had crossed the Mississippi, and eleven since he had cut loose from his base at Grand Gulf. He had marched two hundred miles, had defeated two armies in five battles, captured nearly one hundred cannon, and killed, wounded or captured more than 12,000 of the enemy, and had done all this with a loss of less than 5000. It was one of the grand achievements of the war, and deserves to rank with the great achievements of all wars.

He was rapidly reinforced, until he had about 70,000 men. With this army he could hold Vicksburg in a vice until it surrendered, and at the same time keep Johnston from interfering. Before those reinforcements reached him, he had tried two assaults on the works, hoping to take them by storm, but had been repulsed. The siege continued until it ended on the 4th of July by the surrender of Vicksburg with 37,000 prisoners and 173 guns. Up to that time that was the largest capture reported in any war. Indiana was largely represented in this great campaign, the following regiments being engaged in it: McClelland's Corps—Osterhaus's division, Garrard's brigade, the Forty-ninth and Sixty-ninth; Sheldon's brigade, the Fifty-fourth; A. J. Smith's division, Burbridge's brigade, the Sixteenth, Sixtieth and Sixty-seventh; Hovey's division, McGinnis's brigade, the Eleventh, Twenty-fourth, Thirty-fourth and Forty-sixth; Slack's brigade, the Forty-seventh; Ross's division, Salomon's brigade, the Forty-third; Carr's division, Benton's brigade, the Eighth and Eighteenth regiments, and First battery; Wiley's brigade, First cavalry; Sherman's corps, Blair's division, T. K. Smith's brigade, the Eighty-third; Tuttle's division, Buckland's brigade, the Ninety-third; McPherson's corps, Logan's division, J. E. Smith's brigade, the Twenty-third; Quinby's division, Alexander's brigade, the Forty-eighth and Fifty-ninth.

The Twenty-fourth and Forty-sixth were the first to land at Bruinsburg. In the initial battle of the campaign, at Port Gibson, the Forty-sixth in a charge broke the Con-

federate line and captured the colors of the Fifteenth Alabama.

The battle of Champion's Hill deserves an extended notice, for it was mainly fought by an Indiana General, and both his brigades were commanded by Indiana men, and five of the nine regiments in his division were from Indiana. Of the importance of this battle, and the victory there won, the Comte de Paris says:

"The battle of Champion's Hill, considering the number of troops engaged, could not be compared to the great conflicts we have already mentioned, but it produced results far more important than most of those hecatombs, like Shiloh, Fair Oaks, Murfreesboro, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, which left the two adversaries fronting each other, both unable to resume the fight. It was the most complete defeat the Confederates had sustained since the commencement of the war. They left on the field of battle from three to four thousand killed and wounded, three thousand able-bodied prisoners, and thirty pieces of artillery. But these figures can convey no idea of the magnitude of the check experienced by Pemberton, from which he could not again recover. The strongest of his divisions (Loring reached Jackson with 5778 men) had been isolated and could not again get into line for some time. The others were so reduced in number as to envy the fate of the latter; driven beyond Big Black River, definitely separated from Johnston, they could not avoid total destruction except by seeking refuge in Vicksburg, which was to become their prison."

When Grant went to attack Johnston at Jackson Pemberton thought to fall upon Grant's communications and thus compel him to retreat. But Grant had discarded his line of communications, and had no base of supplies. Pemberton got as far toward Raymond as Baker's Creek, but owing to recent rains the creek was so swollen that he could not cross, so he turned back to go and join Johnston at Clinton. He had reached the commanding ridge known as Champion's Hill, when General Hovey with his division met and drove in his skirmishers. Quite a severe engagement at once resulted, amounting, as Grant said, to almost a sharp battle. McClernand was close by with his other two

divisions and the division of A. J. Smith, belonging to Sherman's corps. Grant ordered McClernand to move at once to the support of Hovey. Logan with his division was near and at once joined in the battle. Hovey climbed the hill and pushed forward a distance of five or six hundred yards, driving the enemy before him and capturing several hundred prisoners and eleven pieces of artillery. About half way up the slope the enemy had thrown up a line of intrenchments. Before this line Hovey's men were exposed to a plunging fire, that thinned their ranks with terrible effect. Hovey had in the fight all of his two brigades, commanded, respectively, by General George F. McGinnis and Colonel James R. Slack. McGinnis's brigade was made up of the following regiments: Eleventh, Twenty-fourth, Thirty-fourth and Forty-sixth Indiana, and Twenty-ninth Wisconsin. That of Colonel Slack, of the Forty-seventh Indiana, consisted of his own regiment and the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-eighth Iowa and Fifty-sixth Ohio. Hovey also had three batteries of artillery.

Exhausted by the struggle of climbing the hill, and the fighting they had been compelled to do to push the enemy back, the men of Hovey's division could not drive the enemy from this last position. Pemberton, realizing how important this position was to him, hurried forward reinforcements and hurled them upon the lines of Hovey. The assault on Hovey was made with so much strength and vigor that he was forced to fall back, which he did, stubbornly fighting every inch. He was compelled to leave the guns he had captured. Grant had been vainly trying to urge forward the other two divisions of McClernand's corps, and sent Sanborn's brigade of Crocker's division of McPherson's corps to Hovey's assistance. This brigade contained the Forty-eighth and Fifty-ninth Indiana regiments. This enabled Hovey to hold the crest, but not without heavy loss.

By this time Logan was hotly engaged on the right, but he was able to repulse the enemy with great slaughter, when Pemberton once more determined to shake off Hovey and Sanborn. He sent Bowen's division to strengthen his line on that part of the field. It was now half after 12 o'clock. Grant had been impatiently waiting to hear the

guns of McClernand. Hovey had been repulsed, but at this time Crocker's other two brigades arrived. There was an opening between the lines of Hovey and Logan, into which the Confederates made an attempt to throw a force, but the two brigades of Crocker rushed forward, filled the gap and pushed back the enemy. Pemberton at last gathered the largest part of his army in front of Hovey, and made one assault after another, but Hovey maintained his ground. Logan was across the only road of retreat for Pemberton, but General Grant, not knowing that fact, ordered him to come back from the flank movement he was making. Logan reluctantly obeyed, and when Grant was informed of the true state of affairs he ordered Logan to resume his movement, but it was too late. Hovey once more moved to the assault, supported by Crocker, and the men went forward with a will, determined to again take the position they had captured several times, but had not been able to hold. Under a terrific musketry fire, with all their artillery horses killed and their guns silenced, the Confederates finally broke about 5 p. m., and the battle of Champion's Hill was won by the Federals.

On the part of the Federals this decisive battle was fought by the divisions of Hovey, Crocker and Logan, that of Hovey bearing the brunt of the fighting and sustaining the heaviest losses. The three Federal divisions did not number quite fifteen thousand men. Hovey lost 1200 killed, wounded and missing, more than one-third of his division. The total loss of Grant's army was 410 killed, 1884 wounded and 187 missing. Hovey captured 1200 prisoners.

This victory presaged the final fall of Vicksburg, which has already been described, and never did troops fight better than those engaged on that day. It should be said that the Twenty-third Indiana was in Logan's division, and engaged in all the fighting on the Confederate left. Indiana had in the battle eight regiments, or more than one-third of all the troops engaged.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

THE GREAT BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

While Grant was thus violating all the known theories of conducting a military campaign; startling not only the Confederates by his boldness and the quickness of his movements, but attracting the attention of military men as well in Europe as in this country, and compelling them to revise all their books; setting the North wild with delight at his magnificent victory and throwing the Confederacy into the very darkness and gloom of despair—great and tragic events were occurring in the East, where the magnificent Army of the Potomac had fought so many battles without success. That gallant army, always willing, always eager, to meet Lee and his legions, was about to have its revenge for Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. It was to meet Lee, and after the bloodiest three days of conflict ever known, repulse him with a slaughter that made the world turn pale. We left the Army of the Potomac once more in its cantonments after the defeat at Chancellorsville. Hooker was fretting under the miscarriage of his plans, and his sore defeat after so brilliantly outgeneraling his wily opponent. He was not content to accept that defeat as final and began making plans for another aggressive movement, when he was forestalled by Lee. That Confederate leader once more dreamed of forcing a peace on Northern soil. This time he was not to aim at Washington, but hoping to deceive Halleck into a belief that Washington was his objective point, suddenly invade Pennsylvania and strike for its capital, and then at its great commercial emporium. It was very easy to de-

ceive Halleck. Lee was well aware that any movement that looked toward Washington would fill Halleck with apprehension that the capital would be lost, and that he would prevent any movement by Hooker, or any other part of the army, that would take it from its position between Washington and the Confederates. Lee felt sure that Hooker would desire to make the only movement that could check, in its very inception, his designs of invasion, but had full faith that Halleck would not permit him to make it. By skillfully concealing his own movements he got some days the start of Hooker, and, as Lee expected, the Federal commander at once proposed to throw his whole force on the Confederate line of communication, and then, leaving Lee to his own movements, hurl his own army on Richmond. It was a bold plan and one worthy a General of the highest standing, and could hardly have failed, of success. Halleck had in Washington, Baltimore and Harper's Ferry fully forty thousand men he could interpose between Lee and Washington, and had in the neighborhood of Norfolk fully fifteen or twenty thousand more he could call speedily to that work. Instead of using this force to save Washington, Halleck, as Lee felt sure he would, interposed and directed Hooker, at all hazards, to cover Washington, and the fifty or sixty thousand men directly under him remained idle.

It is not necessary to follow the various movements of the two armies, as Lee crossed the Potomac and pushed his advance to almost in sight of Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania. Lee felt sure that Hooker would be close on his track, but did not know where the two armies might come together. Hooker, after showing himself a master in maneuvering, and that he had a full comprehension of what ought to be done and how it ought to be done, finally, because of Halleck, asked to be relieved from the command of the army, and General George G. Meade was put in his place. This change of commanders took place only a day or two before the two armies were to meet in deadly conflict. Our story now brings us to the first day of July, 1863, the very day when Pemberton was making up his mind to surrender Vicksburg with all it contained to Grant, and the day on which the two opposing armies in

the East were to suddenly and unexpectedly run against each other, and fight on ground where neither commander had expected to give or take battle.

Lee, finding that his way to the North was about to be blocked by the new levy of troops, grew alarmed about his own line of communications, and his lack of information of the whereabouts of the Army of the Potomac. He called back Ewell from in front of Harrisburg, and ordered a concentration of his army in the neighborhood of Cashtown or Gettysburg. Gettysburg was a good strategic point for him, with a view to a probable retreat into Virginia, and he turned a part of his army toward that hitherto unknown town, with orders to seize and hold it. About that time Buford, one of the most daring and energetic leaders of the Union cavalry, was reconnoitering to locate Lee, and arrived at Gettysburg and saw the advance of the Confederates moving on that place. Buford realized the importance of the place, and interposed his small force. The Confederates quickly retreated, but Buford at once sent word to Reynolds, in command of the left wing of the Union army, and to General Meade, that Lee was endeavoring to concentrate at Gettysburg. This was on the afternoon of June 30. Buford announced to Reynolds that he would hold the town until further orders. Reynolds sent word that he would come to his help. The commander of the Confederate advance also sent word to Lee that he had found Meade's army. Reynolds was the most capable General in the Army of the Potomac, and was also one of the most energetic. Buford had with him two small brigades of cavalry, one commanded by General Devens, and the other by Colonel Gamble. In this latter brigade was the right wing of the Third Indiana cavalry.

It was about nine o'clock on the morning of July 1st that the battle opened. At that hour the only Union troops present were the two cavalry brigades of Buford, but he gallantly prepared to resist the advance of Hill's corps. Deploying his men to the best advantage, he resisted until the pressure grew strong, and then slowly retired, contesting every foot. Anxious to know if help was coming he climbed to the steeple of the seminary and scanned the horizon, looking for the advance of the First corps. While

there General Reynolds came to his side, and after a minute or two both descended, Buford to encourage his men and Reynolds to hurry forward his troops. The first to reach the field were two brigades of Wadsworth's division. Indiana was represented in each brigade by one regiment, the Seventh being in that of Cutler, and the Nineteenth in that of Meredith. The Seventh, however, was back with the train. Meredith was wounded at the very opening of the fight, before he had time to join the brigade, and it was afterward commanded by Colonel Morrow of the Twenty-fourth Michigan. General Doubleday was in command of Reynolds's corps. While these two brigades were hurrying to take position Buford discovered that Ewell was advancing on another part of the field, so he left Gamble with his brigade to hold in check the overpowering weight of Hill, while he hastened with the other to face the advancing Ewell.

General Reynolds went forward with Cutler's brigade to sustain Buford, while Doubleday placed himself at the head of the "Iron Brigade" (Meredith's). When Cutler got into position Gamble withdrew and formed a column on the left of the infantry. Cutler was soon engaged in a hot fight with superior numbers, and finally had to give ground. The advent of the "Iron Brigade" into the fight is thus described by General Doubleday, in his interesting account of the battle of Gettysburg:

"There was a piece of woods between the two roads, with open ground on each side. It seemed to me this was the key of the position, for if this woods was strongly held, the enemy could not pass on either road without being taken in flank by the infantry, and in front by the cavalry. I therefore urged the men as they filed past me to hold it at all hazards. Full of enthusiasm and the memory of their past achievements, they said to me proudly, 'If we can't hold it, where will you find the men who can?'

"As they went forward under the command of Colonel Morrow, of the Twenty-fourth Michigan volunteers, a brave and capable soldier, who, when a mere youth, was engaged in the Mexican War. I rode over to the left to see if the enemy's line extended beyond ours, and if there would be any attempt to flank our troops in that direction. . . .

"Both parties were now trying to obtain possession of the woods. Archer's rebel brigade, preceded by a skirmish line, was crossing Willoughby's Run to enter them on one side as the Iron Brigade went in on the other. General Reynolds was on horseback in the edge of the woods, surrounded by his staff. He felt some anxiety as to the result, and turned his head frequently to see if our troops would be up in time. While looking back in this way a rebel sharpshooter shot him through the back of the head, the bullet coming out near the eye. He fell dead in an instant without a word. . . . The situation was very peculiar. The rebel left under Davis had driven in Cutler's brigade and our left under Morrow had charged into the woods preceded by the Second Wisconsin under Colonel Fairchild, swept suddenly and unexpectedly around the right flank of Archer's brigade, and captured a large part of it, including Archer himself. The fact is, the enemy were careless and underrated us, thinking, it is said, that they only had militia to contend with. The Iron Brigade had a different head-gear from the rest of the army and were recognized at once by their old antagonists. Some of the latter were heard to exclaim: 'There are those d—d black-hatted fellows again!' Taint no militia. It's the Army of the Potomac.'

"Having captured Archer and his men, many of the Iron Brigade kept on beyond Willoughby's Run, and formed on the heights on the opposite side."

It was 11 o'clock before the rest of Reynolds's corps came to the field, and during the two hours Wadsworth's division had been contending against great odds. Let us again quote from General Doubleday:

"By this time the enemy's artillery had been posted on every commanding position to the west of us, several of their batteries firing down the Chambersburg pike. I was very desirous to hold this road, as it was in the center of the enemy's line, who were advancing on each side of it, and Calef—exposed as his battery was—fired over the crest of ground where he was posted, and notwithstanding the storm of missiles which assailed him, held his own handsomely, and inflicted great damage on his adversaries. . . . It was a hot place for troops; for the whole posi-

tion was alive with bursting shells, but the men went forward in fine spirits, and, under the impression that the position was to be held at all hazards, they cried out, 'WE HAVE COME TO STAY!' The battle afterward became so severe that the greater portion did stay, laying down their lives for the cause they loved so well. Morrow's brigade remained in the woods where Reynolds was killed."

General Howard had hurried his corps, the Eleventh, to the battle field, and great was the need of it, for Wadsworth and Doubleday had been fighting against all of Hill's corps, and Ewell was just bearing down on them from another direction. Before the middle of the afternoon, two-thirds of Lee's army was contending against the First and Eleventh corps of Meade's army—nearly fifty thousand against twenty thousand. The odds were too great. First the Eleventh corps was broken. The Eleventh had not protected the flank of the First, and it was not long before Ewell's artillery had opened on Wadsworth. He promptly threw Cutler's brigade back into the woods on Seminary Hill. Morrow's brigade remained hidden from the enemy in the woods where Reynolds fell, and owing to the fact that the First corps occupied a position in the center of the Confederate line, and the attacks on Doubleday were not simultaneous, he was enabled to hold his position until near the close of the day. Gradually, however, the pressure grew too strong on Doubleday. Before the final crash came Baxter's and Cutler's brigades punished one division of the Confederates heavily. Baxter had just repulsed an attack when he was threatened with another on his flank. The two brigades took refuge behind a stone wall, and lying down let the Confederates come close to them, when they sprang to their feet and poured in a fire so deadly that more than five hundred of the assailing column were killed or wounded, while the others were so demoralized they gave themselves up as prisoners.

By this time the Eleventh corps, that had been driven through the streets of Gettysburg, was rallying on Cemetery Hill, a point that was to become famous two days later. What was left of the First corps rallied on Seminary

Hill, where they defended themselves from behind a few rails that had been hastily thrown together. The enemy was closing in on them from three sides. Buford, with his cavalry, saved the day for a while, but could not delay the catastrophe very long. Cutler formed his brigade behind a railroad grading, making a show of force which further delayed the advance of the Confederates, thus enabling the artillery to withdraw, when the troops, exhausted by a fight that had continued for more than eight hours, and almost surrounded by the enemy, retired to Cemetery Hill, where they took position, and thus the battle of July 1st ended with the advantage in favor of the Confederates.

The loss on both sides had been horrible, that of the First and Eleventh corps amounting to nearly 10,000 men, of whom about half had been killed or wounded. The Nineteenth regiment lost two hundred and ten out of two hundred and eighty-eight that went into battle. After the arrival of General Hancock on the battle field, Wadsworth's division was sent to hold possession of Culp's Hill.

The battle of the 2d of July was divided into two parts—first, the attack of Longstreet on Sickles, and of Early on Culp's Hill. Lee had determined to win the great victory he sought, and thus force a peace, so he carefully planned and prepared for what he could not help feeling would be the hardest fought battle in which he had yet commanded. The entire forenoon was given to completing his preparations for attack, and on the part of Meade to getting ready to resist the attack. Lee designed that the assaults on Sickles and on Culp's Hill should be simultaneous. They occupied the two extremities of the Union line. A decided success on either extremity would insure him the ultimate victory, but that against Sickles promised the greatest final success, for it would give Lee such a commanding position that it would be almost impossible for Meade to extricate his army. Thus he determined that the attack on Sickles should be the main one, while that on Culp's Hill was to be heavy enough to prevent Meade from reinforcing his left.

The position taken by Sickles has been greatly criticised, but no criticism has ever been made upon the fighting of Sickles or his corps. That the battle which followed

may be clearly understood by the reader, we quote General Doubleday's admirable description of the Union line, premising that Meade's army was on Cemetery Ridge:

"The ridge was nearly in the shape of a horseshoe. The Twelfth corps was on the extreme right; next came one division of the First corps on Culp's Hill, then the Eleventh corps on Cemetery Hill, with two divisions of the First corps at the base; next the Second corps; then the Third, and the Fifth corps on the extreme left, the Sixth corps being posted in the rear of Round Top as a general reserve to the army. Sickles, however, denies that any position was ever marked out for him. He was expected to prolong Hancock's line to the left, but did not do so for the following reasons: First, because the ground was low, and second, on account of the commanding position of the Emmetsburg road, which ran along a cross ridge oblique to the front of the line assigned him, and which afforded the enemy an excellent position for their artillery; third, because the ground between the valley he was expected to occupy and the Emmetsburg road constituted a minor ridge, very much broken and full of rocks and trees, which afforded an excellent cover for an enemy operating on his immediate front. He had previously held an interview with General Meade and asked that an experienced staff officer be sent with him to assist in locating a suitable position for his corps. At his request General Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, was sent for that purpose. They rode out to the ridge and Sickles directed that his troops should be posted along that road, with his center at Peach Orchard, which was about a mile from and nearly opposite to Little Round Top; his right wing, under Humphreys, extending along the road, while his left wing, under Birney, made a right angle at the Peach Orchard with the other part of the line, and bent around so as to cover the front of Little Round Top at its base. . . .

"Syke's corps—the Fifth—came up from the right about 5 p. m., soon after Longstreet's attack on Sickles was fairly under way, and formed along the outer base of Little Round Top, with Crawford's Pennsylvania reserves at their right and front."

Meade believed that the main attack of the enemy

would be on his right, but Sickles felt that its weight was to fall upon him. It was a little before four o'clock when the Confederates were ready to open the battle, and they dashed forward preceded by a swarm of skirmishers. Owing to the woods they had been able to partly mask their movements, but a reconnoissance Sickles had caused to be made had developed their presence in heavy masses. The assault was to be by Longstreet's corps, containing more than one-third of Lee's whole army. The Comte de Paris thus describes the opening of the battle:

"The Federals, who have seen on the opposite slopes the serried lines of the assailants advancing with their flags flying and shouting their war cry, are ready to receive them. Ward waits for their attack in good positions, and without flinching, but as he has sent Berdan with the Third Maine to the Orchard, his brigade is reduced to five regiments. A desperate struggle takes place along the rocky slopes which the Confederates are beginning to climb; fortunately for Ward, Robertson, in extending his left for the purpose of surrounding him, exposes his flank to DeTrobriand, and on this side his soldiers begin to fall back. He is obliged to take the remainder of his force to their assistance, and Ward, thus freed, recovers the ground he has just lost. The First Texas, which was trying to seize the nearest guns of Smith's battery, redeems the combat on the left, but the Federal guns, being thenceforth free, inflict severe losses upon their assailants, who were trying in vain to capture them. During this time Anderson, who was to support Robertson, has not followed his movements on the right, and is about to strike the center of DeTrobriand's line, which is its strongest part. Being obliged to cross the ravine under the enemy's fire, he has been repulsed with great loss. Besides, two regiments having become separated from Robertson's brigade, and continuing to march with Law's troops, this brigade would find itself isolated and in a most critical position but for the timely arrival of Benning. This General, like Anderson, having adhered to his original direction, thus finds himself in the rear of Robertson. These three brigades at the same time renew the attack. DeTrobriand and Ward offer the most desperate resistance; Smith's and Winslow's batteries sup-

port them as much as the nature of the ground will allow. The woods, the rocks, and the slopes give the defenders great advantage, but they are much weaker numerically than the Southerners, who rush to the attack with desperate energy; consequently their losses follow in quick succession, and their line is speedily thinned, there being no reserve to reinforce it. The combat thus begun does not cause Hood to lose sight of the Round Tops. The highest seems inaccessible, and, moreover, the view of the enfolding Federal line is hidden from him by the smallest; it is this one, together with the surrounding slopes that it is necessary to take possession of. Law, entrusted with this task, penetrates into the small valley of Plum Run, to ascend it again between the slopes of Devil's Den and those of the Round Tops; his brigade is reinforced by the two regiments that have been detached from that of Robertson; he has under his command soldiers from Texas and Alabama, tried in various combats, ardent as the sun under which they were born, indefatigable and insensible to danger, resembling, in one word, the brilliant Hood, who has long been training them and is encouraging them by his presence. Ward has only placed a single regiment, the Fourth Maine, before Little Round Top in the bottom of the valley where the Plum Run flows, but he has had time to reinforce it with the Fortieth New York, which DeTrobriand has sent to his assistance when attacked by Robertson, and the Sixth New Jersey, detached from Burling's brigade. The three regiments, soon increased to four by a new contribution from this brigade, go into ambuscade behind the rocks and resist Law's furious attack; nevertheless they lose ground and uncover the approaches of the Little Round Top. In order to support their retreat, Ward is obliged to strip his right; DeTrobriand, compelled in his turn to extend his left in order to fill up the space thus formed, places the Seventeenth Maine in the wheat field behind the wall which at the south separates this field from that portion of the wood abandoned by Ward. Winslow fires his guns against this wood. By thus increasing the length of his line DeTrobriand only keeps two small regiments in the center, for he can not call in the Third Michigan without breaking all connection with Graham.

He, however, holds out against Anderson's second assault; the latter is wounded and his troops are repulsed. But Benning's arrival has dealt a fatal blow to Ward. The Confederates once more climb the hill, driving the Federals, who defend themselves foot by foot, ending by taking possession of three pieces of Smith's artillery."

This graphic description tells how desperately the two brigades of Ward and DeTrobriand defended the positions assigned them, and how they only yielded in the end to overpowering numbers. All writers on the battle of Gettysburg have recognized the great importance of Little Round Top, and expressed surprise that its importance had not been seen by Meade, and properly defended. In excuse of Meade it can be said that he was fully persuaded all the time that Lee's main attack would be upon his right, and not upon his left, therefore had given more of his thoughts to strengthening his right. General Warren, who happened to be sent to the left, was the first to recognize that Little Round Top was the key to the position, and if once in the possession of the Confederates nothing but a disastrous retreat awaited Meade. When he arrived there it was occupied only by a few of the signal corps. He rushed troops to its top, and they arrived there only just in time to push back, with their clubbed muskets, the Confederates who were climbing up the other side. Had it not been for the desperate fighting of Ward's brigade at the base of Little Round Top, Law and his Confederate troops would have crowned its summit and planted their batteries before Warren could have placed a single Federal there. Had Law reached it, as Vincent did, he would have stayed there, as did Vincent, and Gettysburg would have been another victory for Lee. The Twentieth Indiana was a part of Ward's brigade, and shared in that desperate defense of the Union left. In this fighting the Twentieth lost the second Colonel of the regiment, killed on the battle field. Its first Colonel, William Brown, fell at the second battle of Bull Run, and now Colonel John Wheeler gave up his life while gallantly leading his regiment. The regiment left one hundred and fifty-three killed and wounded on the battle field.

The battle was not ended by the repulse of Ward and

DeTrobriand, but went on with increasing fury, as Meade rushed reinforcements to his threatened left. How Little Round Top was saved to Meade, and how the battle raged along its slopes; how the Confederates at one time pierced the center of Meade's lines; how the desperate valor of the Union troops and night put an end to the assaults of Longstreet, and how with a rush the Federals pushed him back to the lines he had captured from Sickles, belong to the general history of this battle. We must now turn to the right of the Union line, where two other Indiana regiments were stationed. These were the Seventh and the Nineteenth, which had been so deeply engaged in the fight of the first day. These two regiments belonged to Wadsworth's division of the First corps, and were stationed on Culp's Hill. Ewell made a desperate attack on the Twelfth corps, holding the extreme right of the Union lines, but Wadsworth and his decimated division on Culp's Hill witnessed the fighting without taking part in it.

The Fourteenth Indiana, however, with its brigade, played a conspicuous part in the fight at Cemetery Hill. The attack of the Confederates had been two fold. Johnson intended to strike Culp's Hill but found the position too strong for him, and he also found some of the Federal works unoccupied. Meade had withdrawn Gear's division to send to the aid of Sickles, and had not filled the gap in his line. Geary did not arrive on the left in time to take any part in the battle which raged on that part of the field, and when he returned he found, to his surprise, the works he had left so short a time before occupied by the enemy. To supplement the attack of Johnson and prevent Meade from sending reinforcements to his extreme right, Early was ordered to attack Cemetery Hill, which was occupied by the Eleventh corps. General Doubleday gives the following account of this attack:

"The enemy first struck Von Gilsa's brigade, which was posted behind a stone fence at the foot of the hill. Still farther to its left, at the base of the hill, was Ames's brigade, both enclosing Rickett's and Weidrick's batteries on higher ground above. Stuart's, Reynolds's and Stevens's batteries, which had been a good deal cut up on the first, were now brought to bear on the approaching enemy.

Colonel Wainwright, Chief of Artillery to the First corps, gave them orders not to attempt to retreat if attacked, but to fight their guns to the last. The enemy advanced up the ravine, which was specially commanded by Stevens's battery. Weidrick, Ricketts and Stevens played upon the approaching line energetically. The rebel left and center fell back, but the right managed to obtain shelter from houses and undulating ground, and came on impetuously, charging over Von Gilsa's brigade, and driving it up the hill through the batteries. In doing so Hays says the darkness and smoke saved his men from a terrible slaughter. Weidrick's battery was captured, and two of Ricketts's guns were spiked. The enemy, in making this movement, exposed their left flank to Stevens's battery, which poured a terrible fire of double canister into their ranks. The Thirty-third Massachusetts also opened a most effective oblique fire. The batteries were penetrated but would not surrender. Dearer than life itself to the cannoneer is the gun he serves, and these brave men fought hand to hand with handspikes, rammers, staves, and even stones. They shouted, 'Death on the soil of our native State rather than lose our guns.' Hancock, all this time, should have been kept busy on his own front repelling an attack from Rodes and Pender, but as they did not come forward, and as he felt there was great danger that Howard would lose Cemetery Hill and his own right be turned, he sent Carroll's brigade to the rescue. Carroll was joined by the One Hundred and Sixth Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from Schurz's division. For a few minutes, Hays says, there was an ominous silence, and then the tramp of our infantry was heard. They came over the hill and went in with a cheer. The enemy, finding they were about to be overwhelmed, retreated, as no one came to their assistance. When they fell back our guns opened a very destructive fire. It is said that out of 1750 men of the organization known as 'The Louisiana Tigers,' only 150 returned."

The Fourteenth Indiana was a part of Carroll's brigade, and was in this gallant charge. General Doubleday does not tell all the story. Weidrick's battery that had been captured by the Confederates was re-taken in this charge, and

the Fourteenth captured the colors, all the field officers and most of the men of the Twenty-first North Carolina. This ended the fight on the second of July. The Confederates had failed everywhere except on the extreme right, where Johnson had been able to fasten himself in the works that Geary had abandoned when he was sent to reinforce the left. Longstreet, it is true, had driven back the Third corps with terrible slaughter, but he had failed to break the Union left, and in turn had been pushed back from the slopes of Little Round Top. The attack on Cemetery Hill, after beginning so auspiciously for the Confederates, had failed owing to the gallant charge of Carroll's brigade.

The third day's battle at Gettysburg will go down in history, and be for ages the theme of song, because of the charge of Pickett on Hancock's lines; because of the heroic defense of the men fighting under the eye of Hancock, who on that day once more earned the title of "The Superb." No one who loves deeds of heroism would detract for a single instant from the praises so justly earned by Pickett and his men on that third day of July, but we must all admit that in heroism and devotion they did not surpass, even if they equaled, French and his division, led by Kimball's brigade, at Fredericksburg. Pickett led an army to the charge; French led only three brigades. Pickett had fewer obstacles to overcome than had French; his men were not so long under fire before they clinched with their enemy in deadly struggle as were those of French. They both failed, as they were foredoomed to do from the very start. At Fredericksburg, however, the Federals, undismayed by the annihilation of French, made two other attempts to break the Confederate line, while at Gettysburg, when Pickett failed, the Confederates had not heart enough to make another assault.

On the 2d, Lee failed in both attempts to break the Union line. The assaults had not been simultaneous as he had intended, and thus Meade had been able to draw from his right to help his left beat back Longstreet, and Hancock had been able to send Carroll to help Howard drive back Anderson. Lee could not leave the field and confess himself beaten without making another effort to drive

Meade from the position he had chosen, and for this effort he selected his choicest troops to be led by Pickett, who always went to battle as gayly as to his dinner, and whose men would follow wherever he led. This was to be Lee's supreme effort, and he determined to make the assault so strong that by its very momentum it would push its head through the center of Meade's lines, and he chose for the point against which the onslaught should be directed that where Anderson had failed on the evening before. To aid in this another attack was to be made on the extreme right of the Federal line at the same time.

It will be remembered that, on the evening of the 2d, Johnson had been able to occupy and hold a part of the Federal works at Culp's Hill. He was strongly reinforced during the night, and when Longstreet opened on the center, he was to push forward his turning movement and take Meade in reverse. This was a dangerous movement for the Federals, as it threatened Meade's only line of retreat, should retreat become necessary. Lee intended that Johnson should continue his turning movement in conjunction with the assault he intended Longstreet to make on the center. It will be remembered that Carroll's brigade, with which the Fourteenth Indiana was connected, had been sent, on the afternoon of the 2d, to aid Howard in repulsing Anderson. It had been retained on Cemetery Hill, and temporarily attached to Gibbon's division, and thus became involved in the hottest of the contest with Pickett. The Twenty-seventh Indiana was on the right with Slocum's corps, in Colgrove's brigade of Ruger's division.

On the 2d Early was to assault the right, while Longstreet drove his corps against Sickles, but he did not commence his attack until after that of Longstreet had failed. How he failed has been told. On the 3d he made his attack before Longstreet was ready, and as his movement was the first of the day, in the order of time, it will be first considered. Of this attack on the right, the Comte de Paris says:

"Williams, with whom Slocum, commanding the entire right wing, has left the Twelfth corps, plants his artillery on the Power and McAllister Hills, whence it sweeps the distant front of the wooded plateau occupied by Johnson. Ruger's division menaces the Confederate left by way of the

south banks of Spangler's streamlet. During this time, Geary, resting his right on the triangular wood, strikes in the rear with his left that portion of the intrenchments occupied by the enemy. At early dawn the fire of the Union artillery demolishes these weak intrenchments, stopping at the end of a quarter of an hour to allow the infantry to advance. But Johnson forestalls the Federals, hurling his battalions against them. The Confederates come up in three lines, scarcely separated from each other, and attack their adversaries with vigor. They have at last obtained a view of the Baltimore road covered with wagons, troopers and straggling infantry, who are pushing toward the south in crowds, seized with a foolish terror in spite of the efforts of several squadrons of Union cavalry to preserve order along this important highway. The sight stimulates their ardor. The shock is terrific, and a desperate struggle takes place among the rocks with which the ground is thickly covered. All the batteries of Meade's reserve that have not been summoned to the left concentrate their fire upon the slopes occupied by the assailants. Sedgwick, south of the road, is preparing to co-operate in case the enemy should succeed in obtaining a foothold upon the open ground which extends to the right of Geary. The marshy stream which runs down from the Spangler house stops Ruger's progress, but Lockwood, who had just been joined by the rest of his brigade, proceeds to assist Geary. The conflict is prolonged without losing any portion of its desperate character. Cannon balls and shells pour upon the Confederates, who have not a single gun with which to reply. The Unionists, being reinforced, present to them an impenetrable front on all sides. The hours are slipping away; the sun, which is rising higher and higher, is absolutely scorching. At times the combat languishes, then is renewed again with fresh violence. During the intervals of silence Johnson tries in vain to catch the sound of Longstreet's attack, which would relieve him by distracting the attention of the enemy. He alone sustains all the brunt of the struggle—a terrible struggle, hand to hand, man to man, impossible to describe, for it is made up of incidents as numerous as the combatants themselves. But Jackson's soldiers, accustomed never to back out, are still unwilling

to give up the hope of victory. On the right, Jones and Nichols maintain their position without gaining or losing ground. Walker has been detached at the extreme left on the banks of Rock Creek to watch Ruger's movements. Steuart and the largest part of the reinforcements sent to Johnson occupy the position which is at once the most menacing and the most exposed at the entrance of the wood, for if Ruger becomes entirely separated from Geary they receive the cross fire of artillery and musketry without shelter. Finally, after seven hours' fighting, the Confederates, feeling that they are wasting their resources in vain, make one last effort to break the right of Geary so as to reach the Baltimore pike. But Kane, having been reinforced by Shaler's brigade, is ready to receive them. Steuart, wishing to outflank his right, extends his line as far as the stream, and after having re-formed it, leads his men to the charge. The bravest among them would perhaps have hesitated if he had not set them an example, for they know that they are called to perform a desperate act; but they all follow him with a rush into a circle of fire where the enemy is awaiting them. Useless heroism, for the skirmishers that Ruger has thrown across the stream open a murderous fire of musketry against their left flank, while they are fighting Geary's troops in front, and after a stubborn resistance they are finally repulsed. Ruger immediately crosses the stream, Geary penetrating the wood with him. The Southerners, exhausted, can not withstand this combined movement of the Twelfth corps; they are driven out of the intrenchments thrown up on the slopes of Culp's Hill, and pushed back on the left bank of Rock Creek, leaving three stand of colors and about five hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy; the success of the Federals on the right wing is complete. It is eleven o'clock, and the combat is over on that side; it has not yet commenced along the rest of the line."

The Twenty-seventh took a prominent part in this seven hours of fighting, and with the Second Massachusetts led the charge which finally drove the enemy to retreat. In this conflict it lost more than one hundred in killed and wounded.

Let us now turn to the left, where Longstreet is or-

ganizing the elite of the Southern army for the last desperate effort against the Union lines. If it fails Lee's invasion of the North fails, and he must retire, if permitted to do so, into Virginia, baffled and beaten, with the loss of a large part of the proud army he led across the Potomac. In his first attempt to invade the North he had met with some distinguished successes, notably the capture of Harper's Ferry, with all its stores and its garrison of more than eleven thousand men, but in this, his second effort, to force a peace on Northern soil, he had, up to this time, no success to record, except the contributions he had levied upon the unarmed inhabitants of Pennsylvania. It is true that in the first day at Gettysburg he had administered terrible punishment to the right wing of the Federal army, but in turn had met with great losses; on the second day he had driven back the left wing of Meade, but when the battle ended he had failed to pierce the line, and his troops had been forced back from the extreme positions they had captured. If he did not win now his army would not be in a condition to make another effort, and nothing would be left him but to devise ways by which he could escape, and he well knew that if the Union General was bold and vigilant, it would be a matter of the extremest difficulty to avoid the capture of his army, or at least a large part of it.

It is no wonder then that he was anxious for the success of this supreme effort. On the other hand, Meade felt that the supreme moment would soon come, and that the salvation of his army and the cause of the Union depended upon his ability to resist the thunderbolt that was to be launched against him. He carefully examined his lines, strengthening the weak places and massing his artillery, and the weary hours of waiting went on. None but those who have experienced it can know the wear on the nerves caused by waiting for a battle to open. When the guns sound, when the head of the assaulting column is seen, it is easy to prepare for the shock, but when an army lies for hours, knowing that a shock is coming, but can not tell when, or just where, the strain on the men is terrible. The hours wore on, the Federals waiting for the inevitable. At last Longstreet was ready. At once one hundred and

twenty guns were hurling shot and shell into the Union lines, while eighty were replying to this cannonade.

Every one knew this was but the prelude to the storm that was to come. For three-quarters of an hour this horrible din continued, the distant mountains reverberating the sounds. Cemetery Hill, where the hottest of this fire was concentrated, was plowed up by the falling shells. The men sought in vain for some place of hiding from this awful storm of death. The cannonade ceased as suddenly as it began, and there was a deep and ominous silence, when the advancing lines of the Confederates were seen. Then from every part of Cemetery Ridge, from the Hill and from Little Round Top, the Union artillery thundered, cutting through and through the Confederate lines, but on they came, a wave of death. They faltered, and it seemed that they would break. The pause had been but a moment when the wave rolled on once more, gaining impetuosity as it advanced. Its path was strewn with the dead and dying. Officers and men went down under the awful cannonade that assailed them, but gayly, jauntily, as if assured of victory, those who were left pressed on.

Pickett led. He aimed at the part of the Union line held by Doubleday, but long before he reached it, he swerved, changed direction and moved on Gibbon. There was where the blow was to fall. Gibbon and his men saw it, and braced themselves for the conflict. As they came within easy musket range a murderous flame leaped from the Union line; such a flame that nothing but a miracle, it seemed, could save any one who stood before it. The roar of musketry was added to the roar of artillery, and the advancing foe was hidden from view by the smoke. Had they withstood that terrible fire? A lift in the smoke showed that they were still coming on. They reached the Union line and then the struggle came man to man. In this advance Pickett had exposed his flank to an enfilading fire from a part of Doubleday's forces. This fire was so terrible that they faltered, wavered, but would not break. Some of them climbed over the temporary barricades, and Armitage laid his hand upon one of the guns that had been sending death into his ranks, but he fell dead. Where he died marks the height of the wave, the spot where Lee's invasion stopped. It could go no further.

A little to the right of the Confederate line, Wilcox, who did not follow the change of direction of Pickett, sought to strike Doubleday, but exposed his flank to the same Vermonters who had dealt such a fatal blow to Pickett, and they turned, and charging upon Wilcox, drove him back. The ground along the whole line of the assault was covered thickly with the dead and wounded, and hundreds who could not retreat hid themselves among the stones, or surrendered as prisoners. It was an awful hour for Lee. The flower of his army had been cut down, and when Pickett fell back, defeated and overthrown, Lee saw the doom of his cause. The Fourteenth Indiana took part in this repulse of Pickett, and lost heavily.

We have imperfectly sketched the part that each of the Indiana regiments, with the exception of the Seventh, took in this great battle. It belonged to Cutler's brigade of Wadsworth's division of the First corps, but was not with its brigade on that awful first day of July, when Cutler and Meredith fought so stubbornly against Hill's corps. In the forced march made by Reynolds on that day, the Seventh was with the train, and did not arrive in time to take part in the fighting. When the First corps slowly and sullenly fell back to Cemetery Ridge it found a small reinforcement awaiting it, being the Seventh Indiana, with five hundred fresh troops. Wadsworth met the regiment and led it to Culp's Hill, where, under the direction of an engineer officer, a defensive line was speedily marked out. The rest of the brigade soon joined the Seventh, and out of the abundance of wood and stone, breastworks were thrown up, and the right of the line was firmly established. Thus the Seventh Indiana was the first of the Union troops to occupy the important point known as Culp's Hill, a point which Lee ordered Ewell to occupy that night. Ewell made the attempt but why he failed is thus related by Stine in his "History of the Army of the Potomac":

"What few of Wadsworth's two brigades that were left were worn out and the Seventh Indiana was assigned to picket duty, with company B on the extreme right of the line. It was stationed near where the hill turns to the west. On the picket post on the extreme right of the line was Sergeant Hussey, with privates Hershberger and W.

S. Odell. A noise was heard as of men moving cautiously in the timber some distance to their right. As they advanced to investigate, before the enemy discovered them, they got behind some bowlders, permitting the officer leading to pass them, when Sergeant Hussey dashed out and seized the officer, while Hershberger and Odell fired on the advancing body of troops. Other members of the company running up poured in such a rapid fire that the enemy turned and fled in the direction of Rock Creek, where Johnson's division lay. Some prisoners were captured in that night's encounter. Ewell was greatly astonished to find a force on Culp's Hill and abandoned the project of trying to take it that night."

The heaviest loss of any corps at the battle of Gettysburg was 6059 in the First. This is the heaviest loss for the numbers engaged recorded in any modern war. It was twenty-five per cent. of the entire loss of the Union army during the three days, and all occurred on the first day of the battle. The heaviest loss in any one brigade was in that of Meredith, being 1153. This was the heaviest percentage of loss also. The heaviest loss of any regiment was that of the Twenty-fourth Michigan of this brigade, being 363.

The history of the Army of the Potomac for the next ten months is one that a historian naturally shrinks from writing. The army was anxious, yes, eager to throw itself upon its defeated enemy and complete the destruction of Lee, but timorous counsels prevailed, and Lee was permitted once more to cross back into Virginia with hardly a show of pursuit. For ten months the two armies faced each other. The summer passed, and autumn came, followed by winter, and with the exception of a few forward and backward movements, and occasional encounters between the cavalry forces of the two armies, now and then assisted by a part of the infantry, nothing was done until the army fell under the master hand of Grant, when it started on the campaign which ended the rebellion.

CHAPTER XLIX.

THE COBURN AND STREIGHT RAIDS.

Once more our story takes us to the West where, for the first time, the Union army was to meet with a great disaster. In the West the campaigns had generally resulted in favor of the Unionists. It is true that 1861 had witnessed the defeat of Lyon at Wilson's Creek, and the check of Grant at Belmont, but even that check was a technical victory for Grant. He fully accomplished all that he had set out to do, but not all that came in his mind to do when he found the condition of affairs at Belmont, and although he was finally compelled to retreat, it was not until after he had destroyed the Confederate camp. The year 1862 had witnessed Mill Springs, Forts Henry and Donelson, forcing the abandonment of Columbus and Nashville; Shiloh and Corinth, and Island No. 10, which opened the Mississippi to Memphis; and finally Stone's River. Sherman had failed at Vicksburg, and the Unionists had met with disaster at Mumfordsville and Richmond, Kentucky, and had been checked at Perryville, but altogether the campaigns in the West had been favorable to the Union troops. The Confederates had been driven from Missouri and Kentucky, and from nearly all of Tennessee, and Grant was in Mississippi. The story of how Grant, throwing aside all the established theories of war, had driven his army like a wedge between Pemberton and Johnston, fighting one of them one day and the other the next, until he finally drove one of them so far away that he could not interfere again with his movements, and then pushed the other back into Vicksburg, where he hemmed in and finally captured his

whole army, has been told. No sooner was that done than Grant asked to be permitted to put his army on the march for other conquests. Mobile, on the Gulf, was an inviting point, and he declared in his quiet way that, if permitted, he could capture that rich city, and thus effectually close the port against blockade runners, and at the same time obtain for himself a new base from which he could move on toward the rear of Richmond. But the scheme was too bold for Halleck.

Grant, after Vicksburg, was permitted to rest for a time, while a part of his army was sent to share with Banks in the Red River folly, while still another part was ordered to reinforce Rosecrans and, by direction of Halleck, put in its time repairing a railroad along its entire journey—a railroad that could be, and was, destroyed by the Confederate cavalry almost as fast as it was rebuilt. While Grant had been taking Vicksburg and opening the Mississippi, and Hooker and Meade had been fighting great battles in the East, Rosecrans, at the head of as fine an army as could be found on the continent, had remained inactive. He did not move until after Vicksburg had fallen.

Before taking up what is known as the "Tullahoma Campaign," it will be well to consider one or two other movements which involved several Indiana regiments. We left Rosecrans and his army resting after the terrific battle of Stone's River. Bragg had withdrawn to Chattanooga, while Rosecrans remained in and around Murfreesboro. The Confederates in the early years of the war outclassed the Federals in cavalry, both in numbers of men and in the daring and skill of the leaders. In the West were Van Dorn, Forrest and Wheeler, and Morgan, who, however, can hardly be classed with the others, for he was a mere raider, shunning a fight when he could, and was only successful in capturing isolated detachments of Federals, and in bridge burning. Bragg had hardly settled down in winter quarters after his defeat at Stone's River, than his cavalry became very active, dashing here and there, now striking Rosecrans's communications, and then swooping down upon some Federal post. In the West the Union Generals were greatly hampered by having long

lines of communication to keep up, but even more so by trying, under Halleck's policy, to hold a great scope of country by small detachments. Halleck seemed possessed with the idea that the quickest way to end the war was by posting companies and regiments in out of the way towns or localities, where they were not only liable to capture by sudden attacks of superior forces, but where they could be of no earthly use to the army in the field. If the Union army passed through a town in making a forward movement, it must leave a part of its force as a garrison. Thus it did not take a forward movement of many miles to rob the army of a good part of its fighting strength.

In 1862, and the early part of 1863, these isolated detachments were very attractive to the bold cavalry leaders of the South. Only a few days after his defeat at Stone's River, Bragg sent out Wheeler, who, pushing directly toward Nashville, burned a railroad bridge almost in view of the city. Two or three days afterward he captured four transports going up the Cumberland River carrying supplies for Rosecrans. He burned a number of important stations and returned without being molested. He only gave his men a rest of a day or two and then started out on another and much more important expedition. All this time Rosecrans kept his cavalry close to his infantry.

Wheeler approached Franklin, only twenty miles away from Nashville, with about three thousand men and two batteries of artillery. Rosecrans sent General Jeff C. Davis, at the head of his division of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, to strike Wheeler in the rear, while another force was sent to Triune. Wheeler was not to be caught, however, and while this two-jointed force was looking for him between Nashville and Murfreesboro, he rapidly marched away to the northwest and suddenly appeared before Dover, after capturing several small detachments on the way. This post was commanded by Colonel Harding, who had about eight hundred men under him. Wheeler made one charge after another, but was beaten back with severe loss. At one time he penetrated into the town, but Harding and his men fought in the streets, and Wheeler at last was compelled to retreat, after having sustained a loss of nearly three hundred killed and wounded. Wheeler then made his way back to Columbia as best he could.

On March 4th Colonel John Coburn with his brigade, consisting of the Thirty-third Indiana, Eighty-fifth Indiana, Nineteenth Michigan and Twenty-second Wisconsin, to which were added the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio and about six hundred cavalry, was sent on a reconnoitering and foraging expedition. Many of the men in this command were new and had never been under fire. Coburn had hardly got started when he met a strong force, which fell back before him. Van Dorn, who was in command, gathered his forces together and determined to wait for Coburn at Thompson's Station. Coburn had been astonished at finding the enemy so near Franklin and sent back word to his immediate commander, General Gilbert, asking for additional instructions. All he received was an order to send his wagons back to Franklin. During the night Coburn received information of the presence of Van Dorn at Spring Hill, and this he also sent to Gilbert, and waited for instructions, which did not come. At eight o'clock in the morning he resumed his march.

Van Dorn had massed his troops, consisting of about 5000 mounted men and eight pieces of artillery. Coburn had with him less than three thousand. Coburn met the outposts of the Confederates and drove them before him, Van Dorn skillfully concealing his men. The cavalry that was to have co-operated with Coburn had fallen back. Had it continued on its march it would have discovered the trap Van Dorn had laid, and been able to warn Coburn. The latter, seeing only a few troops in his front, advanced as Gilbert had directed. The Comte de Paris thus details what followed:

"Just as his column appears at the entrance of the defile at the opposite extremity of which the station is located, King's battery opens fire upon it. Coburn immediately makes preparation for the fight. The two hillocks commanding the station are occupied, the one to the westward, on the right, by the two Indiana regiments, the one to the eastward, on the left, by the Nineteenth Michigan and Twenty-second Wisconsin. The battery, reduced to five pieces by the breaking down of the sixth during the previous day's engagement, is divided between these two detachments. The One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio

remains in the rear with the train; the cavalry has to cover the extreme left, two squadrons on foot stretching out the line on this side.

"While the Federals are deploying, Forrest's battery, posted on the right of the Southerners, joins its fire to that of King's battery. Coburn, believing he has only the forces he has met the previous day before him, orders the two Indiana regiments to cross the valley which separates them from the slopes occupied by this last battery, and to capture the enemy's guns. The Federals, advancing in double column, deploy above the station. Well drilled in maneuvering, although never having been under fire,* they have all the self possession which the want of familiarity with danger sometimes imparts, and they march boldly under the fire of the enemy's battery. But the moment has arrived for the enemy to show themselves. A portion of Armstrong's brigade bears to the left in order to support that of Whitfield, which, being strongly posted behind the wall, opens a terrific fire of musketry against the assailants. The latter do not allow themselves to be held in check, and get within one hundred and fifty yards of their adversaries without having responded to their fire. But they can not proceed farther, and throw themselves flat upon the ground in order to offer a less conspicuous mark to the terrible fire that is being directed against them. The danger is not lessened, and their leaders, becoming convinced that the enemy's position is impregnable, give the order for retreat. The Confederates seize this opportunity to assume the offensive, and, pursuing the Unionists with shouts of victory, they press them close, trying to prevent them from forming again on the heights which they have so imprudently abandoned. But the Indiana soldiers reach these heights before them, and, turning round quickly, send them a few volleys of musketry which compel them to fall back behind the station to prepare for a new attack. Coburn, becoming aware of the numerical superiority of the enemy, decides to beat a retreat at once. He sends word

*The Comte de Paris is in error, at least so far as the Thirty-third Indiana is concerned. It had several times been under fire, notably at the battle of Wild Cat, one of the most important of the minor engagements of 1861. It also was frequently called upon to beat back the Confederates pursuing the Federals on the retreat from Cumberland Gap.



WM. S. HOLMAN.



WM. E. NIBLACK.



SPEAKER MICHAEL C. KERR.



SPEAKER JOHN W. DAVIS.



GEORGE W. JULIAN.

GROUP OF NOTED INDIANA CONGRESSMEN.

to his train to proceed in the direction of Franklin, and orders Colonel Jordan to bring on his cavalry to support the movements of the infantry. But the Confederates hold their prey in hand, and are not disposed to let it escape. Forrest, as soon as he sees the enemy's right bring on the fight, is seized with a happy idea; he orders Colonel Starnes to attack the Unionists' left with two of his regiments at the extremity of the hillock situated east of the station, and, taking the five other regiments along with him, he makes a detour by the way of the Lewisburg road in order to bar the retreat of the Federals. Starnes promptly executes the task assigned him. At the moment when Coburn is preparing to retire, the two regiments he has stationed on the left are vigorously attacked. The half battery which supports them precipitately leaves the field of battle; its example is followed by the pieces posted on the right. The dismounted cavalymen, who form the extreme Federal left, are driven back; Forrest's artillery occupies their position and takes the Unionist regiments in flank. Colonel Jordan, seeing Coburn's lines thus broken, does not think it proper to execute the orders he has received; instead of going to the assistance of his brave comrades, he takes his cavalry and Aleshire's battery back to the place where the train and the regiment left in charge of it are waiting. The Nineteenth Michigan and Twenty-second Wisconsin, thus turned and deprived of the support they had relied upon, form themselves en potence, facing east; but they can not long defend themselves in this position, and are driven back west of the turnpike, upon the hillock which the Indiana regiments still hold. The hill situated north of this hillock affords an excellent position. The Federal cavalry, the artillery, and the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio might, by posting themselves there, secure the retreat of the rest of the brigade, but the troops, influenced by Jordan's action, do not appear to think of anything else but to leave the battle field, and they speedily follow the train along the Franklin road. These troops are soon joined by a portion of the Twenty-second Wisconsin, which during the recent change of front Lieutenant Colonel Bloodgood has separated from the rest of the regiment with untoward haste. Forrest's maneuver

however, has not failed to attract Coburn's attention; he is trying to make his line fall back in order to gain the heights upon which he expects to give assistance to the rest of his troops. But this movement is interrupted by a general attack from all the enemy's forces. While Starnes is pressing Coburn's left, Armstrong and Whitfield charge him again in front and on his right. The Federals defend themselves bravely, and finally succeed in repulsing the persistent assaults of their adversaries. Coburn avails himself of the respite this advantage gives him to bring all his forces to the rear. But Forrest soon makes his appearance and obliges him to stop. The combat is renewed with violence; the Federals having the advantage of position, once more drive back their assailants. Forrest then, instead of persisting in attacking them on the flank, orders his mounted men to get into the saddle, and, rapidly gaining the rear of the enemy, reaches the hill which Jordan has not been able or is unwilling to occupy in advance of them. Leaving a portion of his forces in this position, he advances with the remainder against the small Federal band, reduced to about twelve hundred men, which, being pressed on other sides, has gained the summit of the ravine in the hope of forcing a passage toward the north. This time the Unionists are hemmed in. Coburn determines to make a desperate bayonet charge upon the enemy in front of him, but Forrest, arriving in the midst of these valiant soldiers, who have not even a cartridge left to defend themselves with, prevents him. All further struggle is impossible. Coburn surrenders with all those who have not forsaken him. A few shots from King's battery still fall among the compact group of soldiers of both parties who have ceased fighting. Finally the firing stops. Forrest at once sends forth his mounted men in pursuit of Jordan and those who had followed him, but they can not be overtaken; Coburn's resistance has saved them by giving them the necessary start to reach Franklin, where they will carry the news of the disaster. The conflict has lasted for nearly seven hours."

The disastrous results of the battle of Thompson's Station reflected no discredit upon the troops engaged. They fought as bravely as ever men fought, and against great

odds. Colonel Coburn handled his men with skill, and did all he could to avert the disaster. The blame primarily belongs to General Gilbert, who sent out so small a force, and when he was notified of the presence of the enemy in great strength, neither ordered Colonel Coburn to return, nor sent him proper support. Secondly, the disaster is attributable to the actions of Colonel Jordan. Had he posted his men on the hill as directed by Colonel Coburn, the two batteries and the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio would not have followed him off the field, and Colonel Coburn could have succeeded in making good his retreat, possibly with the loss of a few prisoners, and saving his command. Nearly all the Union commanders committed the fault of sending out expeditions too weak to cope with the enemy, who, always having interior lines, and always fighting in a friendly country, could concentrate easily. We must now record another disaster in which Indiana troops suffered from similar causes.

On the 7th of April, 1863, General Rosecrans organized a provisional brigade of seventeen hundred men, consisting of the Fifty-first and Seventy-third Indiana, Third Ohio, Eightieth Illinois, and two companies of Tennessee cavalry, and assigned it to the command of Colonel A. D. Streight, of the Fifty-first Indiana. This independent brigade was intended to make an expedition into Alabama and Georgia, to interrupt communications and to destroy property, the main object being to reach Rome and destroy the great cannon foundries of the Confederacy. Streight was to move from Nashville to Fort Henry, and there mount his men, and General Dodge was to be ready to co-operate with him. The two forces were to move in unison for a day or two, and then, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, Dodge was to change his direction, hoping that the enemy would follow him, while Streight was to strike out on his way to Gadsden and Rome. Streight was promptly at the appointed rendezvous, but he had not been able to mount his men. A day or two were lost and then Streight, with only a part of his force mounted, went to Tuscumbia where he united with Dodge. The Confederates received information of the movement and Bragg ordered Forrest, with his whole brigade, to unite with Roddy, who was confronting the Unionists at Tuscumbia.

The two Federal forces separated, Dodge leading off in one direction and Streight heading for Russellville. Dodge soon met with so strong an opposition that he was forced to turn back, before Streight had got a sufficient start on his mission. Streight pushed ahead, however, using every effort to mount his men. His pace could not be very rapid, owing to so many of his men having to march on foot. He gathered all the animals he could, but they were mostly broken down horses or mules. Forrest, being well mounted, rapidly gained upon Streight, who had only about twelve hours the start of him. By the night of the 29th Forrest was directly on the heels of the Federals. At daylight on the 30th Streight resumed his march. By this time he had been able to mount all his men. He had to burn all his wagons, packing his ammunition and some of his provisions on the horses. Before his rear guard could get in motion the Confederates fell upon it and drove it in confusion on the main column.

Streight reached the narrow defiles of Day's Gap, and quickly took advantage of the strong position afforded. His men dismounted and took possession of the slopes over which the road passes. Forrest undertook to surround him, but Streight massed his forces upon the Confederate center. He drove Roddy back by a murderous discharge of musketry, and then charged him with a part of his forces. Roddy was completely routed and Streight captured his two guns. Streight then returned to his position to await another attack. Forrest did not dare attempt another attack, but allowed the Federals to resume their march. Forrest then sought to head off Streight. He sent a part of his forces to make a detour while with the remainder he followed the Federals, and coming up once more with the rear guard as it was crossing a ford of Long Creek, fell upon it suddenly. Taken by surprise as they were crossing the stream the Federals were at first driven in considerable confusion, but they soon re-formed and covered the ford. Streight had occupied a strong position back of the stream, and the fight was opened. Night had come but the battle was waged, the only means of distinguishing positions being by the flashing of the muskets. About nine o'clock Streight began his retreat, abandoning

the two guns he had captured, which, owing to the want of ammunition, were of no further use to him. The men were greatly fatigued, not having halted except to fight, but he pushed them on through the night.

Forrest followed him closely and twice during the night attacked the rear guard. At Blountsville Streight rested for two hours to give some attention to his worn-out animals, and then resumed his march toward Gadsden. He pushed into the mountains, and did not halt until midnight. He started again at daylight, but Forrest was close on his track. The Federals burned all the bridges behind them, but that scarcely delayed the indefatigable Forrest, and he overtook the rear guard, just as Streight with the head of the column had reached the Coosa at Gadsden. By this time Forrest's men were exhausted, and the number of his stragglers increased every hour. He took six hundred of his best men and pushed on after Streight, who had been able to secure a number of fresh horses and to destroy some important depots of provisions. Arriving at the village of Turkey Town Streight was compelled to give his men some rest and time for refreshments. The men had scarcely begun making their coffee when the approach of the enemy was announced. He sent the Seventy-third Indiana into the woods to draw his adversaries into an ambush. Forrest discovered the ambush and avoided it, but charged with three hundred men on the Seventy-third. Colonel Hathaway, the gallant commander of the regiment, was killed, but his men continued to fight. Streight hurried forward with reinforcements and Forrest was repulsed.

Streight sent two hundred and fifty of his best mounted men to make a dash on Rome, to seize and hold the bridge at that point. Soon after night the Federals resumed their retreat. The little column was detained at Little River, in trying to find a ford. In crossing this river the reserve of his ammunition was submerged and thus rendered unfit for use. At daybreak on the 3d of May the column reached Cedar Bluff, having marched nearly one hundred and fifty miles in seventy-two hours, and fought three important battles. It pushed on and reached the Chattooga, burning the bridge after crossing. A pause had been made for food, but while eating, the guns of Forrest

were heard, he having found a ford across the Chattooga. The Federals at once formed ready to fight. In numbers they excelled their pursuers, but Forrest made such a display of his forces that they appeared much more numerous than they really were. Streight was out of ammunition and finally surrendered what was left of his force, numbering 1466 men. This expedition was begun without adequate means, but the courage and endurance of the small Federal force can not be too highly praised. Had Streight's men been well mounted in the beginning they would have outstripped Forrest and destroyed works of inestimable value to the South.

CHAPTER L.

THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.

After a long period of "masterly inactivity," Rosecrans, in the latter part of June, 1863, prepared for a forward movement. When he finally got into motion he displayed great powers as a strategist, and so manuevered as to get the start of Bragg, who had been lulled into fancied security by the long inaction of the Army of the Cumberland. At that time Lee was invading Maryland and Pennsylvania, and Grant was closing his grip on Pemberton in Vicksburg. Rosecrans's first movement was only intended as a demonstration. Reynolds's division of the Fourteenth corps led, with Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry in advance. This brigade was destined to become famous before the war closed. Wilder was the Colonel of the Seventeenth Indiana regiment, and conceived the idea that if a brigade could be mounted for speed in movement, but fight as infantry, it would make itself felt. After some delay he received authority to mount a brigade. Two Indiana regiments, the Seventeenth and Seventy-second, were in the brigade, which from its organization to the close of the war was commanded by Indianians, first by Colonel Wilder, and then by Colonel Abram O. Miller, of the Seventy-second. No brigade in the Army of the Cumberland did as much marching as the "Lightning Brigade," as it soon came to be called, and few, if any, did as much fighting. None bore a higher name. Before proceeding to detail the movements of General Rosecrans it may be well to describe the positions held by Bragg, when the campaign opened.

Bragg's position was a very strong one. Duck River and Caney Fork covered his front, which extended from McMinville on the right to Columbia on the left. His infantry was concentrated between Manchester and Tullahoma, Polk's corps being at Shelbyville. General Hardee's corps defended Hoover's, Liberty and Bellbuckle Gaps, passes through the mountains which would have to be traversed before Bragg could be disturbed. General Rosecrans determined to concentrate the corps of Generals Thomas, McCook and Crittenden against Bragg's right, covering this movement by a feint upon his left with Granger's corps. Granger moved first to Triune and then to Salem. On the 24th of June the whole army was in motion. General McCook advanced toward Liberty Gap. Two of his divisions bivouacked at Millersburg, while Johnson's was sent on to the Gap. Upon approaching the Gap, Colonel Thomas J. Harrison, with five companies of the Thirty-ninth Indiana, mounted infantry, was thrown forward. He soon provoked a conflict, when General Willich's brigade was sent to his support. Willich soon pushed the enemy's skirmishers back upon the reserves. Another brigade was ordered forward (Baldwin's), and the Federals pushed into the Gap for a distance of about two miles, where they bivouacked for the night.

Thomas with his corps advanced on the Manchester Turnpike, Reynolds's division leading. About seven miles out from Murfreesboro Wilder, in advance, encountered the enemy's cavalry. He attacked at once and drove them back upon their reserves, and then pushed the whole force through Hoover's Gap, a defile three miles long. He took a position at the southern end of the defile. In this preliminary fighting four companies of the Seventy-second were in the lead, and charging upon the Confederate cavalry captured a flag, which bore an inscription saying it had been presented by the ladies of Selma. This was the first battle in which the Seventy-second engaged, the last being at Selma, by an interesting coincidence. In the charge through the Gap Company C of the same regiment captured Hardee's signal station, with all its paraphernalia. The Eighteenth Indiana battery was also hotly engaged. A large body of infantry came forward to drive Wilder back, but

he had chosen his position with great skill, and the Spencer rifles of his command held the enemy at bay, although they greatly outnumbered him, until the Sixty-fifth Indiana regiment and the Nineteenth Indiana battery came dashing to his support, and the battery was soon sending its shells into the Confederate ranks. General Reynolds came up with two other brigades, and Hoover's Gap remained in possession of the Unionists, marking the success of the first stage in the game which Rosecrans was playing. Thus, in the two first engagements of this campaign, Indiana led.

Wilder had been ordered to halt before penetrating the defile, but when he got the Confederates on the run he could not forego pushing them. His boldness and promptness saved Rosecrans's plan from miscarrying. Had Wilder tarried on the road, or had he failed to promptly and energetically follow up his first success, Bragg would have been able to so block the passage of the Gap as to either stop Rosecrans entirely or compel him to fight bloody battles to get through. As it was, Wilder met two Confederate brigades coming to hold the Gap, as he emerged from it. They at once attacked him, but the Spencer rifles of his command held them in check. They then undertook to outflank him, but the other brigades of Reynolds arrived in time to checkmate that movement, and the Federals held the Gap, leaving Rosecrans free to continue his turning movement against Tullahoma.

McCook's fight at Liberty Gap was less successful than that of Reynolds at Hoover's. Willich had boldly followed Harrison with his five companies of the Thirty-ninth Indiana, but was checked by a superior force of the enemy. Miller's brigade came to his assistance, outflanked the Confederates, climbed a hill and opened an oblique fire. The Confederates were compelled to retreat, but being reinforced contested every foot with Willich and Miller, until night put an end to the combat. Thus the first day ended in favor of Rosecrans. On the 25th Bragg determined to drive back the Federals from Liberty Gap. In the afternoon he made a desperate attack on Willich, and was repulsed. General R. W. Johnson, commanding the division, in his report, said: "Willich's brigade again received the shock, but in splendid style was the enemy driven back over an

open field." Bragg then tried a flanking movement, securing the heights on their right, and so sharply pressed Willich that he was dislodged, but at that moment Carlin, with his brigade, came to the help of the sorely pressed Willich, and the Confederates were in turn driven back. Willich had two Indiana regiments with him—the Thirty-second and Thirty-ninth, the Eighty-first was with Carlin, and the Twenty-ninth with Miller. Scribner's brigade, in which was his own regiment, the Thirty-eighth Indiana, also took an active part in the fight at Hoover's Gap.

On the 26th Thomas moved forward, heavy skirmishing going on during nearly the whole day. The position obtained by Thomas rendered the concentration of Rosecrans's army easy. While he was waiting for the concentration of his army, which was somewhat delayed by the condition of the roads, Rosecrans determined to throw Wilder, with his mounted infantry, on the rear of Bragg. Wilder pushed to Decherd, drove off the guard and began the work of destroying the railroad. About midnight a large Confederate force was in his front, but he was skillful, and had absolute reliance on his soldiers. His work had not been completed, and he hated to return, so he retreated into the neighboring mountains, and the next day descended on Tanttallon. There he found an infantry force too strong for him, and he turned to Anderson, but Anderson, like Tanttallon, was well defended. He was now in a critical position, as Wheeler was in pursuit of him. He struck out on the Chattanooga road. Reaching a place where he could conceal from his pursuers all traces of the way he had gone, he turned to the left and took a cut across the mountains, reaching Manchester on the 30th without losing a man.

On the night of the 30th, being convinced that Rosecrans could seize upon his communications, Bragg evacuated Tullahoma. Rosecrans was promptly notified of this, but waited twenty-four hours before he began active pursuit, and Bragg escaped into Chattanooga with all his material. Thus the first stage in the campaign was won by the Federals. Rosecrans had displayed great powers as a General, up to the time Bragg evacuated Tullahoma, and then he failed. His army was in excellent condition for a

rapid pursuit. He delayed too long, however, and when he did move did not push forward with the vigor he ought to have shown. Forrest held back one corps, and Wheeler another. Elk River was swollen by the rains, and Bragg having crossed and destroyed the bridges behind him, the campaign ended for the time. Rosecrans had reconquered an important part of Tennessee, and was in admirable shape to continue his campaign. He had captured more than eighteen hundred prisoners and eight guns, besides much war material, and had suffered a loss of only five hundred and sixty men.

Bragg at Chattanooga was able to draw to himself sundry detachments which soon swelled his force beyond what it was at the beginning of the campaign. The Richmond authorities were urging him to take the offensive, as those at Washington were pushing Rosecrans. To discourage Bragg and his forces came the news of the surrender of Pemberton at Vicksburg, and of the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg. This same news, of course, elated Rosecrans and his soldiers. They became more eager than ever for another forward movement, desiring to be in readiness to do their full share in destroying the enemy that had confronted them so long.

Before following the Army of the Cumberland in its next campaign, which culminated in the battle of Chickamauga, it is necessary to turn to another theater of the war. For a full understanding of the significance of the events about to be recounted, the political situation at the very outbreak of the war should be recalled. The eastern part of Tennessee is mountainous, and a large majority of its people, like those of its neighbor, West Virginia, adhered to the Union. The Southern leaders had precipitated the war in support of the theory that the people of each State had the right to decide for themselves whether they would remain in the Union or go out. They were not willing to apply this same theory to parts of a State, and insisted that because a majority of the people of Western Tennessee were desirous of cutting loose from the old Union, and uniting with the new Confederacy, all the people of the State must go with the South. With this view the Confederate authorities very early began forcing the loyal people of East Tennessee into the Confederate armies,

and used very severe measures against them. Many of the most prominent citizens were thrown into jail, while others were driven from their homes. Hundreds of others sought refuge in the mountains, hiding in caves and in the woods.

President Lincoln very naturally thought that the Government ought to bend every energy possible to protect these people. He also believed that if Eastern Tennessee could be secured several thousand brave and excellent soldiers could be added to the Union armies from among the hardy mountaineers. Therefore he very earnestly urged the importance of taking possession of that section, with a force strong enough to hold it. It was good politics, at least; not party politics but the higher politics which makes a government protect those who are loyal to it. The same motives had governed at the very outbreak of the war in taking possession of Western Virginia. The President urged the necessity of this upon Buell when he first took command, and continued to urge it. In 1862 an attempt was made, and General Morgan got possession of Cumberland Gap, the gateway into East Tennessee from Kentucky. The story of how he was flanked out of that position by Kirby Smith has already been related. The time had now come to make another attempt to relieve that section, and by a much larger force. This new movement was to be under the command of General Burnside. Just as he was preparing to move for East Tennessee Morgan made one of his daring raids in which he crossed Kentucky, penetrated into Indiana, and was finally captured in Ohio. This raid delayed the movement of Burnside for some six weeks, but at last he was ready, and on the 16th of August he took the field.

Burnside had under him the new levies which formed the Twenty-third army corps, which afterwards became so famous for its fighting qualities under Schofield and Cox. He also waited for the return of the Ninth corps which he had loaned to Grant to assist in the capture of Vicksburg. This celebrated corps had been much debilitated by its service in the swamps around Vicksburg and required time to recuperate.

The Ninth corps was coming, but Burnside did not wait

for it, leaving for it, however, a distinctive part in the program he had marked out. The Twenty-third corps consisted of two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, making in all about twenty thousand men. The Confederate forces in East Tennessee were commanded by General Buckner. He had about twenty thousand men. In the Burnside expedition the Seventy-first Indiana and the Fifteenth, Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Indiana batteries took part. We will not follow this expedition in its march, but will say that each division moved with such regularity that all met at the appointed place and hour, and that Buckner evacuated Knoxville on its approach. This success of Burnside was not without some fighting, but no severe battle occurred. The Seventy-first regiment, until its connection with this campaign, had been peculiarly unfortunate. It was organized as infantry in August, 1862, when Bragg was invading Kentucky. It was hurried off to the front, and on the 30th of August was engaged in the disastrous battle of Richmond. In that battle the regiment lost two hundred and fifteen officers and men killed or wounded, and three hundred and forty-seven prisoners. Among the killed were the Lieutenant Colonel and Major. Two hundred and twenty-five members of the regiment escaped capture. The prisoners were paroled, and the regiment was returned to Indiana. After the paroled prisoners were exchanged the regiment returned to Kentucky. Four hundred of the officers and men were sent to Muldraugh's Hill, where, on the 28th of December they were surrounded by a force of four thousand Confederates and compelled to surrender. The regiment was returned again to Indianapolis, where it remained until August, 1863, when it was changed from infantry to cavalry and assigned to the Twenty-third corps. From that time its record was one of arduous and gallant service.

Buckner moved toward Bragg, while Jones was forced back into Virginia. Fraser had a force of between three and four thousand at Cumberland Gap, and had boasted of his ability to hold that position against any force. He was easily hemmed in, and surrendered without firing a single shot. Thus East Tennessee was at last liberated.

The Confederates a little later made a strong effort to drive Burnside out and recapture the territory, and the siege of Knoxville by Longstreet forms one of the interesting chapters of the war, which will be treated in connection with Grant's overthrow of Bragg at Missionary Ridge.

CHAPTER LI.

CHICKAMAUGA—FIRST DAY.

The remarkable success of the Tullahoma campaign raised the reputation of General Rosecrans to a very high point, and at the same time raised the hopes of the country and the courage and enthusiasm of the army he commanded. Following so speedily after the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson and the grand triumph at Gettysburg, it seemed to presage the speedy collapse of the rebellion. The Government at Washington urged Rosecrans to continue the work he had so well begun, and promised him all the support it could possibly give him. Burnside was in East Tennessee, and was ordered to co-operate with Rosecrans, and later was ordered to reinforce him with his whole army, while Grant was ordered to send Sherman from Vicksburg, but Halleck coupled with this movement of Sherman instructions to rebuild a railroad along the entire route he was to pursue—a railroad that the enemy could destroy as fast as it was rebuilt. Bragg had retired to Chattanooga, and that place was to be the next objective point of Rosecrans. The strategy by which Rosecrans won that prize was among the grandest achievements of the war, but it was followed by a battle which somewhat dimmed the lustre of his reputation. The battle of Chickamauga was one of the greatest of the Civil War, or of any war. It tested to the very fullest degree the courage and endurance of the Americans as soldiers, and while it resulted in great loss to the Union army, still the bravery and fortitude of the men in the ranks, and the skill and energy of the officers, thwarted the designs of Bragg, and

in that sense it was a tactical victory for Rosecrans. Through it Rosecrans was able to hold Chattanooga, and the Union army finally marched from there to its complete victory at Missionary Ridge. The importance of this battle, and the number of Indiana organizations engaged in it, together with the prominent part they took, justify an extended account of it in this history. Among the Indiana officers who have given this battle great study is General James R. Carnahan, who was a member of the Indiana Commission to locate the Indiana monuments on that great field. He has written so clearly and so justly of Indiana's part in the battle, that we have adopted his narrative almost in its entirety, and, without quotation marks or other credit, will tell the story as he told it, with but slight abbreviations.

For Rosecrans's army to attempt to capture Chattanooga by direct assault from the north, protected as it was by the mountains and river, was an impossibility. There was but one way to gain possession of this stronghold, and that was by a flank movement which would endanger General Bragg's line of communication. The actual advance in the Chattanooga-Chickamauga campaign began August 16, 1863. The location of the various corps of the Army of the Cumberland at that time was as follows: The Twenty-first corps, McCook commanding, at Winchester, Tennessee; the Fourteenth, Thomas commanding, at Decherd; the Twenty-first, Crittenden, and the cavalry corps under Stanley, at McMinnville, and beyond the Cumberland Mountains. Rosecrans had his headquarters with the Twentieth corps.

The plan of campaign adopted by Rosecrans was to so maneuver his army as to compel Bragg to withdraw from Chattanooga, or submit to a siege which could have but one conclusion, his surrender. To do this Rosecrans would have to abandon his base of supplies and depend for at least thirty days, while crossing the mountains, on his wagons, and at the same time he must be ever ready to meet Bragg in battle with a force equal to his own, should the latter decide to withdraw from Chattanooga. The Twenty-first corps was ordered to cross the Cumberland Mountains and Waldron's Ridge into the Tennessee valley,

while the cavalry corps was to operate on the extreme left, beyond the Twenty-first corps. The rest of the army was to be pushed across the river below Chattanooga, and then across Raccoon and Lookout Mountains to the south of Chattanooga.

The movement commenced auspiciously, the Confederates being pushed back until Hazen's brigade, of Palmer's division, Wagner's, of Wood's division, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, were in sight of Chattanooga. Two of these brigades which thus led in the initiatory movement which brought about the evacuation of Chattanooga, and culminated in the battle of Chickamauga, eleven days later, were commanded by Indiana officers—Wagner and Wilder. The following Indiana regiments and batteries were with these two brigades: With Wagner, the Fifteenth, Fortieth and Fifty-seventh regiments, and the Tenth battery; with Wilder, the Seventeenth and Seventy-second regiments and the Eighteenth battery. One of the first Union officers, if not the first, to enter Chattanooga, the Confederate stronghold, was Captain Eli Lilly, commanding the Eighteenth Indiana battery.

Upon receiving information of the movements of Thomas and McCook, Bragg hastily left Chattanooga and established his headquarters at Lee and Gordon's Mills, twelve miles south of Chattanooga, but soon moved to Lafayette. Thomas, with the Fourteenth corps, continued his movement to Davis's Cross Roads, about thirty miles south of Chattanooga, while McCook marched to Alpine and Summerville. Thus Rosecrans's army was divided by many miles, and was beyond supporting distance in the event of an attack. It does not appear from the record that Rosecrans realized the perilous position of his army. Bragg, well concentrated, was in front of Thomas, while McCook was thirty miles away on one flank, and Crittenden still farther away on the other.

This was Bragg's opportunity, and he gave repeated orders for an attack on Thomas, hoping by his great superiority of numbers to crush him, and then fall on one of the other corps. At last Rosecrans saw his danger, but to see the danger was only to increase it. Thomas could not move in any direction without inviting disaster; nor could Crittenden.

den move toward Thomas without a certainty of being overwhelmed. The only possible move was for McCook to close up to within supporting distance of Thomas. It was a long and difficult mountain march for McCook. About this time Bragg determined to attack Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and then attack Thomas and McCook in turn. On the night of the 12th of September he ordered Polk to attack Crittenden at daylight. Instead of obeying this order Polk announced that he had taken a good position for defense, and would wait for reinforcements.

Sadly disappointed at Polk's failure, Bragg concluded to concentrate his army and wait for Longstreet, who was coming from Virginia. On the 17th of September Bragg issued orders to put his army in motion the next day, as Longstreet was now getting near enough to help him. His blow was to fall on Crittenden. His plan promised well, but he failed to count on the splendid fighting qualities of Rosecrans's army. Johnson was to lead in the movement across Chickamauga creek, but his movement had hardly begun when he struck Minty's cavalry brigade, in which was the left wing of the Third Indiana cavalry. This brigade made such a desperate resistance from Pea Vine creek to Reed's bridge, where Minty was joined by a part of Wilder's brigade, that the Confederates could not cross the creek during the day of the 18th. Walker, who led another part of this movement, found Wilder with the Seventeenth and Seventy-second Indiana regiments with their Spencer rifles and Lilly's Eighteenth battery at Alexander's bridge. It was late in the afternoon before he could force a crossing, and night came before all the Confederates on that flank could cross, and the others had to wait for daylight on the 19th. Thus it was that Bragg's movement met with a decided check, and his great battle could not be delivered until the 19th. When Wilder fell back from Alexander's bridge on the night of the 18th, he joined the second brigade of VanCleve's division, under the command of Colonel George F. Dick, of Indiana. In this brigade were the Forty-fourth and Eighth-sixth Indiana regiments. A position was taken on the east side of the Viniard field, and there the Confederates made a night attack, but were repulsed with heavy loss.

During the night of the 18th Bragg was busy getting his army across the creek ready to attack at daylight; Rosecrans was also busy, and when morning broke on the 19th Thomas was in line of battle. If Bragg's plans were disarranged on the 18th by Indiana commanders and Indiana troops, Indiana troops were destined to do the same work on the 19th. Thomas, hearing of a Confederate brigade that had become separated from its supports, conceived the idea of capturing it. He sent Brannan with his division to do the work. Brannan had been appointed a Brigadier from Indiana. He moved promptly, without waiting to let his men get breakfast, with Croxton's brigade in advance, the Tenth and Seventy-fourth Indiana regiments having the front line of this brigade. About 7:30 it encountered Forrest's cavalry near Jay's Mill, and the great battle of the 19th was opened. To the right of Croxton, Vanderveer's brigade, in which was the Eighty-seventh Indiana, went into position on the run. Connell, with his brigade, counting among its regiments the Eighty-second Indiana, supported Croxton and Vanderveer. The attack on Forrest's cavalry changed Bragg's plan, and he was compelled to give battle on his right instead of on his left. Croxton and Vanderveer were successful against Forrest until the advance of the Confederate infantry relieved him.

Let us now glance at the Indiana organizations engaged on this first day at Chickamauga, and the part they played. The Eighty-second regiment was assigned to the support of Brannan's artillery. In one of the temporary successes of the Confederates, battery H, of the Fifth United States artillery, was captured. The Eighty-second made a charge and retook the battery. The Tenth was in Croxton's brigade, and the first regimental commander to fall on the Union side was Colonel William B. Carroll, of this regiment. While Brannan's division was engaged, the Forty-second and Eighty-eighth regiments were just as hotly engaged on the extreme right of the army at Glass's Mills, nine miles distant. Thus on the extreme right and left of the Union army, at the very opening of the battle on the 19th, Indiana was in the forefront. Following the firing line of the Union army to the right we find Colonel Benjamin F. Scribner, of the Thirty-eighth, commanding

the first brigade of Baird's division. His regiment was with this brigade in the battle which raged in the woods northwest of Jay's Mill and the Winfrey field. Next on the right, in the Winfrey field, was Colonel Philemon P. Baldwin, of the Sixth Indiana, commanding the brigade, and his regiment was in the hottest of the battle that day and night, Colonel Baldwin being killed during the night. During the afternoon of Saturday the Fourth and Fifth Indiana batteries dealt out death to the enemy from this same Winfrey field. Next on the line with Baldwin was the brigade commanded by General August Willich, of Indiana, and in this brigade was the Thirty-second. Next was the brigade commanded by Colonel Joseph B. Dodge, also of Indiana, and with him were the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth regiments. It was in this latter regiment that the late Major General Henry W. Lawton began his military career. Those three brigades became engaged early in the morning, and fought the entire day.

Let us turn to another part of the field over which the battle raged on that fearful 19th day of September, and we shall find Indiana bearing its share of the fighting, and sustaining more than its share of the losses. The Ninth Indiana fought in the Brock field, through the charges and counter charges of Hazen's brigade, until exhausted and without ammunition, it was relieved by fresh troops about 3 p. m. Replenishing its ammunition boxes this gallant regiment again took its place in the line and broke the final charge of Stewart's Confederate division at the Brotherton House. Also in the Brock field, helping to repulse the impetuous charges of the Confederates, was the Seventy-fifth regiment. From 11 o'clock a. m. until night, General Charles Cruft, of Indiana, and his famous brigade, in which was the Thirty-first Indiana, was in the hottest of the fighting north and south of the Brotherton and Alexander bridge. The loss of the Thirty-first was terrible, but it never faltered. About one o'clock the Seventy-fifth regiment arrived, and from that time until the battle closed fought with Cruft and Grose. Next to General Cruft was the brigade under the command of Colonel William Grose, and with him was the Thirty-sixth regiment. The gallantry of Colonel Grose, and the stubborn fighting of his brigade,

made a Brigadier General of him. In the Brotherton woods, on the right of Grose, was the Seventy-ninth Indiana, under its indomitable commander, Colonel Fred Kneller. This regiment with its brigade received the great shock of the battle of Saturday afternoon, in the first charge of Stewart's Confederate division. The Seventy-ninth charged into the enemy's line and captured a battery. In the Brotherton woods was another brigade, commanded by an Indiana man, Colonel George F. Dick, and he had in his brigade the Forty-fourth and Eighty-sixth Indiana regiments. Against this brigade Stewart hurled his division again and again, until, outflanked, the Federal line was compelled to give way. In the Brotherton field the Forty-fourth and Eighty-sixth again formed and met the charges of the enemy during the afternoon, without wavering. The Thirty-seventh was also in the Brotherton field, that afternoon, doing its full duty. We have not yet exhausted the roll of brigades in the Brotherton woods commanded by Indiana officers. Colonel Edward W. King commanded a brigade of Reynolds's division, and gave up his life for the cause in the battle of Sunday, September 20th. With him were the Sixty-eighth and One Hundred and First regiments. These two regiments were in the thick of the battle, winning renown for their steadiness and courage. With their division, aided by the Seventy-fifth Indiana regiment, and the brigades of Cruft and Grose, they repulsed the final assaults of the enemy north of the Brotherton house, and drove back the Confederates with such terrific loss that they would not venture another attack on that portion of the line.

It will be remembered that Bragg had planned to engulf Crittenden's corps at the Viniard farm, and south toward Lee and Gordon's Mills. On this part of the field the battle was fought all day with determined valor by both sides. The Thirty-fifth Indiana fought in the woods south of Viniard's, near the Lafayette road. Batteries were taken and retaken; colors were lost and won again, while the wounded and dead lay thick over the field. Here, in the open fields, through the entire day, sometimes east of the Lafayette road, sometimes west of it, was the brigade commanded by Colonel George P. Buell, and with him was the Fifty-eighth

Indiana regiment. Here also was the Eighty-first regiment. Here, too, was Wilder with his famous brigade of mounted infantry, of which the Seventeenth and Seventy-second Indiana regiments formed a part, and with it were the Second Indiana cavalry and the Eighteenth Indiana battery. Though the contest on this part of the field had been of the fiercest character during the entire day, when night closed not a foot of the line held in the morning had been lost. On this portion of the field, that day, aiding, guiding, directing and leading in all the movements, was that gallant Indianian, General Jefferson C. Davis. Indiana troops opened the battle in the morning of the 19th, and Indiana troops, in the darkness of the night, under Indiana brigade commanders, Willich, Dodge and Baldwin, fought the last fight of the day. While the infantry was heavily engaged from Jay's mill to the Viniard field, the first division of the cavalry corps, under command of Colonel Edwin M. McCook, of Indiana, fought a battle with the cavalry of the enemy south of Crawfish Springs. The Second and Fourth Indiana cavalry formed a part of this division during the fighting at the Springs, and then the Second joined Wilder at the Viniard field. The Eighty-fourth was with Granger's reserve at the McAfee church, assisting in holding the Chattanooga road from the Confederate cavalry.

We have told of the part taken by the Indiana infantry and cavalry. The record of the artillery is as grand and heroic. The Fourth and Fifth batteries were hotly engaged all day and in the night fight in the Winfrey field on Saturday. On Sunday these two batteries were in the east Kelley field line, where the enemy opened the battle that morning. In the Brotherton field, on Saturday afternoon, the Seventh battery faced the charges of Stewart's troops, and held its place in the line. The horses on two of the guns were killed, but the guns were saved. From the Brotherton field the battery went to the Poe field, where Reynolds was engaged, and fought in that line until the battle closed on that night. On Sunday it was again on the Poe field throughout the battle, and only retired when the command was withdrawn from the field. The Eighth battery was in the opening of the battle at the Viniard field, east of Lafayette road, on the morning of the 19th. In one

of the charges of the enemy its guns were captured. The members of the battery joined in the counter charge and recaptured the guns, turning them once more against the foe. On Sunday, on the west line of the Dyer field, the battery engaged in the fight against Longstreet's advancing lines, and fought until every horse was killed, and many of the men were dead or wounded on the field. The Eleventh battery, on Saturday, aided in holding the position at Lee and Gordon's Mills until reinforcements were needed at the Viniard field, when it hastened to that point and went into position on the south side of Viniard's, where it fought during the rest of the day. On Sunday morning it was at General McCook's headquarters when the battle opened, and was hurriedly sent to Lytle hill, where it became hotly engaged. It lost all the horses on two of the guns, yet it remained fighting until the lines were withdrawn. The Eighteenth battery shared the fortunes of Wilder's brigade, from Alexander's bridge on Friday morning until the brigade was taken from the field on Sunday. Captain Lilly fought his battery at Alexander's bridge; he fought from Alexander's bridge to the east Viniard field line, and on that line in the night fight of Friday, the 18th. On Saturday he fought in the west Viniard field; he fought in full battery, and in sections and platoons. Wherever a gun was needed in his brigade line, the gun was sent. Saturday afternoon he sent two guns to the assistance of Reynolds on the Poe field line. On Sunday, at the Widow Glenn's, this battery did its full share in breaking the enemy's lines and driving them back to the east of the Lafayette road. The Nineteenth got into the battle of Saturday about noon near the Poe house, where it fought during the afternoon, the Captain being severely wounded. On Sunday it was engaged in the severe fighting on the west of the Lafayette and Chattanooga road. In the afternoon of Sunday it had a place in the south line of the Kelley field. It was at this point Colonel E. W. King was killed, and when the army retired that night his body was taken from the field on one of the caissons of this battery. The Twenty-first battery fought with General Turchin's brigade on Saturday, in the Brock field. On Sunday it was in the line east of the Kelley field. During the battle this battery fired 1200 rounds of shot, shell and cannister.

CHAPTER LII.

CHICKAMAUGA—SECOND DAY.

Bragg had failed in his initial movement of Saturday. His object was to get possession of the Chattanooga road, and shut Rosecrans out of that place. To accomplish this his men fought with all their former courage and desperation, and although at one point he had succeeded in reaching and crossing the road, he had not been able to hold it. During Saturday night he had been reinforced by the arrival of Longstreet and others, while Rosecrans could put into battle on Sunday only the troops that had been left him after the Saturday fight. But Rosecrans, during the night, rectified and changed his lines very materially. All these changes had not been made until late Sunday morning. Bragg had ordered Polk to open the battle on the Union left at daylight, and the assault was to be taken up all along the line. Polk failed to open the battle at that early hour, which proved to be the salvation of Rosecrans, as it gave him time to strengthen his left.

As the Union lines were finally arranged for the battle of Sunday, Indiana had in line the following organizations: The Forty-second and Eighty-eighth regiments, with John Beatty's brigade at the McDonald house; the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth with Dodge's brigade; the Thirty-second with Willich in the Kelley field, in reserve; the Thirty-eighth with Scribner's brigade; the Fourth battery with Starkweather; the Eighty-seventh regiment with Vanderveer's brigade; the Tenth and Seventy-fourth with Croxton's, on the Poe field, until near noon, and then on the Kelley field line until about 5 p. m., when they were sent

to Snodgrass hill; the Forty-fourth and Eighty-sixth, of Dick's brigade, on the north line of the Kelley field, until afternoon, when they were sent to Harker's Hill, east and in front of the Snodgrass house; the Sixty-eighth, Seventy-fifth and One Hundred and First regiments and Nineteenth battery with King's brigade, on the Poe field, and south Kelley field line; the Twenty-first battery with Turchin on the east Kelley field line; the Sixth regiment and Fifth battery with Berry's (formerly Baldwin's) brigade; the Thirty-first of Cruft's brigade, on the Kelley field line; the Ninth, of Hazen's brigade, on east Kelley field line—sent to Harker's hill about 2 p. m., and to Snodgrass hill about 5; the Thirty-sixth, with Grose's brigade on the continuation of the east Kelley field line in the woods east of Poe's field; the Seventy-ninth regiment and Seventh battery with Sam Beatty's brigade, Poe field line; the Seventy-ninth sent to Snodgrass hill in the afternoon; the Thirty-fifth, Barnes's brigade, on northeast Kelley field line, on the left of the regular brigade; the Fifty-eighth regiment and Eighth battery with Buell's brigade; the Eighty-second in Brannan's line, near Poe house; the Eleventh battery with Lytle's brigade, Sheridan's division; the Thirty-seventh, with Sirwell's brigade, involved in the break of the Union lines, and in the afternoon near Snodgrass house; the Thirtieth regiment—Harrison's—at the Widow Glenn's; the Seventeenth and Seventy-second regiments and the Eighteenth battery, with Wilder on the extreme right of Rosecrans's line; Second and Fourth cavalry and Twenty-second infantry, near Crawfish Springs; the Eighty-first with McCook, just north of Widow Glenn's; the Eighty-fourth with Granger at McAfee church on the extreme Union left.

At the opening of the battle on Sunday morning all the Indiana troops named were in position, or sufficiently near to be available, and before the noon hour, and from that until night closed the battle, were engaged. Along the east Kelley and Poe field lines, hastily constructed barricades of logs and rails had been thrown up. At 9 a. m. the skirmish firing opened on Baird's front, followed, about three-quarters of an hour later, by a terrific assault by two Confederate divisions. In this assault John Beatty's brigade, in which were the Forty-second and Eighty-eighth Indiana

regiments, received the full force of the charge, in the effort to turn the Union left and get possession of the Lafayette road, these two regiments being on the extreme left. The assault on Beatty was made in such force that he was pushed back and across the road. Just at this time Vanderveer's brigade, in which was the Eighty-seventh Indiana, met the charge of the Confederates, as they turned to the south around Baird's left, and repulse them, two Confederate Generals being wounded.

Cleburne's division then attacked Baird's, waiting behind their light breastworks. They were met with such a storm of musketry from the infantry, and canister from the artillery, that they were broken and driven back with great loss. The battle was raging on the north and east sides of the Kelley field, and the Union troops were receiving fire from front and rear. By this time the battle was raging from Baird's left to the Poe house.

Assault after assault was made on the Union lines, but were repulsed, one after another, when, at about 11 o'clock all things were changed. Some one blundered, and the Union lines that had been held intact were suddenly opened, in time to let Longstreet push through. It is not necessary here to discuss who was to blame for that terrible mistake, whether it was Rosecrans or Wood; but it will be enough to say that Wood moved on a written order, and that is offered as his justification. What the result of this battle might have been had not that blunder been committed, no one can tell. At the very time that Wood moved out and left the opening through which Longstreet rushed, the fight was raging all along the line, from the McDonald house to the Poe house. Every brigade, every regiment, every man, was doing all that could be done to beat back the oncoming tide.

On the extreme right of the Union line at the Widow Glenn's was Wilder's brigade, and with the brigade were the Seventeenth and Seventy-second regiments and Eighteenth battery; the Second Indiana cavalry was on the right of Wilder, and the Thirty-ninth Indiana mounted infantry was also at the Widow Glenn's. All of these troops had been most hotly engaged in a desperate fight with five Confederate regiments and a battery, and had driven them

back across the west Viniard field and beyond the Lafayette road, capturing many prisoners. It was just in the midst of this victory at the Widow Glenn's that Longstreet swept through the opening at Brotherton's, and Wilder, with his brigade and the Thirty-ninth Indiana, were cut off from the rest of the army, and forced to retire from the field. When a portion of Longstreet's command swept northward to his right and upon Brannan, it broke the front line of Connell's brigade and drove it back upon the second. In the second line was the Eighty-second Indiana, under Colonel Morton C. Hunter. Colonel Hunter ordered a volley, and then a charge. In this charge the Eighty-second broke the enemy's lines and drove them back, recapturing the works that had been lost. The regiment lost ninety men in this gallant charge.

In the consideration of Sunday's battle of Chickamauga it might very properly be said that up to the time of the opening of the lines by the withdrawal of Wood, there were two armies, one Union and the other Confederate, and one battle. After the opening, and the rush through by Longstreet, it was practically two armies on each side, and two battles at the same time, within sound of each other. One battle raged from the McDonald house at the left of the Union army, extending around the east side of the Kelley field to the wood south of that field, and then to the northwest, to the southwest corner of the Kelley field, the left wing of Rosecrans and the right wing of Bragg contending against each other. The other was the battle of Harker, Brannan and Granger, and the troops that rallied under them on the Union side, under the immediate command of General Thomas, and the entire Confederate left under Longstreet, at Harker's Hill and Snodgrass Hill.

Let us glance, for a moment, at what Indiana officers and troops did before the separation of the battle of Sunday into two parts. As has already been said, the battle opened on Sunday morning about 8:30 o'clock, by an attack on Baird's division, on the line east of the Kelley field, and extending around the northeast corner of the field to the northwest toward the McDonald house. The line was formed: General King's brigade of regulars on the left; next on the right the brigade commanded by Colonel B. F.

Scribner, of Indiana, the Thirty-eighth regiment being in the brigade; to the right of Scribner, Starkweather's brigade. Scribner's brigade was on the turn from the line east of the Kelley field and around the corner of the field. In his front line was the Thirty-eighth regiment and Fourth battery. Hastily constructed works of rails and light logs had been thrown up. In front of the brigade was an open space about seventy-five yards wide, which was perfectly enfiladed by the Fourth Indiana battery.

The opening charges of the enemy fell upon this part of the Union lines. The enemy came in strong force, but as soon as they had cleared the woods and advanced into the open space referred to, the Fourth battery opened with canister, and the infantry poured in a murderous musketry fire at short range. Baird's second line moved up close in the rear of the first, and after the front line had delivered its volley, the second would rise and fire, thus keeping an almost continual blaze in the face of the advancing enemy. The first charge of the enemy was quickly broken, and they hastily retired to the shelter of the woods. Three times during the forenoon these charges were made, with increasing determination. The Confederate officers used every effort to stimulate their troops to deeds of heroism, the battle flags of the general officers being seen in the charging lines, but it was all in vain, each charge being repulsed with great slaughter. As the enemy would retreat the skirmishers of Baird's division would rush after them, capturing many prisoners.

Twice the enemy swung around Baird's left and into his rear, but his troops received and repulsed these rear attacks, as they had done those in front. The last attack was made about 5 o'clock p. m., the enemy pushing their artillery to the front, but this assault, like the others, was repulsed. By this time the ammunition of Baird's men was exhausted, and no more could be had, so the order was given to retire.

On the right of Baird's division was that of General Johnson. It will be remembered that in the battle of Saturday, all of the brigades of this division were commanded by Indiana men—Willich, Dodge and Baldwin, the latter being killed in the night battle. On Sunday Dodge's brig-

ade, in which were the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth regiments, was next to the line held by Baird. On the right of Dodge, was Berry's (formerly Baldwin's), in which were the Sixth regiment and Fifth battery. Willich's brigade, in which was the Thirty-second Indiana, was held as a reserve. During the night breastworks had been thrown up. Before the battle opened Dodge's brigade was moved to the left of Baird, its place being taken by the brigade of Willich. It was not long after the assault on Baird that the enemy struck Johnson, and a deadly contest ensued, lasting more than an hour before the enemy fell back. Directly after the repulse of the enemy Willich was again placed in reserve, and it proved to be just in the right time, for it was when Breckinridge swung around the left of Baird, moving in triple lines on the Kelley field. Willich was there to meet him. He took the Thirty-second Indiana and Forty-ninth Ohio, and charged the enemy, driving them more than a mile. He then took the Thirty-second and swept through the woods, striking the enemy's cavalry on the Chattanooga road. Of this action of Willich, General Johnson, in his report said: "By having Willich in reserve he was enabled to engage the enemy in four different directions, and by his prompt movements he saved the troops from annihilation and capture."

Dodge's brigade had been sent to the left of Baird's division. The battle opened on this brigade about 9 o'clock in the morning. The Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Indiana regiments were in the front line of the brigade. The charge of the enemy about 9 o'clock was repulsed after a very hard fight. From then until 5 o'clock in the afternoon the brigade was under severe fire all the time, but it was able to repulse every charge made upon it. About 5 p. m. Colonel Dodge received orders from his division commander to withdraw, but he was just then engaged in resisting the heaviest charge of the day. He was successful in repulsing the enemy, and then withdrew from the field under a heavy fire of infantry and artillery on his flank. The severity of the battle engaged in by this brigade is attested by the losses it sustained. It went into the battle of Chickamauga with one thousand one hundred and thirty men, and at its close could only muster five hundred and ninety-eight effectives.

Barnes's brigade, in which was the Thirty-fifth Indiana, was sent early on Sunday morning to the support of Wood's division. It took its position, but about 10 o'clock it was ordered to move on the double-quick to reinforce Baird's division, and reached the Kelley field just as the enemy made its last flank movement around Baird's left. The brigade joined in the repulse of the enemy. The Thirty-fifth Indiana, with the Ninety-third Ohio, was then placed in the front Kelley field line on the left of Dodge's brigade. It took part in all the hard fighting on that line during the remainder of the day. The Thirty-fifth lost, that day, sixty-five out of one hundred and ninety that went into battle.

The Sixth regiment and the Fifth battery were on the line east of the Kelley field. The Sixth was in the front line, while the battery occupied a commanding position between the lines. Colonel Berry, commanding the brigade, in his report says: "At 9 o'clock the enemy attacked, and after an hour's hard fighting was whipped and driven from the field, the Sixth Indiana and Ninety-third Ohio doing the fighting in conjunction with the battery." The battery held its position during the entire day. During this fighting Lieutenant Colonel Hagerman Tripp, commanding the Sixth, was terribly wounded. The Colonel of the regiment, while in command of the brigade, had been killed the night before. Colonel Tripp never recovered from his wound, but died from its effects more than twenty years after the battle. About 5 o'clock p. m., the enemy made his final charge on this part of the line, but was repulsed.

The Forty-second and Eighty-eighth regiments were on the extreme left, at the McDonald house, in John Beatty's brigade, of Negley's division. This brigade had been sent, by General Thomas's orders, to the extreme left of the line. The brigade was formed with the Forty-second placed on the right of the front line, and the Eighty-eighth on the left. Scarcely had the line been formed and the advance commenced than these two regiments met the enemy, and although stoutly resisted they fought their way, pushing the Confederates back until the Forty-second reached the McDonald house and established its line to the east of the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, with the Eighty-eighth on its left extending the line across the road.

Palmer's division was on the east Kelley field line. In this division was Cruft's brigade, in which was the Thirty-first Indiana, which was placed in the front line behind some rude works hastily thrown up. The attack on this brigade began about 9 a. m., and continued until about noon, with one determined assault after another, both by infantry and artillery. The Thirty-first remained in the front line until about 11 o'clock, when the reserve changed places with those in front. The line held by this brigade was not broken at any time during the entire day, nor did it waver. The Ninth Indiana was in Hazen's brigade, which was on the right of Cruft. The story of the battle along Hazen's front is but a repetition of the work done by that of Cruft. The line of Hazen was there to stay.

To this line came the Tenth and Seventy-fourth Indiana, after the break in the lines at the Brotherton and Poe fields, and these two gallant regiments joined in the closing struggle of the afternoon. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon Hazen's brigade was withdrawn and sent to the support of Harker's brigade of Wood's division, at what is now known as Harker's Hill.

On Sunday morning Colonel Grose, of Indiana, with his brigade, in which was the Thirty-sixth Indiana, was placed in reserve with Palmer's division. About 9 o'clock Grose was ordered to the left to strengthen Baird's line. Grose was then on the extreme right of the east Kelley's field line. Betwen his position and the left of Baird were the divisions of Palmer, Johnson and Baird, and it was necessary for him to pass in the rear of these troops, and across the Kelley field, to reach the left of Baird. Of the result of this movement, Colonel Grose, in his report says: "Before we arrived at the intended position in the line, the enemy came upon Baird's division, and consequently upon my command, in fearful numbers. I formed the four regiments under a destructive fire from the enemy, in a woodland covered with a heavy underbrush, fronting nearly north and at right angles with the main line of the battle, the Thirty-sixth Indiana and the Eighty-fourth Illinois in the front line. . . . Thus formed we met the enemy with fearful loss on both sides. The brigade advanced and was repulsed, advanced a second time and was again re-

pulsed, and, with some forces that now came to our assistance, advanced the third time and held the woodland. In the contest for the mastery over the woodland fell many of our bravest officers and men. The dead and dying both armies mingled together over this bloody field." The troops that came to Colonel Grose's assistance in this desperate contest were those of Vanderveer's brigade, which was the Eighty-seventh Indiana. About 2 p. m. Grose's brigade was returned to its original position where it remained until the troops were withdrawn from the field.

This short sketch of the Thirty-sixth, and its heroic Colonel, then in command of the brigade, would not be complete without following it in the withdrawal from the field. As the brigade was withdrawing, the enemy opened upon that part of the Union line with great fury. In order to reassure his troops and to impress upon them the necessity of coolness so that there should be no panic, Colonel Grose, with Lieutenant Boice, one of his aides-de-camp carrying the flag, rode on the left of the front regiment of the brigade, as it commenced to withdraw. After crossing the Lafayette and Chattanooga road to the west of Kelley field, Colonel Grose halted the Thirty-sixth Indiana, and with the Sixth Ohio formed a line and faced toward the enemy to defend and cover the retreat.

General Reynolds, of Indiana, with two of his brigades—Edward A. King's and Turchin's—was on the right of Palmer, on Sunday morning. His third brigade, that of Wilder, had been detached. King was the Colonel of the Sixty-eighth Indiana, and beside that regiment had his brigade, the Seventy-fifth and One Hundred and Fifty Indiana regiments, and the Nineteenth battery. With Turchin was the Twenty-first battery. The part taken by the Nineteenth and Twenty-first batteries has been noted.

The attack on the line held by Reynolds began about five o'clock. There the Union line steadily resisted, and the battle raged furiously. Everything was going well, and it looked as if victory would crown the Federals, when suddenly a wonderful change came over all things. Let us look at what brought about this sudden and disastrous change. On the right of Reynolds was Brannan's divis-



CALEB B. SMITH, Sec. Interior.



JOHN P. USHER, Sec. Interior.



HUGH McCULLOCH, Sec. Treasury.



J. N. TYNER, P. M. General.

GROUP OF INDIANA MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

and on his right, that of Wood. Wood was ordered by Rosecrans to move out of line, and to the left to support Reynolds. It was evident that the order had been issued by Rosecrans without a full knowledge of the situation, but Wood, after consulting his corps commander, left the line he held, and moved in the rear of Brannan toward Reynolds. This left a long gap in the Union line, just as Longstreet was moving to the assault. Longstreet saw the gap, and hurled his men into it with irresistible force, thus taking the Union lines on both sides of the gap in flank and in reverse. It resulted in a rout, complete, full and disastrous beyond comparison, of that part of the Federal army. The divisions of General Sheridan, and of Jeff. C. Davis, were swept from the field. Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, together with the Thirty-ninth Indiana mounted infantry, and the cavalry corps of General Mitchell, together with Post's brigade, were cut off from the Union army and retired toward Chattanooga. The division of Wood was broken and scattered; that of Brannan was enveloped in the folds of the great Confederate left, and forced to abandon its lines. Everything from the extreme Union right, the cavalry at Crawfish Springs, to the Kelley field on the left, a distance of more than five miles, was either driven from the field or cut off from rendering any assistance to Thomas. Everything was in the direst confusion. It seemed, indeed, as if all was lost, on that long line, and lost beyond hope of recovery. Indeed, it looked as if the entire army of Rosecrans must very soon be destroyed. In all the history of the war there had been no such disaster without hopeless defeat. That the army was saved, and the real objects of the campaign were secured, are now matters of history. How was it done?

CHAPTER LIII.

CHICKAMAUGA—THE DAY SAVED.

It will be remembered that Brannan's division was on the right of Reynolds and on the left of Wood, therefore it was next to the opening in the Union lines made by the withdrawal of Wood. In this division were the brigades of Croxton and Connell. In that of Croxton were the Tenth and Seventy-fourth Indiana regiments, and in that of Connell, the Eighty-second. At the point where Longstreet passed through the Union lines was the Eighty-second Indiana, under command of Colonel Morton C. Hunter. When Wood moved out of the line it left Connell's brigade without any troops on its right, and Colonel Connell gave orders to the commanders of regiments to change front to the right flank. In his report Colonel Connell says: "These orders had scarcely been delivered before the enemy, making an oblique advance, followed the retiring division on my right (Wood's) and most furiously, and in tremendous force, attacked my front and flank. The Seventeenth Ohio, forming the right of my front, attempted to change front but could not, and after vigorously resisting for a few moments, and when the enemy had approached on its front and flank to within seventy-five yards of its line, was completely broken on its right wing. The Eighty-second Indiana, forming the right of the rear line, very gallantly moved forward through the flying ranks of the Seventeenth Ohio and attacked the advancing enemy, then nearly inside our breastworks."

Soon thereafter the Eighty-second seized the key of the position, and by that act, and by the stubborn fighting

there by the Eighty-second, and other troops which came to its assistance, saved the army. It is now conceded that the occupation of Snodgrass Hill, and the desperate fighting at that point, saved the left wing of Rosecrans's army, and it was the military instinct of Colonel Morton C. Hunter that seized that key at the critical moment. In this connection it will not only be interesting but of high historical value, to quote what Colonel Hunter, in his report, says of the part taken by his regiment on that day, beginning with the enveloping attack of Longstreet on Connell's brigade:

"The Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio had a breastwork of rails in their front. When the enemy made the attack it was furious and angry, so that the Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio, resisting with all their power, soon gave way, came back to the rear and passed over us. I had the Eighty-second Indiana lying down. The enemy was pressing the Seventeenth and Thirty-first with all their power when I ordered the Eighty-second to fire, and to rise and charge them, which it did. The fire proved so deadly, and the shock was so great and unexpected, that the enemy gave way, and we pressed them until we regained the breastwork from which the Seventeenth and Thirty-first Ohio had been driven. In going this short distance of sixty yards I lost ninety-two men, killed and wounded. On looking to my left I saw the whole line had given way as far as I could see. My regiment was left alone, and had to take care of itself. I did not go any farther than the breastworks, seeing I had no support, and ceased firing, when the enemy, about five minutes later, saw there was no force following them, reorganized and came back. When I saw them coming on our right and in front of us, I ordered Lieutenant Colonel Davis, of my regiment, to throw back the right of the Eighty-second, so that the enemy could not surround us. He did so, and then I ordered the regiment to fall back and wheel and fire about every fifty yards, which kept the enemy in check. While falling back Captain McAllister was killed, and our flag staff was shattered to pieces, and the flag disconnected from the staff, when Lieutenant Colonel Davis seized the flag and carried it with him. We fell back about half a mile or more to the top of a hill. While

going up the hill we met stragglers by the hundreds coming from Jeff C. Davis's command, saying that they were flanked. I looked around and could see no one in command. I tried to take command of them, and did stop quite a number of the men from going to the rear, and put them on the left of the Eighty-second Indiana, as the Eighty-second was an organized body. When we reached the top of the hill I determined to go no farther, and ordered the men to throw up a breastwork of rails, a fence being there. We had been there but a few moments till the enemy pressed up and made an attack, which we repulsed. A short time afterward they made a second attack which was more severe than the first, which we again repulsed. In a few moments they made a third attack with still greater severity, and this was repulsed, we having the advantage of position. In the meantime the firing being heavy it attracted the attention of General Thomas, who could not have been far distant, as he sent one of his staff officers, who asked me what troops were fighting there? I told him that it was the Eighty-second Indiana and some men I had stopped going to the rear and put into line. He asked me how long I could hold the hill. I told him as long as our ammunition would last, and I asked him if he knew where I could get a new supply. He made no reply, but rode away. In about fifteen minutes from that time fourteen men came up carrying fourteen boxes of ammunition. I immediately caused this ammunition to be distributed to the men. When we had time we still strengthened our works."

Colonel Hunter says that his regiment had been on Snodgrass Hill more than an hour before any organized troops came to his support. The first regiment to join him was the Ninth Ohio; then Vanderveer's brigade came up and joined on his right. Vanderveer's brigade also belonged to Brannan's division. About 3 p. m. Steedman's division came up and took position on the right of Brannan. Not long after Brannan had got into position with Vanderveer's brigade, General Thomas sent word to hold the hill at all hazards. From this time on until nightfall Longstreet hurled against the line on the hill charge after charge, assault after assault. When any of the men ex

hausted their ammunition they remained in line, and with bayonet or clubbed gun repulsed their assailants. After the line had been established on Snodgrass Hill, Colonel Harker, commanding the third brigade of Wood's division, went into position about a quarter of a mile north of the line fixed by Colonel Hunter, the troops forming a line almost crescent shaped, from the point where the Eighty-second was in line to the northward and eastward. The hill on which Harker formed is now known by his name, and in histories of the battle is called "Harker's Hill." Snodgrass's and Harker's Hills had become the key to the battle, and upon the holding of them depended the life of the Union army, and the holding of Chattanooga.

To Morton C. Hunter, Colonel of the Eighty-second Indiana, is due the establishing of the line on Snodgrass Hill. That his regiment was the first in position at that important point, and that he held it for more than an hour before any other organized troops came to his assistance, is not now disputed. He was not ordered to go there and no other officer was ordered there until after he had established his line, and repulsed several attacks of the enemy. The Eighty-second remained on Snodgrass Hill until the entire army moved off toward Chattanooga, and it did not reach Chattanooga until the morning of the 22d. The regimental organizations which, at some time or another, took part in the fighting on Snodgrass Hill that repulsed Longstreet's forces and saved the day numbered forty-two, with two batteries. Many of these did not get into position until after 3 o'clock p. m. Six of them did not arrive until about 5 p. m. From the time that Hunter first occupied the hill, about 12 o'clock noon, until Steedman's division arrived, about 3 p. m., only twenty-six regiments, or parts of regiments, without artillery, had been contesting against the furious assaults of Longstreet, who also realized that Snodgrass Hill was the key to the battle. Some of the regiments were mere fragments, not having more than fifty men to put into line, while others did not exceed one hundred. All of these regiments had been actively engaged during the fighting on the 19th, and also on the forenoon of the 20th, sustaining heavy losses. For instance, the Eighty-seventh Indiana had lost one hundred

and ninety out of a total of three hundred and sixty-six. The Eighty-second Indiana, with fewer than three hundred officers and men on Sunday morning, had lost ninety-two in the effort to retake the breastworks in the morning, so that less than two hundred of this regiment opened the fight on Snodgrass Hill. In the battle on Snodgrass Hill Indiana was represented by the following regiments: Ninth, Tenth, Fifty-eighth, Sixty-eighth, Seventy-fourth, Seventy-ninth, Eighty-second, Eighty-fourth, Eighty-seventh and One Hundred and First.

In that part of the battle fought on Harker's Hill were the Thirty-seventh, Forty-fourth and Eighty-sixth Indiana regiments. This part of the battle was fought under the direction of General Wood. The line was formed early in the afternoon. The fighting here until night was of the most stubborn kind. The troops were formed in two lines and fired alternately by volleys, the rear line firing while the front line loaded. The veterans of Longstreet could not break this line. Charge after charge was made, the Confederates being broken and driven back each time with fearful loss. The fighting on the two hills was one battle. All who were engaged discharged their whole duty, and fought with unexampled steadiness and bravery, but not surpassed Indiana in daring or soldierly qualities. To the gallant and desperate fighting of the troops thus hastily gathered on Snodgrass's and Harker's Hills, the Confederate Generals bore witness.

The roar of the battle on the Union right grew so strong that Granger and his "reserves," three miles away, rushed without orders to reinforce their struggling comrades, and came not a moment too soon. His men, weary and blown after three miles of a march on the double-quick, through the dust and under the heat of that September day, forgot the heat and fatigue, forgot that their mouths and throats were parched and dry, and that when they reached the hill they were famished for water, and they rushed into a charge on an exultant enemy. With Granger was the Eighty-fourth Indiana, and it was in the front line in the charge.

Let us now go back to Reynolds, who was fighting on the Kelley field line. His division had fought all day with

heroic fortitude, and when the order came to withdraw from the field, it was the last to leave. When the order for withdrawal was received, his troops had expended all of their ammunition, excepting a very small portion which had been gathered from the boxes of the dead and wounded. During the afternoon of Sunday some one, it has never been definitely ascertained who, had ordered the ammunition trains to the rear and had taken them entirely away from the army, so that at the close of the battle on Sunday evening there was scarcely any ammunition for any of the troops. Many of them had exhausted their supply, and were depending upon the bayonet to resist any further charges that might be made upon the line. After receiving the order to withdraw, and while his troops were crossing the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, going toward McFarland's Gap, General Reynolds was met by General Thomas in person, and was ordered to form his troops perpendicularly to the Lafayette and Chattanooga road. This was done, when General Thomas, calling to General Reynolds and pointing to the enemy in the direction of Rossville, said: "There they are! Clear them out!" General Reynolds at once faced his division in that direction and charged upon the enemy who were attempting to intervene between the retreating troops and McFarland's Gap. This charge was made under a heavy fire of both infantry and artillery, but was successful, and it was the last made on that portion of the field during the battle.

The Sixty-eighth and One Hundred and First Indiana regiments, in moving from the field with Reynolds, came upon a broken-down ammunition wagon. They filled their boxes and pockets with ammunition, loading themselves down. This becoming known the two regiments were detached from Reynolds and sent to Snodgrass Hill.

It remains now to note what was done during this campaign by the Second and Fourth Indiana cavalry regiments, and the Twenty-second infantry. Colonel Edward McCook, of the Second Indiana, commanded one of the cavalry divisions. In this division were the Second and Fourth regiments. On the 19th the cavalry was engaged in heavy skirmishing with Wheeler, until Crawfish Springs was reached. Here the second brigade, in which were the

two Indiana regiments, was heavily attacked and had a hard fight, lasting more than an hour, finally repulsing the enemy. The Second was then sent to aid Wilder.

On Sunday both regiments were engaged in guarding the trains and hospital at Crawfish Springs. They held their lines until about 5 p. m., when they protected the trains up the Chattanooga Valley. On the 21st and 22d both regiments were engaged in reconnoitering and had several severe combats with the enemy.

The Twenty-second was part of Post's brigade, and was not actively engaged at Chickamauga. On the 10th of September the brigade was put in charge of the wagon trains of the Twentieth corps. It reached the summit of the mountains, after incredible labor, on the morning of the 12th. Here it remained guarding the passes until the morning of the 18th, when it was ordered to follow its corps. On the 19th it was left at Stevens's Gap with orders to hold its position at all hazards. On the morning of the 20th Post was ordered to hasten to Crawfish Springs. He was in a critical position, and had to force his way which was contested, step by step, by the enemy. The brigade remained with the cavalry during the remainder of the day, and on the 21st and 22d assisted in holding the advance of Bragg in check. It had fought almost continually for three days.

To sum up: Indiana troops, the Seventeenth and Seventy-second regiments and Lilly's Eighteenth battery, under an Indiana brigade commander, opened the fight on Friday morning, September 18. Indiana regiments under two Indiana brigade commanders—Wilder and Dick—closed the engagement on the night of the 18th.

Two Indiana regiments, the Tenth and Seventy-fourth under a division commander appointed from Indiana, General John M. Brannan, opened the battle on the morning of the 19th. Three brigades, all commanded by Indianians—Willich, Baldwin and Dodge—and each brigade containing Indiana regiments, closed the battle after dark at the Winfrey field on the 19th, Baldwin being killed.

Indiana troops under Indiana brigade and division commanders received the first shock of battle on Sunday morning on the Kelley field and Poe field lines.

Indiana troops were with the last to leave the Kelley field line on Sunday evening, and Indiana troops, under Major General Joseph J. Reynolds, were in the last charge made by the Union troops of the Kelley field line in the battle. The Eighty-second Indiana was the first to take position on Snodgrass Hill. Indiana troops came with Steedman from McAfee church to reinforce Brannan on Snodgrass Hill. Brigadier General Brannan was the first General officer on Snodgrass Hill, and was the last to leave it after the troops under his command had fought Longstreet to a standstill. The last regiment to fire a volley on Snodgrass Hill was the Ninth Indiana. The last regiments, absolutely the last, to leave Snodgrass Hill, were the Sixty-eighth and One Hundred and First Indiana. General Brannan in his report says: "Shortly after sunset I withdrew without molestation to Rossville, where I bivouacked for the night, my retreat being covered by the Sixty-eighth and One Hundred and First Indiana."

Of the eleven division commanders at Chickamauga, Indiana had four: Reynolds, Davis, Brannan and McCook. Of the thirty brigades of infantry and mounted infantry, Indiana furnished eleven with commanders, as follows: Scribner, Wilder, King, Robinson, Willich, Dodge, Baldwin, Buell, Grose, Cruft and Dick.

Colonel William B. Carroll, of the Tenth Indiana, was the first field officer killed in the battle.

Colonel Baldwin, of the Sixth Indiana, was the first brigade commander killed in the battle.

Colonel Edward A. King, of the Sixty-eighth Indiana, was the last brigade commander killed at Chickamauga.

The casualty list of Indiana at Chickamauga was, in killed and wounded, two thousand four hundred and nineteen, and in missing six hundred and thirteen, making a total of three thousand and thirty-two. It has been definitely ascertained that most of those reported "missing" were killed or wounded. Thus, in reported killed or wounded, Indiana lost more in that one battle, by four hundred and seventy-seven, than was lost in field and hospital by the entire United States army and navy in the whole war with Spain, and if the "missing" are added, Indiana's loss at that battle exceeded by one thousand and ninety the entire

loss of the United States in its war with Spain. One-fourth of Baird's division, on the Kelley field line, was composed of Indiana troops, and that division lost, in killed and wounded alone, one thousand, nine hundred and seventy seven.

General H. V. Boynton, a distinguished Ohio soldier who took a prominent part in the battle of Chickamauga and whose history of that battle is accepted authority, pay this tribute to Indiana soldiers on that bloody field:

"Indiana's interest in this desperate battle is increased beyond what such figures show as to its character, by the fact that she stood second among all the Northern States in the number of regimental and battery organization which were engaged.

"In the vortex of such fighting as these figures indicate, General Lawton, then a company officer in the Thirtieth Indiana infantry, played his part well throughout the two days' contest. Johnson's division, to which Dodge's brigade, in which Lawton served, was attached, was the third to reach the field. It pushed rapidly forward on the right of the Union firing line. At the end of two hours' bitter fighting at close range, it had forced its way forward beyond all other troops, and from 3 o'clock till dark, was the advanced salient of the army. At dark Cleburne's fresh division of Confederates, aided by two brigades of Cheatham's, burst suddenly on this Union line. Then followed a night fight of two hours at short range, when both sides were guided solely by the rifle flashes of the opposing lines. On both sides it was a battle of veterans. Baird's division was sent forward to assist Johnson, and then both armies listened and waited while the rattle and roar of that solemn tattoo of the first day's struggle swelled up from the depths of the forest, and at length died into silence which none who listened will ever forget.

"The next day, when the battle opened, Dodge's brigade was on the left of the Union line, north of the Kelley field. The Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Indiana, with the Seventy-ninth Illinois, formed the extreme left. Here Lawton stood with his comrades when the deadly storm of that Sabbath morning broke. The Confederate General Breckinridge's division was sweeping in on their front, and stretched two

brigade fronts beyond their left. Yet these soldiers, who must have all been of Lawton's mold, stood unmoved on their lines, fighting to the front, and obliquely to their left, though two Confederate brigades were pressing to their rear and flank. They conceived it to be their duty to hold their lines, and the duty of some one else to grapple with the enemy in their rear. Their trust was not in vain, for soon, with desperate fighting, a brigade, in a charge of bitterest character, in which the Eighty-seventh Indiana bore a most gallant part, cleared that rear of the enemy and drove him from Dodge's flank. The nature of this fighting may be judged by the fact that in the brigade which charged to relieve that flank every officer's horse but two was killed or wounded. With such troops, and in such a school of war, young Lawton grew to military manhood."

General James R. Carnahan, in his address at the dedication of Chickamauga Park, drew this graphic picture of one part of the battle on Saturday, the brigade referred to being that commanded by Colonel George F. Dick, of the Eighty-sixth Indiana.

"Through the early part of that day, and it seemed almost as though its hours would never pass, the troops that had been on duty the night before waited outside that contest and heard that fearful, that terrible, death-dealing tornado, as it raged in front and all about them, and could see the constantly moving columns of the enemy's infantry with flying flags, and could see battery after battery as they moved before them like a great panorama unfolding in an opening on the ridge.

"Those soldiers had been sent back to rest after a night on duty, but rest there was none. The guns of the infantry stood stacked in line, and the battery of six guns attached to their brigade stood just in rear of the troops, with all the horses hitched to the guns and caissons ready to move. Now and then a stray shot or shell would fly over their heads and strike the ground, or burst in the air to the rear.

"The men grew restless, that restlessness that comes to men in that most trying of all times in the life of a soldier, when he hears the battle raging with all the might of the furies about him, when now and then he can catch the sound of the distant shouts that tell that the charge is on,

and there is borne to the ears that rattling, tearing, crashing sound of the volleys of musketry, and of the shot and shell and canister of the artillery, that drowns in its fury the shouts and cheers of the charging lines, and that tell to the experienced soldier that the charge is met by determined and heroic troops, and that great gaps are being torn in the lines—that men and comrades are being wounded, mangled and killed. In such moments and under such circumstances as these, strong men pale, the body grows hot and weak, and the heart of the bravest almost ceases to beat. The men are hungry, but they can not eat; they are tired and worn, but they can not rest; their limbs and feet ache, but they can not sit down; they lie prone upon the ground, but in that position the sound of the battle is intensified, and they rise up; speak to them, if you will, and they answer you as if in a dream; they laugh, but it is a laugh that has no joy in it. The infantry stay close to their gun stacks; the artillerymen, drivers and gunners, stand near to their post of duty, in a fearful state of unrest.

“Thus hour after hour the forenoon was passed by these waiting troops, in a dreadful state of anxiety and suspense. No tidings came from the front. It was only known that the battle was terrible, fearful. Noon time came and passed, and still the battle raged with undiminished fury, and the reserve still waited orders to move. Another hour beyond midday had passed, and the second was drawing toward its close, when suddenly from out the wood to the front and left of the waiting and restless brigade, into the open field dashed an officer, his horse urged to its greatest speed, toward the expectant troops. The men see him coming, and in an instant new life has taken possession of them. ‘There come orders,’ are the words that pass from lip to lip along the line. Without orders the lines are reformed behind the gun stacks, ready for the command. ‘Take arms.’ The cannoneers stand at their posts ready to mount limber chest and caisson. The drivers stand ‘at horse,’ or with hand on rein and toe in stirrup, for details of the drill are forgotten, in feverish anxiety for the command to ‘mount’ and away. How quick, how great the change at the prospect for freedom from the suspense!

the day. The eye has lighted up, the arm has grown strong, and the nerves are once more steady. All is now eagerness for the work that must be before them. Every head is bent forward to catch, if possible, the first news from the front, and to hear the orders that are to be given. All are thoroughly aroused; there will be no more suspense. It is to be action for these troops from this time on until the close of the battle. Nearer and nearer comes the rider. Now could be distinguished his features, and one could see the fearful earnestness that was written on every line of his face. He leaned forward as he rode, in such haste was he. The horse he rode had caught the spirit of the rider, and horse and rider by their every movement told the experienced soldiers that there was to be work for them, that the emergency was great, and that the peril was imminent.

"How much there is of life, of the soldier's life, in time of war, that can not be painted on canvas or described in words. It is that inexpressible part, that indefinable something in the face, in the eye, in the swaying of the body, the gesture of the hand, that the soldier reads in those movements and appearances, the very facts, terrible in detail, that are afterwards put into words, or burst on his vision in the carnage of the field. No one who has seen the life of the soldier in actual warfare, but has seen just such occasions, and just such faces. Such was the face, and such the movement of that staff officer that afternoon of September 19, 1863. He had not spoken a word, there had been no uplifting of the hand as he rode across the field, but that indescribable appearance spoke for him. Every soldier as he saw him read that face and form as though from an open book, yes, and read in all its awful, dreadful meaning that his comrades were in deepest peril, and that help must be borne quickly or all hope would be gone, and thus reading, every man was ready to do his full duty. Not long delayed were the orders, and as he approaches he is met by the brigade commander, as anxious to receive the orders as he who carries them is to give them. The command comes in quick, sharp words: 'The General presents his compliments and directs that you move your brigade at once to the support of the other brigades of your division. Take the road, moving by the flank to the right, double-

quick. I am to direct you,' and then added, so those who stood near heard the words: 'Our men are hard pressed.' The last sentence was all that was said in words as to the condition of our troops, but it was enough, and those who heard knew they had read aright before he had spoken.

"Scarce had the orders been received, when the command, 'take arms!' was heard along the line, and the artillery bugle sounded for canoneers and drivers, 'Mount!' It scarcely took the time to tell it for that brigade to get in motion, moving out of the field and into the road. The artillery took the beaten road, the infantry alongside. It was a grand scene as the men moved quickly into place, closing up the column and waiting but a moment for the command, 'Forward!' The guns of the infantry are at right shoulder and all have grown eager for the order. The bugle sounds the first note of the command. Now look along that column; the men are leaning forward for the start; the drivers on the artillery teams tighten the rein in the left hand, and, with whip in the uplifted right, rise in the stirrups; and, as the last note of that bugle is sounded, the crack of the whips of thirty-six drivers over the backs of as many horses, and the stroke of the spurs, sends that battery of six guns, and its caissons, rattling and bounding over that road, while the infantry alongside are straining every nerve as they hasten to the relief of their comrades so hard pressed. The spirits of the men grow higher and higher with each moment of the advance. The rattling of the artillery and the hoof beats of the horses add to the excitement of the onward rush, infantry and artillery thus side by side vieing each with the other which shall best do his part. As they come nearer, the storm of the battle grows greater and greater. On, and yet on they press, until reaching the Brotherton field the artillery is turned off to the ridge on the left, and goes into position along its crest, while the lines of the infantry are being formed in the woods to the right of the road over which they have just been hurrying. The brigade lines are scarcely formed and the command to move forward given, when the lines which are in advance are broken by a terrific charge of the enemy, and are driven back in confusion on the newly formed line, friend and foe so intermingled that a shot ca

not be fired without inflicting as much injury on our men as upon the enemy.

"The artillery, on the crest of the ridge back of the brigade, have unlimbered and gone into action, and its shells are now flying overhead into the woods, where the enemy's line had been. Confusion seems to have taken possession of the lines, and to add to it, the lines to the right have been broken and the enemy is sweeping past our flank. The order is given to fall back on line with the artillery. Out of the wood, under the fire of the cannon, the men hasten. Now, on the crest of that ridge, without works of any kind to shelter them, the troops are again hastily formed, and none too soon. Down the gentle slope of that ridge and away to the right and left and front, stretches an open field, without tree or shrub to break the force of the balls. In front, and at the edge of the field, scarce two hundred yards away, runs the road parallel to our new line; beyond that road in the heavy timber is where the Confederate lines are formed, well protected in their preparations for their charge. Scarce had the lines been formed when the sharp crack of the rifles along our front, and the whistling of the balls over our heads, gave warning that the advance of the enemy had begun, and in an instant the shouts of the skirmishers are drowned by the shout that goes up from the charging column as it starts down in the woods. The men of the Union line are ready. An Indiana regiment, the Eighty-sixth, is on the left of the brigade; the Seventh Indiana battery of six guns is on the right of this regiment; another Indiana regiment, the Forty-fourth, is immediately on the right of the battery, while to the right and left of these extend the Union lines. The gunners and every man of the battery are at their posts of duty, the tightly drawn lines in their faces showing their purpose there to stand for duty or die. Officers pass the familiar command of caution along the line—'steady, men, steady.' The shout of the charging foe comes rapidly on; now they burst out of the wood and onto the road. That instant, as if touched by an electric chord, so quick, and so in unison was it, the rifles leap to the shoulder along the ridge where wave the Stars and Stripes. The enemy is in plain view along the road covering the entire front; you

can see them, as with cap visors drawn well down over their eyes, the gun at the charge, with short, shrill shout they come, and the colors of Stewart's Confederate division can be seen flushed with victory, confronting us. The men on the ridge recognize the gallantry of the charging foe, and their pride is touched as well. All this is but the work of an instant, when, just as that long line of gray has crossed the road, quick and sharp rings out along the line the command, 'Fire!' It seems to come to infantry and artillery at the same moment, and out from the rifles of the men and the mouths of the cannon leap the death-dealing bullet and canister; again and again, with almost lightning rapidity, they pour in their deadly, merciless fire, until along that entire ridge has come almost one continuous volley, one sheet of flame. Those lines of gray that had commenced the charge so bravely, so confidently, begin to waver; their men had fallen thick and fast about them. Again, and yet again, the volleys are poured into them, and the batteries of artillery on the right and left have not ceased their deadly work. No troops can long withstand such fire; their lines are staggering under the storm; another volley and they are broken and fall back in confusion. The charge was not long in point of time, but was terrible in its results to the foe.

"Along the entire line to the right and left the battle raged with increased fury. We are on the defensive; and all can judge that the lull in front is only the stillness that forebodes the more terrible tornado that is to come. A few logs and rails are hastily gathered to form a slight breastwork. Soon the scattering shots that began to fall about us, like the first heavy drops of the rain storm, gave warning that the foe was again moving to the attack. Again our lines are ready, now lying behind hastily prepared works. Again is heard the shout, as on comes the enemy with more determination than before; but with even greater courage do our men determine to hold their lines. The artillery is double shotted with canister. Again the command, 'Fire!' and hotter, fiercer than before the battle rages along our front. Shout is answered with shout, shot by shot ten fold, until again the enemy break before that death-dealing fire and are again forced back. But why repeat further the story of that Saturday afternoon. Again and again

were those charges repeated along that line. It did seem that our men were more than human and the men in our front daring beyond comparison. The artillerymen worked as never before. Their guns, double-shotted, had scarce delivered their charges, when, before the gun could complete its recoil, it was caught by strong arms, made doubly strong in that fever heat of battle, and was again in position, again double-shotted, and again fired into the face of the foe. The arm bared, the veins standing out in strong lines, the hat or cap gone from the head, the eyes starting almost from the sockets, the teeth set, the face beaded with perspiration, balls falling all about them, those men of the Seventh Indiana battery seemed to be supernaturally endowed with strength. Their comrades of the infantry vied with them in acts of heroism, and daring and endurance. They shouted defiance to their foe with every shot. With face and hands begrimed in the smoke and dust and heat of the battle, with comrades falling about them, the survivors thought only of vengeance.

“All the horses on two of the guns were shot down; another charge is beginning; those two guns might be lost; they must be gotten back. Quick as thought a company of infantry spring to the guns, one hand holding the rifle, the other on the cannon, and with shot falling thick and fast about them, drag the guns over the brow of the ridge and down into the wood, just in the rear of the line, and hasten back again to take their places in line, ready to meet the oncoming charge. In the midst of the charge an artilleryman is shot down; a man from the infantry takes his place and obeys orders as best he can. When that charge began our men were lying down; in the midst of it, so great became the excitement, so intense the anxiety, all fear and prudence vanished, and the men leaped to their feet, and continued to fire and load in the wildest frenzy of desperation. They had lost all idea of danger, and counted not the strength of the assailant. It was the absolute desperation of the men that held our lines. A soldier or an officer was wounded; unless the wound was mortal or caused the fracture of a limb, they had the wound tied or bandaged as best they could, some tearing up their blouses for bandages, and they again took their places in the lines beside

their more fortunate comrades. Each man felt the terrible weight of responsibility that rested on him personally for the results that should be achieved that day. It is that disregard of peril in the moment of greatest danger, that decision, that purpose and grand courage, that comes only to the American citizen soldier, who voluntarily and with unselfish patriotism stands in defense of principle and country, that makes such soldiers as those who fought in the ranks that great day on Chickamauga's fire-swept field. On through the afternoon until nightfall did that furious storm beat against and rage about that line!

"It was a great battle, and great was the heroism and devotion of all who fought on that field, but no troops were more heroic, more steadfast, than those who hailed from Indiana. Indiana troops, almost to an entirety, remained on the fighting lines at Chickamauga until the battle closed. Her men on that field were wherever the fighting was the severest, and wherever the valor and patriotism of the soldier was tested to its highest capacity, from Lee and Gordon's Mills to the McDonald house; on the Viniard field, east and west; at the Widow Glenn's; in the Brotherton field; in the Brock field; in the Brotherton woods; on the Winfrey field; on the Poe field; on the Kelley field line and in the Kelley field; at Snodgrass Hill and Harker's Hill, everywhere where duty called, true, steadfast, heroic, showing themselves to be men and soldiers of the highest, truest mold. It was an honor to stand in their ranks. It was a crowning glory to have stood with Baird at the Kelley field line, or under the eye of "Old Pap Thomas" with the right that saved the army, and thereby held Chattanooga, the objective point of the Confederates. The Union forces were, it is true, finally driven from the field, but Bragg was defeated in his object, which was to recover Chattanooga. The Confederates themselves acknowledged this. General Longstreet, one of the ablest of the Confederate Generals, said: "The last chance for the Confederacy was gone when Bragg returned toward Chattanooga for a dress parade and then settled down about Missionary Ridge."

The losses sustained by Indiana, at Chickamauga, by regiments and batteries were as follows:

REGIMENTS.	OFFICERS.			ENLISTED MEN.			Total
	Killed	Wou'd'd	Miss'g	Killed	Wounded	Missing	
6th	2	6	..	11	110	31	160
9th	2	8	1	11	83	21	126
10th	2	5	1	22	130	5	166
17th	2	..	4	8	2	16
29th	2	5	7	9	87	62	172
30th	2	5	4	8	50	57	126
31st	1	2	..	4	59	17	83
32d	1	4	..	20	77	20	122
35th	3	2	5	20	35	65
36th	10	..	13	89	17	129
37th	7	2	9
38th	1	3	..	12	54	39	109
39th	3	..	5	32	..	40
42d	1	3	..	3	49	50	106
44th	1	9	..	12	52	10	84
58th	2	5	3	14	114	31	169
68th	2	5	1	15	103	11	137
72d	1	10	23	2	36
74th	2	11	1	20	114	10	158
75th	4	2	17	104	11	138
79th	2	1	6	42	9	60
81st	4	2	14	56	21	97
82d	1	1	2	19	67	21	111
84th	3	6	..	20	91	13	133
86th	2	5	..	11	28	21	67
87th	7	4	..	33	138	8	190
88th	4	2	3	29	14	52
101st	5	1	11	85	17	119
2d cav.	1	14	..	15
3d cav.	3	3
4th cav.	12	7	19
4th battery	1	1	14	4	20
5th battery	1	..	1	6	1	9
7th battery	1	..	8	..	9
8th battery	1	9	7	17
11th battery	1	3	11	4	19
18th battery	1	2	..	3
19th battery	1	2	15	2	20
21st battery	12	..	12
Total	35	126	34	342	2008	585	3130

CHAPTER LIV.

FROM CHICKAMAUGA TO MISSIONARY RIDGE.

The reverse suffered by Rosecrans at Chickamauga alarmed the North. The people saw their hopes of a speedy collapse of the rebellion, which had been so bright, suddenly crushed. What to do was the burning question. Meade was still confronting Lee in Virginia. It had long been known that Longstreet had been detached from the army of Lee, and now it was discerned for what purpose. The first thing the administration did in this emergency was to detach the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from Meade and send them, under the command of General Hooker, hastily across the country to the help of Rosecrans. Rosecrans was shut up in Chattanooga, with men and animals in desperate straits for provisions. Bragg had practically closed all avenues of supply except a long and difficult wagon road. The Government felt that something must be done, or all that had been accomplished in the West would be lost, and all eyes were turned toward Grant, the one General who seemed able not only to gain victories but to follow them up, and reap results from them. In accordance with the established policy of Halleck, Grant's army was practically disintegrated after the capture of Vicksburg. He desired to move the army immediately on a new campaign, and suggested two or three plans that he believed sure of success, and also sure to puncture the Confederacy, but Halleck was intent on doing something in Arkansas and Texas, away from the true seat of the war, and while Sherman had been ordered to move by easy stages toward Chattanooga, building railroads, other portions of Grant's army were sent to Banks.

At this juncture, however, the President took matters into his own hands. He determined to send Grant into Tennessee, and for that purpose created a new military department, and assigned Grant to its command. Grant had been at New Orleans in consultation with Banks, and while there had been painfully injured by being thrown from his horse. Upon returning to Vicksburg he was ordered to Cairo, and thence to Louisville, where he met Secretary Stanton, who advised him of his new appointment and the duties devolving upon him. General Grant realized the desperate and precarious condition of the Army of the Cumberland, and promptly relieved Rosecrans from its command, appointing George H. Thomas as his successor. He did more than this, he sent word to Sherman to stop all railroad building and to push forward with all speed to Chattanooga, and hastened to that point himself. Of the condition of affairs in Chattanooga at that time, the Comte de Paris says:

"The evening of October 23d is cold and rainy; the wind whistles in the miserable streets of Chattanooga; the swollen waters of the Tennessee roar around the frail pontoons which connect the town with the right bank of the river. From the slopes of Missionary Ridge, upon which long lines of works are ranged as in an amphitheater, up to the sombre mass of Lookout Mountain, which, like a gigantic sentinel, seems to mount guard over the Federals, there are bivouac fires, the incessant light of which must prove to the Union soldiers that the Southern army is keeping good watch around them. For a month past the Federals have asked nothing but to fight to break this circle of iron. However, their chief has left them in the same inaction, has done nothing to render the enemy uneasy, nor anything to divert his own men from the monotony of their enforced rest. Therefore, understanding that their sufferings are useless, and seeing the fatal termination approaching, they allow themselves to be overcome by mute sadness, the impress of which can be seen on every face.

"The heroic Thomas has promised Grant to starve in Chattanooga, but he has not engaged to live there long nor to come out of the place victorious. He has provisions for four days only; subsistence for two days more has been promised him, to arrive on the following day.

"It is in this gloomy evening of the 23d that an officer, supporting himself painfully on crutches, enters, followed by a small number of aides-de-camp, into General Thomas' headquarters. Those who have recognized him do not doubt that a new era is opening for the Army of the Cumberland. In fact Grant, coming to place himself in the midst of this army, proves that he will risk anything to deliver it, while he inspires it with the confidence which animates him. He finds in Chattanooga about forty-eight thousand combatants, these being the remains of the twelve infantry divisions which had crossed the Tennessee six weeks before. The regiments have been consolidated, the brigades re-formed, and the divisions reduced to six. The four army corps by the order of October 9 are reduced to two only, the Fourteenth and the Fourth, which latter takes the place of the other three suppressed in the general nomenclature. A great number of commanders have disappeared. Crittenden, McCook and Negley, who preceded Rosecrans in the line of disgrace, have asked for an opportunity to justify themselves before a court of inquiry. Van Cleve has received the command of Murfreesboro. Johnson, Steedman and Morgan have been called to other commands, or are obliged to go in search of health in the Northern States. Reynolds and Brannan have left their divisions, one for the post of chief of staff to Thomas, and the other to assume the command of the artillery. One of the two corps is commanded by Granger, who has deserved the honor on account of his gallant conduct. Thomas leaves the Fourteenth corps to Rousseau, his oldest division commander. There are more than twelve thousand men in the cavalry, but it can not concentrate near Chattanooga, where forage is scarce."

Hooker with the Eleventh and Twelfth corps had arrived at Bridgeport, but to proceed to Chattanooga would be but to add twenty thousand more mouths to eat up what little food could be obtained. Grant had already ordered Sherman to push forward. That distinguished officer, in his haste to push forward, came very near being captured by the enemy. The siege of Chattanooga had resulted in new and energetic movements of the Confederates, both infantry and cavalry, in different parts of Ten-

nessee, Alabama and Mississippi. Chalmers, with several regiments, undertook to delay the march of Sherman, and pushed toward the station of Colliersville, a small fortified post about twenty-five miles from Memphis. The post was defended by the Sixty-sixth Indiana. He hoped to capture the garrison, seize a train loaded with troops and burn the bridge. Sherman was at Colliersville, with a small body of regulars, on his way to Corinth. His train was just about moving out, when the pickets of the Sixty-sixth Indiana were driven in by Chalmers. They had been out to reconnoiter the road. The Sixty-sixth was a fighting regiment, and at once prepared to defend the post. Sherman received notice in time, and his train hastily returned. The General and those who were with him jumped out, and rushed to occupy the trenches and the buildings at the station. General Sherman at once took command and disposed his little force to make the most determined resistance, stopping long enough to send a dispatch to Corse's division, which was marching on foot from Memphis, to come in haste, and also ordering a train from Memphis to bring reinforcements. All this was done while a parley was going on under a flag of truce demanding a surrender of the garrison.

Chalmers dismounted his cavalry and completely surrounded the little garrison, and a few moments later cut the telegraph, but the orders for Corse and to Memphis had got through. The demand to surrender was refused and an assault was made which was repulsed. The attack was renewed again and again, but the brave men of the Sixty-sixth, aided by the few regulars with Sherman and the employes of the railroad, repulsed every one, with considerable loss to the Confederates. The train from Memphis, followed by Corse, his men on the double-quick, arrived within a short distance of Colliersville, and Chalmers hastily retreated. The Sixty-sixth was highly complimented by General Sherman for its gallantry in this action.

Burnside, at Knoxville, had been ordered to reinforce Rosecrans, but the order reached him too late for him to reach Chattanooga before the battle at Chickamauga, and to have proceeded after that battle would have only made matters worse for Rosecrans. But the army under Burnside was destined to play an important part in the subse-

quent operations of Grant, not because of any active help it rendered, but because of Bragg making the mistake of detaching from his forces in front of Chattanooga the corps of Longstreet to operate against Burnside, at the very time when Grant was preparing to drive the Confederates from Missionary Ridge. It is more than probable that Grant would have succeeded even had Longstreet remained with Bragg, but his absence made the work of Grant much more certain.

Before taking up the operations of Grant at Chattanooga let us touch briefly upon some matters of comparatively minor importance, but in which Indiana troops took a prominent part. When Rosecrans retired into Chattanooga Bragg settled down with the bulk of his army on Missionary Ridge, with the purpose of besieging Rosecrans, but he was not altogether idle. He sent out his cavalry under Wheeler to make a raid in the rear of Chattanooga, and interfere with Rosecrans's communications. On the first of October Wheeler crossed the Tennessee with a large force of cavalry. General Crook with his division was at once started in pursuit, while Colonel McCook with his division was ordered to Anderson's Cross Roads to try and intercept Wheeler. With Crook was the brigade of mounted infantry under the command of Colonel Miller. It will be remembered that the Seventeenth and Seventy-second Indiana regiments were a part of this brigade. With McCook were the Second and Fourth Indiana cavalry regiments.

Immediately upon receiving his orders Colonel McCook started with the two Indiana regiments, and a section of artillery. An incessant rain delayed the movement, and as McCook approached Anderson's on the second, he saw the smoke of the burning wagons. Wheeler had been ahead of him. McCook hurried forward, and with the Second Indiana and First Wisconsin charged so furiously upon the Confederate troopers that he forced them back past the burning wagons upon the main Confederate force which was in line of battle. McCook did not stop, but boldly charged the line and drove the enemy from their position and pursued them for more than two miles, using the sabre freely. The Confederates re-formed behind a barricade of

rails in a strong position with a creek in their front, but on went McCook and his bold troopers, assaulted this new position and drove the enemy across the Sequatchie Valley. The next morning the pursuit was continued to the top of the mountain, where the enemy was again routed. McCook captured a number of prisoners, recaptured eight hundred mules, and saved some of the wagons of the train. The force thus routed amounted to a division, and was under the command of Wheeler himself.

Crook met with like success. He had under him Minty's cavalry brigade and Miller's brigade of mounted infantry. On the 3d of October he overtook the enemy descending the Cumberland Mountains. He surrounded a brigade, and it was only saved by the arrival of reinforcements and night. Crook pushed forward, driving the Confederates before him. One of Wheeler's objects was to destroy the stores at Murfreesboro, but so rapid had been the movement of Crook that he failed. At Duck River the enemy made strong resistance but was soon routed and driven thirteen miles. Near Farmington Wheeler took a strong position, having reunited his forces. There he was overtaken by the "Lightning Brigade," under Colonel Miller. The gallant Colonel did not hesitate but sprang on the foe. Just as the battle was getting warm, Colonel Miller received the following dispatch from Crook: "From what information I get from you, and what I get from other sources, I am convinced the enemy's forces are much larger than yours. I have no word from General Mitchell's division. Minty is ten miles in the rear. Can you not keep off an engagement? In less than an hour it will be dark. I am confident an action will be certain defeat with so unequal forces." Reading this Miller at once gave the order "Forward," and in fifteen minutes the battle was over, the Confederates rapidly flying. They lost in killed 100, and in wounded 150, and Miller captured more than 300 prisoners, making 500 the brigade had captured that day. When the battle was over Miller replied to Crook: "At the time of receiving your order, to prevent an engagement was impossible; the enemy would have attacked me had I not him. I have whipped him and stampeded all his troops; have taken all four of his cannon and 300 prisoners."

We now have to narrate a campaign in which Indiana troops again distinguished themselves, and led in one of the most remarkable assaults known in the history of warfare. We have already told how Grant reached Chattanooga, and of the condition of affairs at that time. He at once began a series of movements which within less than a month resulted in a grand victory for the Union, and drove the enemy back into the recesses of the mountains of Georgia. It did more than that, for it made Grant Commander-in-chief of all the armies of the Union, and this was the beginning of the end of the war. For some months it had been dawning upon those in power that if success was to be obtained it would be necessary to place some one in supreme command of all the armies so that there would be unity of effort as well as unity of purpose. Grant had never failed. Even his first battle at Belmont, although he retreated, was not a failure, for he accomplished the purpose he had in view. He had never annoyed the authorities with clamors for reinforcements, nor with objections against moving and fighting, but had taken what troops the Government gave him, and when permission to move was also given, had moved promptly, and with such energy and skill that victory was assured every time. He had taken Forts Henry and Donelson, when his immediate chief, Halleck, was demanding reinforcements greater by two fold than Grant's army, and declaring that unless they were sent Donelson could not be captured. At Vicksburg he had conceived and executed a plan of campaign that caused all the military writers of this country and Europe to throw aside their books, and now was to add another campaign, brilliant in conception and execution, to the list of his successes. So it can be said that the most important result of the battles around Chattanooga was that it made Grant Commander-in-chief of all the armies of the Union.

When Grant reached Chattanooga he found that plans had already been made for raising the siege. These plans had received the sanction of both Generals Rosecrans and Thomas, and as soon as they were made known to General Grant he approved them and ordered them put in execution. In brief the plan was to open up a crossing of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry by throwing a pontoon

bridge across the river. This was a work of great delicacy and peril, and had to be done with the utmost secrecy to insure success. It was assigned to General A. J. Smith, and the brigades of Hazen and Turchin were selected for the work. The Sixth Indiana was with Hazen, and the Eighty-second was in Turchin's brigade. Part of the force was sent by land to a point on the river where the bridge was to be constructed, and the remainder floated down the river on the boats, landed and rushed upon the Confederate outposts. The other troops were ferried across, and then the bridge was built. The two Indiana regiments named took a prominent part in this successful movement.

Grant's master-mind grasped at once the whole situation. Bragg was to be defeated and driven back to the South; Eastern Tennessee was to be finally and completely redeemed. This was the task that was before him, with, to him, a new army. Heretofore he had operated altogether with the Army of the Tennessee, and was personally a stranger to the Army of the Cumberland. He knew of its splendid fighting qualities, but the task before him was one of such magnitude that he determined to make success sure, and ordered Sherman to drop everything and push forward with the Fifteenth corps and John E. Smith's division of the Seventeenth corps of the Army of the Tennessee. Already two corps of the Army of the Potomac were at hand, and in one of them, the Twelfth, was the famous Twenty-seventh Indiana, which had won such distinction by its splendid fighting in the East. From this time to the close of the war this splendid regiment was to be identified with all the marches and battles of the Army of the Cumberland, until the remnant, which had been transferred to the Seventieth, witnessed the grand review at Washington.

The first care of General Grant was to get the Army of the Cumberland in fighting trim, after its late marches and battles, and the sufferings of the siege. Its artillery was almost without horses, the animals having died by the thousand from starvation. The men themselves were ready to fight at any time, but they needed to recruit their strength and receive supplies before going again into battle. All this was accomplished while waiting for Sherman. The

building of the bridge at Brown's Ferry had opened up connection with Hooker's two corps of the Army of the Potomac, and thus added materially to the strength of the Army of the Cumberland, but Grant decided to await the coming of Sherman, who was pushing forward with all speed.

In the meantime Bragg had also received some reinforcements, but made the mistake of detaching Longstreet and his corps of veteran Virginians to operate against Burnside at Knoxville. Information of this added to the worries of Grant. If he was to save Burnside, Knoxville and East Tennessee, it was necessary for him to speedily defeat Bragg, and defeat him so thoroughly that neither he nor his army would be in his way in relieving Knoxville. Grant's plan of battle was made, and it only waited for Sherman. The details of that plan it is not necessary to give, further than that Sherman upon his arrival was to assail the north end of Missionary Ridge, and when well established the battle was to be taken up by the Army of the Cumberland, it being intended to so double Bragg's flank as to cut off his retreat, and, if possible, capture his whole army. This plan was modified several times, partly owing to Sherman's delay in getting up; partly because of unexpected difficulties encountered after the battle opened, and partly on account of the audacious bravery of the divisions of Wood and Sheridan, both being led by Indiana troops.

News reached Grant that Bragg was retreating, and this did not suit the views of the Federal commander. To find out whether the information was correct, and to hold Bragg before him, he determined to make a reconnoissance in force, and this proved one of the most brilliant feats of arms performed during the war up to that time. On the morning of the 23d of November, without waiting for Sherman, Thomas was ordered to move out of Chattanooga, deploy his army in front of the fortifications and feel the enemy. If the latter were in force Thomas was to confine his movement to a reconnoissance, but if Bragg was retreating Thomas was to at once seize the whole line of Missionary Ridge, and throw a bridge for Sherman, thus gaining one day in the pursuit. The Comte de Paris thus describes the opening scene:

"Everything is ready in Chattanooga for the great game which is about to be played; Granger, Palmer and Howard, each with two divisions, are waiting only for orders from Thomas. The weather, which up to this time had been against the Federals, at last appears to turn in their favor. A brilliant sun causes the traces of recent storms to vanish; its rays, sifted through transparent vapors, impart a new gloss to the tints with which autumn has decked the woods. Light mists arise from the valleys, carrying away some of their moisture; the brooks, swollen the day before, resume their soft murmur. But Sherman has not reached the point designated for his crossing; his first three divisions are still trudging through the passes of Waldron's Ridge, while the breaking of the bridge at Brown's Ferry detains the Fourth in Will's Valley. Thomas, with as much impatience as his soldiers, awaits the signal of battle. Several hours of daylight have already elapsed when at last he receives Grant's order. Immediately his troops form between the works around the place and the line covering the approaches."

The enemy on the crest of Missionary Ridge saw this movement, but the deliberateness with which it was made led them to believe that nothing more than a grand review was intended. After forming in line the troops remained quiet for more than half an hour, and this added to the deception of the Confederates. The time came for the active aggressive movement, and this was entrusted to the veteran division of General Thomas J. Wood, to be supported by the other divisions if necessary. There were five Indiana regiments in Wood's division—the Sixth, Thirty-second, Sixty-eighth, Seventy-ninth and Eighty-sixth. Orchard Knob, the objective point of the movement, is situated about half way between Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge. It rises to a considerable height above the plain. Between it and the lines of the National troops the ground was low and covered at the time with trees and bushes. Along the western base of the Knob, as also over its rocky summit and for half a mile to the southwest, were barricades of logs and stones.

About 2 o'clock p. m. General Wood moved rapidly forward, with Willich's brigade on the left, in which were the

Thirty-second and Sixty-eighth Indiana regiments, and Hazen's brigade on the right, in which was the Sixth. Sam Beatty's brigade, including the Seventy-ninth and Eighty-sixth Indiana, was in reserve. Chaplain Van Horne, in his "History of the Army of the Cumberland," thus describes the scene:

"General Wood's troops, in harmony with the grandeur of the scenery, the pageant which heralded their advance, and the inspiration which the consciousness of making the initial movement of battle in view of contending armies is adapted to create, pressed rapidly forward. His compact lines, marred by no straggling to the rear, swept from position first the pickets and their reserves, and then moved, without halt or slackened pace, to the attack of the strong line on the hill. Willich, meeting with less resistance than was anticipated in the defense of so important a position, at once hurled the enemy from the base and summit of Orchard Knob. Hazen did not so soon carry a lower hill to the right, as the troops holding it fought in a manner better suited to the surroundings and issues of the conflict. But though resisting bravely they were soon forced by the bayonet to yield position, leaving for capture the Twenty-eighth Alabama regiment and its flag."

The Comte de Paris draws a more graphic picture of the scene, as follows:

"Willich, leading with much enthusiasm the brigade of which he has just received the command, has already dislodged the enemy's sharpshooters from the woods; Hazen holds the position assigned to him, and both together resolutely attack the intrenchment behind which these sharpshooters have joined their reserves. In an instant the Confederates are dislodged. Willich pursues them up the slopes, does not allow them to re-form on the crest of Indian Hill, and vigorously throws them on the opposite declivity of the Knob, which they descend in great haste to reach the line of works constructed at the foot of Missionary Ridge. Hazen has encountered a more serious resistance. General Manigault, commander of a brigade belonging to Anderson's division, has posted his reserves behind the intrenchments which crown the ridge on the southwest of Indian Hill. The country being open, they have seen

from a distance the approach of the Federals and greet them with a well sustained fire. The ranks in Hazen's first line are thinned and come to a halt, but at the sound of his voice they close up and spring upon the enemy, whom they rout after a short fight. The Southerners defend themselves with desperation, but are crushed by numbers and surrounded."

It was a magnificent pageant, in full view of two large armies, and with such gallantry and dash was the movement made that its success was complete and speedy. General Wood was fully justified in using the following glowing language:

"Then at the bugle signal the magnificent array, in exact lines and serried columns, moved forward. It scarcely ever falls to the lot of man to witness so grand a military display. Every circumstance that could heighten the interest of, or impart dramatic effect to, the scene was present. On the ramparts of Fort Wood were gathered officers of high rank, covered with honors gathered on other fields. There were also officers distinguished for scientific attainments and rare administrative ability. Troops in line and column checkered the broad plain of Chattanooga. In front, plainly to be seen, was the enemy so soon to be encountered in deadly conflict. My division seemed to drink in the inspiration of the scene, and when the 'advance' was sounded moved forward in the perfect order of a holiday parade. It has been my good fortune to witness, on the Champs de Mars and on Longchamps, reviews of all arms of the French service, under the eye of the most remarkable man of the present generation. I once saw a review, followed by a mock battle of the finest troops, El Re Galantumo. The pageant was held on the plains of Milan, the queen city of Lombardy, and the troops in the sham conflict were commanded by two of the most distinguished officers of the Piedmontese service, Cialdini and another whose name I can not recall. In none of these displays did I ever see anything to exceed the soldierly bearing and steadiness of my division, exhibited in the advance of Monday afternoon, the 23d. There was certainly one striking difference in the circumstances of these grand displays. The French and Italian parades were peaceful pageants;

ours involved the exigencies of stern war; certainly an immense difference.

"I should do injustice to the brave men who the moved forward to the conflict in such perfect order were to omit to record that not one straggler lagged behind sully the magnificence and perfectness of the grand batt array."

This was the opening of the great battle that was give another triumph to the Federal arms, and add a other victory to those already won by General Grant. No was to come the romance of battles, commonly referred as "the battle above the clouds." For the purpose of sti further deceiving Bragg and keeping him from discoveri the movements of Sherman, Grant determined to make demonstration against the Confederate flank resting c Lookout Mountain, and, if possible, to push that demo stration to as decided a success as had been that again Orchard Knob.

General Hooker was in Wauhatchie Valley with one the two corps he had brought from the Army of the Pot mac. On the 23d the bridge at Brown's Ferry parted f the second time, which prevented Osterhaus's division Sherman's army from crossing, so General Grant aga modified his plan. Sherman, with his three divisions th had already crossed the river, was ordered to attack t Confederate right, as originally intended, while Hooker with his corps, strengthened by the division of Osterhar was to attack the left, on Lookout Mountain. With Oste haus's division Hooker also had the two brigades of Cruf division from the Fourth corps, and in this division Indiana had three regiments, the Thirty-fifth in Whittake brigade, and the Ninth and Thirty-sixth in that of Gros Each of these regiments was to play an important part the coming engagement. Lookout Mountain had be deemed almost inaccessible. Its abrupt sides were defer ed naturally by masses of stone, and the Confederates h added to its natural strength by erecting numerous lin of breastworks and rifle pits.

Hooker had so placed his artillery as to sweep the cre of the mountain. Naylor's Indiana battery was placed on little wooded knoll on Moccasin Point, and was so admi



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GROUP OF INDIANA MEMBERS OF THE CABINET.

bly served that it dismounted the guns of a Confederate battery on top of Lookout, one thousand five hundred feet above it. Being thus able to sweep the crest of Lookout his artillery was of great assistance to Hooker. Hooker's plan was by a feint to draw the attention of the enemy toward the mouth of Lookout Creek, while the bulk of his force was to cross the stream higher up, follow the slope from south to north, and attack the ridge at the Cravens house. The Federal troops were to press forward, no matter what obstacles might be in the way. Hooker had made all his arrangements during the night for his movement at daylight on the 24th. When daylight came the mists were rising from the valleys and hanging around the sides of the mountain.

Grose with his brigade was to open the fight by attempting to cross a bridge on the Chattanooga road. This bridge had been partly destroyed by the enemy. Grose moved forward in two lines, the Thirty-sixth Indiana being in the first and the Ninth in the second. He attacked the outposts of the enemy and drove them before him, but the bridge had to be repaired, and this the Confederates determined to prevent if possible. The conflict was sharp and deadly, but Grose clung to his work. About 10 o'clock some of the other divisions had crossed at one or more of the fords. Grose was then ordered to leave a part of his brigade in front of the road bridge, and with the rest of his brigade cross the creek at a point higher up and join Woods, of Osterhaus's division. These troops attacking the flank of the Confederates threw the line into disorder, when the two regiments of Grose, left at the bridge, rushed across in the face of a destructive fire, and throwing themselves upon the enemy drove them in a rout to the Cravens House. Here they were met by the troops of Geary and Whitaker, who had crossed at the fords. From the Comte de Paris the following description of the rest of the battle is taken:

"After passing the stream Whittaker gained the foot of the palisades under the harmless fire of Stevenson's soldiers; Geary formed in line on Whittaker's left, and then the entire line advanced toward the north through a chaos of piled logs of wood. All the officers have dismounted and

the ranks are broken. Nevertheless, the Federals, forming a serried line of sharpshooters and skirmishers, rapidly gain ground. In fact they see a portion of the enemy's forces below them on the banks of the stream, another portion above their heads, and feel that they must be the first to reach the top of the fortified crest, the profile of which appears before them on a background of clouds. They thus fall upon the main body of Walthall's soldiers, who, ascending the slope, already fancied themselves in safety. The latter are finally dispersed. Out of fifteen hundred combatants, about one hundred are placed hors de combat and more than eight hundred are captured; only a few crowd around their chief."

Jackson, the Confederate commander, had not expected this disaster; in fact knew nothing of it until it was too late to prevent it. Whittaker got possession of the Cravens house and the two howitzers there, before the guns could fire a single shot. The Confederates, however, would not yield the field without another struggle. A Confederate brigade was sent to stem the tide, but it soon gave way before Geary. More reinforcements were hurried forward and a new line was formed and the battle renewed with great energy. The Federals pressed onward among the rocks and through the brushwood. Their lines wavered somewhat, but still they gained ground, pressing the enemy backward step by step. Then it was the Federals who were reinforced. Woods and Grose joined Geary and Whittaker and they quickly drove the enemy from one line to another. The mist and rain hid the battle from the view of Grant and his army in the valley around Chattanooga, but the crack of the musketry and the boom of the cannon told that the battle was still going on. Hooker sent an order to his subordinates to halt after carrying the crest, but before it reached them the troops had passed a mile beyond the crest. Cruft again joined in the turmoil on the right and the Confederates were driven back to the cross roads which they were obliged to hold, if they were to escape complete overthrow.

It was then that a new factor appeared on the scene. Johnson, on the right bank of Chattanooga Creek, had been eagerly waiting for an opportunity to aid Hooker.

His time had come. He quickly threw Carlin's brigade across the stream and joined in the fray. With Carlin were the Thirty-eighth, Forty-second and Eighty-eighth Indiana regiments. Carlin dislodged the Confederate sharpshooters and then ascended the slopes on a run and joined Geary who ordered the whole line to advance to the relief of Whittaker. The latter was standing firm, but was heavily pressed. Fortunately for the Confederates the density of the fog brought an end to the fight, and Hooker's tired soldiers threw themselves on the ground to rest, while the remnant of the Confederates stole away. It was a brilliant victory, won against great natural obstacles, and was an unexpected blow to Bragg, giving him warning that he must fight to hold his own. The six Indiana regiments were in the lead of their various brigades, and won great praise.

Let us now turn, for a moment, to the movements of General Sherman. Grant had intended that Sherman should attack Bragg's right flank at the same time that Hooker assailed him on his left, the object being to crush both flanks of the Confederates back on the center, and then, catching the center between assaults on both flanks and in front, utterly destroy Bragg's army. Owing to many obstacles Sherman was not able to attack on the 24th, and thus Hooker's driving the Confederates from Lookout really operated against the Army of the Tennessee, as it permitted Bragg to add the force from Lookout to that which was to operate against Sherman the next day.

Sherman had to cross both the Tennessee River and Chickamauga Creek, and both streams had been swollen by heavy rains. Sherman's preliminary movements had been very successful. By evening of the 23d he had collected his four divisions near the crossing point. At midnight Giles A. Smith's brigade embarked on one hundred and sixteen boats and silently floated down to the point selected for crossing the Tennessee River. Two regiments quickly landed and surprised the enemy. His men began at once throwing up defensive works to protect the bridge. By using a steamboat and some of the pontoons Lightburn's brigade of Morgan L. Smith's division was quickly ferried across the river. In Lightburn's brigade was the Eighty-

third Indiana. It was followed by the division of John E. Smith, in which were the Forty-eighth and Fifty-ninth Indiana regiments. By midday Ewing's division, in which were the Twelfth and One Hundredth Indiana, in Loomis's brigade, and the Ninety-seventh and Ninety-ninth, in that of Cockerell, had crossed. Sherman at once pressed forward his three divisions, Morgan L. Smith was in the lead. Without firing a gun he arrived on the last slopes of Missionary Ridge, and his skirmishers pushed on to the crest, where by 4 four o'clock Sherman was well established on the top.

He thought the victory won, and the Confederate position turned. But what was his disappointment when he discovered that the ridge he had conquered so easily was isolated from the real ridge held by the enemy, and that a wide valley intervened. His maps had misled him. He saw at a glance that instead of being able to take the Confederate line in flank he would have to attack it in front, and that, too, against very great obstacles. It was too late in the day to begin such an attack, but he made some of the preliminary movements. Lightburn's brigade was sent to seize a knoll which terminates the ridge on the northeast. A sharp encounter followed, but Lightburn won. So ended the 24th of November, with Hooker well established on Lookout Mountain and Sherman across the Tennessee, ready for the great conflict that all knew would come on the morrow. Bragg, with more than forty thousand men and one hundred and twelve guns, crowned Missionary Ridge. Grant largely outnumbered him, but it looked as if it would be impossible for any army to successfully assault the Confederate position in front, yet it must be assailed in front if at all. Let us see what the next day brought forth.

CHAPTER LV.

MISSIONARY RIDGE.

Now comes the morning of the 25th. Grant, misled by the message of Sherman of the evening before, had issued orders for a joint attack by Sherman and Thomas. At daylight Grant took position at Fort Wood, where he could view the whole extent of the battle field. His first glance at the field disclosed to him that the conditions were not as he had believed. He saw on the north of the tunnel that the enemy was in strong force in front of Sherman. If Sherman did not dislodge them the direct attack on Missionary Ridge by Thomas could not take place. He had announced to Sherman that Thomas would begin the fight at an early hour, but now saw that the fight must be opened by Sherman, but failed to notify Sherman that Thomas could not open the battle.

It was intended that Sherman should throw the enemy's right back and bar the road to Cleveland, thus preventing the premature withdrawal of Bragg. Grant was quick to see that his preconceived plan had somewhat miscarried, owing to the failure of Sherman to carry the ridge to the tunnel on the evening before, but he was just as quick to seize another alternative, and to direct Hooker to make the decisive attack against the enemy's left. He realized that his success would not be as decisive as it would have been could he have shut Bragg off from the road to Cleveland, but that it would prevent the latter from making a junction with Longstreet, who had been sent against Burnside at Knoxville.

Sherman with his usual readiness had made his ar-

rangements to begin battle at an early hour. During the night the enemy had greatly strengthened his position. The crest south of the tunnel was the key to Bragg's position on that flank, and it had been crowned with artillery. It was against this position Sherman directed his main efforts. To Ewing's division was assigned the work of carrying this crest. It could not be done from the front, so Sherman divided the attack; Corse with his excellent brigade was to attempt the left while that of Loomis took the right. Loomis, with the One Hundredth Indiana in the lead, scaled the slope until he reached a little wooded grove, and then fiercely attacked the knob on its western side. Sherman, not having been advised by Grant that Thomas's attack was to be delayed because of his own failure to reach the tunnel, waited to hear the guns of Thomas, and did not send in all his force.

Corse met with desperate resistance, and was repulsed again and again. Loomis was a little more successful. He reached the grove and there planted himself. He tried to assault the knob, and, like Corse, was repulsed, but he clung to the little grove and resisted all attempts to dislodge him. Grant, anxious for the success of Sherman, in order that Thomas might make his attack in front, kept sending reinforcements to his great Lieutenant, who had only engaged four of his fifteen brigades. The misunderstanding between the two Generals might have caused a disaster, but Grant, when at last convinced that Sherman could not reach the point desired, determined upon another move, which was at first intended only to relieve the pressure against Sherman, but which, owing to the heroic courage and spontaneous action of the Army of the Cumberland, proved decisive of the contest. Before relating this decisive and brilliant action of the Army of the Cumberland, let us glance at the work Hooker was doing far off on the right.

Early in the morning, when Grant discovered that Sherman had not penetrated to the ridge at the tunnel, the result of which move was to determine the attack of Thomas, he promptly conceived the plan of pushing Hooker forward on the right, and making his success the signal for Thomas to assault. Hooker got in motion about 10 o'clock. At noon

he reached the crossing of Chattanooga Creek, only to find the bridge destroyed. It was nowhere fordable, so the only thing to do was to rebuild the bridge, and this caused delay. By two o'clock Osterhaus had been able to cross his division by a narrow foot bridge, and an hour later, the bridge having been repaired, the impatient Hooker rushed forward his troops. He had sent no messenger to Grant, intending to announce his success from the top of the ridge. All the movements of Sherman were in plain view of Grant, but those of Hooker were hidden by the configuration of the ground. About the time that Osterhaus passed Chattanooga Creek Sherman determined to throw in a part of his reserves and he ordered two brigades of John E. Smith's division to advance. They were quickly driven back and hotly pursued. The pursuit was checked by Loomis's brigade.

If the battle was not to be lost, Grant could no longer delay the attack by the Army of the Cumberland, and now came one of those grand and inspiring scenes sometimes witnessed in battle. For hours the Army of the Cumberland had stood with arms in hand, impatient for the order to take part in the fray and avenge Chickamauga. The time had come, and it prepared for the work before it. The two divisions selected for the work were those of Sheridan and Wood. With Sheridan were the Twenty-second Indiana in F. F. Sherman's brigade, and the Fifteenth, Fortieth, Fifty-first, Fifty-seventh and Fifty-eighth in that of Wagner. With Wood were the Thirty-second and Sixty-eighth, in Willich's brigade, the Sixth in Hazen's, and the Seventy-ninth and Eighty-sixth in Sam Beatty's. Each of these eleven regiments was to win imperishable glory, and one of them, the Eighty-sixth, was to be the first to plant its flag on the heights, while the Fifteenth was to be the first in its brigade to carry its colors to the top of the ridge in the front of Sheridan. No more graphic account of this assault has been given than that written by Mr. B. F. Taylor, who witnessed it as the correspondent of the Chicago Tribune. The two divisions were formed in line, and were to move at the signal of six guns fired from Orchard Knob. Let us now quote from Mr. Taylor:

"The brief November afternoon was half gone; it was

yet thundering on the left; along the center all was still. At that very hour a fierce assault was made upon the enemy's left near Rossville, four miles down toward the old field of Chickamauga. They carried the ridge; Missionary Ridge seemed everywhere—they strewed its summit with rebel dead; they held it. And thus the tips of the Federal army's widespread wings flapped grandly. But had not swooped; the grey quarry yet perched upon Missionary Ridge; the rebel army was terribly battered at the edges, but there, full in our front, it grimly waited, biding out its time. If the horns of the rebel crescent could not be doubled crushingly together, in a shapeless mass, possibly it might be sundered at its center, and tumbled in fragments over the other side of Missionary Ridge. Sherman was halted upon the left; Hooker was hard in Chattanooga valley; the Fourth corps, that rounded out our center, grew impatient of restraint; the day was waning; but little time remained to complete the commanding General's grand design; Gordon Granger's hour had come; his work was full before him.

“And what a work that was to make a weak man falter and a brave man think! One and a half miles to traverse, with narrow fringes of woods, rough valleys, sweeps of open field, rocky acclivities, to the base of the ridge, and no foot in all the breadth withdrawn from rebel sight; no foot that could not be played upon by rebel cannon, like piano keys, under Thalberg's stormy fingers. The base attained, what then? A heavy rebel work. That work carried, and what then? A hill, struggling up out of the valley, four hundred feet, rained on by bullets, swept by shot and shell; another line of works, and then, up like a Gothic roof rough with rocks, awreck with fallen trees, four hundred more; another ring of fire and iron, and then the crest, and then the enemy.

“To dream of such a journey would be madness; to devise it was a thing incredible; to do it a deed impossible. . . . The story of the battle of Missionary Ridge is struck with immortality already; let the leader of the Fourth corps bear it company.

“That the center yet lies along its silent line is still true; in five minutes it will be the wildest fiction. Let us

take that little breath of grace for just one glance at the surroundings, since we shall have neither heart nor eyes for it again. Did ever battle have so vast a cloud of witnesses? The hive-shaped hills have swarmed. Clustered like bees, blacking the housetops, lining the fortifications, over yonder across the theater, in the seats with the Catalines, everywhere, are a hundred thousand beholders. Their souls are in their eyes. Not a murmur can you hear. It is the most solemn congregation that ever stood up in the presence of the God of battles. I think of Bunker Hill as I stand here; of the thousands who witnessed the immortal struggle; and fancy there is a parallel. I think, too, that the chair of every man of them will stand vacant against the wall tomorrow, and that around the fireside they must give thanks without them, if they can.

"Generals Grant, Thomas and Granger conferred, an order was given, and in an instant the knob was cleared like a ship's deck for action. At twenty minutes of four Granger stood upon the parapet; the bugle swung idle at the bugler's side, the warbling fife and the grumbling drum unheard—there was to be louder talk—six guns, at intervals of two seconds, the signal to advance. Strong and steady his voice rang out: 'Number one, fire! Number two, fire! Number three, fire!' It seemed to me the tolling of the clock of destiny—and when at 'Number six, fire!' the roar throbbed out with a flash, you should have seen the dead line that had been lying behind the works all day, all night, all day again, come to a resurrection in the twinkling of an eye—leap like a blade from its scabbard, and sweep with a two-mile stroke toward the Ridge.

"From divisions to brigades, from brigades to regiments, the order ran. A minute, and the skirmishers deploy; a minute and the first great drops begin to patter along the line; a minute and the musketry is in full play, like the crackling whips of a hemlock fire; men go down here and there, before your eyes; the wind lifts the smoke and drifts it away over the top of the Ridge; everything is too distinct; it is fairly palpable; you can touch it with your hand. The divisions of Wood and Sheridan are wading breast deep in the valley of death.

"I never can tell you what it was like. They pushed out,

leaving nothing behind them. There was no reservation in that battle. On moves the line of skirmishers, like a heavy frown, and after it, at quick time, the splendid columns. At right of us, and left of us, and front of us, you can see the bayonets glitter in the sun. . . .

"And so through the fringe of woods went the line. Now, out into the open ground they burst at the double quick. Shall I call it a Sabbath day's journey, or a long one and a half mile? To me, that watched, it seemed as eternity, and yet they made it in thirty minutes. The tempest that now broke upon their heads was terrible. The enemy's fire burst out of the rifle pits from base to summit of Missionary Ridge; five rebel batteries of Parrots and Napoleons opened along the crest. Grape and canister and shot and shell sowed the ground with rugged iron, and garnished it with the wounded and the dead. But steady and strong, our columns move on.

'By heavens! it was a splendid sight to see,

For one who had no friend, no brother there.'

But to all loyal hearts, alas! and thank God, those men were friend and brother, both in one.

* * * * *

"And all the while our lines were moving on; they had burned through the woods and swept over the rough and rolling ground like a prairie fire. Never halting, never faltering, they charged up to the first rifle pits with a cheer, forked out the rebels with their bayonets, and lay there panting for breath. If the thunder of guns had been terrible it was now growing sublime; it was like the footfall of God on the ledges of cloud. Our forts and batteries still thrust out their mighty arms across the valley; the rebel guns that lined the arc of the crest full in our front, opened like a fan of Lucifer and converged their fire down upon Baird, Wood and Sheridan. It was rifles and musketry; it was grape and canister; it was shell and shrapnel. Missionary Ridge was volcanic; a thousand torrents of red poured over its brink and rushed together to its base. And our men were there halting for breath! And still the sublime diapason rolls on, echoes that never waked before, roared out from hight to hight, and called from the far

ranges of Waldron's Ridge to Lookout. As for Missionary Ridge, it had jarred to such music before; it was the 'sounding board' of Chickamauga; it was behind us then; it frowns and flashes in our faces today; the old Army of the Cumberland was there; it breasted the storm till the storm was spent, and left the ground it held; the old Army of the Cumberland is here! It shall roll up the Ridge like a surge to its summit, and sweep triumphant down the other side. Believe me, that memory and hope may have made the heart of many a bluecoat beat like a drum. 'Beat,' did I say? The feverish heat of battle beats on; fifty-eight guns a minute, by the watch, is the rate of its terrible throbbing. That hill, if you climb it, will appall you. Furrowed like a summer fallow, bullets as if an oak had shed them; trees clipped and shorn, leaf and limb, as with the knife of some heroic gardener pruning back for richer fruit. How you attain the summit weary and breathless, I wait to hear; how they went up in the teeth of the storm no man can tell.

* * * * *

"But our gallant legions are out in the storm; they have carried the works at the base of the Ridge; they have fallen like leaves in winter weather. Blow, dumb bugles! Sound the recall! 'Take the rifle pits,' was the order; and it is as empty of rebels as the tomb of the prophets. Shall they turn their backs to the blast? Shall they sit down under the eaves of the dripping iron? Or shall they climb to the cloud of death above them, and pluck out its lightning as they would straws from a sheaf of wheat? But the order was not given. And now the arc of fire on the crest grows fiercer and longer. The reconnoissance of Monday had failed to develop the heavy metal of the enemy. The dull fringe of the hill kindles with the flash of great guns. I count the fleeces of white smoke that dot the Ridge, as battery after battery opens upon our line, until from the ends of the growing arc they sweep down upon it in mighty Xs of fire. I count till that devil's girdle numbers thirteen batteries, and my heart cries out, 'Great God, when shall the end be?' There is a poem I learned in childhood, and so did you; it is Campbell's 'Hohenlinden.'

One line I never knew the meaning of until I read it written along that hill! It has lighted up the whole poem for me with the glow of battle forever:

‘And louder than the bolts of heaven,
Far flashed the red artillery.’

“At this moment General Granger’s aides are dashing out with an order; they radiate over the field, to the left, right and front: ‘Take the Ridge if you can’—‘Take the Ridge if you can’—and so it went along the line. But the advance had already set forth without it. Stout-hearted Wood, the iron-gray veteran, is rallying on his men.

“And now you have one of the most startling episodes of the war; I can not remember it in words; dictionaries are beggarly things. But I may tell you they did not storm that mountain as you think. They dash out a little way, and then slacken; they creep up, hand over hand, loading and firing, and wavering and halting, from the first line of works to the second; they burst into a charge with a cheer, and go over it. Sheets of flame baptize them; plunging shot tear away comrades on the left and right; it is no longer shoulder to shoulder, it is God for us all! Under tree trunks, among rocks, stumbling over the dead, struggling with the living, facing the steady fire of eight thousand infantry poured down upon their heads as if it were the old historic curse from heaven, they wrestle with the Ridge. Ten, fifteen, twenty minutes go by like a reluctant century. The batteries roll like a dream; between the second and last lines of rebel works is the torrid zone of the battle; the hill sways up like a wall before them at an angle of forty-five degrees, but our brave mountaineers are climbing steadily on—up—upward still! You may think it strange, but I would not have recalled them if I could. They would have lifted you, as they did me, in full view of the heroic grandeur; they seemed to be spurning the dull earth under their feet, and going up to do Homeric battle with the greater gods.

“What colors were first upon the mountain battlement I dare not try to say; bright honor itself may be proud to bear—nay, proud to follow the hindmost. Foot by foot they had fought up the steep, slippery with much blood; let them go to glory together. But this I can declare, the Sev-

enty-ninth and Eighty-sixth Indiana, of Wood's division, fairly ran over the rifle pits, and left their whole line in the rear, and their breathless color bearers led the way. A minute and they were all there, fluttering along the Ridge from left to right. The rebel hordes rolled off to the north, rolled off to the east, like the clouds of a worn-out storm!"

Besides the eleven regiments in the two divisions of Wood and Sheridan, Indiana had nine others taking part in that most glorious of battles. Johnson's division supported Sheridan, on the right, and had with him the Thirty-eighth, Forty-second and Eighty-eighth Indiana regiments. Baird's division, including the Tenth, Seventy-fourth, Seventy-fifth, Eighty-second, Eighty-seventh and One Hundred and First Indiana regiments, was on the left of Wood. The order was to take the rifle pits at the foot of the Ridge, but when they were taken the men were not satisfied. It is beyond all question that the Seventy-ninth and Eighty-sixth Indiana regiments (combined that day under the command of Colonel Fred Kneffler) inspired the movement to attempt the crest itself. They were the first to break out of the rifle pits and start up the slope of the Ridge, but they had no sooner begun the movement than the whole of Wood's division followed after them. The spirit spread to the division of Sheridan, and its gallant men were seen springing from rock to rock, from tree to tree. When the movement was first noticed by those on Orchard Knob word was sent recalling the troops. It did not reach Wood's division, but did, at least, get to Wagner's brigade of Sheridan. That gallant brigade, containing five Indiana regiments, was halted in pursuance of that command, and lost a large number of men before it again started up the hill. Halted, it would not fall back, and seeing the troops of Wood still climbing the hill, without orders it once more joined in the rush for the top, and was the first of Sheridan's division to reach the crest.

The Confederate center was broken, and as the routed troops were pushed back, they were met by the victorious brigades of Hooker. Bragg managed to save his right wing, which had been battling all day against Sherman, but his center and left were broken to pieces. Hooker had been delayed by the destroyed bridge across Chattanooga Creek,

but when he crossed he pushed forward with his usual impetuosity. He still had with him the division of Cruft, who reached the crest. The crest is very narrow and Hooker arranged his seven brigades with Cruft in the center. Stewart's Confederate division hastily occupied some breastworks that had been constructed by the Federals on the night of the 20th of September. Cruft attacked them in front, while Osterhaus and Geary advanced on the right and left. The Confederates were soon driven back to a second line of works, which they were speedily forced to leave. Once started on a retreat Hooker gave them no rest and the retreat became a rout, and hundreds were captured.

Then the whole line of Bragg fell back in rapid retreat, while Sheridan as rapidly pushed the pursuit. Chickamauga had been avenged, and the glory was divided between the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Potomac, and the Army of the Tennessee. Had Sherman's success been as complete as that of Thomas and Hooker, little would have been left of Bragg's army. The material trophies of the victory were forty guns, more than six thousand prisoners and a large number of flags. Beatty's brigade, in which were the Seventy-ninth and Eighty-sixth Indiana, captured eight guns. Wood's division alone captured seven colors and more than 2000 stand of arms.

As has been said the flag of the Eighty-sixth was the first to appear on the crest, while that of the Fifteenth was the first of its brigade. At one time the Fifty-seventh was deployed two hundred yards in advance of its brigade, driving the enemy's skirmishers before it. When the command was given to take the crest it sprang forward, but, unfortunately, when about half way up the slope it received an order to fall back. That order caused the regiment to lose fearfully. When Cruft was ordered to attack Stewart the Ninth dashed forward, driving back the heavy skirmish line of the enemy, and then fiercely assaulted the main line. In Sherman's attack on the Ridge, Loomis's brigade, in which were the Twelfth and One Hundredth Indiana, was on the extreme right of the line. The One Hundredth was the first regimental organization to reach the summit, and was nearer the Confederate line than any other regiment of Sherman's army. At one time the Federal skirmish line

was being driven back. Captain Brouse, of Company K, of the One Hundredth, volunteered to take his company and reinforce the skirmishers. The offer was accepted and Company K charged with such impetuosity as to drive the Confederate line back to and across the railroad embankment. There the Captain maintained the fight, his men firing from one side of the embankment while the enemy fired from the other. While encouraging his men the Captain was terribly wounded. Of the four regiments in the entire army of Grant sustaining the heaviest loss in killed and wounded, three were from Indiana. The losses of the four were: Fifteenth Indiana, 199; Fortieth Indiana, 158; Ninety-seventh Ohio, 149; One Hundredth Indiana, 112. The One Hundredth lost more than any other regiment that fought under Sherman.

The heaviest loss of any brigade in Grant's army was that of Wagner's brigade of Sheridan's division. Its loss in killed and wounded was 730. It was composed of seven regiments, four of them from Indiana. The four Indiana regiments lost 513, and the other three regiments 217. The total loss of Sheridan's division was 1328. It contained five Indiana regiments, and twenty regiments from other States. The five Indiana regiments lost 561, while the total loss of the other twenty regiments was but 767; the average of the five Indiana regiments was 112, while that of the other twenty regiments was thirty-eight. The Army of the Cumberland, containing twenty-two Indiana regiments, and one hundred and twenty-seven regiments and batteries from other States, lost, in killed and wounded, 3997; that of the twenty-two Indiana regiments was 1010, or an average of nearly forty-six; that of the one hundred and twenty-seven regiments and batteries from other States was 2987, or an average of a little more than twenty-three. The average Indiana loss was about double that of the others. This excess of loss of the Indiana regiments held good in about all the brigades and divisions of the army. Thus, two Indiana regiments in Grose's brigade lost thirty-six; four other regiments twenty-eight; two Indiana regiments in Beatty's brigade lost seventy-four; five other regiments 101; three Indiana regiments in Vandever's brigade lost sixty-nine; four other regiments ninety-four. This last is

the only case where the average of the regiments of other States equaled that of Indiana.

The four Indiana regiments in Wagner's brigade lost 513; the total loss of Howard's Eleventh corps was 331; of Hooker's Twelfth corps, 341; of Palmer's Fourteenth corps, 941. The next heaviest loss of a division was that of Wood, 1028. The five Indiana regiments lost 220, an average of forty-four; the remaining twenty regiments lost 808, an average of forty. The total loss in killed and wounded in the Army of the Tennessee was 1495. Of this, five Indiana regiments lost 181, an average of thirty-six. Fifty other regiments lost 1314, an average of twenty-six. The One Hundredth Indiana lost 112, being a greater loss than any other regiment in the army. The entire loss of Indiana in that great battle was in killed and wounded, only five in all the Indiana regiments being reported missing. These comparisons of losses are given, not to disparage the regiments of other States, but simply to show that Indiana regiments were in the hottest of the fighting, whether it was on Lookout Mountain; with Sherman fighting for the tunnel; or with Thomas in the center. It was Indiana's glory that its troops were thus chosen to lead movements of so much moment, and that they fought to the finish with such distinguished gallantry. The following table shows the losses in killed and wounded of Indiana regiments:

Regiments.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
6th	13	63	76
9th	2	23	25
10th	11	11
12th	10	50	60
15th	24	175	199
22d	3	42	45
32d	9	35	44
35th	11	11
36th	1	10	11
38th	9	9
40th	20	138	158
42d	8	34	42
57th	2	89	91
58th	5	60	65

Regiments.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
59th	1	1
68th	3	22	25
74th	2	16	18
75th	4	15	19
79th	28	28
82d	4	16	20
83d	3	3
86th	6	40	46
87th	2	13	15
88th	1	16	17
99th	3	3
100th	7	105	112
101st	2	33	35
Total	<u>128</u>	<u>1061</u>	<u>1189</u>

CHAPTER LVI.

EAST TENNESSEE AND TEXAS.

From the very outbreak of the war President Lincoln was deeply interested in giving relief to the loyal people of East Tennessee. A very large majority of the people of that end of the State were intense adherents of the Government, and as the war progressed they were forced to submit to many hardships and severities at the hands of the Confederates. Guerrilla bands infested the mountains and robbed and pillaged without mercy; the jails were filled with those who took an active stand in favor of the old government, and hundreds were forced into the insurgent armies by the merciless conscription acts of the Confederate Government. President Lincoln held that it was the duty of the Government to afford relief to its friends, if possible, and that if Eastern Tennessee could be wrested from the Confederates, thousands of its brave mountaineers would enroll themselves in the armies of the Union.

When General Sherman was in command in Kentucky, in 1861, the President urged all these considerations upon him, but at that time it appeared impossible, with the troops at his command, to make the campaign suggested. When Buell took command the President again urged this matter with all the force he could, but Buell planned another campaign. At last, however, an expedition was started and Cumberland Gap was seized, as has been narrated in another chapter. Its failure was a terrible disappointment to the long-suffering people of East Tennessee, and hundreds of them, despairing of the Union, voluntarily united with the Confederate forces. In 1863 the Government de-

terminated to make another effort to wrest East Tennessee from the Confederates, and General Burnside was ordered to organize a force for that purpose. As there were no Indiana troops directly connected with Burnside's entry into Tennessee and his defense of Knoxville, we shall pass on quickly over that part of the war, pausing only to tell of one Indiana brigade that had much to do with the defense of East Tennessee, and which, in a campaign of only a few months, suffered more hardships than fell, perhaps, to the lot of any other brigade in the army during the same length of time.

Burnside, in accordance with orders, had pushed on to Knoxville, driving out the Confederate forces. After Bragg had forced Rosecrans back to Chattanooga, he detached Longstreet and sent him to operate against Burnside, in East Tennessee. It was then the Indiana regiments came into active campaign work.

In 1863 there was an urgent demand for troops and a call was made for six months' men. Under that call Indiana raised four regiments, the One Hundred and Fifteenth, One Hundred and Sixteenth, One Hundred and Seventeenth and One Hundred and Eighteenth. They were brigaded together and made a part of the division of General Wilcox and attached to the Ninth corps. They were rapidly moved to Cumberland Gap. This was practically a brigade of boys, for it was mainly made up of volunteers from sixteen to twenty-three years of age, quite a number being under sixteen.

Almost at the moment that Bragg began his hasty retreat from Missionary Ridge, General Grant issued orders for the movement of troops to the relief of Burnside at Knoxville. He first ordered Granger with the Fourth corps, but as that officer did not move with the expedition expected of him, his corps was attached to the Army of the Tennessee, and General Sherman was put in command of the whole. At the same time Grant ordered Wilcox to move from Cumberland Gap toward Knoxville. Wilcox at once put his command in motion, and then the trials of the Indiana brigade began.

General Jones, in command of a part of the Confederate forces, became aggressive, but on October 6 Wilcox

moved from Cumberland Gap to Morristown, and Jones's aggressive movement was checked. When Wilcox received orders to move to the relief of Burnside, his troops were almost destitute of clothing, and were poorly equipped in every way. Winter was approaching, and even had the command remained at Cumberland Gap it would have been almost impossible to supply it with the necessary equipments, as the line of communication was long, and over roads that were often almost impassable. To move them still farther into the mountains was but to make their condition measurably worse. This the General and the men knew, but there was no hesitation.

Grant started three columns to the aid of Burnside—one under Sherman, on the south side of the river, one from Decherd, under Elliott, and one under Foster, from Cumberland Gap. Foster had been assigned to the command at Knoxville, but had not been able to reach that point, and had been placed in command of all the troops composing what was called the left wing of the Army of East Tennessee. When it moved from Cumberland Gap the Indiana brigade, under Colonel Mehan, was sent to Tazewell to threaten Longstreet's communications.

This movement of Wilcox was alarming for Longstreet, as it put an aggressive force on his flank and rear. He at once saw the necessity of driving back this Federal force, and faced his whole army in that direction. His advance soon struck the Federal cavalry, and heavy skirmishing resulted, the cavalry slowly retiring on its infantry support. On the first of December, 1863, Longstreet undertook to force a passage of Clinch River at Walker's Ford. This ford was defended by the Indiana brigade, and a heavy fight resulted. The defense of the Ford was successful, and on the afternoon of the 2d Longstreet withdrew.

This movement of Wilcox had results far out of proportion to the number of his troops. It caused Longstreet to turn aside from his movement against Knoxville, and detained him two days, thus giving Sherman that much time to get his army within striking distance. This forced Longstreet to undertake to capture Knoxville by assault, but Burnside had used those two days to good advantage, and had so strengthened his defenses as to make

the assault a failure. It is more than probable that had Longstreet moved promptly on Knoxville instead of trying to drive back Wilcox, he would have found that place so weakly defended that his assault would have been successful before Sherman could get up. Thus the Indiana brigade really had more to do with the relief of Knoxville than history has given it credit for.

Knoxville had been relieved, but the Indiana brigade was left to guard the two crossings of Clinch River—Tazewell and Walker's Ford—and from October to February, it received rations for only thirty days. The men were often reduced to living on one ear of corn a day. Beef on foot was driven over the roads, but the cattle were so poor and lean as to furnish but little sustenance to the troops. No other supplies could be obtained. There were few overcoats in the brigade, and before the winter fairly began the men were barefooted, and were driven to the necessity of making moccasins out of the raw hides of the cattle killed, or out of the few blankets left. Their clothing was almost gone, and in this condition they were compelled to be on the move almost constantly, as the enemy was very aggressive.

It was the severest winter known for many years in that section. The men could not be put into winter quarters, as they were kept marching and counter-marching from Tazewell to Walker's Ford. The two points were ten miles apart, yet the brigade made the march between them five times in one week. There were a few small water mills in the mountains, and their possession passed between Federals and Confederates almost weekly. When the mills were in the hands of the Federals they were able to grind into meal what corn they could get. At other times they were compelled to pound it as best they could, or parch it and make that suffice. At one time the Confederates undertook to get in the rear of the brigade and seize the Gap. The Indianians marched thirty miles that night over roads deep in mud, and reached the Gap just in time to save it. The One Hundred and Seventeenth regiment was cut off from the rest of the brigade, and only escaped capture by crawling over the cone of the mountain. Longstreet was then on his retreat, and the One Hundred and

Seventeenth got caught between two wings of his army. Colonel Saylor, who commanded the One Hundred and Seventeenth at the time, thus tells the story:

"About 4 o'clock in the evening of the 14th of December, the enemy had passed through Mulberry Gap east of us, and with a strong force, reported to be two brigades, took possession of the road leading north of the Gap to Clinch River, where our brigade was stationed, capturing a supply train for Knoxville. The firing on the train guard was the first notice we had that the enemy was in our rear. . . . As soon as dark came on, the camp-fires of the enemy lighted up the valleys on each side of us as far as we could see, up and down both the Clinch and the Holston valleys. Our regiment, of about five hundred men, was hedged in between the two armies, or, in other words, we were in the center of Longstreet's forces; which made our position look desperate in the extreme. There was but one avenue of escape, and that looked very unpromising; the only hope being to climb the mountain on the west side of the Gap, which was deemed impossible, and would have been to men in less desperate circumstances.

"We were unable to take anything with us except arms and ammunition. No rations could be carried, and most of the men left blankets and overcoats behind. After great danger and labor we succeeded in gaining the mountain's crest, and after marching, or rather crawling, among the rocks and chasms, succeeded in reaching our forces on the south side of the mountain, about eight miles below the Clinch Gap."

Of the after movement of the regiment Colonel Saylor gives a graphic account, and as it is a true picture of the hardships of the Indiana brigade we quote from it:

"We were immediately marched to the extreme right wing, and placed in line of battle under fire of a rebel battery, placed on our right on the heights above us, which enfiladed our line, but fortunately did us little damage. This position we held the entire day, repelling the infantry attacks in our front, until night came on, and then covered the rear of our forces to near Strawberry Plains. The men having been called to arms the day before without an opportunity to get supper, had had nothing to eat since. The

next day we marched through mud and rain until one o'clock when we went into camp, without shelter of any kind, overcoats or blankets. There we remained until the next day, when we received a small ration of black, smutty wheat flour, after two days' constant marching and fighting. The men were without a vessel of any kind to cook their flour in, but the soldiers were equal to the occasion. They put the flour on their rubber blankets, poured water over it and made a stiff dough. This they stuck on, or wound around one end of their ramrods, and held it over the fire until baked, and then ate, to them, the sweetest and best bread they had ever tasted.

"From this place we went into camp in a wood the men called 'Starvation Hollow,' where was issued one ear of corn to each man for one day's rations. I remember distinctly that was our Christmas dinner in 1863. From 'Starvation Hollow' we moved to Strawberry Plains, eighteen miles above Knoxville, and remained there until New Year's morning, 1864, known as the cold New Year's day throughout the whole country, when we were ordered to Monroe Gap, or Hamilton Station, twenty-seven miles away. During this march most of the men were nearly barefoot, and many of them were severely frostbitten, while all suffered terribly. When we went into camp the men had no shelter except what they could make out of cedar bushes.

"We remained at this station a few days when we were ordered to cross the Clinch River at Walker's Ford, which we did by wading in ice cold water to the men's waists. By this time most of the men were barefooted, and left blood in the snow, and on the frozen ground, that marked the line of march. Yet through all these trials and sufferings the men were patient and obedient, and as uncomplaining as men could be under such circumstances."

The losses by death in this brigade in the short space of six months were terrible, being eight per cent. The deaths were nearly all caused by hardships, only a few by battle. At the close of their service the men returned to Indiana and were mustered out. Few brigades, if any, suffered as many privations and hardships, or did more effective service.

There is one scene of the closing days of 1863 and the opening days of 1864 that is not pleasant to dwell upon. The historian will always approach the Texas campaign with feelings of disgust, so fraught was it with blunders. Its conception was a blunder, but could hardly have been otherwise, since it was almost wholly political.

General Grant was ever restless when not in action. Immediately after the surrender of Vicksburg he mapped out a new campaign, the objective point being Mobile, first, and to the rear of Richmond second. He wanted to unite with Banks in Louisiana and capture Mobile, thus obtaining a new base on the Gulf. This would still further separate the Confederacy into sections, and from there he could move to the rear of Richmond, doing what Sherman did from Savannah in 1865. Halleck was in chief command and would not listen to this daring scheme of the only thoroughly successful General the North had. He thought of nothing but disintegrating the victorious Army of the Tennessee, and sending detachments here, there and everywhere, into far distant regions. His heart seemed to be set on getting possession of what might well be termed the outposts of the Confederacy, without being able to comprehend that if the heart of the secession were eaten out the outposts would fall of themselves. Arkansas, Western Louisiana and Texas had a fascination for him. He acted as if he thought that if he could once get possession of the territory west of the Mississippi River, he could, by some undeveloped method, choke the Confederacy to death. Either that, or he was afraid that if Grant was left in command of his triumphant army he would achieve other victories, and would thus overshadow him at Washington. Whatever may have been his motive, however, he ordered Grant to divide his army, sending a part to Rosecrans, a part to Banks in Louisiana, and a part to Arkansas.

Banks had been placed in command in Louisiana in December, 1862, with orders to capture and hold several points in Western Louisiana. This was as much a commercial as a military expedition. It was believed that in Western Louisiana would be found vast amounts of cotton, the sale of which would, to some extent, replenish the national treasury. He succeeded fairly well in his first expedition.

capturing Opelousas. In 1863, when Grant began his active movement against Vicksburg, Banks was ordered to proceed against Port Hudson, the only other Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi. He laid siege to it, and a few days after Vicksburg surrendered Port Hudson fell. It was then that Grant conceived his scheme of capturing Mobile.

As has been said, Halleck preferred a plan of his own, and Grant was ordered to send large reinforcements to Banks, who was to move against what is known as the Teche country. Grant sent the reinforcements as ordered and went himself to New Orleans to consult with Banks. While there the defeat of Rosecrans at Chickamauga caused the prompt recall of Grant to Tennessee. While Grant was preparing to drive Bragg from Missionary Ridge Banks sent a large force into Western Louisiana, and his disasters began. Incapacity was displayed everywhere.

Grant, in obedience to Halleck's orders, sent Banks the Thirteenth corps. Under McClellan, and one of his favorite commanders in the Peninsula campaign, was General Franklin. He had fallen under the displeasure of the Government at the battle of Fredericksburg. He was really an accomplished officer, but General Burnside accused him of failure to second his efforts properly in that bloody battle, and, in consequence, he had been relieved from command. From that time he had vainly asked for active service, but it was not until the Government became urgent about the Texas expedition that he was successful in his application. He was sent to Banks. It would have been better for the country had he been put in chief command.

Three plans of operations against Texas presented themselves—one by the way of Red River, one overland from New Orleans, and one by the Gulf and the Rio Grande. In 1863 an attempt by the way of Red River was made and failed, and then Banks tried an expedition overland. It also ended in failure. Halleck was persistent and preferred the overland route, but General Banks determined to use the navy and proceed to the mouth of the Rio Grande. To divert the attention of the enemy from the real point of attack Franklin was ordered to make a demonstration up the Bayou Teche. It was poorly equipped for an ex-

pedition that was sure to meet with determined opposition, and many of the officers seemed to vie with each other in incompetency.

Franklin had with him the Nineteenth corps, and Lawler's and Washburne's divisions of the Thirteenth corps. He was to carry on this demonstration as far as Opelousas, and as soon as he heard of the departure of the fleet withdraw and unite his troops in the vicinity of Brashear City, to be ready to embark for Texas should they be needed. Banks sailed on the 26th of October. Upon receiving news of the sailing Franklin recalled his forces that had been sent in the direction of Alexandria. It was an open country and Franklin did not hesitate to separate his divisions by forty-five miles, the distance from Bayou Bourbeaux to New Iberia. On the 2d of November the Nineteenth corps halted at Vermillionville. The third division of the Thirteenth corps, under Washburne, and Burbridge's brigade of Lawler's division of the same corps, did not break camp. There had been a few musket shots with roving bands of Confederate cavalry, but no one dreamed of the presence of an active enemy.

General Richard Taylor was in command of the Confederate forces, and was a most active and enterprising officer. He had fallen back before the advance of Franklin, but he again moved forward when that officer began his retrograde movement. He had but a small force, but he was ever watchful, waiting an opportune moment to strike. The Federals either kept no scouts, or were supremely confident that no force would attack them. At last his opportunity came, and he availed himself of it with his accustomed energy. Washburne's division was on the banks of the Carrion Crow, while Burbridge's brigade, about 1800 strong, was at Bayou Bourbeaux. The two detachments were separated by several miles. Burbridge was resting in fancied security, and one of his regiments was engaged in voting, it being the day of the election.

Taylor knew of the isolated position of Burbridge, and determined to assail him. He sent a regiment of cavalry to make a demonstration against Washburne's division, and advanced with the rest of his forces against Burbridge. He masked his troops in a wood that skirted the Bayou. All

was rest and jollity in the Union camp, and not a picket was out to bring a warning of impending danger. Suddenly Taylor fell upon the Sixty-seventh Indiana regiment, occupying the Union right. The regiment was not given time to form or take arms, but was crushed by the suddenness of the blow, losing several hundred prisoners. The rest of the brigade hastily took arms and a brisk fight ensued, the Federals managing to save their artillery. The Confederate cavalry made their appearance galloping across the prairie, on the opposite side from their infantry, threatening to cut off the retreat of the Federals. Then the whole Federal line broke in confusion, and was vigorously pressed by the enemy. Soon the prairie was covered with wagons and fugitives, who scattered in every direction.

Fortunately General Washburne heard the sound of the battle and joined Burbridge, ordering up his division, which promptly marched to the relief of their comrades, and arrived just in time to save the remnant of Burbridge's brigade. Taylor saw that he would now have an unequal battle to fight, so he contented himself with the success he had already won, and fell back, carrying with him more than 500 prisoners. This rout of the Union troops was wholly the fault of Burbridge, for had he been prepared he could have successfully resisted any assault Taylor could have made until reinforcements reached him. In this disastrous fight Indiana had four regiments, the Forty-sixth, Forty-seventh, Sixtieth and Sixty-seventh. The last two were in Burbridge's brigade, and the first two in the relieving force.

Banks's expedition to the mouth of the Rio Grande was moderately successful, and he managed to get control of that stream as far as Brownsville. He was thus able to intercept the trade that had been going on between Mexico and the Confederacy, but he was not able to penetrate the interior, and finally returned to New Orleans. Then Halleck insisted on a movement up Red River. General Grant was ordered to send another corps to Banks, but he vigorously protested, saying that he would have need of all his troops for his own campaign in the spring. He insisted that the real point to attack was Mobile, but Seward joined with Halleck and the great cotton speculation expedition

was begun. Grant sent A. J. Smith and his corps, with the distinct promise of Banks that they should be returned in one month. They did not get back to the Army of the Tennessee until December, 1864, just in time to help Thomas crush Hood at Nashville.

CHAPTER LVII.

THE OPENING OF 1864.

The year 1863 had been, on the whole, successful for the Union cause. It had opened with the terrible disaster at Chancellorsville, followed by the invasion of Maryland. Grant and Rosecrans were apparently idle in the West. The Government was putting forth all its efforts, but the cost of the struggle in men and treasure, and the little apparent headway that had been made in 1861-2, had caused many of the Northern people almost to abandon hope of eventual success. A few, however, chief among them being President Lincoln, did not despair. He was upheld by the Governors of some of the loyal States, such as Morton, Andrew and Curtin, and by the rank and file in the armies. Doubt of success might find a lodgement in the breasts of the politicians, statesmen and great financiers, but no such doubt was ever heard in the camp. There the boys in blue believed that they would at last win the victory.

After Chancellorsville came the glorious victory of Gettysburg and the capture of Vicksburg. Then the tide of secession began to run backward, slowly at first, but with increasing volume until the end came. Rosecrans' strategy had pushed Bragg out of Chattanooga, and the strategy of Bragg had in turn come very near not only recapturing that gateway to the Southwest, but destroying the grand Army of the Cumberland. Two things defeated his plans, or rather, rendered them nugatory—the unsurpassed fighting qualities of the Army of the Cumberland, and the failure of Bragg's Generals to seize the opportunities that were open to them. The high tide of the Confederate cause

had been reached. Chickamauga was to be the last victory for the South. It is true the Confederates were to be able to sometimes repulse, for the time being, Federal attacks, but no other important victory was to be inscribed upon their banners.

Chickamauga was to be followed by Orchard Knob, Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and then by the relief of Knoxville, thus checkmating the last distinctively aggressive movements of their armies in the West, until, in the closing months of 1864, Hood began the campaign that proved fatal, not only to his army, but to his cause. In the East Meade had done little after Gettysburg, and Lee remained in his front defiant, if not confident. All the Federal forces in the West and Southwest, except in Louisiana and Texas, were placed under Grant, the one man who seemed able to achieve success, and such success as to materially damage the cause of the South. It is true that he had not succeeded in wholly destroying Bragg's army, but he had so injured and crippled it that the South could never again make it as strong as it had been before Missionary Ridge, either in numbers or dash. It is also true that, through the impetuosity and daring courage of his own army, he missed the great success he desired. It is possible that had not the divisions of Wood and Sheridan, moving without orders, so completely broken the right wing of the Confederates by climbing the ridge, Grant would have gotten Hooker and Sherman so far in the rear of Bragg as to have practically destroyed him. But wherever Grant commanded, victory had been won, and the country was beginning to turn its eyes toward him as the one to lead the Union armies to final victory.

During the winter of 1863-4 Grant proposed a plan of campaign in the West, but Halleck did not see any merit in it. Napoleon's theory of war was to divide an army for subsistence, and concentrate it for fighting. But Halleck acted as if he believed in the reverse of this—divide to fight and concentrate for subsistence. Halleck had been placed in command of all the armies with a great flourish of trumpets, and from his well-carpeted office in Washington at-

judgment or discretion of those who commanded in the field. In this he was but the forerunner of the "Naval Strategy Board," that became so offensive during the war with Spain.

The President now reached the conclusion that some other head of the Army should be chosen, but would not make the movement himself. There had been, especially in the East, a jealousy among the general officers that had materially crippled the Army of the Potomac, and it was felt that to put a man in command of all the armies who would be outranked by many of his subordinates would only intensify the jealousies already existing. It was determined by Congress to give the direction of the war to some one else than Halleck, so a bill was introduced creating the office of Lieutenant General, and providing in it that the President might assign whoever was promoted to that rank to the command of all the forces. The bill became a law and General Grant was promptly nominated to the Senate and confirmed. This was the beginning of the end. From this time military skill and not military dilettanteism was to govern in the conduct of the war, and all the armies were to move in unison, and with one well-defined purpose—the overthrow and destruction of the armies of the South. Armies and not towns or cities were to be the objective points in this new plan of movement. The occupation of territory was no longer to be the prime object, and better than all else, all the armies were to move at the same time, and to keep moving. There was to be no more falling back. Grant was to take command of the Army of the Potomac in person, while supervising and directing the movements of all the other forces. The only digression from this well conceived plan of campaign was when Grant reluctantly yielded to the urgent representations of Secretary Seward, and let Banks turn from the expedition against Mobile, as prescribed by Grant, to his almost fatal invasion of Texas.

In October, 1863, the Government called for 300,000 men, and this call had only been partly complied with, when, preparing for the decisive year of 1864, another call for 200,000 men was made in March. The troops furnished under the calls of October, 1863, and February, 1864, did


not wholly replace the losses during 1863, by discharges and expiration of terms of enlistment, so, immediately upon the promotion of General Grant to the command of all the armies, the additional call for 200,000 men was made. No better illustration of the confidence inspired by this promotion can be given than is told in the response by the people to the call for 200,000 men in March. Under the calls of October, 1863, and February, 1864, aggregating 500,000 men, only 317,000 were furnished. Under the call of March, 1864, for 200,000, the States furnished 259,515, fifty-nine thousand more than called for. Every State, with the exception of Vermont, Delaware and Michigan, furnished an excess over its quota. Nearly all of the men under this call were ready for service when the campaign opened in May.

The situation, when Grant took supreme command, was as follows: Meade and Lee were confronting each other on the Rapidan, the former with 100,000 and the latter with about 85,000. To Meade's army could be added the Ninth corps, under Burnside, numbering about 30,000, and several detached bodies of troops. Sherman was at Chattanooga with more than one hundred thousand, confronting General Joseph E. Johnston, who had replaced Bragg, with about an equal number. Banks was in Louisiana, and there were troops in Kentucky, Missouri and Arkansas. Before taking up in detail the various movements after Grant became Commander-in-chief, let us tell the story of what has become known as the "Meridian Raid."

General Grant had planned a movement with Mobile as his final objective, with Atlanta and Montgomery intermediate. General Sherman was sent to make a demonstration from Memphis, with instructions to destroy the railroad completely as far as Meridian, Mississippi. While this was being done the Army of the Cumberland made several tentative movements to develop the intentions of Longstreet in East Tennessee, and Johnston in Northern Georgia. These movements entailed hard marches, and some fighting, but resulted in no definite good.

The Meridian expedition was well conceived, and promised great results. That part of it directly intrusted to General Sherman was well executed, but as so often happened during the war, a subordinate officer not only failed

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SENATOR JOSEPH E. McDONALD.

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in the part entrusted to him, but let his command meet with a great disaster. At that time, especially in the West, the Confederates were much superior in cavalry, not only in the number of sabres, but in the talent of the officers in command. The boldest and the ablest of the Confederate cavalry commanders was Forrest. He was bold in his conceptions, rapid in his execution, and a veritable thorn in the side of all the Union commanders. At the time of the "Meridian Raid," he was in Northern Mississippi. General Grant planned to have him met by a superior force and crippled effectively for some time to come.

For this purpose a force of seven thousand men was assembled at Memphis, placed under the command of General W. Sooy Smith, and ordered to move directly on Meridian, where he would meet Sherman, who was to move with an infantry force out from Vicksburg. Smith was ordered to move by the 1st of February. General Sherman cautioned him as to the usual tactics employed by Forrest; that he always attacked with vehemence, but, if no mistakes were made, could easily be overcome. Smith was ordered to be on his guard, to strenuously resist an attack, and when it was repulsed to assume a vigorous offensive with his whole force.

On the morning of the 3d of February Sherman moved out from Vicksburg with two strong columns, and pushed on to Meridian, meeting with but little opposition. There he destroyed the extensive machine shops and arsenals, while vainly waiting for General Smith, who did not make his appearance. Smith was to have started from Memphis on the 1st, but did not get away until the 12th, thus insuring the failure of the expedition. Among his command were the Seventh Indiana cavalry and Seventy-second mounted infantry.

That part of the expedition assigned to the command of General Smith was doomed to failure from the very start. He delayed so long in beginning his march that co-operation with Sherman was out of the question. He was to meet and drive Forrest from Northern Mississippi, or to so cripple him that he would be barred from interfering with the plans of Grant for some months to come. Smith moved so deliberately that the news of his expedition got far in ad-

vance of him. Forrest thus learned not only of the movement, but its strength, and became convinced that even with the inferior numbers he was able to bring into the field he could win a victory.

He prepared to meet Smith, and for two or three days smart skirmishing took place between parts of the two opposing forces. On the morning of February 22, 1864, while in the presence of the enemy, who were plainly bent on forcing a fight, Smith ordered his men to fall back in column, instead of in line of battle. Forrest was quick to see and seize the opportunity thus offered him, and with characteristic impetuosity dashed upon the exposed column. The Fourth Regulars in the rear resisted with great determination. The Seventy-second Indiana was dismounted and formed in line. At about that time the Regulars were compelled to fall back. Between them and the Seventy-second were two regiments of Tennessee cavalry. Without waiting to fire a shot those two regiments broke in the wildest confusion and fled panic stricken, right over the line of the Seventy-second, sweeping away a number of the horses belonging to the Indiana regiment. In their flight they also forced the artillery into a field bisected with deep ravines, where the guns had to be abandoned.

As soon as the fleeing Tennesseans were out of the way the Seventy-second with cool deliberation opened on the pursuing enemy with their Spencers and compelled Forrest to halt. Here a desperate struggle took place until Forrest succeeded in outflanking the Indianians, and they were compelled to retreat with some loss, but still in good order. Later the Seventy-second again formed across the road, and checked the pursuit. Of the conduct of the Seventy-second in this disastrous battle, General Smith, under date of March 19, 1864, wrote:

"To the Seventy-second Indiana Mounted Infantry is justly due the glory of saving the entire expedition from rout and ruin on the afternoon of February 22. On that occasion the Seventy-second established the reputation it has long enjoyed of being one of the bravest, coolest and most irresistible regiments in the army. You were run over by four regiments of your brigade in the morning, in a perfect stampede; yet, nothing abashed, you waited to fight

rather than follow those who were retreating. The enemy came upon you three brigades strong; they were flanking and overwhelming you, yet not a man moved from his post until General Grierson ordered you to fall back, when you moved off as orderly as it was possible under the circumstances. Your men exhibited no signs of panic, or that excitement which is usually exhibited by the best regiments on such occasions; but every man appeared perfectly cool and self-possessed, and even appeared delighted at the prospect of cutting up the enemy when they should get him on open ground.

"In the engagement in the afternoon, when the enemy was finally checked for the day, the indomitable heroism of the Seventy-second Indiana was gloriously conspicuous. You were assailed in front and on both flanks by not less than eight regiments of the enemy, yet you held your position, cutting the enemy down as fast as he approached, until, convinced he could never meet you on equal terms, he moved a heavy column on either flank, and actually fired two volleys in your rear; when, disdaining to see so noble a band of men struggling against such fearful odds and disadvantages, I ordered you to fall back. Your men obeyed slowly and reluctantly, taking their time to it, and still keeping up a regular fire on the enemy until he ceased to pursue."

Let us now turn once more to Texas. Early in 1864 General Grant again urged his scheme of capturing Mobile, and from there operating against the rear of Richmond. At New Orleans, and at different points in Louisiana and Texas, the Government had large forces, which Grant insisted should be utilized for the capture of Mobile. This plan was wholly military. It would have hermetically sealed that port to the blockade runners, and at the same time have furnished a new base for future operations, either against other points in the Cotton States or against Richmond. It would have accomplished in the first half of 1864, without costing much in blood, what Sherman did during the last months of the year, after fighting his way from Chattanooga to Atlanta. With Sherman at Mobile in February or March of 1864, he would have been in the rear of Richmond in July, and Richmond, Lee and the Southern

Confederacy would have fallen in 1864. This was the military side of the question, but the political side prevailed, and the end of the Confederacy was put off until 1865.

The same political and commercial reasons which operated to send Banks into Texas in 1863, still prevailed with Halleck and the Government at Washington. As has been said in a former chapter, Grant was ordered to send another corps to the help of Banks in this new expedition against Texas, and he sent that of A. J. Smith. Halleck's plan was an extensive one. The navy was to co-operate with Banks, and General Steele was to march through Arkansas. The point of junction between Banks and Steele was to be Alexandria. The combined movement was to begin March 16. General A. J. Smith was promptly on hand, and arrived at Alexandria on the 19th. Steele was not there, and could not get there. General Smith was in the habit of acting promptly. He had been trained in an army that did not like to remain idle in the presence of an enemy. He heard of a Confederate force not far distant from Alexandria, and on the 21st of March moved out with energy to attack it. He found the enemy, fell upon them, and captured a number of prisoners and all their cannon. This was the only gleam of success the Red River expedition of 1864 had.

There was a swarm of cotton speculators with the army, and demoralization followed. General Banks did not arrive at Alexandria until the 25th of March. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Admiral Porter said that when the boat bringing Banks arrived at Alexandria, it was "loaded down with cotton speculators, bagging, roping, champagne and ice." The army felt that the expedition was not military in its character, but was, in fact, a great cotton speculating raid. The men became careless and reckless, and it was not long until they lost all confidence in their officers, and to the discontent of the soldiers was soon added troubles among the Generals. At last a forward movement toward Sabine Cross Roads began. The army moved without any regard to military rules, and as if it was marching through a friendly country, and not that of an enemy. It was stretched out for many miles, the trains of each division following the di-

vision, and as the trains were expected to carry back immense quantities of cotton, they were very large.

At Sabine Cross Roads, Banks's advance found the enemy in strong force. Taylor had made his dispositions with skill. He had with him about 10,000 fighting men. General Lee had command of the Federal advance, and although he had a large force of cavalry made no effort to explore the country. He was followed by a train so immense that it took twelve hundred men to guard it. This was a fatal blunder, for this immense train was between him and any reinforcement, and the road was very narrow. A little before noon on April 8th Lee reached the valley back of which Taylor was waiting for him. Lee wanted to wait for reinforcements, but Banks, who was with him, ordered him to push forward, although he knew that his divisions of infantry were so far back that they could not support each other effectively. Lee could not fall back to meet reinforcements, for the immense trains were only a short distance in the rear.

While Lee was hesitating about obeying the order of Banks to attack, Taylor, who wanted to have the fight over before the arrival of the rest of Banks's army, opened the battle. The fight at once became exceedingly fierce and bloody, the Federals fighting with great determination, and the Southerners charging with their usual impetuosity. The Southern officers exposed themselves recklessly, and many of them were killed. Franklin had been summoned by Banks when he found the enemy in his front, and while the fighting was going on reached the field with a few companies of Cameron's division. He arrived at an opportune moment. The Confederates had captured Nimms's battery, whose officers allowed themselves to be shot down by the side of their guns. The Confederates had just reached the skirt of the wood on the Federal left when Franklin arrived. He had double-quickened his men the entire distance from Bayou St. Patrice to Sabine Cross Roads. He was too late to repair the disaster, but he rapidly formed his fifteen hundred men on the right and left of the road and was able to hold Taylor in check for a moment. He was soon, however, driven back into the woods. The Federal artillery could neither fire nor maneuver in the woods, and the road

was encumbered by Lee's trains. At last the artillery drivers abandoned their guns to the enemy, and with their teams thrust themselves in the midst of the train wagons, which the demoralized Federals had been vainly endeavoring to turn for retreat. It was not long until the rout was complete. The fugitives dispersed themselves in the woods, abandoning to the enemy the possession of the trains. A few overturned wagons obstructed the way and Taylor's soldiers captured about two hundred and fifty. They also captured 2000 prisoners, twenty cannon and several flags. The fighting had only lasted one hour. Taylor vigorously pressed the pursuit, the fugitives, in their flight, throwing away their muskets, and thousands of them were gathered up by the Confederates.

Emory heard the sound of the battle, and was pressing forward with his splendid division when he was met by the swarm of fugitives who, with ambulances, wagons, artillery caissons and cavalry, rushed through his columns. To stop this mad flight Emory caused his men to cross bayonets. This forced the demoralized men to turn aside, but did not stop their flight. The balls of the pursuing enemy began to fall in his lines. He did not lose a moment. The Sixty-first New York regiment, which had the advance, rapidly deployed to cover the formation of the division. The Confederates rushed blindly on this line of Emory, but his four thousand veterans stood fast and the slaughter was terrible as the Confederates charged again and again. It was almost a muzzle to muzzle fight. It only lasted about half an hour, but in that time Emory lost three hundred and fifty-six men, the Confederate loss being much greater. Night ended the conflict, and the Confederate pursuit, but the remains of the Thirteenth Corps were saved. That night Banks fell back to Grand Ecore.

There he took up a strong position, but meantime Taylor had been largely reinforced. Taylor made his dispositions for battle with his usual skill, and at 4 o'clock p. m. on April 9th, the signal was given and the Confederates rushed to the attack. At first, success was with them, and it looked as if the Federals were once more to be routed. However, A. J. Smith, at an opportune moment, moved forward and pushed the enemy back, capturing a large

number of prisoners, and the whole Federal line advanced and the Confederates were definitely repulsed everywhere.

In these two battles the Federals lost 4000 men and the Confederates 3500. In the battle of the 8th, at Sabine Cross Roads, Indiana had the following organizations: Sixteenth, Forty-sixth, Forty-seventh, Sixtieth and Sixty-seventh infantry, Twenty-first (heavy artillery), and the First battery. In that of the 9th, at Pleasant Hill, the Forty-sixth, Forty-seventh, Fifty-second (detachment), and Eighty-ninth regiments, First, Third and Ninth batteries. The fate of the expedition was sealed and Banks decided to fall back to Alexandria. By this time the fleet, which had followed up Red River, was in danger from falling water, and Banks was disposed to abandon it, and save the remnant of his army. Demoralization and insubordination became so great that General A. J. Smith openly threatened to put Banks under arrest and assume command of the army. The fleet was finally saved by the ingenuity of Colonel Elliott, and the whole expedition returned to New Orleans.

CHAPTER LVIII.

FROM CHATTANOOGA TO ATLANTA.

Lieutenant-General Grant, upon taking supreme command, at once conceived a campaign such as the history of war had never known. Never before had a commanding General armies so large, a theater so vast. All the armies of the Union were to move at his command, and he at once changed the whole order of campaigning. Hitherto towns and fortified places had been the objective points of the Union Generals. Now, opposing armies were to be the objective. Thus Sherman, who was to command in the West, was instructed that he was to go wherever Johnston did; that he was never to lose sight of him. So with Meade in the East. He was to follow and fight Lee. If Lee retired into Richmond, then Meade was to follow; if Lee moved in any other direction Meade must turn also. If Lee was destroyed Richmond would fall; without the destruction of Lee, Richmond would be a barren conquest. Three armies were to converge on Lee: Hunter from the valley, Butler, by the way of Bermuda Hundreds, and Grant, through the Wilderness. Hunter failed, Butler failed, but Grant clung so tenaciously to Lee that from the 4th of May, 1864, when the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, until the final surrender at Appomattox in 1865, the two armies were in constant and deadly touch every hour.

With the campaign in the West, however, Indiana was more closely identified, for while the State was represented with both Grant and Butler, yet by far the greatest number of Indiana troops were with Sherman. In fact Indiana furnished a very large part of the army that marched from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and from Atlanta to the sea. As

has been said Sherman was placed in command of the combined armies of the Cumberland and Tennessee, under Thomas and McPherson, respectively, and to these two armies was added that of the Ohio, under General John M. Schofield. Sherman's great part of the drama was to operate against the army formerly commanded by Bragg, but now under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest and wisest commanders the South produced. Atlanta was one of the strong strategic points of the South, and Sherman was to reach and destroy it, destroying in the meantime, if possible, the army of Johnston.

Sherman opened his great campaign with a fighting force of 99,000 men. Opposing him Johnston had 85,000. The entire distance between Chattanooga and Atlanta was through wild and rugged mountain passes, every mile of which was easy of defense. The movement really began on the 2d of May, although the orders were for the 5th. Thomas began his movement on the 2d, and then followed more than one hundred days of battle. As a military campaign, wherein brilliant generalship and rugged fighting went hand-in-hand, it has never had an equal.

With Sherman were the following Indiana organizations:

Army of the Cumberland—

Howard's Corps: Stanley's division, Thirty-first and Eighty-first, in Cruft's brigade; Thirty-fifth, in Whitaker's brigade; with this brigade served the Eighty-fourth, until August, when it was transferred to that of Grose. In Grose's brigade, Ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty-sixth and Eighty-fourth after August, and the Fifth battery. Newton's division, Fortieth and Fifty-seventh, in Wagner's brigade. Wood's division, Thirty-second, in Willich's brigade, until mustered out in August; Sixth in Hazen's brigade, until mustered out in August; Seventy-ninth and Eighty-sixth in Sam Beatty's brigade.

Palmer's Corps: Johnson's division, Forty-second and Eighty-eighth, in Carlin's brigade; Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth in Scribner's brigade. Davis's division, Twenty-second, in McCook's brigade. Baird's division, Eighty-second, in Turchin's brigade; Seventy-fifth, Eighty-seventh and One Hundred and First, in Vanderveer's brigade;

Tenth and Seventy-fourth, in Este's brigade. Seventh and Twelfth batteries.

Hooker's Corps: Williams's division, Twenty-seventh in Ruger's brigade. Butterfield's division, Seventieth, in Ward's brigade; Thirty-third and Eighty-fifth, in Ross's brigade. Rousseau's division, Seventy-third, in Granger's brigade. The Fifty-eighth acted as pontoniers.

Cavalry Corps: Garrard's division, Second and Fourth cavalry, and Eighteenth battery in Stewart's brigade; Seventeenth and Seventy-second, in Wilder's brigade. Kilpatrick's division, left wing of Third cavalry, in Klein's brigade; Eighth cavalry, in Sanderson's brigade.

Army of the Tennessee—

Fourteenth Corps: M. L. Smith's division, Eighty-second, in Lightburn's brigade. Harrow's division, Ninety-seventh, in Walcutt's brigade; Ninety-ninth, in Oliver's brigade.

Dodge's Corps: Sweeney's division, Sixty-sixth, in Rice's brigade. Veatch's division, Twenty-fifth, in Grower's brigade.

Blair's Corps: G. A. Smith's division, Twenty-third and Fifty-third, in Sanderson's brigade.

Army of the Ohio—

Hascall's Division, Eightieth and Ninety-first, in McLean's brigade; Twenty-second battery. Cox's division, Sixty-third and Sixty-fifth, in Manson's brigade, and Nineteenth battery. Stoneman's division, Fifth and Sixth cavalry. A number of these divisions and brigades changed commanders before the campaign closed.

At the opening of the campaign Johnston held his main force at Dalton, and Sherman determined to drive him from there by a flank movement. In this movement, or at least that part of it intrusted to Howard's corps, Grose's brigade, including the Ninth, Thirtieth and Thirty-sixth regiments and Fifth battery, had the advance, and was ordered to pursue the retreating enemy. On May 13 the brigade struck the Confederate rear guard and drove it through Dalton, the Ninth and Thirty-sixth being the first Union troops to enter that stronghold. Three miles south of Dalton the brigade again came upon the rear guard of Johnston, behind hastily constructed barricades. The bri-

gade charged the barricades and drove the enemy for some distance, capturing a number of prisoners.

It is impossible to follow in detail all the movements of the army during that memorable campaign and to particularize the services of the fifty or more Indiana organizations engaged in it. It is enough to say that in all the marches and in all the engagements Indiana troops were in the lead, or among the first, and that not a regiment or battery failed in doing its whole duty. Commanding officers, from brigade commanders to those of corps and armies, gave unstinted praise in their reports to the bravery, discipline and devotion of the Indiana troops.

On the 15th of May Sherman found Johnston strongly entrenched at Resaca, and almost immediately the fighting began. Carlin's brigade, in which were the Forty-second and Eighty-eighth Indiana regiments, was the first to encounter the enemy on the 15th, and by desperate fighting was able to hold its position during the entire day. Most of the fighting at Resaca was done by the two corps of Hooker and Howard. At Resaca the Seventieth Indiana was especially prominent. It was the first battle of the Seventieth, yet all admitted the regiment acted like veterans. In front of Ward's brigade was a four-gun battery, and the Seventieth was ordered to take the battery. The charge was made down a hill into a valley, across an open field and up a wooded slope to the hill crowned by the Confederate redoubt in which were the four guns. The charge was most gallantly made, and the enemy driven from the guns. The battery, however, was open to a concentrated fire from other Confederate guns, and the Seventieth could not hold the redoubt. They would not let it go, but hiding themselves as well as they could they kept up such a fire that the enemy could not retake the battery and redoubt. All day they kept those guns prisoners, as it were, and at night the guns were brought into the Union lines. In this fight the regiment lost thirty-three killed and one hundred and forty wounded.

The Fortieth and Fifty-seventh were in Wagner's brigade of Newton's division. Colonel Leonard, of the Fifty-seventh, was killed, his regiment being hotly engaged for several hours, firing, it is said, 40,000 rounds of ammunition. The result of the fighting was to compel Johnston

to abandon Resaca on the night of the 16th. The Thirty-seventh captured the flag of the Thirty-eighth Alabama.

After Johnston left Resaca it was a continuous battle for several days, the most desperate encounters taking place on the 25th and 26th in the vicinity of New Hope church. On the 25th Generals Williams and Butterfield were instructed to drive the enemy beyond New Hope church. With Williams was the Twenty-seventh Indiana, and with Butterfield were the Thirty-third, Seventieth and Eighty-fifth. The country was hilly and covered with trees and undergrowth. Williams and Butterfield dashed at the enemy with such vigor and resolution as to drive him back to the church. There the enemy was reinforced by artillery, and again his line was gallantly assaulted, but it was too strong for the Federals. Johnston had thrown his army across General Sherman's line of march, and was ready for battle. His position was a strong one, and Sherman saw that it would be necessary to concentrate a heavy force, and gave orders accordingly. All the next day was consumed in making the necessary concentration, but frequent encounters occurred.

Sherman thought to flank Johnston, but found that his line was so extended that it would be necessary to assault. Van Horne, in his "Army of the Cumberland" thus describes the assault and its result:

"General T. J. Wood's division of the Fourth corps was selected to make the assault, to be supported on the left by General R. W. Johnson's division of the Fourteenth corps, and by General McLean's brigade of General Schofield's Twenty-third corps on the right. The column was formed in the rear of the extreme left of the Twenty-third corps—Wood's division in column of six lines deep, Johnson on his left, with a brigade front. After moving a mile to the East, General Howard supposed he had reached the enemy's flank, and directed General Wood to wheel his command so as to face the south, and advance. The enemy's works were soon discovered, and upon examination of their strength the column was moved another mile to the east. Here Generals Howard and Wood reconnoitered the ground and ascertained that the line of works did not cover the whole division front, and preparation was made for attack. Johnson's division was slightly refused

on Wood's left, with Scribner's brigade in front, and McLean's brigade was sent to a point in full view of the enemy's works, a little to the right of the place of attack, to attract his attention and draw his fire.

"At 5 p. m. the entire column marched briskly forward, Hazen's brigade of Wood's division leading, and having driven back the enemy's skirmishers, assaulted his main line with great vigor. Hazen at first was without support from Johnson's division on his left, and was so heavily engaged that General Wood was compelled to move up his supporting lines. Scribner's brigade was also hurried forward on Hazen's left, but, before getting abreast of Hazen, was struck in flank from the opposite side of the creek on the left. Colonel Scribner halted, to throw out troops to cover his flank, at the crisis of the assault, and it was soon evident that it had failed. The Confederate General, Cleburne, threw his reserves and an enfilading fire upon Wood's left flank, and forced it back, and his right at the same time was subjected to a cross fire of artillery and musketry, and was almost without support, as McLean had not shown himself to the enemy nor opened fire. As both of Wood's flanks were melting away under a most destructive fire, General Howard ordered a withdrawal of the column. The retirement was made with such deliberation as permitted the removal of the wounded. General Johnson withdrew to the left and rear of the main line, and General Wood to a ridge farther to the front and right. General McLean withdrew entirely, and left the two divisions in complete isolation."

In this desperate assault General Wood lost more than fourteen hundred men, killed, wounded and missing. With Wood were the Thirty-second Indiana, in Willich's brigade, and the Sixth, in that of Hazen. With Johnson were the Thirty-seventh, Thirty-eighth, Forty-second and Eighty-eighth Indiana regiments. During the day, the enemy came out of his works in front of Newton's division, but was handsomely repulsed by Wagner's and Kimball's brigades.

Then followed another season of flanking and fighting, until Johnston formed a new and strong line with his left resting on Lost Mountain. On the 14th of June the fighting began around Kenesaw, Lost and Pine Mountains.

Johnston had chosen his position with his usual skill and had strongly fortified it. Sherman was again compelled to concentrate, and to concentrate in that country, heavily wooded, cut by ravines and covered by hills, all fortified and defended, was no slight task, and all Sherman's skill was needed. Fighting for every inch gained the Union troops continued to advance, gaining, slowly and with heavy loss, positions nearer the Confederate line. Sherman again attempted to turn Johnston's flank, but that wily General discovered it in time to check the dangerous movement. General Sherman at last determined to make an assault on Kenesaw, and the 27th of June was fixed as the time. The fighting for position had been going on for several days, and many deeds of heroic fighting were witnessed. One of the most gallant charges was made by the Thirty-first Indiana, on June 21. On the afternoon of the 20th the advance of General Stanley had been checked by the enemy occupying an intrenched hill in his front. That night General Stanley told Colonel Neff, of the Thirty-first, that he was to take that hill the next morning. During the night Colonel Neff intrenched one company of his regiment on a hill a short distance from the one he was assigned to capture the next morning. He moved forward the remaining companies of his regiment and concealed them at a point as close to the hill he was to assault as he could, without attracting the attention of the enemy. At 6 o'clock in the morning, his intrenched company opened fire on the enemy, attracting his attention. While thus engaged in watching the single company, the rest of the regiment dashed forward, and without firing a shot captured every man on the hill. This clever work won from Generals Howard and Thomas the warmest words of praise for Colonel Neff and his gallant regiment.

The assault on the 27th failed after terrible slaughter, but it again proved the tremendous fighting qualities of the Union soldiers. In "Battles and Leaders," General O. O. Howard thus tells of one of the numerous battles fought around Kenesaw Mountain:

"That night, the 16th of June, Johnston again went back to a new line, already prepared, just behind Mud Creek. Our troops, being on the alert, followed at once with great rapidity. Just where the old lines joined the

new (for Johnston's right wing was unchanged), I saw a feat the like of which never elsewhere fell under my observation. Baird's division, in a comparatively open field, put forth a heavy skirmish line, which continued such a rapid fire of rifles as to keep down a corresponding hostile line behind its well-constructed trenches, while the picks and shovels behind the skirmishers fairly flew, till a good set of works was made four hundred yards distant from the enemy's and parallel to it. One of my brigades (Harker's), by a rush, did also a brave and unusual thing in capturing an intrenched and well-defended line of the enemy's works and taking thirty defenders' captives. Again, another (Kirby's brigade), having lost Bald Hill in a skirmish, retook it by a gallant charge in line, under a hot fire of artillery and infantry, and intrenched and kept it."

In Baird's division, thus complimented by General Howard, were the Tenth, Seventy-fourth, Seventy-fifth, Eighty-second, Eighty-seventh and One Hundredth and First Indiana regiments, while the Thirty-first and Eighty-first were with Kirby in the charge spoken of. In this wonderful campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, divisions, and even brigades, were so often withdrawn from the corps to which they belonged, and assigned to some duty where their presence was needed, that it is impossible to follow in detail the movements of regiments. Even the reports are so meager in detail that they furnish but little information to guide the writer of history. It was during one of these numerous engagements around Kenesaw that the Confederate General Bishop Polk was killed. A foot note in Lossing's "Civil War in America" says the shell that killed General Polk was fired by William Atwell, of Allegheny City, who belonged to Knopp's battery. This is a mistake. Polk was killed by a shell thrown from Simonson's Indiana battery. Simonson was himself killed the next day.

Having failed in his assaults on Kenesaw, General Sherman again resorted to his flank movements, and slowly, day by day, pressed Johnston farther back toward Atlanta. On the 17th of July the Confederate authorities decided to change commanders and tactics. Hood was given command of the army with orders to fight. In pressing his flank movements Sherman had widely scattered his forces,

the Armies of the Ohio and Tennessee being separated from that of the Cumberland by many miles, and it was this fact that led Hood to suddenly determine to break the Army of the Cumberland. In its advance it had reached Peach Tree Creek, a stream that was difficult to cross. While in the act of crossing, Hood saw his opportunity. This was on the 20th of July. Hood skillfully withdrew his skirmishers, as if withdrawing from the position occupied by him, at the same time massing his forces screened by deep woods. The first Federal divisions to cross the creek threw forward their skirmishers, but found no enemy in their front.

Suddenly, at 3 p. m., the Confederates, in dense masses, rushed from the woods and fell upon Newton's division, attacking him in front, while attempting to turn his left flank. With a part of his division Newton repulsed the attack on his flank, while Wagner's and Blake's brigades, after desperate fighting, drove the enemy from the front. Immediately Blake's brigade changed front at right angles and engaged another Confederate division.

Never had the Army of the Cumberland been in greater danger than it was on that afternoon of July 20. If the Confederates succeeded against Newton, the chances were that Thomas's whole army would be driven back in disaster. Next to Newton was Ward's division. A member of the Thirty-third Indiana had gone out far beyond the line, when he saw the enemy advancing to interpose between Ward and Newton. He hastened to inform Colonel John Coburn, who commanded the brigade. The Colonel carried the information to Ward and urged an advance. Ward refused, saying he could not move without orders. Coburn continuing to insist, Ward finally said he might advance with his brigade and that of Colonel Benjamin Harrison. Coburn saw that a hill in front would be the key to the position, and the two brigades made a rush for it. They reached the summit just in time to assault and drive back the enemy, the fighting being of the most desperate character. Had it not been for this timely advance of Coburn and Harrison, Hood would have pierced the lines of Thomas, and a great disaster to the Army of the Cumberland would have resulted.

The battle soon involved Williams's division, of Hook-

er's corps. At one time, when the attack on Williams was progressing, the Twenty-seventh Indiana and the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania checked the Confederate advance, seizing an important position and holding it the rest of the day. Foiled in his first attempt to break the lines Hood rested for a time, and then made a more determined effort than ever, but was again foiled and driven back. General Howard, in "Battles and Leaders," thus speaks of a part of the battle of Peach Tree Creek:

"Hardee on the right, and Stewart on his left, in lines that overlapped Newton's position, at 3 o'clock of the 20th of July struck the blow. They came surging on through the woods, down the gentle slope, with noise and fury like Stonewall Jackson's men at Chancellorsville. As to our men, some of them were protected by piles of rails, but the most had not had time to barricade.

"Stewart's masses advanced successively from his right, so Newton was first assailed. His rifles and cannon, firing incessantly and with utmost steadiness, soon stopped and repulsed the front attack; but whole battalions went far east of him into the gap before described. Thomas, behind the creek, was watching; he turned some reserved batteries upon those Confederate battalions, and fired his shells into the thickets that bordered the deep creek, sweeping the creek's valley as far as the cannon could reach. This was sufficient; in his own words, 'it relieved the hitch.' The hostile flankers broke back in confusion. In succession, Ward, Geary, Williams and Palmer received the oncoming waves, and though their flanks were shaken in places, they each made a strong resistance, and soon rolled the Confederates back, shattered and broken."

With Newton, as brigade commanders, were Generals Kimball and George D. Wagner, of Indiana, and the Fortieth and Fifty-seventh Indiana regiments. With Ward were two Indiana commanders of brigades, Colonels John Coburn and Benjamin Harrison, and their regiments, the Thirty-third and Seventieth, were in the thickest of the fighting. The Twenty-seventh was with Williams. Jeff. C. Davis commanded a division under Palmer, and Colonel Scribner a brigade. Palmer's corps contained the following Indiana organizations: Tenth, Twenty-second, Thirty-seventh, Thirty-eighth, Forty-second, Seventy-fourth, Sev-

enty-fifth, Eighty-second, Eighty-seventh, Eighty-eighth, One Hundred and First regiments, and the Seventh and Nineteenth batteries.

On the 22d of July Hood made another sortie from Atlanta. He aimed, by a long detour, to throw Hardee on the rear of McPherson, and roll up the Army of the Tennessee. He was thwarted, and Hardee received a bitter defeat by one of those happy accidents that sometimes occur in war. General Dodge had placed two of his divisions in the rear of the Seventeenth corps. They were waiting the order to move to a position on the left of Blair. Within a very few minutes they would have been moving, and would have left nothing between Hardee and the rear of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps. Suddenly firing was heard off to the southeast. Major W. H. Chamberlain, of the Fifty-first Ohio, in "Battles and Leaders" thus describes what followed:

"He (Dodge) saw in an instant that something serious was at hand. He gave General Fuller orders to form his division immediately, facing southeastwardly, and galloped off toward Sweeney's division. He had hardly reached that command when Hardee's lines came tearing wildly through the woods with yells of demons. As if by magic Sweeney's division sprang into line. The two batteries of artillery (Loomis's and Laird's) had stopped on commanding ground, and they were promptly in service. General Dodge's quick eye saw the proper disposition to be made of a portion of Colonel Hersey's brigade, and, cutting red tape, he delivered the orders directly to the Colonels of the regiments. The orders were executed instantly, and the enemy's advance was checked.

"The battle of General Dodge's corps on this open ground, with no works to protect the troops of either side, was one of the fiercest of the war. General Dodge's troops were inspired by his personal presence, for he rode directly along the lines, and must have been a conspicuous target for many a Confederate gun. His sturdy saddle horse was worn out early in the afternoon, and it was replaced by another. There was not a soldier that did not feel that he ought to equal his General in courage, and no fight of the war exhibited greater personal bravery on the part of an entire command than was shown here. Nor can I restrain

a tribute to the bravery of the enemy. We had an advantage in artillery, they in numbers. Their assaults were repulsed only to be fearlessly renewed, until the sight of dead and wounded lying in their way, as they charged again and again to break our lines, must have appalled the stoutest hearts. So persistent were their onslaughts that numbers were made prisoners by rushing directly into our lines."

It was in this battle that General McPherson lost his life. The Twenty-fifth Indiana was in Fuller's division and the Sixty-sixth in that of Sweeney. At the reunion of the Army of the Tennessee, held in Indianapolis in November, 1901, General Dodge, who was President of the Association, in speaking of this battle said that he deployed the Sixty-sixth Indiana to hold the Confederates in check, and so stoutly did they resist the enemy that afterward he had hard work to convince the Confederate General that it was only a regiment and not a brigade.

General Sherman had gradually flanked until he had thrown nearly his whole army south of Atlanta. To meet him Hood placed two corps of his army at Jonesboro. It was determined to storm the position of the Confederates, and the troops of the Fourth corps were selected, and from these Morgan's division and two brigades under General Carlin were chosen for the assault. To these were afterward added Este's brigade of Baird's division. At 5 p. m. the attack was quickly and vigorously made along the whole battle front. Morgan's division carried its entire front, and leaped the fortifications, using sword and bayonet. A part of Este's brigade was also successful, the Tenth Kentucky and Seventy-fourth Indiana gaining the intrenchments. Had the Fourth corps met with like success it is probable that the whole of Hardee's command might have been captured, but its movements were so delayed by the difficulties in getting through the underbrush, that it was dark before it reached the front of the enemy. This was the most brilliant and successful assault on fortified works during the whole war, and although it failed of the entire success anticipated, it was the only successful assault of the kind made by either army. A strongly intrenched line was carried, and a thousand prisoners, eight guns and seven battle flags captured. In this grand achievement Indiana was represented by the Tenth,

Thirty-eighth, Forty-second, Seventy-fourth and Eighty-eighth regiments.

In making his movement to the south of Atlanta Sherman had left Slocum's corps to watch that city on the north, and to take advantage of any movement of the enemy. On the night of the 1st of September heavy explosions were heard. Early on the morning of the 2d General John Coburn, of Indiana, was ordered to make a reconnaissance with his brigade. He soon found that the city had been evacuated, and was met by the mayor, who formally surrendered the place to him. A Lieutenant Scott reported that the city had surrendered to him, and one or two officers in their reports gave him the credit he had claimed. He was not even present with General Coburn when the surrender was made, being in another part of the command, but had he been, the mayor would hardly have surrendered to a lieutenant, when the commander of a brigade was on the spot. The surrender was made to General Coburn and to no one else.

Thus ended the great campaign which began four months before. An Indiana regiment, the Thirty-third, lost more men during the campaign than any other regiment in Sherman's army, its loss in killed and wounded being thirty-five killed and 307 wounded. Twenty-nine of the wounded died, making a total death loss of fifty-four.

CHAPTER LIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE EAST.

The Army of the Potomac, that noble army that had fought so many bloody battles, was to begin a campaign that was to have no pause until the final collapse of the rebellion. It was to begin the campaign under a new leader, one who having once put his army in motion was not accustomed to turning back. Just before Grant took active command, General Meade had reorganized the Army of the Potomac, by reducing the number of corps. The different corps were consolidated and numbered Second, Fifth and Sixth. The Second was given to Hancock, the Fifth to Warren and the Sixth to Sedgwick. This reorganization also enabled Meade to get rid of some officers who, from seniority and not from merit, had obtained high commands. But at the same time the army lost the services of some excellent Generals. It was a new army to Grant, but after his headquarters' flag was unfurled, it was not long until all commanding officers knew that his brain alone would control all movements in future. He carefully mapped out his plan, and then proceeded to its execution. It differed radically from all others that had been attempted or discussed. McClellan, Burnside and Hooker had all aimed at the capture of Richmond, and Halleck's whole idea seemed to be to capture towns and territory. On the other hand, Grant's object always was the enemy's army. He cared little for either towns or territory, if he could only capture or destroy the armies of the South, knowing that if they were destroyed he would have no trouble in occupying the towns, and the territory would naturally revert to the

Union. In another matter Grant was distinguished from all who had preceded him. It mattered not who had been in command, when a movement began the orders to those in advance had been always to be "careful and not bring on an engagement." Grant's orders, on the contrary, were to fight at every opportunity. A story was told of Sheridan when he was in Tennessee, that on one occasion he telegraphed Halleck that he was confronted by a largely superior force of the enemy. Halleck replied, telling Sheridan to be careful and not bring on an engagement, to which Sheridan pithily answered: "It is not me who wants to bring on an engagement, but the other fellow." On another occasion, when told to be careful and not bring on a fight, he answered that he had supposed he had been sent out to fight, that that was what armies were organized and equipped for. General Grant, in the first order to Meade for the movement of the army, gave notice of the new departure in methods. His instructions were whenever an opportunity offered to attack the enemy to fight at once.

With the Army of the Potomac, when the campaign opened, Indiana had four infantry regiments, and the right wing of the Third cavalry. The Fourteenth regiment was in Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division, Hancock's corps and the Twentieth was in Ward's brigade of Birney's division in the same corps; the Seventh and Nineteenth were in Cutler's brigade of Wadsworth's division, Warren's corps; the Third cavalry was in Chapman's brigade of Wilson's division. At midnight on the 3d of May, 1864, the Army of the Potomac began crossing the Rapidan. Warren's corps crossed at Germanna Ford, preceded by Wilson's cavalry. The corps had hardly entered the famous Wilderness before it divided. Griffin's division followed the cavalry toward Robertson's Tavern, while Crawford's, Wadsworth's and Robinson's proceeded toward Old Wilderness Tavern. Hancock crossed at Ely's Ford, and took the road toward Chancellorsville. Sedgwick followed Warren. Griffin first found the enemy, and pressed him back slowly, Wadsworth going to his assistance. Crawford's division had the extreme left of the corps, being in advance. The battle soon raged between Ewell's Confederate corps and that of Warren. Griffin was forced back, losing two guns. Wadsworth's division formed in line of battle with

Cutler's brigade on the right. He struck the right wing of Ewell. The woods were dense, and covered with a thick undergrowth, so that it was impossible to move with celerity, or to keep an alignment. The result was that a gap occurred between Cutler and the brigade on his left. Into this gap Ewell threw a strong force, taking Cutler in flank, and soon the whole division was forced to fall back. Hancock was hurried forward, while Warren held Ewell in check, at last succeeding in driving back his advanced brigades. Hancock soon got his corps in line and joined in the battle. Getty's division of Hancock's corps was in the advance when it met a heavy force of the enemy, and Birney was sent to his assistance. A section of Rickett's battery lost so many men and horses that the guns were captured. Detachments of the Fourteenth Indiana and of the Eighth Ohio were ordered to recapture the guns. Moving forward with almost the swiftness of the wind, these two small detachments drove the enemy from the captured guns, and brought them back in triumph. Wadsworth with his division was sent, late in the afternoon, to aid Hancock, but the enemy withdrew and the fighting ceased for the night.

At five o'clock the next morning Wadsworth, in pursuance of orders, moved forward to the attack, and began pressing back the enemy, who fought with his usual stubbornness. Wadsworth had two horses killed under him, and had mounted his third, when word came from Hancock that his left was yielding. Not long after this Wadsworth was killed, and his division, being taken in flank, broke to the rear. Cutler rallied his brigade near the Old Wilderness Tavern. Longstreet having come up, the Confederates proved too strong for Hancock, and he was driven back some distance. In all the annals of war there is nothing found like the battle of the Wilderness, and its full story ought to be read by every American, that he may have a thorough knowledge of how Americans can and do fight under the most adverse circumstances.

At one time during this terrible battle, the Confederates broke Hancock's line near the Brock Road, and the Plank Road. It looked as if the whole Federal army was about to be driven back once more, and another fatal defeat added to those the Army of the Potomac had suffered.

At this crisis of the battle General Carroll's brigade was sent to make a charge on the advancing Confederates. It hurled itself against the oncoming line with such force as to drive back the enemy and restore the Union lines.

Having failed to break through the Wilderness and get between Lee and Richmond, Grant resorted to a flank movement which resulted in a series of engagements such as possibly had not been seen before during the war. Grant determined to seize Spottsylvania, but Lee was ahead of him, and when the Federals arrived they found the enemy strongly intrenched, and for several days one assault after another was made on the Confederate lines. Grant had been feeling the Confederate lines, looking for a weak place, and had determined that the only point promising success in an assault was at a salient that was so situated that it could be reached by a ravine, and which was then baptized with the name of the "Bloody Angle." To make this assault, which all knew would be of a most desperate character, Hancock's corps was selected. In this corps were the Fourteenth and Twentieth Indiana regiments, the former in Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division, and the latter in Ward's brigade of Birney's division. The assault was made a little before daylight, and Hancock easily seized the salient, capturing several thousand prisoners. The Confederates would not yield this important position without a desperate effort to recover it, and one assault after another was made, until the dead and wounded were piled high in every direction. All day long and until far into the night the fighting raged, but the Federals clung to what they had won, and held it. The loss was terrible on both sides. In all the fighting around and in the "Bloody Angle," the Fourteenth and Twentieth took part.

This was not the only fighting done in and around Spottsylvania. It was a life and death grapple between Grant and Lee. If Grant succeeded Lee would be utterly destroyed, as Grant would be between him and Richmond and Lee would have to fight outside of his intrenchments when Grant with his superiority of numbers would easily crush him. It was of almost equal importance to Grant to break through these impeding lines, for then he could finish Lee, and then, in a short time, the war. So it is not to be

wondered at that the Federals clung tenaciously to the work of breaking Lee's lines, or that the Confederates, with equal tenacity, clung to their defense. Lee's army was Grant's object, and he was impressed with the idea that if he could destroy Lee there would be little left of the Confederacy, hence he struck here, there, anywhere, with the hope that somewhere he would find a weak point in the Confederate lines.

The battle of Laurel Hill was one of the desperate engagements between Grant and Lee, and was fought on the 8th of May, while Grant was making his movement to gain Spottsylvania. The Nineteenth Indiana was a part of Cutler's, formerly Wadsworth's division, and in the same division, but in another brigade, was the One Hundred and Forty-third Pennsylvania. Captain De Lacy of that regiment tells the following story:

"I was at that time Sergeant in Company A, 143rd Pennsylvania Volunteers, and we were the right company and connected with the left of the Nineteenth Indiana; or, in other words, the Nineteenth was on our right.

"The force of the last charge fell heavily on the Nineteenth, and pushed the men of that regiment back up the slope of the ridge a short distance, probably thirty or forty paces, although they continued their fire; but the color-bearer of the Nineteenth did not move back, but manfully held up his colors, although the Confederates had reached to within thirty or forty steps of him. At that critical moment, the writer and George W. Engle, of Company A, 143rd Pennsylvania, by permission of Major Charles M. Conygham, then commanding the 143rd, went to the rescue of the colors of the Nineteenth.

"The position of the lines at the time was almost at right angles, and we reached the color-bearer in less than one minute; he was alone and down on one knee holding up his flag. I went to his right, and George W. Engle to his left. He was at the side of an old rail fence which was partly broken down, along which the regiment had been in line. Soon after reaching him he ran his right arm high up, supporting the flag, when a ball struck the staff and shattered his arm. He partially fell back with the flag against the writer, who was on one knee by his side, at the same time the flag falling over both of us. I assisted in raising

him up to his knees; then he dropped his wounded arm to the ground, and ran up his good arm and grasped the colors firmly, while he fairly groaned with pain, but called out to us: 'Stay with me, boys.' We told him to keep up the flag, we would stay with him; and we did, and used our guns the very best we could.

"It was one of the hottest locations I ever got into; the enemy, not thirty steps in our front, lying down in a little depression in the field. We could see their ramrods glisten every time they turned them to load their guns. For fifteen or twenty minutes this was the actual condition, though the regiment continued to fire, and other troops that had been rallied and brought up took part and made it so hot that the enemy made a break for the woods. Very many of them were killed or wounded.

"At about this time the men of the Nineteenth closed in on their colors and we started for the One Hundred and Forty-third, which was not over fifty yards to the left. No braver man than that color bearer ever lived."

It was a brave act for Sergeant De Lacy, and his comrade Engle, and they deserved medals for it, if they never received them.

While these battles were being fought around Spottsylvania, Sheridan moved off with his cavalry corps to make that wonderful raid around Richmond. With him was the right wing of the Third Indiana cavalry, and one of his brigades was commanded by General George H. Chapman, an Indiana man. Sheridan fought the Confederate cavalry and defeated them, and then fought the cavalry assisted by infantry and again won a decided victory. In all the fighting of the cavalry corps the Third Indiana bore a conspicuous part.

Not being able to break through Lee's lines at Spottsylvania, Grant began a series of flank movements which finally brought him in front of Petersburg, but he did not arrive there without one or more battles, the bloodiest being at Cold Harbor, in which the Seventh, Fourteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Indiana regiments took part. At Petersburg Grant again found Lee in his front, behind almost impregnable breastworks, and a siege began which lasted for many months, with fighting almost every day.

Leaving Grant in front of Petersburg, let us follow the

story of another campaign, in which Indiana troops bore an honorable part. It will be remembered that one part of General Grant's comprehensive plan was to move an army from Shenandoah Valley on toward Richmond, while he was holding Lee fast. This army was under the command of General Hunter. To watch it and operate against it there was a Confederate force under Early. Hunter was defeated, and was forced to retreat up the Kanawha Valley, leaving Baltimore and Washington uncovered. Lee thought he saw his opportunity, either to capture Washington or to compel Grant to let go his hold on Petersburg, just as he had compelled the withdrawal of McClellan from the Peninsula two years before.

Lee rapidly reinforced Early and sent him on an invasion of Maryland. Sigel was at Martinsburg with quite a force, but he soon fell back, crossing into Maryland. A thousand wild rumors were soon flying through the country. Before Early's advance fled a frightened host of refugees. Sigel sent word to Halleck, in Washington, of the advance of the enemy, but that officer refused to believe it was anything more than a raiding party. The information reached Grant, and he notified Halleck that he could send an army corps to Washington, if necessary, but Halleck replied that it was not necessary. At that time Washington was wholly defenseless, there being but a few hundred troops in the city.

General Lew Wallace, of Indiana, was in command of the Department of Baltimore. He had one regiment of seasoned volunteers, and a few hundred one hundred day men, numbering all told only about 2500. With these he moved out to Monocacy Junction, knowing that time was all important to save Washington. There he was joined, in the afternoon, by one brigade of Ricketts's division of the Sixth Army Corps, and skirmished with the enemy in front of Frederick. That night General Ricketts came up with his other brigade. Wallace now had about 7000 men, and he determined to resist Early's advance. He disposed of his troops so as to guard the roads to Washington and Baltimore. Early on the morning of July 9, the Confederates assaulted the lines of Wallace, but were driven back. The battle continued until about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when Wallace, seeing that he was outflanked, slowly with-

drew. So stubborn was the fighting that Early did not advance again until late on the afternoon of the 10th, having been delayed more than thirty hours.

As the advance of Early reached the outskirts of Washington the remaining divisions of the Sixth corps, that had been hurried forward from City Point by Grant, debarked from the steamers. They were hastened to the front and Washington was secure. In his report General Grant gave the credit of saving Washington to Wallace, and repeats the same more at length in his "Memoirs."

Early remained in the valley, and great confusion existed at Washington until Grant sent Sheridan to take command. To Sheridan's command was added the Nineteenth corps, which had been brought around from Texas. In this corps were the Eighth, Eleventh and Eighteenth Indiana regiments. The right wing of the Third Indiana cavalry, and the Seventeenth battery, were already in the valley. Sheridan began the work of organizing his army for an active campaign, his orders being to drive the Confederates from the valley, and then make it impossible for them to return. By the 19th of September Sheridan was ready, and then began a most remarkable campaign, with a series of wonderful victories. On September 19 he met Early in force near Winchester, and by night had defeated him, capturing most of his cannon and supplies, with several thousand prisoners. The next morning Sheridan pushed forward in hot pursuit. In this opening fight of the campaign, the Eighth, Eleventh and Eighteenth regiments, and the right wing of the Third cavalry, with the Seventeenth battery, took part. General Emory, who commanded the Nineteenth corps, in his report thus speaks of a part of that battle:

"Grover's division was placed in line of battle, on the right of the Sixth corps, and Dwight's division was placed en echelon on the right of Grover's. Not many minutes elapsed before receiving orders to charge the enemy. I ordered Grover's division to charge, holding Dwight's in reserve. The charge was made with great bravery, dispersing the enemy's first line, but this first success seemed to throw our men off their guard, and gave them too much confidence, and they rushed, without orders, with impetuosity upon the second line of the enemy, which had the pro-

tection of woods and stone walls, and they met with a bloody repulse." The Eleventh and Eighteenth Indiana regiments were in this charge, and Colonel Dan Macauley, of Indiana, commanded a brigade in Grover's division.

On the 22d of September Sheridan again defeated Early, driving him from a strongly intrenched position at Fisher's Hill. Sheridan gave the enemy no rest, but pursued until it seemed as if Early could not again take the offensive. Sheridan then returned to Cedar Creek to recuperate his men. On the 19th of October occurred one of the most remarkable battles in the world's history. While Sheridan was temporarily absent, the Confederates, suddenly and without warning, sprang upon the Federals, and soon had them in rapid retreat, after losing nearly all their guns. Sheridan was at Winchester. He rapidly rode to the front, re-formed his defeated troops, and before the sun went down crushed Early, recapturing the cannon lost in the morning, and taking more than twenty pieces from the enemy. Sheridan had hardly re-formed his line when the enemy again came rushing forward. Of his repulse, and the final charge by the Union troops, General Emory, in his "Narrative" says:

"Very soon the pickets came in, quickly followed by the enemy's infantry. Our first line (Grover's division) then rose up en masse and delivered their fire, and the enemy disappeared. There was not the sound of a musket or gun for twenty minutes following. The first division was deployed on the right of the second, and the charge commenced. The enemy resisted at every fence and ditch and other obstacle with great bravery, but still the line swept on."

When Sheridan got through with Early he no longer had an army, but as a solitary fugitive, followed by a few cavalymen, he left the valley. In all the fights of this campaign the Indiana troops took a part. This remarkable campaign re-elected President Lincoln. Never afterward was there an organized force of the Confederates in the Shenandoah valley.

Before resuming the story of the greater campaign, let us refer briefly to one or two expeditions of lesser importance, but in which Indiana troops bore a distinguished part. When Sherman began his Atlanta campaign he left

a force at Chattanooga and another at Memphis, to watch guerrillas and protect the railroads leading to the North. The force at Memphis was under command of General Washburne. His special mission was to look after Forrest. About the 1st of June, 1864, Washburne sent out an expedition under command of General Sturgis. On the 10th of June it was learned that Forrest was in a well chosen position a few miles in front of Sturgis. With Sturgis were the Ninety-third infantry and Seventh cavalry, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Indiana batteries.

The cavalry of Sturgis's command were in advance. The ground was not suited for that branch of the service, and the Seventh Indiana was dismounted and formed in a piece of woods. The Fourteenth Indiana battery opened the fight on the part of the Federals, and shelled the advancing Confederates. The Confederates made several charges on the line of the Seventh Indiana, but that gallant regiment was able to hold its ground. At one time it came to a hand-to-hand fight, with clubbed carbines. Then the Seventh did deadly work with revolvers. When the battle opened, the infantry was several miles in the rear, but hastened forward as fast as the wretched condition of the roads would permit. General Grierson, who commanded the cavalry, rode back to hurry forward the infantry. The First regiment he met was the Ninety-third Indiana. He told the Colonel that his line could not hold longer than twenty minutes. "We will be there in that time," replied the gallant Colonel, and he and his men dashed forward, going into line of battle almost on the run. As they formed they were approached by a regiment wearing Federal uniforms and carrying the Union flag. This was a favorite dodge with Forrest. Supposing them to be what they purported to be, the Ninety-third let them approach to within a short distance. Then the pretended friends poured a deadly fire into the Ninety-third, killing and wounding sixty-five at that one volley, the Lieutenant-Colonel and Adjutant being among the number.

The infantry coming up by piecemeal, Forrest was able to hurl his masses upon them and defeat them in detail. The defeat soon became a rout, and Sturgis lost all his train and many of his guns. General Grierson compli-

mented the Seventh Indiana cavalry in the following terms:

"Your General congratulates you upon your noble conduct during the late expedition. Fighting against overwhelming numbers, under adverse circumstances, your prompt obedience to orders and unflinching courage, commanding the admiration of all, made even defeat almost a victory. For hours on foot, you repulsed the charges of the enemy's infantry, and, again, in the saddle, you met his cavalry, and turned his assaults into confusion. Your heroic perseverance saved hundreds of your fellow-soldiers from capture. You have been faithful to your honorable reputation, and have fully justified the confidence and merited the high esteem of your commander."

CHAPTER LX.

FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE.

We left Sherman and his army at the capture of Atlanta, after four months of almost constant marching and fighting. The losses, however, had not been very heavy. Sherman had Atlanta, but the Confederate army had not been destroyed, and was about as strong numerically as at the beginning of the campaign. Giving up Atlanta, Hood had formed the bold plan of striking northward, hoping to compel Sherman to follow him, thus drawing him away from the heart of the Confederacy. He also indulged in the pleasing idea that he could carry the war to the Ohio River, and perhaps across that stream into either Ohio or Indiana. For some days the object of Hood remained uncertain to Sherman, but that General disposed his troops to checkmate whatever the movement might portend. Hood displayed a good deal of generalship in cloaking his movements, and finally reached Snake Creek Gap on his way to the North, without Sherman being able to do much more than follow him.

Preparatory to his contemplated move on Tennessee and the North, Hood had ordered Forrest to make a raid with a large force on Sherman's communications. On the 22d of September Forrest appeared before Athens. There he captured about five hundred men of the garrison and burned the stores. Half an hour later the Eighteenth Michigan and the One Hundred and Third Ohio also surrendered. This was Forrest's last success. He found that the Federals were preparing to meet and crush him, so he divided his forces. He sent Buford with 4000 men to Huntsville,



SENATOR DAVID TURPIE.

which he threatened, but the Federal commander could not be frightened. On the 2d of October Buford appeared before Athens, which had been re-garrisoned by the Seventy-third Indiana. Buford thought he would have an easy victory, and on the refusal of Lieutenant Colonel Shade, of the Seventy-third, to surrender, he assaulted the works several times, but was repulsed each time with heavy loss. Forrest finally escaped and crossed the Tennessee River, having wholly failed in accomplishing the object of his expedition.

Sherman followed Hood with his whole army, having first sent Thomas to Chattanooga to organize the forces there to intercept the Confederates. Sherman had long contemplated breaking away from his base and making a march to the sea, and he now determined to follow out that plan. To assist Thomas he sent the Fourth corps, under Stanley, and the Army of the Ohio, under Schofield. To these were to be added the troops at Chattanooga and Nashville, and A. J. Smith was ordered with his corps from Missouri. To Thomas was assigned the task of destroying Hood, while Sherman was to pierce the heart of the Confederacy.

With his usual energy Sherman began preparations for his great march to the sea. He weeded out of command all worthless regimental and company officers, and rapidly accumulated at Atlanta the stores he would need, limiting the supply almost wholly to ammunition, expecting to live off the country through which he would march. When all was ready he destroyed Atlanta, and with 60,000 chosen troops began one of the most remarkable marches known in military history. With him on this march were the following Indiana organizations:

Fifteenth Corps (Logan)—

C. R. Woods's division, Twelfth regiment in the brigade of W. B. Wood; Thirty-seventh and One Hundredth in Catterson's brigade. Hazen's division, Eighty-third in Wells's brigade; Ninety-ninth in Oliver's brigade. Smith's division, Forty-eighth and Fifty-ninth in Clark's brigade. Corse's division, Sixty-sixth in Rice's brigade.

Seventeenth Corps (Blair)—

Mower's division, Twenty-fifth in Tillotson's brigade. G. A. Smith's division, Twenty-third and Fifty-third in Pott's brigade. Fifty-eighth as Pontoniers.

Fourteenth Corps (Davis)—

Carlin's division, Forty-second and Eighty-eighth in Hobart's brigade; Thirty-eighth in Miles's brigade. Morgan's division: Twenty-second and one company of Thirty-seventh, in Fearing's brigade. Baird's division, Eighty-second in Hunter's brigade; Seventy-fifth, Eighty-seventh and One Hundred and First, in Gleason's brigade; Seventy-fourth in Este's brigade. Nineteenth battery.

Twentieth Corps (Williams)—

Baird's division, Seventieth, Harrison's brigade; Thirty-third and Eighty-fifth, Dustin's brigade; Eighth cavalry, left wing of Third cavalry in Jordan's brigade.

Sherman so spread out his army as to utterly confuse the Confederates and they never could tell just where he would strike. So well was the time marked that at every stage of the march from the start until the sea was reached every wing of his army was at the appointed place at the appointed hour. There was little or no fighting done except by the cavalry on the flanks.

By the 13th of December Sherman had Savannah practically under siege, and on the afternoon of that day General Hazen's division assaulted and captured Fort McAllister. In this assault the Eighty-third and Ninety-ninth Indiana regiments took part. On the 20th of December the Union forces entered Savannah, and Sherman's great march was a success.

Now let us turn and see what Thomas and Hood were doing. It will be remembered that the Twenty-third and the Fourth corps were sent back to operate under Thomas. At Nashville was a large force of dismounted cavalry, and General Thomas bent all his energies to secure mounts for these and put them in serviceable order. General A. J. Smith was ordered to hurry forward from Missouri, but he had many and long marches to make before he could reach railway or steamboat transportation. General Thomas sought to concentrate all his forces in the immediate vicin-

ity of Nashville, but at the same time to delay Hood's advance as long as possible. A number of severe engagements took place between detached portions of the two forces, and at one time the Twenty-third corps was in very dangerous proximity to Hood's army, and was only saved by the generalship of General Schofield.

It was a race between Hood and Schofield for Harpeth River. Schofield skilfully withdrew his army from Spring Hill in the night time and thus gained some miles on Hood. The Fourth corps under Wood reached the river at Franklin, hastily repaired the bridge, crossed the trains, and then took position to cover the crossing of the Twenty-third corps. Wagner's division of the Fourth corps was acting as rear guard. When the Twenty-third corps, under Cox, reached Franklin, it was ordered to take position south of the river. It formed a line with Stiles's brigade on the extreme left, holding the line between the river and the Lewisburg turnpike. Casement's brigade came next, then Moore's brigade, then Reilly's, then Strickland's, the extreme right being held by Kimball's division of the Fourth corps. One brigade of Wagner's division, that of Opdycke, was in reserve in the works. The other two, Conrade's and Lane's, were posted some distance in the front, with orders to hold until the enemy developed his strength, and then retire inside the works. General Wagner, however, gave orders to his brigade commanders to fight to the bitter end. This came very near causing a great disaster to the Union troops.

The battle of Franklin was one of the most destructive during the war, for the numbers engaged, and displayed an obstinate courage on the part of the Confederates seldom seen, and an equal persistency on the part of the Federals. Hood lost more in killed at Franklin than Grant did at Shiloh; than McClellan did in his seven days of fighting on the Peninsula; than Burnside at Fredericksburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, or Rosecrans at Stone's River, and nearly as many as Grant at Cold Harbor. The battle was peculiarly destructive of General officers, the Confederates losing thirteen killed or wounded. General Schofield was in command, but the fighting was done directly under the command of General J. D. Cox, except that done by the

cavalry. On the Union side the fighting was nearly all done by the Twenty-third corps, and Wagner's and Kimball's divisions of Wood's Fourth corps.

It was late in the afternoon when the Confederates advanced to the attack, and when they did advance it was in strong lines. Wagner's two brigades, instead of retiring, opened a vigorous musketry fire, which checked the enemy for a short time, but the long Confederate line soon outflanked the two brigades, and then with a rush they were hurled from their position and driven toward the Union lines. For a while the Federals behind the works could not fire on the advancing foe, as they were masked by the two retreating brigades. The two brigades rushed through the lines, followed by the Confederates, and it looked as if the battle was lost to the Union, as their line had been pierced. It will be remembered that Opdycke's brigade of Wagner's division was in reserve inside of the lines. Quick as a flash its gallant commander ordered a charge, and with a wild hurrah the men sprang upon the foe, drove them back and restored the line. This break in the line occurred about the center. The Confederates advanced again to the assault, this time falling on Stiles's brigade, which was on the extreme left. He had formed his men with the Sixty-third, One Hundred and Twentieth and One Hundred and Twenty-eighth Indiana regiments in the front line. On his right was Casement's brigade, with the Sixty-fifth and One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Indiana and the Sixty-fifth Illinois in the front line.

The Confederate line of battle was in three divisions, each division formed with two brigades in front and one brigade in reserve. The One Hundred and Twentieth Indiana, holding the extreme left of Stiles's line, was sharply recurved along a railroad cut, which was quite deep. The regiment was exposed to an enfilading fire of both small arms and artillery, but it held its place firmly, and could not be shaken. The center of Stiles's line was protected by a thorny hedge, which the enemy found impassable. The first assault of the enemy met with a bloody repulse. The second line reached the front of the One Hundred and Twenty-eighth Indiana, placed their colors on the parapet, and climbed over it. The color bearer was shot down, and

the men who had climbed over were captured. The Confederate reserves renewed the action twice, but at last gave it up. At the end of an hour from the opening of the fight the front (Stiles's line) was clear of the enemy.

The fighting on the line of Casement's brigade was similar to that on Stiles, but his line was a straight one, and no one regiment was exposed more than another. The extreme flanking company on the right (a company from the Sixty-fifth Indiana) was armed with repeating rifles, and did most excellent service. The Confederates assaulted Casement's line again and again, but were driven back with terrible slaughter. Four Confederate brigades had assaulted two of the Federals and were repulsed without the Federals being compelled to call upon their reserves. Next to the right of Casement was the brigade of Moore. In his front line were the Eightieth and One Hundred and Twenty-ninth Indiana regiments.

When the two retreating brigades of Wagner broke through the line, a part of Strickland's brigade, which was on the right of Moore, gave way. This uncovered Moore's right and placed him in a dangerous position, but the courage and determination of the Federals were equal to the occasion, and they held their line fighting hand-to-hand over the parapet. The center of the brigade was occupied by a small detachment of raw recruits from the One Hundred and Eighty-third Ohio, and in the pressure they gave way. Moore hurried two companies of the Eightieth Indiana from the extreme right, and drove the Confederates back, making good the gap. This temporary success of the enemy at the center of Moore's line encouraged them and they renewed their efforts. They made a bold dash to capture the flag of the One Hundred and Twenty-ninth Indiana, and actually grasped the flag, but they were shot down and the coveted flag retained. This was just before the two companies of the Eightieth Indiana reached the line and filled the gap. To the right of Ruger's division came that of Kimball. In this division occupying the front line were the Ninth, Thirtieth and Eighty-fourth Indiana in Grose's brigade; the Thirty-first in Kirby's brigade, and the Thirty-fifth in Whittaker's. The Eighty-first occupied the second line of Kirby's brigade. In

front of Grose's brigade there was a sharp fight for a short time, but the division was not generally engaged.

While this fighting of the infantry was going on, the cavalry had an equally sharp battle. Of this cavalry fight General James H. Wilson, in "Battles and Leaders," gives the following account:

"One important circumstance connected with this battle has been persistently dwarfed or neglected altogether by historians. Simultaneously with Hood's infantry assault his cavalry under Chalmers advanced to the attack, driving back Croxton and his pickets from the Lewisburg turnpike to the north side of the Harpeth River, where Hatch, Johnson and Harrison's troopers had been disposed so as to cover and watch the fords and protect the left and rear of Schofield's army. Realizing the importance of holding this position, as soon as the rebel cavalrymen had made their appearance on the north side of the river, which properly formed a real line of defense for the Union army, I ordered Hatch and Croxton to charge with vigor, and drive the enemy into the river, if possible, while Harrison, with Capron's old brigade, would look well to the left and rear. The field was broken by hills, covered with woods and small clearings not especially unfavorable to mounted men, but the occasion was a grave one. It indicated either the advance of Hood's whole army, as at Duck River, or a turning movement by his cavalry; and in either case, from the fact that the National infantry and artillery were still on the south side of the river, it was absolutely necessary for their safety that my orders should be carried out to the letter. My subordinate commanders dismounted every man that could be spared, and went in with a rush that was irresistible. The fight was at first somewhat desultory, but toward the middle of the afternoon it became exceedingly sharp. The enemy's troopers fought with their accustomed gallantry, but the Union cavalrymen, outnumbering their antagonists for the first time, and as skilfully directed, swept everything before them. So closely did they press the enemy that they drove them into the water wherever they reached it. No time was allowed them to find the fords, and no rest was given them till the last man was driven to the south side of the river."

In this gallant fight were the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Elev-

enth, Twelfth and Thirteenth Indiana cavalry regiments. Thus ended the battle of Franklin, which was the staggering blow to Hood. That night General Schofield withdrew his army and joined General Thomas at Nashville. Hood followed on and encamped around Nashville, placing Thomas in a sort of siege as it were. General Thomas was not ready to strike the finishing blow and great uneasiness was felt at the North on account of his delay, but finally, when the blow was delivered, Hood's army practically ceased to be. The battle of Nashville is worthy an extended notice in any history dealing with the events of the war, but especially in any history of Indiana, as its troops bore a distinguished part. The battle was fought on the 15th and 16th of December, 1864. In this battle were the following Indiana organizations:

Fourth Corps (Wood)—

Kimball's division, Kirby's brigade, Thirty-first and Eighty-first infantry; Whittaker's brigade, Thirty-fifth; Grose's brigade, Ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty-sixth (one company), and Eighty-fourth. Elliott's division, Lane's brigade, Fortieth and Fifty-seventh. Beatty's division, Streight's brigade, Fifty-first; Kneffler's brigade, Seventy-ninth and Eighty-sixth, Twenty-fifth battery.

Twenty-third Corps (Schofield)—

Couch's division, Cooper's brigade, One Hundred and Thirtieth; Moore's brigade, Eightieth and One Hundred and Twenty-ninth; Mehringer's brigade, Ninety-first and One Hundred and Twenty-third, Fifteenth battery. Cox's division, Casement's brigade, Sixty-fifth and One Hundred and Twenty-fourth; Stiles's brigade, Sixty-third, One Hundred and Twentieth and One Hundred and Twenty-eighth; Twenty-third battery.

A. J. Smith's Corps—

McArthur's division, McMillen's brigade, Ninety-third. Garrard's division, Morris's brigade, Eighty-ninth and Ninth battery; Gilbert's brigade, Third battery; Wolfe's brigade, Fifty-second.

Wilson's Cavalry Corps—

Hatch's division, Stewart's brigade, Eleventh. John-

son's division, Biddle's brigade, Sixth. Knipe's division, Hammond's brigade, Ninth and Tenth; Johnson's brigade, Twelfth and Thirteenth.

Steedman's division, Grosvenor's brigade, Sixty-eighth regiment and Twentieth battery.

On December 15 Thomas was ready, and opened the fight with a detachment of General Steedman's troops, in which were the Sixty-eighth Indiana regiment and Twentieth battery. This detachment assaulted the enemy's works between the turnpike and the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. Being exposed to a severe fire, the troops were withdrawn. The charge was so gallantly made that General Hood was deceived as to its ultimate aim, and drew troops from his center and left to give strength to his endangered flank. Now the real battle began in earnest. McArthur's division of Smith's corps moved forward with resistless force. Before them was a detached earth-work covering four guns, dominated by a stronger work off to the right. Hatch's division of dismounted cavalry was ready to co-operate with McArthur in assaulting the works. It was not long until both works were in the hands of the exulting Unionists.

Schofield and Smith now moved forward in unison, and General Wolfe's brigade captured the works on the left. General Schofield was trying to work around so as to control one of the two remaining lines of retreat available to Hood, and carried a series of hills. The charge was made by Cooper's brigade of Couch's division. As Cooper was moving to assault the hills, a heavy force of the enemy appeared in his rear. General Couch sent Mehringer's brigade to hold the Confederates until Doolittle's and Casement's brigades could come to his help. The fighting was most severe, and lasted until after dark.

The strongest position in front of the Fourth corps was Montgomery Hill, an irregular cone rising to a height of about one hundred feet. The approaches were covered with abatis and sharpened stakes firmly planted in the ground. Beatty's division was called upon to furnish the assaulting column. Colonel Post's brigade was to lead. The charge was gallantly made and entirely successful. Later General Wood engaged the enemy with his entire corps, and ordered General Kimball to charge with his whole di-

vision. The division, cheering as it moved, rapidly ascended the hill and leaped over the works, capturing several pieces of artillery and a large number of prisoners. So far everything had been in favor of the Federals. They had captured every position assaulted and taken a large number of prisoners, seventeen cannon and hundreds of small arms. The cavalry had been equally successful, and had gained the rear of Hood's lines.

General Thomas determined to renew the fight the next day, if Hood remained in position, or to rapidly pursue, should he retreat. The movement on the 16th was begun by the Fourth corps, followed speedily by General Smith. Hood's lines, on the morning of the 16th, were along the Brentwood hills. These hills rise to about three hundred and fifty feet above the surrounding country, and consist of two ranges. Overton Hill was intrenched around the northern slope and the approaches were obstructed by abatis. The position was exceedingly strong, and was defended by a heavy force. It was determined to assault this position, and Post's brigade was to lead, supported by Streight. Grosvenor's brigade, and Thompson's brigade of colored troops of Smith's corps, were to co-operate. At 3 o'clock the assaulting column moved up the steep ascent. The leading men reached the parapets, and a few gained the works, but the fire of the enemy's reserves was so destructive that both attacking lines were driven back with heavy loss.

The advance on the right soon followed the attack on Overton Hill. It was the crisis of the battle. McMillen's brigade of McArthur's division was to ascend from the west side, while the other brigades were to attack in front when he should be half way up to the summit. The following account of the charge is given in the story of Hood's invasion of Tennessee, in "Battles and Leaders," written by Colonel Henry Stone, a member of the staff of General Thomas, and is given here because the Ninety-third Indiana was one of the leading regiments in McMillen's brigade:

"General Thomas, who had been making a reconnoissance, had no sooner reached Schofield's front than General McArthur, who commanded one of Smith's divisions, impatient at the long waiting, and not wanting to spend a

second night on the rocky hill he was occupying, told Smith that he could carry the high hill in front of Couch—the same that Couch himself had told Schofield he could carry—and would undertake it unless forbidden. Smith silently acquiesced, and McArthur set to work. Withdrawing McMillen's (his right) brigade from the trenches, he marched it by the flank in front of General Couch's position, and with orders to the men to fix bayonets, not to fire a shot, and neither to halt nor cheer until they had gained the enemy's works, the charge was sounded. The gallant brigade, which had served and fought in every part of the northwest, moved swiftly down the slope, across the narrow valley, and began scrambling up the steep hillside, on the top of which was the redoubt, held by Bate's division, and mounted also with Whitworth guns. The bravest onlookers held their breath as those gallant men steadily and silently approached the summit, amid the crash of musketry and the boom of the artillery. In almost the time it has taken to tell the story they gained the works, their flags were wildly waving from the parapet, and the unmistakable cheer, 'the voice of the American people,' as General Thomas called it, rent the air. It was an exultant moment; but this was only a part of the heroic work of that afternoon. While McMillen's brigade was preparing for this wonderful charge, Hatch's division of cavalry dismounted, had also pushed its way through the woods and had gained the tops of two hills that commanded the rear of the enemy's works. Here, with incredible labor, they had dragged by hand two pieces of artillery, and, just as McMillen began his charge, these opened on the hill where Bate was, up the opposite slope of which the infantry were scrambling. At the same time Coon's brigade, of Hatch's division, with resounding cheers charged upon the enemy and poured such volleys of musketry from their repeating rifles as I have never heard equaled. Thus beset on both sides, Bate's people broke out of the works, and ran down the hill toward their right and rear as fast as their legs could carry them. It was more like a scene in a spectacular drama than a real incident in war. The hillside in front, still green, dotted with the boys in blue swarming up the slope; the dark background of high hills beyond; the lowering clouds; the waving flags; the smoke slowly rising

through the leafless tree tops and drifting across the valleys; the wonderful outburst of musketry; the ecstatic cheers; the multitude racing for life down into the valley below—so exciting was it all, that the lookers-on instinctively clapped their hands, as at a brilliant and successful transformation scene, as indeed it was. For, in those few minutes, an army was changed into a mob, and the whole structure of the rebellion in the Southwest, with all its possibilities, was utterly overthrown. As soon as the other divisions farther to the left saw and heard the doings on their right, they did not wait for orders. Everywhere, by a common impulse, they charged the works in front, and carried them in a twinkling. General Edward Johnson and nearly all his division and artillery were captured. Over the very ground where, but a little while before, Post's assault had been repulsed, the same troops now charged with resistless force, capturing fourteen guns and one thousand prisoners. Steedman's colored brigades rallied and brought in their share of prisoners and other spoils of war. Everywhere the success was complete."

The Eleventh Indiana cavalry was in Hatch's division, which captured the two hills referred to. It was Beatty's division which led in the second assault on Overton Hill, and in the assaulting party were the Fifty-first, Seventy-ninth and Eighty-sixth Indiana regiments. Hood began a rapid retreat, followed by the Fourth corps until late at night. The pursuit was continued by the cavalry. The story of this pursuit is thus graphically told by General James H. Wilson, the cavalry commander, in "Battles and Leaders:"

"Pressed on all sides, and perceiving that further resistance was futile if not impossible, the Confederates broke and fled in confusion from the field, leaving all their artillery and many prisoners to fall into our hands. The cavalrymen had, however, become separated from their horses by an unusual distance, and although the latter were hurried forward as rapidly as possible, and Croxton, who was the most available, was ordered to mount and push without delay through Brentwood, to be followed by Hatch and Hammond as soon as they could mount, it had become so dark before they were well under way in pursuit that the men could scarcely see their horses' ears. It

was a rainy and disagreeable night, but nevertheless Hatch, Knipe, Croxton, Hammond, Coon and Spalding dashed forward, each vieing with the other for the advance, and each doing his best to reach the Franklin turnpike that night so as to drive the now thoroughly disorganized enemy from his last line of retreat. Orders were also sent to Johnson to move rapidly by the Hillsborough turnpike, and after crossing the Harpeth to turn up on its south bank and fall upon the enemy at or near Franklin. Every one obeyed orders with alacrity, but darkness and the distance were against them. Hatch's column had not gone more than two miles when its advance, under Colonel Spalding, encountered Chalmers's cavalry, strongly posted across the road behind a fence-rail barricade. They charged it at once, and a spirited hand-to-hand melee ensued, in which many men were killed and wounded on each side. Colonel Spalding had the honor of capturing Brigadier General Rucker, in a personal encounter, in which each had seized and wrested the other's saber from him, and turned it against its owner. It was a scene of pandemonium, in which every challenge was answered by a saber stroke or pistol shot, and the flash of the carbine was the only light by which the combatants could recognize each other's position. The gallant Confederates were driven in turn from every fresh position taken up by them, and a running fight was kept up until nearly midnight. Chalmers had, however, done the work cut out for him gallantly and well. He was overborne and driven back, it is true, but the delay which he forced upon the Federal cavalry by the stand he had made was sufficient to enable the fleeing Confederate infantry to sweep by the danger point that night, to improvise a rear guard, and to make good their escape the next day."

The Federal cavalry bivouacked that night and on the next morning took up the pursuit again. Of this second day General Wilson says:

"The pursuit was resumed at the earliest dawn next morning and was kept up throughout the day, with a succession of sharp engagements, in which the Union cavalry were always victorious.

"Late in the evening, apparently exhausted with rapid marching, the enemy took up a strong position in the open

fields about a mile north of the West Harpeth River. It was then so dark from fog and approaching night that the men of Hatch's division, who had become somewhat intermingled with the sullen and taciturn Confederate stragglers, began to doubt that the ranks which were now looming up in their front were really those of the enemy's rear guard. The momentary hesitation caused by this doubt gave Forrest an opportunity to straighten his lines and to post his single remaining battery in position so as to sweep the turnpike. Hatch on the left and Knipe on the right were at once ordered to charge the enemy's flank, while the Fourth regular cavalry, under Lieutenant Hedges, was directed straight against his center. Seeing what was about to burst upon him, the battery commander opened with canister at short range, but had hardly emptied his guns before the storm broke upon him as well as upon the entire rebel line. Forrest did his best to hold his ground, but it was impossible. Hedges rode headlong over the battery and captured a part of his guns, while Hatch's horsemen, under a counter fire from their own guns, with irresistible fury swept everything before them. Before the fight was over night closed in and covered the field with a pall of impenetrable darkness. The scene, like that of the night before, was one of great confusion, but every musket flash and every defiant shout was a guide to the gallant and unrelenting pursuers. Hammond passed around the enemy's left, fording the West Harpeth, and with the Tenth Indiana cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Ben. Gresham commanding, struck a new line, formed a short distance south of the river, and in a desperate hand-to-hand fight, mounted men against footmen, saber and pistol against stout hearts and clubbed muskets, with the pall of darkness over all, again scattered the enemy, capturing their remaining gun and spreading confusion and terror throughout the retreating mass of now completely disorganized Confederates. It was 10 o'clock before the National cavalry ceased the pursuit, and an hour later before order could be restored to its ranks. Men and horses were ravenously hungry and almost worn out with three days of continuous marching and fighting, and there was nothing left them but to bivouac on the field. At early dawn the next morning, the nineteenth, the cavalry corps, although entirely out of rations, re-

sumed the pursuit, Hatch and Knipe pressing closely upon the enemy's rear guard, which had again been formed and was now commanded by Forrest in person, while Croxton and Johnson endeavored to reach around it and strike the retreating Confederates at Spring Hill. The densely wooded hills, the muddy roads, the plowed fields, rendered almost impassable by the constant rains, and, above all, the now rapidly rising streams, made it impossible for the flanking columns traveling through the open country to overtake the enemy and again bring him into action."

Indiana was represented in this pursuit, and the engagements which occurred, by the Eleventh cavalry in Hatch's division, the Sixth in Johnson's, and the Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth and Thirteenth in that of Knipe. Two of the brigade commanders were from Indiana, Colonel Robert E. Stewart and Colonel James Biddle. Between the 15th and 28th of December, the cavalry corps captured thirty-eight field pieces, eleven caissons, twelve colors, 3332 prisoners, including one general officer, one train of eighty pontoons, and one hundred and twenty-five wagons. It lost one gun, 122 officers and men killed, 521 wounded and 250 missing. Hood's army was practically destroyed. A small portion of it was afterward assembled under Johnston in North Carolina, but the rebellion in the West was over.

During the months while Sherman was marching to the sea, and Thomas was destroying Hood's army, Grant was drawing his net closer and closer around Petersburg, the grand Army of the Potomac fighting almost daily. Thus ended 1864.

CHAPTER LXI.

THE END COMES.

With Grant holding fast to Petersburg, and Sherman at Savannah ready to march north, and with Hood's army destroyed in the West, all felt that the end of the rebellion was near at hand. The resources of the South were exhausted. To raise another army was impossible. There were still many thousand armed men scattered around in different parts of the South, and the Confederate government was using every effort to collect a part of these to operate under Johnston against Sherman, but the outlook was not very encouraging. Lee could not escape from the clutches of Grant, and all the hopes of the Confederacy rested upon Lee and his army. The end was in sight, yet there were many and hard battles to be fought before the South would give up. In this last year of the war let us first follow Sherman. When Hood was destroyed General Grant ordered the Army of the Ohio, under General Schofield, to be sent to co-operate with Sherman. Schofield was to capture Wilmington and be ready to join Sherman when he got that far North. Hence, Grant was holding Lee in Petersburg while two other large armies were preparing to close in on him.

On January 15, 1865, Sherman began his march to the North. He pursued the same strategy that had characterized his march from Atlanta to the sea, moving the wings of his army in such manner as to confuse the enemy as to where he would eventually strike. He met with little opposition until after he had traversed South Carolina. The first considerable opposition was at Averysboro, on March

16, when Hardee, with a part of Johnston's army, undertook to check Sherman's march. The Twentieth corps, with two divisions of the Fourteenth, soon ran over Hardee, but Johnston was preparing a more deadly effort. On the 18th of March Sherman's army fought its last battle with the enemy, and it was a battle at a point where Sherman was not anticipating it. He was converging his army on Goldsboro, when word came to Slocum that the enemy was in force in his front. The battle which ensued was opened by Indianians. Colonel Cyrus E. Briant, of Indiana, was leading with his brigade, when he was ordered to deploy his command, and brush away what was supposed to be only cavalry. In his brigade were the Forty-second and Eighty-eighth Indiana regiments. Colonel Briant drove the advanced lines of the enemy out of several positions. Colonel George P. Buell, of Indiana, was ordered with his brigade to the left of Colonel Briant.

It was soon discovered that Johnston with his whole army was present to contest matters with Sherman. Johnston was able to throw so strong a force on Briant and Buell that they were driven back and the Nineteenth Indiana battery lost three guns. Slocum and Davis were hurrying troops to the front and placing them in position, and soon had six brigades in line to receive the advancing Confederates. Johnston had expected to catch Sherman's army in detail and defeat at least one wing of it before the other could come to its help. In this he was disappointed by the stubborn fighting of Carlin's advanced division, and later by the troops placed in line by General Jeff. C. Davis.

Near Wilmington, North Carolina, the Confederates had erected what was claimed to be the most formidable fort in the world. In General Grant's comprehensive plan for crushing the rebellion it became necessary to take this fort, known as Fort Fisher. Schofield's Army of the Ohio was to operate in that section to form a junction with Sherman, but could not do so unless Fort Fisher was reduced. In December, 1864, Grant had sent against the fort a formidable fleet, accompanied by a large part of the Army of the James under General Butler. The fleet bombarded the fort, but no assault was made by the accompanying land force. On the return of the expedition to Fortress Monroe, Butler was promptly removed from

command, and the same force was sent back to Fort Fisher under the command of General Terry.

On the 13th of January the fleet bombarded the fort all day, with apparently little impression. It was then determined to make a double assault—one by the army and the other by sailors and marines from the fleet. Ames's division, in which was the Thirteenth Indiana regiment, was chosen for the assault on the part of the army. At 2 o'clock preparations for the assault were begun. At a signal sixty sharpshooters from the Thirteenth Indiana, and forty volunteers, all under command of Lieutenant Lent, of the Thirteenth, dashed forward to within less than 200 yards of the fort. The sharpshooters were armed with repeating rifles, while the forty volunteers were provided with picks and shovels. It was but a few minutes until the volunteers had dug rifle pits and the sharpshooters opened a destructive fire on the parapet, being assailed at the same time by a heavy fire of musketry and cannon. Curtis's brigade of Ames's division now sprang forward and with a cheer was over the parapet before the astonished enemy realized their danger. Thus this strongest fort in the world was captured, the assailants losing about 900. Two days later the magazine exploded, killing about 300.

Schofield being established at Wilmington and Sherman rapidly approaching, Grant determined to finish with Lee. When Grant opened the campaign in the Wilderness he had in the Army of the Potomac four Indiana infantry regiments, and the right wing of the Third cavalry. The four infantry regiments were the Seventh, Fourteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth. They had fought in all the battles of the Army of the Potomac. When the end came the Twentieth alone remained. With it had been consolidated at different times the recruits and veterans of the other three regiments. The story of these regiments in the Wilderness, at Spottsylvania, Laurel Hill and Cold Harbor, has already been told. It remains now only to follow them around Petersburg. The Twentieth was in De Trobriand's brigade, of Birney's division of the famous Second Corps. After the consolidation with it of the veterans and recruits of the Fourteenth, the regiment was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Meikel. In Au-

gust, 1864, Hancock was sent to Deep Bottom. In the very opening fight after debarking, the Twentieth captured two huge mortars which had been placed there to fire on the gunboats.

On returning to the army De Trobriand's brigade was placed to defend a fort that had come to be known in the army and throughout the country as "Fort Hell," on account of the large number who had been killed there by the enemy. On the 10th of September General De Trobriand was ordered to capture the rifle pits of the enemy in his front. He determined to make a night attack. He chose three of his regiments for the dangerous work. The Twentieth Indiana was to form in mass, without noise, behind a swell of ground and charge from there with the bayonet on the whole salient part of the enemy's picket line. De Trobriand says of the attack: "It was the affair of a quarter of an hour. The enemy, surprised, overwhelmed by the human torrent which rushed upon him, gave way, and abandoned to us, not only the section attacked, but still more of his line, both to the right and to the left. The works were quickly turned by the companies provided with picks and shovels, and we were solidly established in the rifle pits, which the enemy was not able to recapture from us."

Colonel Meikel was killed, being the third commanding officer the Twentieth had lost in battle. Colonel Brown was killed at the second Bull Run, and Colonel Wheeler at Gettysburg. Of Colonel Meikel General De Trobriand said: "He was a young officer of great merit and daring bravery. His loss was keenly felt in the brigade, and amongst all who had been brought in contact with him." One of the new forts erected by General Grant in front of Petersburg was named in his honor.

In the battle of Hatcher's Run, Hancock's Second division was in great danger of being cut off by the Confederates. De Trobriand, with five companies of the Twentieth, was rushed to the aid of the imperilled division. So deadly was the conflict that in five minutes he lost eighteen officers and 170 men, but the enemy was repulsed and the division saved. On the 25th of March, 1865, the battle raged all along the line in front of Petersburg. During the night of the 24th the Confederates stormed and cap-

tured Fort Steedman, but were soon driven back, and then General Grant determined to push things. An order was issued to capture all the fortified picket lines in front of the Sixth and Second corps. The Twentieth was assigned to the work of carrying those in front of its brigade, which it did, taking more than 100 prisoners, and the lines were held despite all the efforts to recapture them. In the fight over these works, Colonel Andrews, commanding the Twentieth, was badly wounded.

The world knows how Grant finally drove Lee out of Petersburg, and then pursued him with terrible energy. The first line of battle formed in the war, on the Union side, was formed by General Thomas A. Morris, of Indiana, at Phillippi, on June 19, 1861. The last line of battle formed by the Army of the Potomac, the one that told in unmistakable terms to Lee that his hour had come, was formed by General Robert S. Foster, of Indiana, who was commanding a division under Gibbon. Sheridan with his cavalry had headed Lee at Appomattox and General Gordon was preparing to break through the cavalry lines, when General Foster came up with his division, after an unparalleled march, and placed his men across the path of Gordon. When Gordon saw that line he sent word to Lee that the end had come, and at once a flag of truce was raised. Of this night march General Gibbon said that at midnight, on the 8th of April, he had halted his corps for a rest of a few hours, with orders to march again promptly at 4 o'clock in the morning. Tired and worn out Gibbon overslept himself and did not wake up until after daylight. Mortified, and fearful that this lack of watchfulness might give Lee the opportunity to escape, Gibbon hastily sent his staff in every direction to start the troops. Foster had the advance, and when the staff officer reached his bivouac he found Foster gone. Foster had not slept, but at the appointed hour promptly moved on. General Gibbon said he was glad there was one man in the corps who was a better soldier than he was himself.

Lee's surrender was soon followed by that of Johnston, but there still remain some things to tell of interest to Indiana troops. When the pursuit of Hood ended, General Thomas began preparations to go into winter quarters with his army, but General Grant designed otherwise. He

ordered A. J. Smith's corps to be sent to General Canby to operate against Mobile, and subsequently ordered General Stoneman, with a cavalry force, to pierce North Carolina and destroy the railroads that Sherman could not reach, and a cavalry force under General Wilson to penetrate into Alabama for the same purpose, and to co-operate with Canby against Mobile. With this expedition of General Wilson, our story now has to do, as in it Indiana troops added to the laurels they had already won. With Wilson were the following Indiana organizations: McCook's division, LaGrange's brigade, Fourth cavalry and a battalion of the Second cavalry; Miller's brigade, the Seventeenth and Seventy-second mounted infantry.

On the 23d of March General Wilson started for Tuscaloosa and Selma, and his expedition proved to be one of the most important of the war, defeating the enemy in several engagements, capturing his strongholds by the most brilliant bravery, destroying millions of property, and finally capturing the fugitive President of the Southern Confederacy. On the 1st of April Wilson met Forrest near Randolph, and had a sharp engagement with him. In this engagement Captain Taylor, of the Seventy-second Indiana, had a running fight with Forrest himself for more than 100 yards, wounding Forrest with his sword. Forrest succeeded in drawing his revolver, when he shot and killed Captain Taylor.

On the next day Wilson appeared before Selma, one of the strongest fortified places in the South. The outer line was an abatis 200 yards wide, and the outer edge 400 yards from the main line of works. This consisted of trees dragged in as closely together as they could be laid; inside the abatis, and 200 yards from the main line was a row of chevaux de frise. Inside of this were several rows of stakes driven in the ground, and wires stretched from one to another. Still farther inside was a row of fence rails planted in the ground at an angle, and still closer to the main line of works was a row of cedar posts or trees about eight feet high. A ditch eight feet wide and eight feet deep, and an embankment about fifteen feet high, completed the works. These were defended by several batteries, in all thirty-two guns, and about 7000 men. This was what had to be overcome.

The Lightning brigade was selected for the work. Colonel Miller in his report says: "About noon General Wilson sent for me to come to him at the rear of our brigade. He stated what he wanted done; that my brigade would have to make the assault on the works at Selma; that they were very strong, but he had confidence I could take my brigade over them. The General now made the statement that if we could take the place it would be among the big things of the war—that Sherman had started twice for that place and failed; Sturgis lost his force in a similar effort. Forrest had cleaned him out, horse, foot and dragoons, and that in less than six hours his (Wilson's) fate would be decided."

A part of the Seventy-second mounted infantry was left to hold a road in the rear, with orders to hold it at all hazards. Colonel Miller wanted his whole brigade to make the charge, but the Seventy-second had to hold the bridge against Chalmers, and General Wilson promised to support Miller with the Fourth regulars. Colonel Miller formed his line with the Seventeenth Indiana on the extreme right, the One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois next, and then some companies of the Seventy-second, that, as Colonel Miller said, had left the regiment to see the fun. The Ninety-eighth Illinois was on the left. Colonel Miller in his report says: "I went to each regimental commander, Colonel Vail of the Seventeenth, Colonel Biggs of the One Hundred and Twenty-third, and Colonel Kitchell of the Ninety-eighth, and showed them the works and told them it was expected of us to carry them. They all remarked, 'They are certainly very strong.' I admitted it, but told them we had never made a charge that had not been attended with success. At this Colonel Biggs said, 'I will go in or die.' Vail and Kitchell both said, 'Good for Biggs! We can keep up our ends of the line with our regiments.' With the advice that each one of them should see their line officers I left them, and the arrangements were completed." Colonel Miller had only about 1500 men and officers with whom to charge these elaborate works. We again quote from Colonel Miller's report:

"A short time before the sun went down, the advance was made over an open plain. When we were about half a mile from the works the enemy opened out on the line with

increased firing of both large and small arms. General Long was soon cut down by a musket ball, receiving a dangerous wound in the head. I was shot and disabled within 100 yards of the works. Colonel Biggs fell at the entrance of the road leading through the works. General Wilson, as promised, was on hand with his Fourth regulars. Colonel Vail now had charge of the brigade, and soon arranged for the further advance, and in a short time Selma was ours, with 3000 prisoners."

General Upton was ordered to dismount a regiment of his cavalry and attempt to turn the Confederate right. When successful he was to fire a single gun, and that was to be the signal for the assault on the main line. While waiting for this signal, Chalmers made a determined attack on the position held by nine companies of the Seventy-second, and General Long determined not to wait any longer for Upton, and ordered the charge at once. B. F. Magee, author of the "History of the Seventy-second," witnessed the battle from the line where his company with others of his regiment was holding Chalmers in check. He draws this graphic picture of the scene:

"After General Wilson left us at the bridge he rode on to the ridge, where he could see most of his own lines, and nearly the whole line of the rebel works, and waited there until he was sure everything was ready. Just as the sun is going down his staff officers ride up to him from every part of the field and tell him everything is ready. He takes off his hat, and from where we are, north of the creek, we plainly hear him sing out, 'All right!' The bugles blow 'Forward!' and simultaneously the whole line moves toward the rebel works on quick time. We, across the creek, hold our breath. In five minutes our lines reach the outer edge of the abatis, and the batteries from all the forts open on them. Here our men lie down for a few minutes, to get their breath; for two or three minutes an ominous silence follows. Except an occasional shot from our skirmishers all is still. You cannot conceive with what suspense we listened, but we had not long to wait. Again the bugles sound—this time a charge. Again we hold our breath, as our men raise the accustomed cheer, and start through the abatis. Now is the moment of triumph or defeat for the rebels. Every gun from their

forts and batteries belches forth volleys of grape and canister. Seven thousand fiends rise up from behind their works and pour into our ranks volley after volley of leaden hail. We tremble! Is it possible that any line of battle on earth can stand such a hell as this? But see! General Long goes down, shot in the head. Colonel Miller goes next, shot through the thigh. Heavens and earth! can our men ever get through that abatis? Again we hear our men cheering, as one by one, and in squads they emerge from the abatis, seize hold of the chevaux de frise, swing them around like gates, and rush on for the main works. They stumble and tumble over the wires stretched across the way, but are up again in an instant, and our Spencers begin to rattle. We catch our breath as the men catch hold of the stakes and twist them out of the way; they go through them, and again our Spencers play such a tune as makes our blood gallop through our veins. We raise the cheer—but stop! Another lull. Colonel Edgerton, of the Fourth Ohio, is killed. Our men have reached the stockade, and again the rebel musketry and artillery belch forth volumes of death. The sun goes down and hides his face from the scene. Good heavens! and must our men all be murdered there, and so close to the works, too? No! no! They seize hold of the pickets, and with giant strength break them off, twist them out of the way, or pull them out of the ground; while at other points they hoist each other over them, or bend down and let their comrades mount upon their backs and thus leap over them. Another volley of death from the rebels! It is their last. But in this volley, at a single point, an officer and four men of the Seventeenth are killed, almost in a heap, as they try to tear out the stockade, and all along the line our men have fallen by scores. Undaunted, our men leap over the stockade in numbers, and rush through the gaps in squads, and again open out with their Spencers; and again the blood rushes through our veins. Our men again raise the cheer and rush for the ditch, and the rebels begin to fly.

“During all this time General Wilson has intently watched his whole line; his two regiments of mounted men are ready and eager for the fray. His body guard and staff officers are by his side; his two blood-red battle flags are flying at either side of him. He sees this is the supreme

moment of triumph. He and his officers raise the cheer! The bugles from every side sound the 'charge!' and with the swiftness of the wind he and his flying squadrons rush for the city. We know that the victory will be ours! One by one our men reach the top of the parapet, and the flag of the Seventeenth Indiana is already waving over the works; but many of them are shot down and roll back into the ditch, or fall forward among the rebels. Colonel Biggs is shot down as he attempts to pass where the road goes through the works; and our brigade is nearly without officers. But still our men rush up the slope, gain the top in numbers, and the rebels fly for the city a mile away, and are shot in the back as they run. Our men, remembering the charge of the Seventeenth yesterday, and the mutilation and robbing of the dead, now make no effort to capture many prisoners.

"Just where the Seventeenth strikes the main line of works is a fort that must be manned by veterans, as here the struggle is long and fearful in the extreme. Here five of our men were killed after they got into the fort. The gunners stuck to their guns to the very last, and from the piles of dead lying under the wheels of the guns, and behind the limbers we should judge that few of them made their escape, or even cared to. General Wilson, with his blood-red battle flags still flying at the head of his column of the Fourth regulars and Seventh Pennsylvania cavalry, now rushes through the works and the victory is complete. As the men of the Lightning brigade begin to form inside the works he rides up to them, takes off his hat, and says: 'Men, I now see how it is you have gotten such a hell of a name.' This rough compliment was properly appreciated by the men, and they greeted it with a round of applause."

This was one of the most gallant actions of the war, as it was one of the most important captures. General Grant knew the strength of the works and the importance of the place, and thought it would require an army to take it, and in March had written to General Wilson. "General Canby will move from Mobile with over 40,000 infantry to co-operate with you; this will make success sure." Yet a single brigade, made up largely of Indiana soldiers, captured this strongly fortified place.

Selma was the great manufacturing depot of the Con-

federacy. The saltpeter works alone covered more than five acres of ground; the arsenal covered six acres and was full of ammunition of every kind, and was stored with supplies. The foundries had been running full handed, and six cannon of large caliber were found finished ready for mounting. The Confederates burned the saltpeter works as our men entered the city, but the Federals destroyed the foundries, the arsenal and vast amounts of stores.

On the 17th of April General Wilson captured Columbus. Among the trophies were fifteen locomotives, 250 cars, fifty-two field guns, a Confederate ram, mounting six seven-inch guns, four cotton factories, 115,000 bales of cotton, a navy yard, foundry and 100,000 rounds of ammunition.

General Wilson had been ordered to clean out all that section of the country, and he pushed his men in every direction. Colonel LaGrange, with his brigade, had quite a fight at West Point. His advance was composed of the Second and Fourth Indiana cavalry, and Beck's Indiana battery. This advance held the attention of the Confederates until the arrival of the rest of the brigade, when preparations were made for an assault. Detachments from the First Wisconsin, Second Indiana and Seventh Kentucky were dismounted to make the charge. They moved forward, drove the skirmishers inside the fort, and reached the ditch, which was too wide to leap, and too deep to pass. Sharpshooters kept the enemy down until materials for a bridge could be obtained, when the charge was sounded again, and the detachments rushed over the parapet on three sides. Simultaneously with the storming of the fort, the Fourth Indiana dashed through the town, scattered a superior force of cavalry, and burned five locomotives and trains.

On the 17th of April General Wilson started for Macon, with the Seventeenth Indiana in the advance, under Colonel White. When within a few miles of Macon a flag of truce was met, bearing information that an armistice existed between Generals Sherman and Johnston. Colonel White sent the communication back to his division commander, who sent it to General Wilson. General Wilson was not wholly satisfied, and rode forward to investigate and halt

his command, but Colonel White had dashed into Macon and received the surrender of the city.

The last engagement of the war was on May 13, at Palmetto Rancho, Texas, and in that, as in the first engagement, Indiana troops took part. A small force of Union troops encountered a Confederate cavalry force, and a sharp engagement ensued. The last man killed on the Union side fell in this engagement. John J. Williams, of Company B, Thirty-fourth Indiana regiment, was the last to lose his life on the field for the cause of the Union.

Several of the Indiana regiments remained in the service for some months after the surrender of the last of the Confederate forces, being sent to Texas to watch Maximilian. They were finally mustered out of the service early in 1866.

CHAPTER LXII.

HONORS OF THE WAR.

In 1890 Congress passed an act to establish a branch of the National Soldiers' Home, at Marion, in Grant County. At that time the government was maintaining Homes for veterans at Dayton, Ohio; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Togus, Maine; Elizabeth City, Virginia; Leavenworth, Kansas, and Los Angeles, California. The years were adding rapidly to the number of those who needed the care of the government, to make their declining years comfortable and peaceful, and largely through the efforts of Major George W. Steele, member of Congress from the Marion district, it was determined to build a new Home at Marion. A beautiful rolling tract of land, covering about 230 acres, was selected two and a half miles southeast of that city. It is bordered on the east and south by the Mississinnewa river, a beautiful stream fringed on either side by trees of magnificent foliage. About sixty acres of the Home grounds are covered by large forest trees. There are twenty-two buildings which have cost the government about \$232,000. The site is a commanding one, being readily seen from a large scope of territory on either side of the river. About 1,500 veterans are cared for in this model institution, and live amid scenes of great natural beauty, enriched by art.

The National Home and all the branches are crowded to their utmost capacity, and many old soldiers who were really in need of a home objected, from various causes, to being cared for in those maintained by the general government. The question of erecting a State Home was agitated,

and the Grand Army of the Republic took the matter up, accumulated between \$5000 and \$6000, and obtained about 250 acres of ground, in Tippecanoe County, near Lafayette. The Legislature of 1895 enacted a law establishing a Home on the land in Tippecanoe County. By the terms of this act the Grand Army of the Republic conveyed to the State its title to the land in question, and also turned over the funds it had collected. Seventy-five thousand dollars was appropriated for the erection of buildings, and authority was given to the various counties of the State to erect cottages on the grounds at their own expense.

The Home is managed by a Board of Trustees appointed by the Governor, who serve for a term of three years. The members of this Board, together with all the officers of the institution must be taken from among the honorably discharged soldiers or sailors of the Union. The trustees elect a commandant and an adjutant, who have charge of the Home. Those entitled to admittance in the Home are thus designated by the law:

"All honorably discharged soldiers, sailors and marines, who have served the United States in any of its wars, and who have been residents and citizens of the State of Indiana for one year immediately preceding, and who are at the time of the date of the application for admission to the Home, who may be disabled or destitute, also the wives of such disabled and destitute soldiers, sailors or marines, and destitute widows over forty-five years of age, of soldiers, sailors or marines of the United States, who have been citizens and residents of the State of Indiana for one year immediately preceding, and who are at the time of the date of the application for admission to the Home, may be admitted to the said Soldiers' Home under such rules and regulations as may be adopted by said Board of Trustees; Provided, That preference may be given to persons who served in Indiana military organizations: Provided further, That the words disabled or destitute shall be construed to mean persons without means of support, or physically disqualified to perform manual labor to the extent of earning a livelihood or persons depending upon charity: Provided, That the benefits of this act shall extend only to widows

and wives of soldiers where the contract of marriage was entered into before the passage of this act."

Under this act the State has erected proper buildings, and several counties have availed themselves of the privilege conveyed and built handsome cottages. The State reserves the right, when the time comes that the buildings and grounds shall be no longer needed for the purpose of a Home for soldiers, to use them for any purpose whatsoever, as the Legislature may determine. A great majority of those who fought for the Union were taken from the fields and workshops of the country, and as they were dependent upon the labor of their hands for maintenance before the war, they were equally so dependent when they laid down their arms, and but few of them were able to lay by a sufficiency to make their last years comfortable. These Homes are not charitable institutions, but are only incidents in the discharge of a great debt.

Immediately on the close of the war a temporary home for disabled soldiers was established in Indianapolis, and an appeal was issued to the people of the State for aid in making a permanent home. Sufficient money was obtained by this means to purchase a piece of ground near Knightstown, in Henry County, and a Home was established. The Legislature, in 1867, adopted this Home on the part of the State and appropriated \$50,000 for the erection of buildings. It was used for awhile as a Home for disabled soldiers, but is now devoted wholly to the care and education of the orphan children of Indiana soldiers and sailors. The school now has eight buildings for general purposes and six cottages for boys. The industrial building is 100 by 78 feet, and two stories high.

For some years after the close of the war the question of erecting, at Indianapolis, a grand monument to commemorate the achievements of Indiana's citizen soldiery was agitated by the public press. The matter did not take shape until about 1880, when the Grand Army of the Republic, an organization composed of soldiers who had fought in the war, took it up, and raised quite a sum of money for that purpose. Finally, in 1887, the Legislature passed an act appropriating \$200,000 and the tract of ground in Indianapolis, known as the "Governor's Circle," was selected as the site of the monument. This piece of

ground had been set apart, at the original platting of the city, for the use of the State on which to erect a residence for the Governor, but no such building had ever been erected. It is in the heart of the city, at the intersection of Meridian and Market streets, and is about 200 feet in diameter. Plans for the proposed structure were asked for, and that submitted by Bruno Schmidt, of Berlin, Germany, was chosen, and the work of building at once began. The monument is built of Indiana stone. The corner stone was laid on the 22d day of August, 1889, with elaborate ceremonies. Among the distinguished guests present, were Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States, and some of the members of his cabinet.

This splendid monument, commemorating the bravery and endurance of the citizen soldiery of Indiana is a work of art, and not like most other great shafts, an unsightly pile of brick or stone. Its design is artistic and beautiful, in every part, and its proportions symmetrical. The following are the dimensions of the structure:

Diameter of circle, including approaches.....	192	feet
Diameter of foundation and terrace	110	"
Diameter of base of terrace.....	68	"
Diameter of pedestal at base, including projections	62	"
Diameter of pedestal proper, at base	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	"
Diameter of pedestal proper at top.....	35	"
Diameter of base of shaft	32	"
Diameter of shaft at base	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	"
Diameter of shaft at capital	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	"
Diameter of lanterne	8	"
Height of terrace	11	"
Height of pedestal	59	"
Height of shaft	149	"
Height of lanterne	21	"
Height of statue on top of lanterne	28	"
Total height of monument and statue	268	"

The platform of the capital is reached by a spiral staircase and by an elevator. Just below the capital is a bronze astragal bearing the dates of the years of the war. Midway of the structure is another bronze astragal, emblematic of the navy, and further down is a third astragal, representing the army. On the east and west sides are

carved groups representing peace and war. On the subordinate pedestals are beautiful candelabras. On the east and west sides, just beneath the sculptured groups, are the largest artificial water fountains of the world. They are fed from driven wells, by engines capable of supplying about 20,000 gallons per minute. The water falls in beautiful cascades to a stone basin. This monument is dedicated to "Indiana's Silent Victors." The monument was completed in 1902, and dedicated on May 15, of that year.

Many counties have also erected monuments, and some have built "Memorial Halls." The State has erected at Chickamauga and Shiloh monuments to each Indiana organization engaged in those battles.

CHAPTER LXIII.

DISTINGUISHED OFFICERS.

BRIG.-GEN. PLEASANT A. HACKLEMAN.

The only general officer from Indiana killed in battle during the war of the Rebellion was Pleasant Adam Hackleman. General Hackleman was born in Franklin County on the 15th of November, 1814, two years before Indiana was admitted into the Union. He grew to manhood with what few advantages surrounded the life of a pioneer. After his marriage he began the study of law, and was admitted to the bar in 1837, removing to Rushville, where engaged in practice. He rose rapidly in his profession, and in popularity with the people. He served as clerk of the courts of Rush County from 1847 to 1855, having previously served a term or two in the State Legislature. He was a speaker of remarkable force, and was twice nominated by his party for Congress, but defeated both times. In 1861 he was appointed by Governor Morton one of the delegates to the peace convention at Washington. In May of that year he was appointed Colonel of the Sixteenth Indiana Regiment, and immediately after the battle of Bull Run was ordered East with his regiment. In April, 1862, he was promoted to a Brigadier-Generalship, and was ordered to report to General Halleck, then at Pittsburg Landing. He served with that army until he met his death, on the 3d of October, 1862. His brigade was heavily engaged with the enemy, when reinforcements came to help. In swinging into line the reinforcements fell in confusion, and then broke. It was while attempting to rally them he met his death. When he fell he realized that his wound was fatal, and to those around him said:



MAJ.-GEN. JOSEPH J. REYNOLDS.



MAJ.-GEN. ROBERT H. MILROY.



BRIG.-GEN. PLEASANT A. HACKLEMAN.



LIEUT.-COMMANDER WILLIAM GWIN.



ADMIRAL GEORGE BROWN.

"If we are victorious, send my body home; if not, bury me on the field."

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT H. MILROY.

One of the ablest and bravest soldiers produced by Indiana during the war of the Rebellion was Robert H. Milroy. He was a native of the State. When he was about twenty-four years of age, while on a visit to Pennsylvania, he entered as a student the Military school at Norwich, Vermont, where he was graduated, taking the degrees of Master of Arts, Master of Military Science and Master of Civil Engineering. Several months later he returned to Indiana, and from there drifted to Texas, which had just won its independence from Mexico. He did not remain there long, but returned to Indiana and began the study of law. When the war with Mexico came he was among the first to enlist, and became a Captain in the First Indiana regiment. When the term of service of his regiment expired he made many efforts to get the government to receive his company as an independent organization, but failed. For the next few years he practiced law. He was among the first to see that the political agitation of 1860 would result in civil war and organized a military company at his home in Rensselaer; when President Lincoln called for 75,000 troops he was quick to tender his services. He was at once appointed, by Governor Morton, Colonel of the Ninth Indiana regiment. With this regiment he went to West Virginia, and took part in all the movements of that campaign, under Generals McClellan and Morris. He and his gallant regiment won for themselves a name for being ever ready for a fight or for any other duty.

He served through the three months' service and returned home, to recruit his regiment for three years. In September, 1861, he was made a Brigadier-General, and again assigned to duty in West Virginia. He served for some time in the Cheat Mountain country, under Generals Rosecrans, Banks and Fremont. He there won the title of the "Gray Eagle," of the army. He fought with great gallantry in numerous engagements. In 1862 General Milroy commanded a brigade under Pope in his disastrous campaign in the valley, and was present, taking active part,

in most of the battles fought in that campaign. In November of that year he was made a Major-General of volunteers, being one of the three officers of that rank from Indiana.

In 1863 he found himself in command at Winchester. Hooker was confronting Lee at Fredericksburg. After the fatal battle of Chancellorsville, Lee started on his way to invade Pennsylvania. Winchester and Milroy were in his path. Hooker neglected to give notice to Milroy of the movements of the Confederates, and Halleck also failed to warn him. Suddenly he learned through his own scouts that the main army of the Confederates was bearing down upon him. Their advance had been skillfully made, but Milroy was alert enough to get out of Winchester. On his retreat he fought a terrific engagement with the enemy, and attained success at first, but finally was overwhelmed. His men scattered in almost complete rout.

The next year he found himself in the West, and when Hood was marching to attack Thomas at Nashville, Milroy badly defeated the Confederate General Bate. He served until the close of the war.

JOSEPH J. REYNOLDS.

The second Brigadier-General appointed from Indiana during the war of the Rebellion was Joseph J. Reynolds, who was also one of the three Major-Generals appointed from the State. General Reynolds was a Kentuckian by birth, having been born at Flemingsburg, in that State, January 4, 1822. He was educated in the common schools of that place, until his parents removed to Lafayette, Indiana. He then entered Wabash college, but before he was graduated, he was appointed a cadet to West Point, on the recommendation of Albert S. White. He was graduated from the Military Academy in 1843, in the same class with General Grant. He was assigned to the Fourth artillery, and served in Texas in 1845. He was transferred to the Third artillery, and in 1847 was promoted to First Lieutenant and appointed assistant professor of natural and experimental philosophy at West Point. He served in this position until 1855. He was then stationed in the Indian Territory, but resigned in 1857 to accept the chair

of mechanical engineering in Washington college, St. Louis. In 1860 he returned to Lafayette and went into business with a brother. When the civil war came he was among the first to tender his services to Governor Morton, and was made Colonel of the Tenth regiment, and on the 10th of May was commissioned a Brigadier-General of volunteers by President Lincoln. He was assigned to duty in West Virginia. There he fought and defeated General Robert E. Lee, and drove him from the State. He served with distinction until January, 1862, when business matters made it necessary for him to resign. He returned to Lafayette and devoted himself to a speedy settlement of his business affairs, when he again tendered his services to the government. In September, 1862, he was again appointed Brigadier-General, and two months later was promoted to a Major-Generalcy. He was assigned to duty with the Army of the Cumberland, and was with that army in its numerous marches and battles. At the battle of Chickamauga he commanded the fourth division of General Thomas's corps, and fought with conspicuous gallantry.

When General Thomas was put in command of the Army of the Cumberland, General Reynolds became his chief of staff. A short time later he was sent to New Orleans, and placed in command at that point. While there, in connection with General Canby, a plan was laid to attack Mobile. While the troops were on board the vessels, ready to begin the movement against Mobile, orders were received from General Grant to send the Nineteenth corps, the one Reynolds commanded, to Fortress Monroe. About 17,000 of the corps, who were already on board of vessels, were dispatched with all haste to Virginia, and arrived in time to proceed to Washington, and save it from capture by Early. That part of the corps took part in all the battles of Sheridan in the valley. General Reynolds remained in the Southwest, and was placed in command of other troops in the field. In November, 1864, he was placed in command of the Department of Arkansas, and remained in command of the department until April, 1866, when he was mustered out of the volunteer service, and appointed a colonel in the regular army, being assigned to the Twenty-sixth infantry. At the same time he was brevetted a Brigadier-General, in the regular army, for distinguished

services at Chattanooga, and the same day was brevetted a Major-General, for services at Missionary Ridge. From 1867 to 1872 he commanded the military district composed of Louisiana and Texas. While holding this command he was offered by Texas a seat in the United States Senate, but declined. He was afterward assigned to duty in the Department of the Platte, where he remained until 1877 when he was retired from the service.

EDWARD R. S. CANBY.

High among the honored names in the war of the Rebellion was that of Edward R. S. Canby. To him Indiana has a right to lay claim. General Canby was born in Kentucky, in 1818, but removed with his parents to Indiana when he was but a child. He was appointed to West Point, in 1835, and was graduated in 1839. He took an active and honorable part in the Mexican war. He was promoted to a Captaincy, in 1851, and was made a Major in 1858. He was a Colonel in 1861 when the war broke out. At the time he was in New Mexico, and at once set about organizing the militia, and took such active steps that he saved New Mexico to the Union. By February, 1862, he had collected a few thousand volunteers, and a small force of regulars, at Fort Craig, on the Rio Grande River. There he was attacked by two thousand Texas Rangers, under the command of General Sibley, and a bloody battle took place, which resulted in a decided victory for the Union forces. For this service he was made a Brigadier-General, and afterwards was promoted to Major-General of Volunteers. In May, 1864, he relieved General Banks as commander of the Department of the Gulf, and all the troops in the trans-Mississippi district were placed under his orders. In connection with General Reynolds, who was in command at New Orleans, he planned an attack upon Mobile. Just at the time the troops were embarking on the expedition against Mobile, a large part of them, 'consisting of the major portion of the Nineteenth Corps, were ordered to City Point. This forced a postponement of the attack on Mobile, but General Canby kept it constantly in view, and in 1865 effected the capture, in conjunction with Admiral Farragut. This capture has always been regarded as one

of the most brilliant victories of the war, and it was largely due to the soldierly abilities of General Canby.

Not long after this event, General Dick Taylor, in command of the Confederate troops in that district, surrendered his forces to General Canby. This surrender carried with it about all of the Confederate troops remaining after the surrender of Lee and Johnston. At the close of the war General Canby was placed in command of the Military District of North and South Carolina, and afterward of the Department of the Gulf. His administration, in those troublous times, was firm, yet conciliatory, and met with the approval of General Grant. His last service was on the plains against the Modoc Indians. He was in command of the forces sent against those tribes, at the outbreak of hostilities in 1873. He had driven them to the lava beds of the mountains, when they asked for a consultation, with a view to a surrender. General Canby was warned against treachery, but with two or three officers advanced to meet the Indians, when they were fired upon, and General Canby slain. His death occurred April 11, 1873. General Canby was regarded as the best read man on military law in the army, and was counted an authority upon all such subjects.

GENERAL JEFF. C. DAVIS.

In the War of the Rebellion the most brilliant soldier from Indiana was General Jeff. C. Davis. He was born in Clark County, Indiana, March 2, 1825. When the war with Mexico came he was pursuing his law studies, but at once abandoned them and enlisted in the Second Indiana regiment, under command of Colonel Joseph Lane. For gallant services at the battle of Buena Vista, he was made Second Lieutenant in the First United States artillery. He served with distinction, and became known as one of the bravest of the young officers in that war. In 1852 he was promoted to First Lieutenant in the same service. He was at Fort Sumter, with Major Anderson, when that fort was bombarded by the soldiers of South Carolina, and was there at the surrender. Almost immediately afterward he was commissioned Captain, and Governor Morton appointed him Colonel of the Twenty-second regiment of In-

diana volunteers. This regiment he led into Missouri, and commanded a brigade under Fremont, Hunter and Pope. He soon became known as a fighting officer. He commanded a division at the battle of Pea Ridge, and displayed the most conspicuous gallantry, as well as ability as a General. At Milford, Missouri, he captured a superior force of the enemy, and was made a Brigadier-General. He took part in the siege of Corinth. When Bragg and Kirby Smith invaded Kentucky, he was sent to that State. While at Louisville he had an unfortunate altercation with General William Nelson, and killed him in the Galt House. He was never tried for the offense, but it is possible the occurrence delayed his deserved recognition in the way of promotion.

With his old division of the Twentieth Corps, he led the advance of the right wing of Rosecrans's army in the Stone's River campaign, and in a fight at Knob's Gap drove Bragg from his position. At the battle of Stone's River he displayed his wonted gallantry. The attack on Johnson's division by the Confederates was so sudden and overpowering that the whole division was forced to give way. This exposed Davis's flank, and on him the victorious enemy fell with overpowering numbers, but there they met a more determined opposition, and Davis was only forced back by slow degrees, contesting every inch of ground with the utmost stubbornness. At Chickamauga he resisted successfully, for several hours, on the first day of that memorable battle, a superior force of the enemy, thereby foiling Bragg's plan, and giving Rosecrans time to unite his army in a more compact form. The fighting was of the most severe character for several hours, and the loss heavy. He also took part in the battles fought under Grant around Chattanooga, and was then sent with Sherman to the relief of Knoxville. In the Atlanta campaign he had command of the Fourteenth corps, having been brevetted Major-General. He captured Rome, with an immense amount of stores, and a number of cannon. He made the assault on Kenesaw, and while the assault failed as a whole, Davis got a position near the works of the enemy and fortified and held it against all odds. At Jonesboro, he made the most brilliant and successful assault on fortified works made by either army in the Atlanta campaign.

In this assault he was completely successful. In command of the Fourteenth Corps he went with Sherman to Savannah, and then northward through the Carolinas.

When Johnston made his last desperate attempt to stem the tide of disaster, which was sweeping over the Confederate armies, and to destroy Sherman's army in detail, it was upon Davis's Corps the blow fell at Bentonville. Never did troops fight more gallantly, and never were they handled more skillfully than at Bentonville. Johnston failed, and failed because of the gallantry of the Fourteenth Corps, and the skill of its commander. General Davis was made Colonel of the Twenty-third United States infantry. After the close of the war he served in California and the West against the Indians. When General Canby was assassinated by the Modoc Indians, General Davis took command and forced the hostiles to surrender. He died in Chicago, November 30, 1879.

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER WILLIAM GWIN.

It was not in the army alone that Indiana won honor during the war. Among the early victims offered on the altar of the country was Lieutenant-Commander William Gwin. Lieutenant Gwin was born at Columbus, Bartholomew County, December 5, 1832. After attending St. Xavier's college at Cincinnati, and St. Xavier's college at Vincennes, he was, in 1847, appointed a cadet in the Naval school at Annapolis. In 1852 he successfully passed his examination and was promoted to Passed Midshipman, and in 1855 to Master, and on the following day to Lieutenant. He served with various commanders, and in many parts of the world. While serving on the *Vandalia* he was sent with a detachment of sailors and marines to visit one of the Feejee islands for the purpose of searching for some shipwrecked American seamen. Finding that all but one of the sailors had been murdered by the islanders, he demanded reparation. He had with him a force of sixty. In approaching the principal village of the island he fell into an ambuscade and was attacked by about five hundred of the natives. Lieutenant Gwin at once charged upon the enemy, killing seventy of them, when the others threw down their arms and surrendered.

During his sea service he visited the Holy Land, and many places in the East, and France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Naples and Greece. In 1861 he was executive officer of the *Susquehanna*, on duty in the Mediterranean. His ship was ordered home on the breaking out of the war. On the arrival of the *Susquehanna* at Boston, the other officers resigned and went South. He was put in command of the Cambridge and ordered to join the Atlantic blockading squadron. He rendered valuable service, especially in keeping the Rappahannock river open to Fredericksburg, destroying several batteries and capturing many prisoners. In 1862, at his own request, he was ordered to join the Mississippi flotilla, under command of Commodore Foote. He was given the command of the wooden gunboat *Tyler*, and took an active part in the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson. A short time after the surrender of Donelson he made a daring reconnoissance up the Tennessee river, capturing a Confederate gunboat, a transport, and a large amount of other property, and many prisoners.

When Grant was engaged in his deadly struggle at Shiloh, Lieutenant Gwin, with his gunboat, in conjunction with Lieutenant-Commander Shirk, in command of the *Lexington*, moved up and down the river anxiously waiting an opportunity to open his batteries on the enemy. Finally the opportunity came. The Confederates reached a point where the guns of the two gunboats would be effective, and the batteries opened. Grant's chief of artillery has massed several guns at an available point, and the high tide of Confederate success was reached. All through the night the gunboats kept dropping their immense shells amid the forces of the enemy. His next service was in Yazoo Pass, in August, 1862. He was still in command of the wooden gunboat *Tyler*. In conjunction with the *Carondolet* and *Queen of the West* he was ordered on an expedition up the Yazoo. He had proceeded but a short distance when he met the Confederate iron-clad ram, *Arkansas*. He immediately gave battle, but his two consorts failed to support him. He made a running fight of fourteen miles with the enemy, and his vessel was fairly riddled with balls. In December, 1862, in command of the *Benton*, he was ordered, with several other vessels, up the Yazoo to attack the batteries at Haines's Bluff. About

4 o'clock in the afternoon the batteries opened their fire. Commander Gwin, with the Benton, took position nearest the enemy and moored his vessel to the bank. For more than an hour, while the other vessels were getting into position, the Benton stood the fight alone. Having given the range and elevation of his guns, Lieutenant Gwin went on deck to observe the effect of the shots. While standing with both arms raised, holding his glass to his eyes, he was struck obliquely on the breast by a round shot. He was soon after moved to the hospital on the flagship of the squadron, where he lingered for a week before his death. Lieutenant Gwin was ranked as one of the bravest and best of the naval officers, and had not death cut short his career would soon have reached the highest grade in the navy.

NAPOLEON COLLINS.

Among the distinguished officers of the navy during the War of the Rebellion was Napoleon Collins, a citizen of Indiana. He was a native of Pennsylvania, but was appointed to the navy from Indiana, in 1834. He served on several of the war vessels of the country, and in almost all seas, passing through the various grades. He was a Passed Midshipman in 1840, Lieutenant in 1846, Commander in 1862. When the War of the Rebellion broke out, many of the officers of the navy sided with the South, but Lieutenant Collins remained true to the Union, and was employed on many important expeditions. In 1864 he was in command of the Wachusett, and was cruising along the coast of Brazil, watching for the Confederate steamer Florida. The Florida and her sister ship, Alabama, had done great damage to American shipping. They had been permitted to sail into and out of neutral ports, in all parts of the world, without any effort at detention. They had even been furnished with supplies at some of the ports, in direct violation of the laws of nations. At Fernando de Noronha, the Alabama had taken three American ships into port, rifled them of such stores and cargo as were needed by the cruiser, and then burned them, within gunshot of the fort, without interference or protest by the authorities of Brazil. Commander Collins determined that if he came across either the Florida or the Alabama he would

either capture or sink them, if he had to do it in neutral waters. On the 6th of October, 1864, while his vessel was lying in the port of Bahia, Brazil, the Florida steamed into port and took a position about a half mile from the Wachusett's berth. Immediately after her arrival, a Brazilian corvette took position between the two vessels.

The Florida received permission, from the Brazilian authorities, to remain in port for forty-eight hours. Commander Collins determined to destroy or capture her before the time of departure. About daybreak, on the morning of the 7th, he got under way and crossed the bow of the Brazilian vessel. It was his intention to run the Florida down and sink her at anchor, but the plan miscarried. He struck her on the starboard quarter, doing considerable damage, but did not disable her. A few pistol shots were fired from the Florida, which were replied to by a volley of small arms, and a discharge from two of the large guns of the Wachusett. The Florida then surrendered. The Brazilian vessel made no attempt to interfere, except to send a protest to Commander Collins. The Florida was towed out of the harbor, and Collins sailed for the United States, with his prize. The capture was effected in neutral waters, and was a violation of international law, and, on receiving the protest of the Brazilian Government, the United States promptly disavowed the act, and ordered the Florida to be returned to Brazil. However, in a collision with a transport in Hampton Roads, the famous Confederate cruiser was sunk. The United States Government claimed that the sinking was an accident, but the impression prevailed that it was an accident brought about with the full knowledge of the commander of the transport. While the Government disavowed the act of Commander Collins, it was cordially approved by the people of this country, and no official censure was ever passed upon the commander of the Wachusett. In 1866 Mr. Collins was promoted to a Captaincy, in 1871 was made a Commodore, and in 1878 a Rear Admiral.

ADMIRAL GEORGE BROWN.

Indiana has furnished one head of the navy of the United States. George Brown was born in Indiana, June

19, 1835. He obtained his education in the schools of the neighborhood until 1849, when at the age of fourteen he was appointed a cadet in the navy. His first service was in the Mediterranean, and in 1856 he was made a Passed Midshipman. He was then rapidly promoted to Master and Lieutenant, receiving all three appointments the same year. He served in the Brazilian fleet and on the coast of Africa until the breaking out of the civil war, when he was called home and assigned to service with the Mortar fleet, and afterward to the Atlantic blockading squadron, where he won considerable distinction as an energetic and faithful officer. When the gunboat fleet was organized for service on the Mississippi river, he was among the naval officers who were transferred to that scene of duty. He was with the fleet at Vicksburg, and commanded the *Indianola* in her desperate fight against two Confederate iron clads, and two cotton-protected steamers. After a gallant resistance of more than an hour the *Indianola* was forced to surrender to the four hostile vessels. Lieutenant-Commander Brown was severely wounded in that engagement, and remained a prisoner for several months.

After his exchange he was appointed to the command of the *Itasca*, and in 1864 was in the battle of Mobile bay. He also took an active part in the siege of Mobile, in 1865. He was made a Commander in 1866. After the close of the war he served for awhile as Commander of the Norfolk navy yard. When the Japanese Government purchased from the United States the Confederate ram, *Stonewall*, Commander Brown, as agent of the Japanese Government, took the command of that vessel. He was afterward on duty at Boston for some time. In 1877 he was appointed a Captain, and assigned to the Pacific squadron, from which he was once more transferred to the Norfolk navy yard. In 1887 he was made a Commodore and placed in command of the Pacific squadron, where he remained until 1893, when he was promoted once more, this time reaching the rank of Rear Admiral, and on the retirement of Admiral Ramsey he became the ranking Admiral of the navy. He was placed upon the retired list in 1897. In every sphere of duty, in his long service of nearly fifty years, he

met the expectations of his superior officers, and of the Government, and earned all his promotions by merit.

BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL ALVIN P. HOVEY.

Among the gallant soldiers of Indiana who won special distinction in the service was Brevet Major-General Alvin P. Hovey. He was a born soldier. Indiana was his native State, he having been born in Posey County, where he lived all his life. Law was his profession, and he stood high both as a practitioner and as a Judge. Politically he affiliated with the Democratic party until about the close of the War of the Rebellion. He was a Lieutenant in a company recruited for service in the Mexican war. His first civil office was that of Judge of the Circuit Court. He was afterward appointed a member of the Supreme Court, and was at one time United States District Attorney for the District of Indiana. In all these positions he served with conspicuous ability.

When the War of the Rebellion came it found him practicing his profession. He entered the service early in 1861, and was appointed Colonel of the Twenty-fourth regiment. He was already familiar with the theoretical part of war, and it was not long after his appointment that he had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the practical part of a soldier's duty. He was at the battle of Shiloh, and there handled his regiment with rare skill, it being a part of Wallace's division. For his services on that glorious field he was made a Brigadier-General. He was at the siege of Corinth, and then served with the Army of the Tennessee under Grant. When General Grant left Memphis he placed General Hovey in command at that place.

For some time he served in Arkansas, and was engaged in several conflicts with the enemy, in all of which he added to his fame as a soldier and a strict disciplinarian. When General Grant began his preparations to swing around to the rear of Vicksburg, and attempt to take that stronghold from that side, General Hovey, with his division, was called to reinforce Grant's army. His division did much of the heavy fighting from the time Grant crossed the Mississippi river until he finally closed in on the Confederate stronghold. From Bruinsburg to Vicksburg, Hovey's di-

vision lost more men in killed and wounded, and captured more prisoners and material of war than any other division of Grant's army. In fact, its losses and its captures nearly equaled those of all the rest of the army. It was his division which bore the brunt of the fighting at Champion's Hill. Grant had driven his army between the forces of Johnston and Pemberton. Johnston had been vainly endeavoring to have Pemberton move so that the two forces might be united, but he had delayed the movement too long. At last, on the evening of the 15th day of May, 1863, he started to try and effect a junction with Johnston. Grant was endeavoring to force him back on Vicksburg. Early on the morning of the 16th, Hovey, who had the advance on one of the roads occupied by Grant's troops, struck Pemberton, who was strongly posted on a series of low hills. For three or four hours skirmishing, sometimes almost amounting to a severe battle, was kept up. General McPherson, who was following Hovey, realizing the situation, sent word back to Grant, suggesting that he come as soon as possible to the field. In the meantime he was pushing two of his divisions forward to the help of Hovey.

By the time General Grant got to the field the skirmishing had grown into a desperately contested battle, of which Hovey's division was bearing the brunt. General Grant was one of those commanders who refrain from interfering where their subordinates are doing well, so on his arrival, instead of taking command himself he left Hovey to direct the fighting while he hurried up reinforcements. Hovey for a long time was struggling against desperate odds. While he was thus contending with a superior force, two of the other divisions of his corps were in hearing of the battle, and could have reached him in less than an hour, but failed to do so. General Grant had left Hovey, and gone to another part of the field, where he found Logan, with his division, across the only road of retreat left to the Confederates. Hovey again asked for reinforcements, and General Grant ordered Logan to move to his help. Just about this time Hovey had been reinforced by other troops and made several desperate assaults on the enemy, one of them being successful, and Pemberton was soon hurrying on toward Vicksburg. Of this bat-

tle, and the action of General McClernand, General Grant, in his "Memoirs," says:

"McClernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battlefield long before noon, and in easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. These traversed the woods separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward, but he did not come. It is true, in front of McClernand there was a small force of the enemy posted in a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had followed, the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off. Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join onto his right flank. Hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. To obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand had to advance to get into battle, and substantially over the same ground. Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his immediate superior.

"We had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. This excludes all of McClernand's command except Hovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1844 wounded and 187 missing. Hovey alone lost 1200 killed, wounded and missing, more than one-third of his division.

"Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known the ground as I did afterward, I cannot see how Pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. As it was he lost over 3000 killed and wounded and about 3000 captured in the battle and pursuit."

Just before his assassination, President Lincoln appointed General Hovey Minister to Peru, an office which he held until 1870, when he resigned and returned to Indiana. In 1886 he was nominated by the Republicans and elected to Congress from the First district. Two years afterward he was nominated and elected Governor, dying during his term of office.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL NATHAN KIMBALL.

The Union armies during the great struggle for the life of the Nation, were recruited from all ranks of the people.

The professional man, the merchant, the banker, the mechanic, the farmer and the laborer, alike offered themselves to defend the cause of the Union. Among those who volunteered from Indiana, was Nathan Kimball, a physician of Loogootee. He was a graduate of Asbury University. During the Mexican war he commanded a company in the Second Indiana regiment, and was at the battle of Buena Vista, where he won great praise for rallying his company after the regiment broke, and returning with it to the battle where it fought without flinching during the rest of the day. Colonel Bowles, who commanded the regiment, demanded a Court of Inquiry. After the close of the court, when the Colonel appeared at dress parade of the regiment, Captain Kimball refused to permit his company to be inspected by him, and marched it off the parade ground. For this he was arrested and tried, but his sword was returned to him in a very short time. When all Indiana was rushing forward to defend the Union, Dr. Kimball was appointed Colonel of the Fourteenth regiment, and soon was in West Virginia with his men.

In March, 1862, he was with Shields and Banks at Winchester, and on the 23d defeated Stonewall Jackson, in a hotly contested battle. In McClellan's futile campaign on the Peninsula, General Kimball commanded a brigade. He also served under Pope. On the last night of the retreat of Pope's army, Kimball was in the rear with his brigade, when he discovered that, by the neglect of an officer, the Fourteenth Indiana had been left behind on picket duty, not having been notified of the retreat. General Kimball immediately went back and brought off the regiment safely, while the enemy was on all sides of him. At the battle of Antietam Kimball fought with desperate bravery, for two hours contending with the foe. His ammunition failed, but his men supplied themselves from their dead and wounded comrades. He repulsed several charges and made a counter-charge in which he captured 300 prisoners.

At Fredericksburg, when General Sumner prepared to storm the heights, General Kimball's brigade was given the advance. The story of how French and Hancock suddenly ran against a stonewall fairly alive with sharpshooters, and bristling with cannon, and of how the Union troops clung to the advance, has often been told. It was death to ad-

vance, death to retreat, and death to remain. The Union soldiers threw themselves on the ground to hide from the terrible storm of shot. When the battle was over, the dead and wounded of Kimball's brigade were found nearer that stonewall than any other of the Union troops. In this battle General Kimball was desperately wounded. On recovering from his wound General Kimball was ordered to report to General Grant, and was placed in command of a brigade in Hurlbut's division. He was with Grant at Vicksburg, and followed Sherman to Atlanta. In that campaign his brigade was one of those engaged in that terrible but futile assault at Kenesaw. General Kimball served until August, 1865, when he was mustered out as a Brevet Major-General.

MRS. ELIZA E. GEORGE.

Men were not the only heroes during the war, nor were they the only sacrifices offered. All over Indiana were heroic wives who, while their husbands were out fighting the battles of the country, were at home, caring for their children, amid poverty, and hardships as heavy as those of the soldiers in the field. There are many women in Indiana today, who are as deserving of a pension as any of those who are on the roll, for they gave their strength to the cause of the Union, just as much as did their husbands at the front. Had not their husbands been at the front, those heroic wives would have been shielded from the hardships which they were compelled to undergo, and which finally sapped their strength and left them invalids. Had their devotion not been so great, they would not have been such sufferers. No history of their toils and sufferings can be given, nor can the story be told of the bravery and devotion of many wives who followed their husbands to the field and gave their time to the care of the sick and wounded—all without compensation. In nearly every camp where Indiana troops were found, those volunteer nurses could also be found. They bore privation and hardship with the same cheeful devotion as the soldiers themselves.

While the troops were in the field the women of Indiana were busy in preparing all things needful for their com-

fort. The boat loads of hospital stores, bandages, sheets, pillowslips, dressing gowns, fruit and other delicacies, which were sent to the front, amply testify to the love, the devotion, the patriotism of the women of Indiana. Temporary hospitals were established at different points in the State, and there the nursing was always done by volunteers from the ranks of the patriotic women. At Indianapolis they established a home for the care of the wives of soldiers who were in temporary need of shelter. At this home hundreds were fed, housed and cared for. The women were the main leaders in the work of raising supplies for the Sanitary Commission, and it was their labor which operated the many Sanitary Fairs.

Among the heroic souls who laid down their lives for their country in that great struggle, no one is more worthy of mention than Mrs. Eliza E. George, of Fort Wayne. She was just as much a martyr to the cause as was anyone who gave his life on the battlefield, or who died in the hospital. Her name ought never be forgotten. Leaving her home, in 1862, she went to the front, to care for the sick and wounded, to cheer and comfort the dying, and strengthen, by her motherly and patriotic example, the living. "Mother George" was she called by the soldiers. So gentle, so loving, so attentive to all their wants, so patient with the sick and wounded, she was indeed a mother to those who fell under her ministrations. She joined the army in the West, and was at Nashville, Memphis, and on the Atlanta campaign. She carried comfort and cheer with her. Often worn out and weary, sleeping without shelter, and with no covering but an army blanket, she bore all the hardships without a murmur, and was never too weary to care for a sick soldier, or pray with a dying one. When Sherman started on his grand march to the sea, Mrs. George did not forsake "her boys," but went along on that wonderful campaign. She was the same amid danger and horrors. On more than one occasion, while she was administering to the wounded, the balls or shells of the enemy killed those around her, but she escaped unharmed, until just as the war was about over, when Lee had surrendered, and Johnston had laid down his arms, she died, in North Carolina, from exhaustion, engendered by her exposure in caring for the wounded.

Her remains were brought back to Fort Wayne, and there the patriotic citizens erected a handsome monument to her memory. It is of polished white marble, bearing on one side a graphic picture of the horrors of war. It is a scene near Kenesaw Mountain, where Mrs. George was very active in her labors of love. A wounded soldier sits near a hospital tent, leaning against a tree, with his cup and canteen by his side. Over the fire are the camp-kettle and coffee pot. The nurse is passing from the fire, with a cup of smoking coffee, to the soldier who extends his hand to receive it. On the north front of the monument is the following inscription:

“MRS. ELIZA E. GEORGE.

“Born at Bridgeport, Vermont, October 20, 1808,

“Died at Wilmington, North Carolina, May 9, 1865.”

“After faithfully aiding with her friendly hands, and cheering with her Christian and motherly voice, the sick and wounded soldiers of our army on the march, on the battlefield and in the hospital, for over three years, the heroine fell at her post, honored and loved by all who knew her.”

CHAPTER LXIV.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

Few wars recorded in history have had more important results than that between the United States and Spain. In sixty days one army of Spain was captured and two of its great fleets totally destroyed. They were not only defeated, but every vessel in each fleet was wholly destroyed, and the geography of the world was changed. Islands which had been in the possession of Spain for centuries were wrested from that government, and the United States became a "world-power." The destruction of the Spanish fleets and obtaining possession of the Spanish islands in the Gulf and in the Pacific Ocean were the least of the results of the short war, which actually lasted but sixty days. It made the United States one again, cementing the North and South together once more under the old flag. This important war lasted so short a time that Indiana could do little more than show the willingness of its sons to once again rush to the defense of the flag.

The people of Cuba were struggling to throw off the Spanish yoke; and there was great sympathy for them among the people of the United States. Owing to the efforts of citizens of the United States to assist the insurrectionists in Cuba, the relations between Spain and this country became very much strained. On the night of the 15th of February, 1898, the United States warship *Maine* was blown up in Havana harbor, killing or wounding 266 of the officers and men. This caused the most intense excitement throughout the whole country, and with almost one voice the people demanded war with Spain, to the end

that the Spanish dominion in the Gulf of Mexico should cease forever. On the 19th of April both Houses of Congress passed a resolution declaring the people of Cuba free and independent, demanding that Spain relinquish all authority in Cuba, and directing the President to use all the land and naval forces of the United States to carry the resolution into effect. The President signed the resolution the next day.

On the 22d of April the President issued an order placing the ports of Cuba under blockade, and sent the fleet under Admiral Sampson to enforce the blockade. On the 23d the President issued a call for 125,000 volunteers. Under this call Indiana's quota was placed at four regiments of infantry and two batteries of artillery. Late on the evening of the 25th Governor Mount received the official call, and at once issued his proclamation calling the National Guard to rendezvous at Indianapolis. The first company to report for duty was that of Captain David F. Allen of Frankfort, which arrived at Indianapolis at 5 o'clock, April 26. Before night of the 26th the companies had all arrived and were in camp. In numbering the regiments it was decided to begin where the civil war left off, making the four regiments called for, the One Hundred and Fifty-seventh, One Hundred and Fifty-eighth, One Hundred and Fifty-ninth and One Hundred and Sixtieth, and numbering the two batteries the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth.

As was the case in the civil war Indiana was the first State to announce its quota full and ready for service. On the 10th of May the One Hundred and Fifty-seventh and the two batteries were mustered into the service, and on the 15th started for the camp at Chickamauga Park. The One Hundred and Fifty-eighth and the One Hundred and Sixtieth went forward on the 16th. The One Hundred and Fifty-ninth was sent to Virginia on the 22d.

On the 25th of May the President called for 75,000 additional men, Indiana's quota being placed at one regiment of infantry, two companies of colored troops, one company of engineers and one company for the signal service. Indiana had enough companies waiting to fill the new regi-

ment, and it required but a short time to recruit the independent companies.

None of the Indiana organizations reached the scene of war, except the Twenty-seventh battery, which was sent to Porto Rico, and was on the firing line, ready to open fire on the Spanish, when word was received that Spain had sued for peace. The One Hundred and Sixtieth and One Hundred and Sixty-first regiments became a part of the Army of Occupation and were sent to Cuba, where they remained until April, 1899.

That none of the Indiana regiments were able to win distinction on the battlefield during the short war with Spain was the fault neither of the State nor of the men who volunteered. The fact that within so few hours after the call of the President was received Indiana was ready to respond with full regiments and batteries demonstrated that the spirit of patriotism so abundantly displayed from 1861 to 1865 still lived in the hearts of the Indianians. It is a hackneyed phrase to say that the men were sorely disappointed that they did not get an opportunity to engage the enemy, and it is more than probable the large majority of them were glad when peace came without their being called upon to engage in bloody battle. Yet from the spirit, the discipline, the readiness shown, we have a right to believe that had they been called upon to engage the enemy they would have been equally brave, equally devoted as their fathers had been from 1861 to 1865. They responded to the call with as much alacrity and as much enthusiasm.

There was, however, a marked difference in the condition of affairs in the State at the outbreak of the civil war, and when war was declared against Spain. In 1861 the State treasury was empty, and there was neither a militia organization, nor arms and equipments for the volunteers, but in 1898 the treasury was full, and the State had a well organized and equipped National Guard. The Guard was admirably drilled, and both officers and men were acquainted with the duties of a soldier. It was mainly from this well-equipped and drilled National Guard the regiments for the State's quota were taken.

Notwithstanding Indiana was the first State, in 1898, to announce that its quota was full and ready for the field,

none of those well organized and drilled regiments was among the invading force in Cuba. Indiana was entitled to the distinction of sending the first volunteers to that island, and that honor would have been accorded, had it not been for Adjutant-General Corbin. The Governor of Indiana notified the war department that the State had two colored companies, with colored officers. General Corbin informed him that no colored officers would be permitted. The Governor appealed to the President, who overruled the Adjutant-General, and that officer had his satisfaction by preventing any Indiana regiments from being a part of the invading force.

The State did, however, have several representatives in the army of invasion, as members of the staffs of some of the general officers, and several men who had joined the regulars. One of them, William Brown, of Dubois County, as a member of one of the regular batteries, fired the first and last shot at the block house on the hill of El Caney. Another, Jesse K. Stork, of the same County, was one of the first men to fall in the attack on El Caney.

The war with Spain left a legacy of armed strife behind it in the Philippines, and Indiana was called upon to furnish, and did furnish, a large number of men for the regular army, and sent to the islands one full company, that of Captain D. F. Allen, of Frankfort. Mr. Allen had been commissioned a Captain in the Thirty-eighth United States infantry, and sent to the State to recruit. He went at once to his home city, Frankfort, and in six days, enlisted 300 men. On reporting to his regiment, at Jefferson barracks, he was permitted to fill his own company from the men he had recruited, upon the distinct promise that he would make it in drill and discipline equal to the best in the regiment. That this pledge was faithfully carried out is shown by the following extract from the report of the Inspector-General: "This company (I), presented a very gratifying appearance, neat and soldierly; by far the best company of volunteers that I have yet seen."

The company did gallant service in several hot engagements with the enemy, and was repeatedly complimented by the Generals in command, as was the conduct of Captain Allen. The company reached Manila December 27,

1898, and from that time until it started for the United States again, two years later, was in active service, first in Southern Luzon and then in Panay.

Most of that time the company was on detached service, Captain Allen having command of a district. So well did he perform his duties, and such were the discipline and soldierly behavior of his men, that on one occasion, when he was ordered to a different field of duty, the inhabitants of the town where he was in command petitioned the authorities not to transfer him. He captured several of the leaders of the insurrectos, and made at one place a large capture of arms, by a skillful march and attack on a Filipino stronghold in the mountains.

One of the most distinguished of the officers, who served both in Cuba and in the Philippines, was General Henry W. Lawton, of Indiana, who, during the civil war, won distinction in the Thirtieth Indiana regiment, and who, for gallant service at Atlanta, was awarded a medal by Congress.

Henry Ware Lawton was not a native of Indiana, but was an Indiana soldier in every respect. He was born in Manhattan, Ohio, March 17, 1843. While a boy he became a resident of Fort Wayne, and there grew to manhood. When the civil war broke out he was a student in the Methodist Academy at Fort Wayne, but he promptly laid aside his books and enlisted in the Ninth Indiana regiment, being made Sergeant of Company E. He served with that company and regiment through the three months' campaign. In August, 1861, he was commissioned First Lieutenant in the Thirtieth Indiana, and served with it until the close of the war, passing through the various grades until he reached the Lieutenant-Colonelcy in 1864. He was finally mustered out in November, 1865. The Thirtieth was one of the famous fighting regiments of the Union army, and Lawton was with it in all its battles.

He took part in the battles of Shiloh, Stone's River, Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge, his regiment winning great honors, especially at Chickamauga. He was with Sherman in his march from Chattanooga to Atlanta. At the battle of Atlanta he led a charge of skirmishers against

a line of Confederate rifle pits, captured and held them, repulsing two fierce assaults by the enemy. He was renowned in the army for his desperate courage, and was always ready to lead any forlorn hope. When Sherman started on his march to the sea the Thirtieth regiment was one of those sent back to aid Thomas in repelling Hood. At the battle of Nashville Lawton commanded the regiment, leading it in one charge after another.

On being mustered out of the service he entered the law school of Harvard College, but in 1867 was tendered and accepted a commission in the regular army. He served on the plains against the Indians, winning there a name for desperate fighting. It was Lawton with his command that captured the celebrated Indian chief, Geronimo. He was promoted from time to time until he reached the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel. When the war with Spain was declared he was the Inspector-General of the army, but at once asked for active duty. He was made a Brigadier-General and was placed in command of the Second division of the Fifth Army Corps. He had command of the advance and his troops were the first to land in Cuba. He commanded the forces which fought the battle of El Caney, and for his services on that occasion was made a Major-General.

In December, 1898, he was sent to the Philippines. There, as usual, he was always at the head of his men when an engagement was on. He was killed on the 19th of December, 1899.

FINIS.

APPENDIX,

ROSTER OF TERRITORIAL AND STATE OFFICERS FROM 1787 TO 1903

TERRITORIAL GOVERNORS.

Arthur St. Clair (Governor Northwest Territory), from 1787 to 1800.
John Gibson (acting), from July 4, 1800, to January 10, 1801.
William H. Harrison, from 1801 to 1812.
Thomas Posey, from 1812 to 1816.

GOVERNORS OF THE STATE.

Jonathan Jennings, from 1816 to 1822.
Ratcliff Boon (acting), from September 12 to December 5, 1822.
William Hendricks, from 1822 to 1825.
James B. Ray (acting), February 12 to December 11, 1825.
James B. Ray, from 1825 to 1831.
Noah Noble, from 1831 to 1837.
David Wallace, from 1837 to 1840.
Samuel Bigger, from 1840 to 1843.
James Whitcomb, from 1843 to 1848.
Paris C. Dunning (acting), from 1848 to 1849.
Joseph A. Wright, from 1849 to 1857.
Ashbel P. Willard, from 1857 to 1860.
Abram A. Hammond (acting), from 1860 to 1861.
Henry S. Lane, January 14 to January 16, 1861.
Oliver P. Morton (acting), from 1861 to 1865.
Oliver P. Morton, from 1865 to 1867.
Conrad Baker (acting), from 1867 to 1869.
Conrad Baker, from 1869 to 1873.
Thomas A. Hendricks, from 1873 to 1877.
James D. Williams, from 1877 to 1880.
Isaac P. Gray (acting), from 1880 to 1881.
Albert G. Porter, from 1881 to 1885.
Isaac P. Gray, from 1885 to 1889.
Alvin P. Hovey, from 1889 to 1891.
Ira J. Chase (acting), from November 24, 1891, to January 9, 1893.
Claude Matthews, from 1893 to 1897.
James A. Mount, from 1897 to 1901.
Winfield T. Durbin, from 1901 to —.

William Henry Harrison was appointed Governor of Indiana Territory May 13, 1800, but was not sworn in until January 10, 1801. John Gibson, Secretary of the Territory, acted as Governor until General Harrison took the oath. When General Harrison took command of the army of the frontier, during the war with Great Britain, General Gibson again acted as Governor for several months until Mr. Posey was appointed.

Jonathan Jennings was elected to Congress, from the Second district, and resigned the office of Governor September 12, 1822. Ratcliff Boon, Lieutenant-Governor, served for the remainder of the term.

On the 12th of February, 1825, Governor William Hendricks was elected to the United States Senate, and resigned the Governorship. At the time there was no Lieutenant-Governor, Ratcliff Boon having resigned that office, and James Brown Ray, President pro tempore of the Senate, became acting Governor.

Governor Whitcomb was elected to the United States Senate December 27, 1848, and Lieutenant-Governor Paris C. Dunning became acting Governor.

Governor Willard died October 3, 1860, and was succeeded by Lieutenant-Governor Abram A. Hammond.

Governor Henry S. Lane was elected to the United States Senate January 16, 1861, and Oliver P. Morton, Lieutenant-Governor, succeeded.

In December, 1865, Governor Morton visited Europe, and during his absence of several months, Mr. Baker was acting Governor. Governor Morton was elected to the Senate January 23, 1867, and was succeeded by Lieutenant-Governor Conrad Baker.

Governor Williams died November 20, 1880, and was succeeded by Isaac P. Gray, Lieutenant-Governor.

Governor Hovey died November 23, 1891, and was succeeded by Lieutenant-Governor Ira J. Chase.

LIEUTENANT-GOVERNORS.

Christopher Harrison, from 1816 to 1819
 Ratliff Boon, from 1819 to 1825. (Became acting Governor.)
 John H. Thompson, from 1825 to 1828.
 Milton Stapp, from 1828 to 1831.
 David Wallace, from 1831 to 1837.
 David Hillis, from 1837 to 1840.
 Samuel Hall, from 1840 to 1843.
 Jesse D. Bright, from 1843 to 1845. (Resigned.)
 Godlove S. Orth (acting), 1845.
 James G. Reed (acting), 1846.
 Paris C. Dunning, from 1846 to 1848. (Became acting Governor.)
 James G. Reed (acting), 1849.
 James H. Lane, from 1849 to 1853.
 Ashbel P. Willard, from 1853 to 1857.
 Abram A. Hammond, from 1857 to 1860. (Became acting Governor.)
 Oliver P. Morton, 1861. (Became acting Governor.)
 John R. Cravens (acting), from 1861 to 1863.
 Paris C. Dunning (acting), from 1863 to 1865.
 Conrad Baker, from 1865 to 1867.
 Will Cumbback (acting), from 1867 to 1869.
 Will Cumbback, from 1869 to 1872. (Resigned.)
 George W. Friedley (acting), from 1872 to 1873.
 Leonidas Sexton, from 1873 to 1877.
 Isaac P. Gray, from 1877 to 1880. (Became acting Governor.)
 Frederick W. Viehe (acting), 1881.
 Thomas Hanna, from 1881 to 1885.
 Mahlon D. Manson, from 1885 to 1887.
 A. G. Smith (acting), from 1887 to 1889.
 Ira J. Chase, from 1889 to November 24, 1891. (Became acting Governor.)
 Francis M. Griffith (acting), from 1891 to 1893.
 Mortimer Nye, from 1893 to 1897.
 William S. Haggard, from 1897 to 1901.
 Newton W. Gilbert, from 1901 to —.

In 1886, under a proclamation by Governor Gray, the people voted on candidates to fill the unexpired term of Mahlon D. Manson, occasioned by his acceptance of a Government office. Robert S. Robertson was elected, and was recognized by the House and the administrative officers, while the Senate and Governor recognized A. G. Smith, President of the Senate.

TERRITORIAL SECRETARY.

John Gibson, from 1800 to 1816.

SECRETARIES OF STATE.

Robert A. New, from 1816 to 1825.
 William W. Wick, from 1825 to 1829.
 James Morrison, from 1829 to 1833.
 William Sheets, from 1833 to 1837.
 William J. Brown, from 1837 to 1841.
 William Sheets, from 1841 to 1845.
 John H. Thompson, from 1845 to 1849.
 Charles H. Test, from 1849 to 1853.
 Nehemiah Hayden, from 1853 to 1855.
 Erasmus B. Collins, from 1855 to 1857.
 Daniel McClure, from 1857 to 1859. (Resigned.)
 Cyrus L. Dunham, from 1859 to 1861. (Appointed.)
 William A. Peelle, from 1861 to 1863.
 James S. Athon, from 1863 to 1865.
 Nelson Trusler, from 1865 to 1869.
 Max F. A. Hoffman, from 1869 to 1871.
 Norman Eddy, from 1871 to 1872. (Died.)

John H. Farquhar, from 1872 to 1873. (Appointed to fill vacancy.)
 William W. Curry, from 1873 to 1875.
 John E. Neff, from 1875 to 1879.
 John G. Shanklin, from 1879 to 1881.
 Emanuel R. Hawn, from 1881 to 1883.
 William R. Myers, from 1883 to 1887.
 Charles F. Griffin, from 1887 to 1891.
 Claude Matthews, from 1891 to January 9, 1893. (Resigned.)
 Myron D. King, from January 9, 1893, to January 17, 1893. (Appointed.)
 William R. Myers, from 1893 to 1895.
 William D. Owen, from 1895 to 1899.
 Union B. Hunt, from 1899 to 1903.
 Daniel E. Storms, from 1903 to —.

TERRITORIAL AUDITORS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.

Peter Jones, commissioned September 5, 1805; resigned in 1810.
 William Prince, commissioned April 13, 1810; resigned in 1813.
 General W. Johnston, commissioned January 20, 1813; resigned in 1813.
 William Prince, commissioned February 8, 1813; resigned in 1813.
 Davis Floyd, commissioned June 15, 1813; served till December, 1816.

AUDITORS OF STATE.

William H. Lilley, from 1816 to 1828.
 Benjamin I. Blythe, from 1828 to 1829.
 Morris Morris, from 1829 to 1844.
 Horatio J. Harris, from 1844 to 1847.
 Douglas Maguire, from 1847 to 1850.
 Erastus W. H. Ellis, from 1850 to 1853.
 John P. Dunn, from 1853 to 1855.
 Hiram E. Talbott, from 1855 to 1857.
 John W. Dodd, from 1857 to 1861.
 Albert Lange, from 1861 to 1863.
 Joseph Ristine, from 1863 to 1865.
 Thomas P. McCarthy, from 1865 to 1869.
 John D. Evans, from 1869 to 1871.
 John C. Shoemaker, from 1871 to 1873.
 James A. Wildman, from 1873 to 1875.
 Ebenezer Henderson, from 1875 to 1879.
 Mahlon D. Manson, from 1879 to 1881.
 Edward H. Wolfe, from 1881 to 1883.
 James H. Rice, from 1883 to 1887.
 Bruce Carr, from 1887 to 1891.
 John O. Henderson, from 1891 to 1895.
 Americus C. Dally, from 1895 to 1899.
 William H. Hart, from 1899 to 1903.
 David E. Sherrick, from 1903 to —.

TERRITORIAL TREASURERS.

William McIntosh, commissioned February 9, 1801; removed for cause.
 James Johnson, commissioned September 4, 1806; resigned in 1813.
 General W. Johnston, commissioned May 29, 1813; served until December, 1816.

TREASURERS OF STATE.

Daniel C. Lane, from 1816 to 1823.
 Samuel Merrill, from 1823 to 1835.
 Nathan B. Palmer, from 1835 to 1841.
 George H. Dunn, from 1841 to 1844.
 Royal Mayhew, from 1844 to 1847.
 Samuel Hannah, from 1847 to 1850.
 James P. Drake, from 1850 to 1853.
 Elijah Newland, from 1853 to 1855.
 William R. Nofsinger, from 1855 to 1857.
 Aquilla Jones, from 1857 to 1859.
 Nathaniel F. Cunningham, from 1859 to 1861.
 Jonathan S. Harvey, from 1861 to 1863.
 Matthew L. Brett, from 1863 to 1865.
 John I. Morrison, from 1865 to 1867.
 Nathan Kimball, from 1867 to 1871.
 James B. Ryan, from 1871 to 1873.
 John B. Glover, from 1873 to 1875.
 Benjamin C. Shaw, from 1875 to 1879.
 William Fleming, from 1879 to 1881.
 Roswell S. Hill, from 1881 to 1883.
 John J. Cooper, from 1883 to 1887.

Julius A. Lemcke, from 1887 to 1891.
 Albert Gall, from 1891 to 1895.
 Frederick J. Scholz, from 1895 to 1899.
 Leopold Levy, from 1899 to 1903.
 Nat. U. Hill, from 1903 to —.

TERRITORIAL ATTORNEYS-GENERAL.

John Rice Jones, commissioned January 29, 1801; resigned in 1804.
 Benjamin Parke, commissioned August 4, 1804; resigned in 1808.
 Thomas Randolph, commissioned June 2, 1804; killed at Battle of Tippecanoe, 1811.

ATTORNEYS-GENERAL OF THE STATE.

James Morrison, from March 5, 1855 to 1856.
 Joseph E. McDonald, from 1856 to 1860.
 James G. Jones, from 1860 to 1861 (died).
 John P. Usher, appointed November 23, 1861; resigned 1862.
 John F. Kibby, appointed March, 19, 1862.
 Oscar B. Hord, from 1862 to 1864.
 Delana E. Williamson, from 1864 to 1870.
 Bayless W. Hanna, from 1870 to 1872.
 James C. Denny, from 1872 to 1874.
 Clarence Buskirk, from 1874 to 1878.
 Thomas W. Woollen, from 1878 to 1880.
 Daniel P. Baldwin, from 1880 to 1882.
 Francis T. Hord, from 1882 to 1886.
 Louis T. Michener, from 1886 to 1890.
 Alonzo G. Smith, from 1890 to 1894.
 William A. Ketcham, from 1894 to 1898.
 William L. Taylor, from 1898 to 1903.
 Charles W. Miller, from 1903 to —.

The office of Attorney-General was created by act of the Legislature, approved March 3, 1855, and James Morrison was elected by the General Assembly to fill the office until the next general election.

SUPERINTENDENTS OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.

William C. Larrabee, from 1852 to 1855.
 Caleb Mills, from 1855 to 1857.
 William C. Larrabee, from 1857 to 1859.
 Samuel L. Rugg, from 1859 to 1861.
 Miles J. Fletcher, from 1861 to 1862. (Killed on Railroad.)
 Samuel K. Hoshour, 1862. (Appointed.)
 Samuel L. Rugg, from 1862 to 1865.
 George W. Hoss, from 1865 to 1869.
 Barnabas C. Hobbs, from 1869 to 1871.
 Milton B. Hopkins, from 1871 to 1874. (Died.)
 Alexander C. Hopkins, from 1874 to 1875. (Appointed.)
 James H. Smart, from 1875 to 1881.
 James M. Bloss, from 1881 to 1883.
 John W. Holcombe, from 1883 to 1887.
 Harvey M. LaFollette, from 1887 to 1891.
 Hervey D. Vories, from 1891 to 1895.
 David M. Geeting, from 1895 to 1899.
 Frank L. Jones, from 1899 to 1903.
 Fassett A. Cotton, from 1903 to —.

CLERKS TERRITORIAL COURT.

Daniel Lymmes, from 1794 to 1804.
 Henry Hurst, from 1804 to 1817.

CLERKS OF SUPREME COURT.

E. Macdonald, from 1817 to 1820.
 Henry P. Coburn, from 1820 to 1852.
 William B. Beach, from 1852 to 1860.
 John P. Jones, from 1860 to 1864.
 Laz. Noble, from 1864 to 1868.
 Theodore W. McCoy, from 1868 to 1872.
 Charles Scholl, from 1872 to 1876.
 Gabriel Schmuck, from 1876 to 1880.
 Daniel Royse, from 1880 to 1881. (Died.)
 Jonathan W. Gordon, from 1881 to 1882. (Appointed.)
 Simon P. Sheerin, from 1882 to 1886.
 William T. Noble, from 1886 to 1890.
 Andrew M. Sweeney, from 1890 to 1894.
 Alexander Hess, from 1894 to 1898.
 Robert A. Brown, from 1898 to —.

REPORTERS OF SUPREME COURT.

Isaac Blackford (one of the Judges), from 1817 to 1850.
 Horace E. Carter, from 1852 to 1853. (Died.)
 Albert G. Porter, from 1853 to 1857. (Appointed.)
 Gordon Tanner, from 1857 to 1861.
 Benjamin Harrison, from 1861 to 1863. (Office declared vacant.)
 Michael C. Kerr, from 1863 to 1864. (To fill vacancy.)
 Benjamin Harrison, from 1864 to 1869.
 James B. Black, from 1869 to 1877.
 Augustus N. Martin, from 1877 to 1881.
 Francis M. Dice, from 1881 to 1885.
 John W. Kern, from 1885 to 1889.
 John L. Griffiths, from 1889 to 1893.
 Sidney R. Moon, from 1893 to 1897.
 Charles F. Remy, from 1897 to —.

CHIEFS OF THE BUREAU OF STATISTICS.

John Collett, from 1879 to 1881.
 John B. Conner, from 1881 to 1883.
 William A. Peelle, Jr., from 1883 to 1894.
 Simeon J. Thompson, from 1894 to 1897. (Resigned.)
 John B. Conner (appointed), from 1897 to 1901.
 Benjamin F. Johnson, from 1901 to —.

STATE GEOLOGISTS.

David Dale Owen, from 1837 to 1838.
 Ryland T. Brown, 1853.
 David Dale Owen, 1859.
 Richard Owen, from 1859 to 1861.
 Edward T. Cox, from 1869 to 1879.
 John Collett, from 1879 to 1885.
 James Maurice Thompson, from 1885 to 1888.
 Sylvester S. Gorby, from 1888 to 1894.
 Willis S. Blatchley, from 1894 to —.

TERRITORIAL JUDGES.

William Clarke, Henry Vanderburgh, John Griffin, appointed July 4, 1800.

JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT.

James Scott, from 1816 to 1831.
 John Johnson, from 1816 to 1817.
 Jesse L. Holman, from 1816 to 1831.
 Isaac Blackford, from 1817 to 1853.
 Stephen C. Stevens, from 1831 to 1836.
 John T. McKinney, from 1831 to 1837.
 Charles Dewey, from 1836 to 1847.
 Jeremiah Sullivan, from 1837 to 1846.
 Samuel E. Perkins, from 1846 to 1865.
 Thomas L. Smith, from 1847 to 1853.
 Andrew Davison, from 1853 to 1865.
 William Z. Stuart, from 1853 to 1857.
 Addison L. Roache, from 1853 to 1854.
 Alvin P. Hovey, from 1854 to 1855.
 Samuel B. Gookins, from 1855 to 1857.
 James L. Worden, from 1858 to 1865.
 James M. Hanna, from 1858 to 1865.
 Charles A. Ray, from 1865 to 1871.
 Jehu T. Elliott, from 1865 to 1871.
 James S. Frazer, from 1865 to 1871.
 Robert S. Gregory, from 1865 to 1871.
 James L. Worden, from 1871 to 1882. (Resigned December, 1882.)
 Alexander C. Downey, from 1871 to 1877.
 Samuel H. Buskirk, from 1871 to 1877.
 John Pettit, from 1871 to 1877.
 Andrew L. Osborne, from 1872 to 1875.
 Horace P. Biddle, from 1875 to 1880.
 William E. Niblack, from 1877 to 1889.
 George V. Howk, from 1877 to 1889.
 Samuel E. Perkins, from 1877 to 1879.
 John T. Scott, from 1879 to 1881.
 William S. Wood, from 1881 to 1883. (Resigned May 8, 1883.)
 Byron K. Elliott, from 1881 to 1893.
 William H. Coombs, from December 2, 1882 to 1883.

Edwin P. Hammond, from 1883 to 1885.
 Allen Zollars, from 1883 to 1889.
 Joseph A. S. Mitchell, from 1885 to December, 1890. (Died 1890.)
 Walter Olds, from 1889 to June 15, 1893. (Resigned June 15, 1893.)
 John D. Berkshire, from 1889 to February, 1891. (Died February, 1891.)
 Silas D. Coffey, from 1889 to 1895.
 Joseph S. Dailey, appointed vice Olds, from July 24, 1893, to 1895.
 Robert W. McBride, appointed vice Mitchell, from December 17, 1890 to 1892.
 John D. Miller, appointed vice Berkshire, from February 25, 1891, to 1892.
 Leonard J. Hackney, from 1892 to 1898.
 Timothy E. Howard, from 1892 to 1898.
 James McCabe, from 1893 to 1899.
 James H. Jordan, from 1895 to —.
 Leander J. Monks, from 1895 to —.
 Alexander Dowling, from 1898 to —.
 Francis E. Baker, from 1898 to 1902. (Resigned.)
 John V. Hadley, from 1899 to —.
 John H. Gillette, appointed vice Baker, from 1902 to —.

JUDGES OF THE APPELLATE COURT.

George L. Reinhard, from January 1, 1893, to 1897.
 Frank E. Gavin, from January 1, 1893, to 1897.
 Theodore P. Davis, from January 1, 1893, to 1897.
 Orlando J. Lotz, from January 1, 1893, to 1897.
 George E. Ross, from January 1, 1893, to 1897.
 Woodfin D. Robinson, from January 1, 1897, to —.
 William J. Henley, from January 1, 1897, to —.
 James B. Black, from January 1, 1897, to —.
 Daniel W. Comstock, from January 1, 1897, to —.
 Ulric Z. Wiley, from January 1, 1897, to —.
 Frank S. Roby, from January, 1901 to —.

UNITED STATES SENATORS.

James Noble, from 1816 to 1831. (Died.)
 Waller Taylor, from 1816 to 1825.
 William Hendricks, from 1825 to 1837.
 Robert Hanna, 1831. (Appointed, vice Noble.)
 John Tipton, from 1831 to 1833. (Unexpired term of Noble.)
 John Tipton, from 1833 to 1839.
 Oliver H. Smith, from 1837 to 1843.
 Albert S. White, from 1839 to 1845.
 Edward A. Hannegan, from 1843 to 1849.
 Vacancy from 1846 to 1846.
 Jesse D. Bright, from 1846 to 1862. (Expelled in 1862.)
 James Whitcomb, from 1849 to 1852. (Died.)
 Charles W. Cathcart, from 1852 to 1853. (Appointed, vice Whitcomb.)
 John Pettit, from 1853 to 1855. (Unexpired term of Whitcomb.)
 Vacancy from 1855 to 1857.
 Graham N. Fitch, from 1857 to 1861.
 Joseph A. Wright (appointed), vice Bright, expelled, 1862 to 1863.
 Henry S. Lane, from 1861 to 1867.
 David Turpie, 1863. (Unexpired term of Bright.)
 Thomas A. Hendricks, from 1863 to 1869.
 Oliver P. Morton, from 1867 to 1877. (Died.)
 Daniel D. Pratt, from 1869 to 1875.
 Joseph E. McDonald, from 1875 to 1881.
 Daniel W. Voorhees (appointed vice Morton), from 1877 to 1879.
 Daniel W. Voorhees, from 1879 to 1897.
 Benjamin Harrison, from 1881 to 1887.
 David Turpie, from 1887 to 1899.
 Charles W. Fairbanks, from 1897 to —.
 Albert J. Beveridge, from 1899 to —.

TERRITORIAL DELEGATES TO CONGRESS.

Ninth Congress, 1805-7—Benjamin Parke.
 Tenth Congress, 1807-8—Benjamin Parke. (Resigned.) Jesse B. Thomas to fill vacancy.
 Eleventh Congress, 1809-11—Jonathan Jennings.
 Twelfth Congress, 1811-13—Jonathan Jennings.
 Thirteenth Congress, 1813-15—Jonathan Jennings.
 Fourteenth Congress, 1815-17—Jonathan Jennings.

STATE REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS.

Fifteenth Congress, 1817-19—William Hendricks.
 Sixteenth Congress, 1819-21—William Hendricks,

- Seventeenth Congress, 1821-23—William Hendricks.
Eighteenth Congress, 1823-25—William Prince (died), Jacob Call to fill vacancy; Jonathan Jennings, John Test.
Nineteenth Congress, 1825-27—Ratliff Boon, Jonathan Jennings, John Test.
Twentieth Congress, 1827-29—Thomas Blake, Jonathan Jennings, Oliver H. Smith.
Twenty-first Congress, 1829-31—Ratliff Boon, Jonathan Jennings, John Test.
Twenty-second Congress, 1831-33—Ratliff Boon, John Carr, Jonathan McCarty.
Twenty-third Congress, 1833-35—Ratliff Boon, John Ewing, John Carr, Amos Lane, Jonathan McCarty, George S. Kinnard, Edward A. Hannegan.
Twenty-fourth Congress, 1835-37—Ratliff Boon, John W. Davis, John Carr, Amos Lane, Jonathan McCarty, George S. Kinnard (died), William Herod (to fill vacancy), Edward A. Hannegan.
Twenty-fifth Congress, 1837-39—Ratliff Boon, John Ewing, William Graham, George H. Dunn, James H. Rariden, William Herod, Albert S. White.
Twenty-sixth Congress, 1839-41—George H. Proffit, John W. Davis, John Carr, Thomas A. Smith, James H. Rariden, William W. Wick, Tilghman A. Howard.
Twenty-seventh Congress, 1841-43—George H. Proffit, Richard W. Thompson, Joseph L. White, James H. Cravens, Andrew Kennedy, David Wallace, Henry S. Lane.
Twenty-eighth Congress, 1843-45—Robert Dale Owen, Thomas J. Henley, Thomas Smith, Caleb B. Smith, William J. Brown, John W. Davis, Joseph A. Wright, John Pettit, Samuel C. Sample, Andrew Kennedy.
Twenty-ninth Congress, 1845-47—Robert Dale Owen, Thomas J. Henley, Thomas Smith, Caleb B. Smith, William W. Wick, John W. Davis, Edward W. McGaughey, John Pettit, Charles W. Cathcart, Andrew Kennedy.
Thirtieth Congress, 1847-49—Elisha Embree, Thomas J. Henley, John L. Robinson, Caleb B. Smith, William W. Wick, George G. Dunn, Richard W. Thompson, John Pettit, Charles W. Cathcart, William Rockhill.
Thirty-first Congress, 1849-51—Nathaniel Albertson, Cyrus L. Dunham, John L. Robinson, George W. Julian, William J. Brown, Willis A. Gorman, Edward W. McGaughey, Joseph E. McDonald, Graham N. Fitch, Andrew J. Harlan.
Thirty-second Congress, 1851-53—James Lockhart, Cyrus L. Dunham, John L. Robinson, Samuel W. Parker, Thomas A. Hendricks, Willis A. Gorman, John G. Davis, Daniel Mace, Graham N. Fitch, Samuel Brenton.
Thirty-third Congress, 1853-55—Smith Miller, William H. English, Cyrus L. Dunham, James H. Lane, Samuel W. Parker, Thomas A. Hendricks, John G. Davis, Daniel Mace, Norman Eddy, Ebenezer M. Chamberlain, Andrew J. Harlan.
Thirty-fourth Congress, 1855-57—Smith Miller, William H. English, George G. Dunn, Will Cumback, David P. Holloway, Lucian Barbour, Harvey D. Scott, Daniel Mace, Schuyler Colfax, Samuel Brenton, John U. Pettit.
Thirty-fifth Congress, 1857-59—James Lockhart (died), William E. Niblack (to fill vacancy), William H. English, James Hughes, James B. Foley, David Kilgore, James M. Gregg, John G. Davis, James Wilson, Schuyler Colfax, Samuel Brenton, John U. Pettit.
Thirty-sixth Congress, 1859-61—William E. Niblack, William H. English, William M. Dunn, William S. Holman, David Kilgore, Albert G. Porter, John G. Davis, James Wilson, Schuyler Colfax, Charles Case, John U. Pettit.
Thirty-seventh Congress, 1861-63—John Law, James A. Cravens, William M. Dunn, William S. Holman, George W. Julian, Albert G. Porter, Daniel W. Voorhees, Albert S. White, Schuyler Colfax, William Mitchell, John P. C. Shanks.
Thirty-eighth Congress, 1863-65—John Law, James A. Cravens, Henry W. Harrington, William S. Holman, George W. Julian, Ebenezer Dumont, Daniel W. Voorhees, Godlove S. Orth, Schuyler Colfax, Joseph K. Edgerton, James F. McDowell.
Thirty-ninth Congress, 1865-67—William E. Niblack, Michael C. Kerr, Ralph Hill, John H. Farquhar, George W. Julian, Ebenezer Dumont, Daniel W. Voorhees (seat contested), Henry D. Washburn (on contest), Godlove S. Orth, Schuyler Colfax, Joseph H. Defrees, Thomas N. Stillwell.
Fortieth Congress, 1867-69—William E. Niblack, Michael C. Kerr, Morton C. Hunter, William S. Holman, George W. Julian, John Coburn, Henry D. Washburn, Godlove S. Orth, Schuyler Colfax, William Williams, John P. C. Shanks.
Forty-first Congress, 1869-71—William E. Niblack, Michael C. Kerr, William S. Holman, George W. Julian, John Coburn, Daniel W. Voorhees, Godlove S. Orth, Daniel D. Pratt (elected to Senate), James N. Tyner (vice Pratt), John P. C. Shanks, William Williams, Jasper Packard.
Forty-second Congress, 1871-73—William E. Niblack, Michael C. Kerr, William S. Holman, Jeremiah M. Wilson, John Coburn, Daniel W. Voorhees, Mahlon D. Manson, James N. Tyner, John P. C. Shanks, William Williams, Jasper Packard.
Forty-third Congress, 1873-75—Godlove S. Orth, State; William Williams, State; William E. Niblack, Simeon K. Wolf, William S. Holman, Jeremiah M.

- Wilson, John Coburn, Morton C. Hunter, Thomas J. Cason, James N. Tyner, John P. C. Shanks, Henry B. Saylor, Jasper Packard.
- Forty-fourth Congress, 1875-77—Benoni S. Fuller, James D. Williams (resigned), Andrew Humphreys (vice Williams), Michael C. Kerr (died), Nathan T. Carr (to fill vacancy), Jephtha D. New, William S. Holman, Milton S. Robinson, Franklin Landers, Morton C. Hunter, Thomas J. Cason, William S. Haymond, James L. Evans, Andrew H. Hamilton, John H. Baker.
- Forty-fifth Congress, 1877-79—Benoni S. Fuller, Thomas R. Cobb, George A. Bicknell, Leonidas Sexton, Thomas M. Browne, Milton S. Robinson, John Hanna, Morton C. Hunter, Michael D. White, William H. Calkins, James L. Evans, Andrew H. Hamilton, John H. Baker.
- Forty-sixth Congress, 1879-81—William Heilman, Thomas R. Cobb, George A. Bicknell, Jephtha D. New, Thomas M. Browne, William R. Myers, Gilbert De la Matyr, Andrew J. Hostetler, Godlove S. Orth, William H. Calkins, Calvin Cowgill, Walpole G. Colerick, John H. Baker.
- Forty-seventh Congress, 1881-83—William Heilman, Thomas R. Cobb, Strother M. Stockslager, William S. Holman, Courtland C. Matson, Thomas M. Browne, Stanton J. Peelle, Robert B. F. Pierce, Godlove S. Orth (died), Charles T. Doxey (to fill vacancy), Mark L. DeMotte, George W. Steele, Walpole G. Colerick, William H. Calkins.
- Forty-eighth Congress, 1883-85—John J. Kleiner, Thomas R. Cobb, Strother M. Stockslager, William S. Holman, Courtland C. Matson, Thomas M. Browne, Stanton J. Peelle (contested), William E. English (on contest), John E. Lamb, Thomas B. Ward, Thomas J. Wood, George W. Steele, Robert Lowry, William H. Calkins (resigned), Benjamin F. Shively (to fill vacancy).
- Forty-ninth Congress, 1885-87—John J. Kleiner, Thomas R. Cobb, Jonas G. Howard, William S. Holman, Courtland C. Matson, Thomas M. Browne, William D. Bynum, James T. Johnson, Thomas B. Ward, William D. Owen, George W. Steele, Robert Lowry, George Ford.
- Fiftieth Congress, 1887-89—Alvin P. Hovey (resigned), Frank Posey (to fill vacancy), John H. O'Neill, Jonas G. Howard, William S. Holman, Courtland C. Matson, Thomas M. Browne, William D. Bynum, James T. Johnson, Joseph B. Cheadle, William D. Owen, George W. Steele, James B. White, Benjamin F. Shively.
- Fifty-first Congress, 1889-91—William F. Parrett, John H. O'Neill, Jason B. Brown, William S. Holman, George W. Cooper, Thomas M. Browne, William D. Bynum, Elijah V. Brookshire, Joseph B. Cheadle, William D. Owen, Augustus N. Martin, Charles A. O. McClellan, Benjamin F. Shively.
- Fifty-second Congress, 1891-93—William F. Parrett, John L. Bretz, Jason B. Brown, William S. Holman, George W. Cooper, Henry U. Johnson, William D. Bynum, Elijah V. Brookshire, Daniel Waugh, David H. Patton, Augustus N. Martin, Charles A. O. McClellan, Benjamin F. Shively.
- Fifty-third Congress, 1893-95—Arthur H. Taylor, John L. Bretz, Jason B. Brown, William S. Holman, George W. Cooper, Henry U. Johnson, William D. Bynum, Elijah V. Brookshire, Daniel Waugh, Thomas Hammond, Augustus N. Martin, William F. McNagay, Charles G. Conn.
- Fifty-fourth Congress, 1895-97—James A. Hemenway, Alexander M. Hardy, Robert J. Tracewell, James E. Watson, Jesse Overstreet, Henry U. Johnson, Charles L. Henry, George W. Faris, J. Frank Hanley, Jethro A. Hatch, George W. Steele, Jacob D. Leighty, Lemuel W. Royle.
- Fifty-fifth Congress, 1897-99—James A. Hemenway, Robert W. Miers, William T. Zenor, William S. Holman (died), Francis Griffith (to fill vacancy), George W. Faris, Henry U. Johnson, Jesse Overstreet, Charles L. Henry, Charles B. Landis, Edgar D. Crumpacker, George W. Steele, James M. Robinson, Lemuel W. Royle.
- Fifty-sixth Congress, 1899-1901—James A. Hemenway, Robert W. Miers, William T. Zenor, Francis Griffith, George W. Faris, James E. Watson, Jesse Overstreet, George W. Cromer, Charles B. Landis, Edgar D. Crumpacker, George W. Steele, James M. Robinson, Abraham L. Brick.
- Fifty-seventh Congress, 1901-3—James A. Hemenway, Robert W. Miers, William T. Zenor, Francis Griffith, Elias S. Holliday, James E. Watson, Jesse Overstreet, George W. Cromer, Charles B. Landis, Edgar D. Crumpacker, George W. Steele, James M. Robinson, Abraham L. Brick.
- Fifty-eighth Congress, 1903-5—James A. Hemenway, Robert W. Miers, William T. Zenor, Francis Griffith, Elias S. Holliday, James E. Watson, Jesse Overstreet, George W. Cromer, Charles B. Landis, Edgar D. Crumpacker, Fred K. Landis, James M. Robinson, Abraham L. Brick.

GENERAL OFFICERS APPOINTED FROM INDIANA 1861 TO 1865.

MAJOR-GENERALS.

Wallace, Lewis, Crawfordsville, commissioned March 21, 1862; resigned November 30, 1865.

Milroy, Robert H., Delphi, commissioned November 29, 1862; resigned July 26, 1865.
 Reynolds, Joseph J., Lafayette, commissioned November 29, 1862; Colonel in regular army, and brevet Major-General.

BRIGADIER-GENERALS.

Morris, Thomas A., Indianapolis, commissioned April 27, 1861; three months' service.
 Reynolds, Joseph J., Lafayette, commissioned May 10, 1861; resigned January 23, 1862; reappointed November, 1862; promoted Major-General November 20, 1862.
 Dumont, Ebenezer, Indianapolis, commissioned September 3, 1861; resigned February 28, 1862.
 Milroy, Robert H., Delphi, commissioned September 3, 1861; promoted Major-General, November 29, 1862.
 Wallace, Lewis, Crawfordsville, commissioned September 3, 1861; promoted Major-General, March 21, 1862.
 Davis, Jeff C., regular army, commissioned December 18, 1861; Brevet Major-General, January 23, 1865.
 Manson, Mahlon D., Crawfordsville, commissioned March 24, 1862; resigned, December 31, 1864.
 Kimball, Nathan, Loogootee, commissioned April 15, 1862, Brevet Major-General.
 Hascall, Milo S., Goshen, commissioned April 25, 1862; resigned, October 27, 1864.
 Hackleman, P. A., Rushville, commissioned April 28, 1862; killed, October 3, 1862.
 Crittenden, T. T., Madison, commissioned April 28, 1862; resigned, May 11, 1865.
 Veatch, James C., Rockport, commissioned April 28, 1862; Brevet Major-General.
 Benton, W. P., Richmond, commissioned April 28, 1862; Brevet Major-General.
 Hovey, Alvin P., Mt. Vernon, commissioned April 28, 1862; Brevet Major-General.
 Cruft, Charles, Terre Haute, commissioned July 16, 1862; Brevet Major-General.
 Willich, August, Indianapolis, commissioned July 17, 1862; Brevet Major-General.
 Meredith, Solomon, Cambridge City, commissioned October 6, 1862; Brevet Major-General.
 Pitcher, Thomas G., Mt. Vernon, commissioned November 29, 1862; Colonel in regular army.
 Wagner, George D., Williamsport, commissioned November 29, 1862; mustered out, August 24, 1865.
 McMillan, James W., Bedford, commissioned November 29, 1862; Brevet Major-General.
 Harrow, William, Mt. Vernon, commissioned November 29, 1862; resigned; reappointed; resigned, April 20, 1862.
 McGinnis, George F., Indianapolis, commissioned November 29, 1862; mustered out, August 24, 1865.
 Foster, Robert S., Indianapolis, commissioned June 12, 1863; Brevet Major-General.
 Gresham, Walter Q., commissioned August 12, 1863; Brevet Major-General.
 Cameron, Robert A., Valparaiso, commissioned August 11, 1863; Brevet Major-General.
 Miller, John F., South Bend, commissioned January 5, 1864; Brevet Major-General.
 McCook, Edward M., Indianapolis, commissioned April 27, 1864; Brevet Major-General.
 Chapman, George H., Indianapolis, commissioned July 21, 1864; Brevet Major-General.
 Grose, William, New Castle, commissioned July 30, 1864; Brevet Major-General.
 Slack, James R., Huntington, commissioned November, 10, 1864, Brevet Major-General.
 Lucas, Thomas J., Lawrenceburg, commissioned November 10, 1864; Brevet Major-General.
 Catterson, Robert F., Rockville, commissioned June 6, 1865; mustered out January 15, 1866.

POPULAR VOTE OF INDIANA FOR PRESIDENT, FROM 1824 TO 1900, INCLUSIVE.

1824.	
Jackson, Democrat	7,343
Clay, Whig	5,315
Adams, National Republican	3,095
1828.	
Jackson, Democrat	22,237
Adams, National Republican	17,652
1832.	
Jackson, Democrat	31,552
Clay, Whig	15,472

1833.	
Harrison, Whig	41,281
Van Buren, Democrat	32,480
1840.	
Harrison, Whig	65,362
Van Buren, Democrat	51,695
1844.	
Polk, Democrat	70,181
Clay, Whig	67,867
Birney, Abolitionist	3,106
1848.	
Cass, Democrat	74,745
Taylor, Whig	69,907
Van Buren, Free Soil Democrat	8,109
1852.	
Pierce, Democrat	95,340
Scott, Whig	80,901
Hale, Abolitionist	6,929
1856.	
Buchanan, Democrat	118,670
Fremont, Republican	94,375
Fillmore, American	22,386
1860.	
Lincoln, Republican	139,033
Douglas, Democrat	115,509
Breckinridge, Democrat	12,295
Bell, Constitutional Union	5,306
1864.	
Lincoln, Republican	150,422
McClellan, Democrat	130,233
1868.	
Grant, Republican	176,548
Seymour, Democrat	166,980
1872.	
Grant, Republican	186,147
Greeley, Liberal Republican and Democrat	163,632
1876.	
Tilden, Democrat	213,526
Hayes, Republican	208,011
1880.	
Garfield, Republican	232,164
Hancock, Democrat	225,522
Weaver, Greenback	12,886
1884.	
Cleveland, Democrat	244,990
Blaine, Republican	238,463
Butler, Labor	8,293
St. John, Prohibitionist	3,028
1888.	
Harrison, Republican	263,361
Cleveland, Democrat	261,013
Fisk, Prohibitionist	9,881
Streeter, Labor	2,694
1892.	
Cleveland, Democrat	262,740
Harrison, Republican	255,615
Weaver, Populist	22,208
Bidwell, Prohibitionist	13,060
1896.	
McKinley, Republican	323,754
Bryan, Democrat	305,573
Palmer, Gold Democrat	2,145
Scattering	5,647
1900.	
McKinley, Republican	336,063
Bryan, Democrat	309,584
Scattering	18,447

In 1820 the Electors were chosen by the legislature and cast the electoral vote for James Monroe.

BOUNTIES AND RELIEF.

The following table shows the amount expended by each County for bounties, relief of soldiers' families and for miscellaneous war purposes, from 1861 to 1865, inclusive:

Counties.	Bounties.	Relief.	Miscellaneous.	Total.
Adams	\$ 64,200	\$ 18,359	\$ 335	\$ 82,894
Allen	550,145	74,853	2,000	625,998
Bartholomew	308,400	19,947	4,350	332,667
Benton	64,510	4,385	141	69,036
Blackford	37,140	5,098	42,238
Boone	277,885	26,250	304,135
Brown	37,675	2,976	40,651
Carroll	125,879	53,881	180,450
Cass	229,404	82,624	3,379	315,407
Clark	94,916	6,776	261	101,954
Clay	102,700	12,300	110,000
Clinton	281,103	28,904	310,007
Crawford	44,200	10,355	54,535
Davies	53,350	2,472	61,822
Dearborn	295,305	93,235	7,375	396,016
Decatur	203,100	157,268	41,500	401,868
Dekalb	130,250	24,481	163,731
Delaware	51,137	179,768	231,905
Dubois	73,380	5,948	923	80,251
Elkhart	192,611	60,420	253,032
Fayette	190,764	64,366	9,201	264,331
Floyd	124,861	85,780	930	211,571
Fountain	240,000	12,000	252,000
Franklin	274,206	7,074	5,705	286,985
Fulton	117,767	8,856	126,623
Gibson	104,014	31,035	135,049
Grant	151,901	31,546	183,447
Greene	15,070	15,070
Hamilton	245,000	111,625	356,625
Hancock	251,793	67,882	319,680
Harrison	73,200	20,000	93,200
Hendricks	266,250	60,200	326,450
Henry	386,661	82,178	468,839
Howard	201,365	36,120	237,485
Huntington	153,610	36,611	190,221
Jackson	61,094	106,035	167,129
Jasper	21,978	6,141	28,119
Jay	23,000	53,035	76,035
Jefferson	265,790	43,468	9,000	318,258
Jennings	126,615	27,120	13,000	166,735
Johnson	220,000	15,000	235,000
Knox	137,410	15,335	563	153,309
Kosciusko	98,017	29,562	500	128,139
Lagrange	163,000	50,061	213,061
Lake	63,374	10,956	876	74,206
Laporte	257,315	167,606	6,332	431,254
Lawrence	92,701	14,565	107,266
Madison	344,893	10,042	354,940
Marion	1,223,720	439,199	14,279	1,677,199
Marshall	35,324	28,799	464	64,588
Martin	12,400	15,001	27,401
Miami	281,650	44,890	4,800	331,340
Monroe	132,975	15,000	17,000	167,475
Montgomery	545,145	81,561	1,500	637,206
Morgan	194,475	82,908	1,150	278,533
Newton	37,800	3,283	800	41,883
Noble	115,872	48,578	164,450
Ohio	68,575	5,153	49	74,233
Orange	29,936	7,376	31	37,343
Owen	49,543	12,214	61,762
Parke	154,666	80,304	234,970
Perry	24,560	14,471	1,200	40,312
Pike	35,899	28,863	64,762
Porter	65,277	54,606	119,833
Posey	203,202	34,384	5,178	242,766
Pulaski	29,524	865	30,289
Putnam	441,107	28,260	469,367
Randolph	115,705	94,447	210,152

Ripley	146,286	23,301	169,587
Rush	233,812	33,099	600	267,511
Scott	65,397	13,112	78,510
Shelby	121,840	59,049	180,889
Spencer	96,851	23,015	4,843	124,710
Starke	1,378	1,341	2,719
St. Joseph	143,503	56,397	204,900
Steuben	74,366	24,571	98,937
Sullivan	166,750	33,408	200,158
Switzerland	147,386	12,553	1,150	161,089
Tippecanoe	535,850	349,965	12,621	894,436
Tipton	125,000	17,735	142,735
Union	138,118	24,205	5,000	167,323
Vanderburgh	171,165	88,600	259,765
Vermillion	76,032	41,839	986	119,457
Vigo	316,039	136,134	452,203
Wabash	179,100	101,506	16,058	296,664
Warren	121,986	46,452	168,439
Warrick	127,550	19,900	3,500	150,950
Washington	170,000	31,500	201,500
Wayne	379,093	184,350	563,443
Wells	126,650	11,424	138,074
White	95,886	5,364	101,250
Whitley	143,637	16,646	159,683
Grand Total	\$15,492,876	\$4,566,898	\$198,866	\$20,258,640

It will be seen that the people of Indiana gave a vast sum to the war. Summarized it stands:

Paid by counties, townships, cities and towns, for the relief of soldiers' families	\$ 4,566,898
Paid for bounties	15,492,876
For miscellaneous military purposes	198,866
State appropriation for relief of families	1,646,809
Contributed to Sanitary Commission	606,570
Paid by State and charged to United States	4,873,593
Total amount expended	\$26,885,612

MEDAL WINNERS.

The following Indiana soldiers in the civil war were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor:

Marion T. Anderson, Captain Company D, Fifty-first, December 16, 1864, Nashville. Led his regiment over five lines of the enemy's works, and fell desperately wounded.

James W. Archer, Adjutant Fifty-ninth, October 4, 1862, Corinth, Mississippi. Voluntarily took command of another regiment, with the consent of one or more of his seniors, who were present, rallied the command and led it in the assault.

Clinton L. Armstrong, Private Company D, Eighty-third, May 23, 1863, Vicksburg. Gallantry in the charge of the "volunteer storming party."

George L. Banks, Sergeant Company C, Fifteenth, November 25, 1863, Missionary Ridge. As color bearer led his regiment in the assault, and, though wounded, carried the flag forward to the enemy's works, where he was again wounded. In a brigade of eight regiments this was the first planted on the parapet.

Thomas A. Blasdel, Corporal Company H, Eighty-third, May 23, 1863, Vicksburg. Gallantry in the charge of the "volunteer storming party."

Thomas J. Box, Captain Company D, Twenty-seventh, May 14, 1864, Resaca, Georgia. Capture of a flag.

Charles W. Brouse, Captain Company K, One Hundredth, November 25, 1863, Missionary Ridge. Leading a desperate charge of skirmishers.

Louis J. Bruner, Private Company H, Fifth Cavalry, December 2, 1863, Walker's Ford, Tennessee. Voluntarily passed through the enemy's lines under fire, and conveyed to a battalion then in a perilous position, and liable to capture, information which enabled it to reach a point of safety.

Abram J. Buckles, Sergeant Company E, Nineteenth, May 5, 1864, Wilderness. Though suffering from an open wound, carried the regimental colors until again wounded.

Orville T. Chamberlain, Captain Company G, Seventh-fourth, September 20, 1863, Chickamauga. While exposed to a galling fire, went in search of another regiment, found its location, procured ammunition from the men thereof, and returned with the ammunition to his own company.

William W. Chisman, Sergeant Company I, Eighty-third, May 22, 1863, Vicksburg. Gallantry in the charge of the "volunteer storming party."

John W. Conway, Corporal Company C, Eighty-third, May 22, 1863, Vicksburg. Gallantry in the charge of the "volunteer storming party."

John Davis, Private Company F, Seventeenth Mounted Infantry, April —, 1865, Culloden, Georgia. Capture of the flag of the Worrill Grays, C. S. A.

Allan H. Dougall, Adjutant Eighty-eighth, March 19, 1865, Bentonville. In the face of a galling fire from the enemy, he voluntarily returned to where the color bearer had fallen wounded, and saved the flag of his regiment from capture.

Corren D. Evans, Private Company A, Third Cavalry, April 6, 1865, Sailors' Creek. Capture of flag of Twenty-sixth Virginia Infantry.

Frederick W. Fout, First Lieutenant Fifteenth Battery, September 15, 1862, near Harper's Ferry. Voluntarily gathered the men of the battery together, remanned the guns, which had been ordered abandoned by an officer, opened fire and kept up the same on the enemy until after the surrender.

Joseph Frantz, Private Company E, Eighty-third, May 22, 1863, Vicksburg. Gallantry in the charge of the "volunteer storming party."

Thomas N. Graham, Second Lieutenant Company G, Fifteenth, November 25, 1863, Missionary Ridge. Seized the colors from the color bearer, who had been wounded, and, exposed to a terrible fire, carried them forward, planting them on the enemy's breastworks.

David H. Helms, Sergeant Company B, Eighty-third, May 22, 1863, Vicksburg. Gallantry in the charge of the "volunteer storming party."

William T. Holmes, Private Company A, Third Cavalry, April 6, 1865, Sailors' Creek. Capture of the flag of the Twenty-seventh Virginia Infantry.

Ira Hough, Private Company E, Eighth, October 19, 1864, Cedar Creek. Capture of a flag.

Aaron R. Hudson, Private Company C, Seventeenth Mounted Infantry, April —, 1865, Culloden, Georgia. Capture of flag of Worrill Grays.

Ruel M. Johnson, Major One Hundredth, November 25, 1863, Chattanooga. While in command of the regiment bravely exposed himself to the fire of the enemy, encouraging and cheering his men.

Absalom Jordan, Corporal Company A, Third cavalry, April 6, 1865. Capture of flag at Sailors' Creek.

William W. Kendall, Sergeant Company A, Forty-ninth, May 17, 1863, Black River Bridge. Voluntarily led the company in a charge, and was the first to enter the enemy's works, taking a number of prisoners.

Jonathan C. Kirk, Captain Company F, Twentieth, May 23, 1864, North Anna River. Volunteered for dangerous service, and, single handed, captured thirteen armed Confederate soldiers and marched them to the rear.

Jeremiah Kuder, Lieutenant Company A, Seventy-fourth, September 1, 1864, Jonesboro, Georgia. Capture of flags of the Eighth and Nineteenth Arkansas.

Henry W. Lawton, Captain Company A, Thirtieth, August 3, 1864, Atlanta. Led a charge of skirmishers against the enemy's rifle pits, and stubbornly and successfully resisted two determined attacks of the enemy to retake the works.

John B. Lynch, Private Company D, Third cavalry, May —, 1864, Fredericksburg. Carried dispatches from the President to General Grant.

John N. Opel, Private Company G, Seventh, May 3, 1864, Wilderness. Capture of flag of Fiftieth Virginia.

Jacob H. Overturf, Private Company K, Eighty-third, May 22, 1863, Vicksburg. Gallantry in the charge of the "volunteer storming party."

Oliver P. Rood, Private Company B, Twentieth, July 3, 1863, Gettysburg. Capture of flag of the Twenty-first North Carolina.

Milton Russell, Captain Company A, Fifty-first, December 23, 1862, Stone's River. Was the first man to cross Stone's River, and in the face of a galling fire from the concealed skirmishers of the enemy, led his men up the opposite hillside, driving the opposing skirmishers before them.

Peter J. Ryan, Private Company D, Eleventh, September 19, 1864, Winchester. Capture of fourteen Confederates in the severest part of the battle.

Charles H. Seston, Sergeant Company I, Eleventh, September 19, 1864, Winchester. Gallantry and meritorious service in carrying the regimental colors.

Reuben Smalley, Private Company F, Eighty-third, May 22, 1863, Vicksburg. Gallantry in the charge of the "volunteer storming party."

William Steinmetz, Private Company G, Eighty-third, May 22, 1863, Vicksburg. Gallantry in the charge of the "volunteer storming party."

John T. Sterling, Private Company D, Eleventh, September 19, 1864, Winchester. Capture of fourteen of the enemy in the severest part of the battle.

Frank Stoltz, Private Company G, Eighty-third, May 22, 1863, Vicksburg. Gallantry in the charge of the "volunteer storming party."

Richard Taylor, Private Company E, Eighteenth, October 19, 1864, Cedar Creek. Capture of flag.

ORDINANCE AND CONSTITUTION OF 1816.

ORDINANCE.

Be it ordained by the Representatives of the people of the Territory of Indiana, in convention met at Corydon, on Monday, the tenth day of June, in the year of our Lord, eighteen hundred and sixteen; That we do, for ourselves and our posterity, agree, determine, declare and ordain; That we will, and do hereby, accept the propositions of the Congress of the United States, as made and contained in their act of the nineteenth day of April, eighteen hundred and sixteen, entitled "An act to enable the people of the Indiana Territory to form a State Government, and Constitution, and for the admission of such State into the Union, on an equal footing with the original States."

And we do further, for ourselves and our posterity, hereby ratify, confirm, and establish the boundaries of the said State of Indiana as fixed, prescribed, laid down, and established in the act of Congress aforesaid; and we do also further, for ourselves and our posterity, hereby agree, determine, declare and ordain; That each and every tract of land sold by the United States, lying within the said State and which shall be sold from and after the first day of December next, shall be and remain exempt from any tax, laid by order or under any authority of the said State of Indiana, or by or under the authority of the General Assembly thereof, whether for State, County or Township or any other purpose whatever, for the term of five years from and after the day of sale of any such tract of land; and we do moreover, for ourselves, and our posterity, hereby declare and ordain that this ordinance and every part thereof shall forever be and remain irrevocable and inviolate without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, first had and obtained for the alteration thereof, or any part thereof.

June 29, 1816.

Attest: WILLIAM HENDRICKS,

June 29, 1816.

Secretary.

JONATHAN JENNINGS,
President of the Convention.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA.

We, the Representatives of the people of the Territory of Indiana, in Convention met at Corydon, on Monday, the tenth day of June, in the year of our Lord, eighteen hundred and sixteen, and of the Independence of the United States the Fortieth, having the right of admission into the General Government, as a member of the Union, consistent with the Constitution of the United States, the ordinance of Congress of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and the law of Congress, entitled "An act to enable the people of the Indiana Territory to form a Constitution and State Government, and for the admission of such State into the Union, on an equal footing with the original States" in order to establish justice, promote the welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity; do ordain and establish the following Constitution or form of Government, and do mutually agree with each other to form ourselves into a free and independent State, by the name of the State of Indiana.

ARTICLE I.

Section 1. That the general, great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and unalterably established; we declare,

that all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights; among which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

Sec. 2. That all power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness. For the advancement of these ends, they have at all times an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter or reform their government in such manner as they may think proper.

Sec. 3. That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences: That no man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship or to maintain any ministry against his consent. That no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious societies, or modes of worship; and no religious test shall be required as a qualification to any office of trust or profit.

Sec. 4. That elections shall be free and equal.

Sec. 5. That in all civil cases, when the value in controversy shall exceed the sum of twenty dollars, and in all criminal cases, except in petit misdemeanors, which shall be punished by fine only, not exceeding three dollars, in such manner as the Legislature may prescribe by law, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.

Sec. 6. That no power of suspending the operation of the laws shall be exercised, except by the Legislature, or its authority.

Sec. 7. That no man's particular services shall be demanded, or property taken, or applied to public use, without the consent of his representatives, or without a just compensation being made therefor.

Sec. 8. The rights of the people, to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches, and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 9. That the printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the Legislature, or any branch of government; and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man; and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.

Sec. 10. In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct of officers, or men in a public capacity, or where the matter published is proper for the public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the Court, as in other cases.

Sec. 11.—That all courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by the due course of law, and right and justice administered without denial or delay.

Sec. 12. That no person arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with unnecessary rigor, or be put to answer any criminal charge, but by presentment, indictment or impeachment.

Sec. 13.—That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and in prosecution by indictment or presentment a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense shall have been committed; and shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Sec. 14. That all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is evident, or the presumption great; and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.

Sec. 15. Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Sec. 16. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.

Sec. 17. The person of a debtor, where there is not strong presumption of fraud, shall not be continued in prison, after delivering up his estate for the benefit of his creditor or creditors, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.

Sec. 18. No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the validity of contracts, shall ever be made, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood nor forfeiture of estate.

Sec. 19. That the people have a right to assemble together in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives and to apply to the Legislature for redress of grievances.

Sec. 20. That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the State, and that the military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power.

Sec. 21. That no soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Sec. 22. That the Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility, or hereditary distinctions, nor create any office, the appointment to which shall be for a longer time than good behavior.

Sec. 23. That emigration from the State shall not be prohibited.

Sec. 24. To guard against any encroachments on the rights herein retained, we declare that everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolable.

ARTICLE II.

The powers of the government of Indiana shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judiciary to another; and no persons or collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.

ARTICLE III.

Section 1. The Legislative authority of this State shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, both to be elected by the people.

Sec. 2. The General Assembly may, within two years after their first meeting, and shall, in the year eighteen hundred and twenty, and every subsequent term of five years, cause an enumeration to be made of all the white male inhabitants above the age of twenty-one years. The number of representatives shall, at the several periods of making such enumeration, be fixed by the General Assembly, and apportioned among the several counties according to the number of white male inhabitants above twenty-one years of age in each; and shall never be less than twenty-five, nor greater than thirty-six, until the number of white male inhabitants above twenty-one years of age shall be twenty-two thousand; and after that event, at such ratio, that the whole number of Representatives shall never be less than thirty-six, nor exceed one hundred.

Sec. 3. The Representatives shall be chosen annually, by the qualified electors of each county respectively, on the first Monday of August.

Sec. 4. No person shall be a representative unless he shall have attained the age of twenty-one years, and shall be a citizen of the United States, and an inhabitant of this State, and shall also have resided within the limits of the county, in which he shall be chosen, one year next preceding his election, if the county shall have been so long erected, but if not, then within the limits of the county or counties out of which it shall have been taken, unless he shall have been absent on the public business of the United States, or of this State, and shall have paid a State or county tax.

Sec. 5. The Senators shall be chosen for three years, on the first Monday in August, by the qualified voters for Representatives; and on their being convened, in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided by lot, from their respective counties, or districts, as near as can be, into three classes; the seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the first year; and of the second class, at the expiration of the second year; and of the third class, at the expiration of the third year; so that one-third thereof, as near as possible, may be annually chosen forever thereafter.

Sec. 6. The number of Senators shall, at the several periods of making the enumeration before mentioned, be fixed by the General Assembly, and apportioned among the several counties or districts, to be established by law, according to the number of white male inhabitants of the age of twenty-one years in each, and shall never be less than one-third, nor more than one-half of the number of Representatives.

Sec. 7. No person shall be a Senator, unless he shall have attained the age of twenty-five years, and shall be a citizen of the United States, and shall, next preceding the election, have resided two years in the State, the last twelve months of which in the county or district in which he may be elected, if the county or district shall have been so long erected, but if not, then within the

Limits of the county or counties, district or districts, out of which the same shall have been taken; unless he shall have been absent on the public business of the United States, or of this State, and shall moreover have paid a State or county tax.

Sec. 8. The House of Representatives, when assembled, shall choose a Speaker, and its other officers, and the Senate shall choose its officers, except the President, and each shall be judges of the qualifications and election of its members, and sit upon its own adjournments. Two-thirds of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members.

Sec. 9. Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and publish them. The yeas and nays of the members, on any question, shall, at the request of any two of them, be entered on the Journals.

Sec. 10. Any one member of either House shall have liberty to dissent from, and protest against, any act or resolution which he may think injurious to the public, or any individual or individuals, and have the reasons of his dissent entered on the Journals.

Sec. 11. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member, but not a second time for the same cause; and shall have all other powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent State.

Sec. 12. When vacancies happen in either branch of the General Assembly, the Governor, or the person exercising the power of Governor, shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.

Sec. 13. Senators and Representatives shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest, during the session of the General Assembly, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

Sec. 14. Each House may punish, by imprisonment, during their session, any person, not a member, who shall be guilty of any disrespect to the House, by any disorderly, or contemptuous behavior in their presence: Provided. Such imprisonment shall not, at any one time, exceed twenty-four hours.

Sec. 15. The doors of each House, and of committees of the whole, shall be kept open, except in such cases as, in the opinion of the House, may require secrecy. Neither House shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than two days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Sec. 16. Bills may originate in either House, but may be altered, amended, or rejected by the other.

Sec. 17. Every bill shall be read on three different days in each House, unless, in case of urgency, two-thirds of the House, where such bill may be depending, shall deem it expedient to dispense with this rule, and every bill, having passed both Houses, shall be signed by the President and Speaker of their respective Houses.

Sec. 18. The style of the laws of this State shall be, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana."

Sec. 19. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may amend or reject, as in other bills.

Sec. 20. No person, holding any office under the authority of the President of the United States, or this State, military offices excepted, shall be eligible to a seat in either branch of the General Assembly, unless he resign his office previous to his election, nor shall any member of either branch of the General Assembly, during the time for which he is elected, be eligible to any office, the appointment of which is vested in the General Assembly: Provided, That nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prevent any member of the first session of the first General Assembly from accepting any office that is created by this Constitution, or the Constitution of the United States, and the salaries of which are established.

Sec. 21. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.

Sec. 22. An accurate statement of the receipts and expenditures of the public moneys shall be attached to and published with the laws, at every annual session of the General Assembly.

Sec. 23. The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeaching; but a majority of all the members elected must concur in such impeachment. All impeachments shall be tried by the Senate, and when sitting for that purpose the Senators shall be upon oath or affirmation to do justice according to law and evidence. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of a majority of all the Senators elected.

Sec. 24. The Governor, and all civil officers of the State, shall be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors; but judgment in such cases shall not extend

further than removal from office, and disqualification to hold any office of honor, profit, or trust, under this State. The party, whether convicted or acquitted shall, nevertheless, be liable to indictment, trial judgment and punishment according to law.

Sec. 25. The first session of the General Assembly shall commence on the first Monday of November next, and forever after the General Assembly shall meet on the first Monday in December in every year, and at no other period, unless directed by law, or provided for by this Constitution.

Sec. 26. No person, who hereafter may be a collector, or holder of public money, shall have a seat in either House of the General Assembly, until such person shall have accounted for and paid into the Treasury all sums for which he may be accountable.

ARTICLE IV.

Section 1. The Supreme Executive power of this State shall be vested in a Governor, who shall be styled the Governor of the State of Indiana.

Sec. 2. The Governor shall be chosen by the qualified electors on the first Monday in August, at the places where they shall respectively vote for Representatives. The returns of every election for Governor shall be sealed up and transmitted to the seat of Government, directed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall open and publish them in the presence of both Houses of the General Assembly. The person having the highest number of votes shall be Governor, but if two or more shall be equal, and highest in votes, one of them shall be chosen Governor by the joint vote of the members of both Houses. Contested elections shall be determined by a committee, to be selected from both Houses of the General Assembly, and formed and regulated in such manner as shall be directed by law.

Sec. 3. The Governor shall hold his office during three years, from and after the third day of the first session of the General Assembly next ensuing his election, and until a successor shall be chosen and qualified, and shall not be capable of holding it longer than six years in any term of nine years.

Sec. 4. He shall be at least thirty years of age, and shall have been a citizen of the United States ten years, and have resided in the State five years next preceding his election; unless he shall have been absent on the business of the State, or of the United States: Provided, That this shall not disqualify any person from the office of Governor, who shall be a citizen of the United States, and shall have resided in the Indiana Territory two years next preceding the adoption of this Constitution.

Sec. 5. No member of Congress, or person holding any office under the United States, or this State, shall exercise the office of Governor, or Lieutenant-Governor.

Sec. 6. The Governor shall, at stated time, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the term for which he shall have been elected.

Sec. 7. He shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of this State and of the Militia thereof, except when they shall be called into the service of the United States, but he shall not command personally in the field, unless he shall be advised so to do by a resolution of the General Assembly.

Sec. 8. He shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint and commission all officers, the appointment of which is not otherwise directed by this Constitution, and all offices which may be created by the General Assembly shall be filled in such manner as may be directed by law.

Sec. 9. Vacancies that may happen in offices, the appointment of which is vested in the Governor and Senate, or in the General Assembly, shall be filled by the Governor, during the recess of the General Assembly, by granting commissions that shall expire at the end of the next session.

Sec. 10. He shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures, grant reprieves and pardons, except in cases of impeachments.

Sec. 11. He may require information in writing, from the officers in the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.

Sec. 12. He shall, from time to time, give to the General Assembly information of the affairs of the State, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall deem expedient.

Sec. 13. He may, in extraordinary occasions, convene the General Assembly at the seat of government, or at a different place, if that shall have become, since their last adjournment, dangerous from an enemy or from contagious disorders, and in case of a disagreement between the two Houses with respect to the time of adjournment, adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper not beyond the time of their next annual session.

Sec. 14. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

Sec. 15. A Lieutenant-Governor shall be chosen at every election for Governor, in the same manner, continue in office for the same time, and possess the same qualifications. In voting for Governor and Lieutenant-Governor the electors shall distinguish whom they vote for as Governor and whom as Lieutenant-Governor.

Sec. 16. He shall, by virtue of his office, be President of the Senate, have a right, when in Committee of the Whole, to debate and vote on all subjects, and, when the Senate are equally divided, to give the casting vote.

Sec. 17. In case of impeachment of the Governor, his removal from office, death, refusal to qualify, resignation or absence from the State, the Lieutenant-Governor shall exercise all the powers and authority appertaining to the office of Governor until another be duly qualified, or the Governor absent or impeached shall return or be acquitted.

Sec. 18. Whenever the government shall be administered by the Lieutenant-Governor, or he shall be unable to attend as President of the Senate, the Senate shall elect one of their own members as President for that occasion. And if, during the vacancy of the office of Governor, the Lieutenant-Governor shall be impeached, removed from office, refuse to qualify, resign, die, or be absent from the State, the President of the Senate pro tem. shall in like manner administer the government until he shall be superseded by a Governor or Lieutenant-Governor. The Lieutenant-Governor, while he acts as President of the Senate, shall receive for his services the same compensation which shall for the same period be allowed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and no more; and during the time he administers the government, as Governor, shall receive the same compensation which the Governor would have received, and been entitled to, had he been employed in the duties of his office, and no more.

Sec. 19. The President pro tempore of the Senate, during the time he administers the government, shall receive in like manner the same compensation which the Governor would have received had he been employed in the duties of his office, and no more.

Sec. 20. If the Lieutenant-Governor shall be called upon to administer the government, and shall, while in such administration, resign, die, or be absent from the State during the recess of the General Assembly, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State for the time being to convene the Senate for the purpose of choosing a President pro tempore.

Sec. 21. A Secretary of State shall be chosen by the joint ballot of both Houses of the General Assembly, and be commissioned by the Governor for four years, or until a new Secretary be chosen and qualified. He shall keep a fair register, and attest all the official acts and proceedings of the Governor, and shall, when required, lay the same and all papers, minutes and vouchers relative thereto before either House of the General Assembly, and shall perform such other duties as may be enjoined him by law.

Sec. 22. Every bill, which shall have passed both Houses of the General Assembly, shall be presented to the Governor; if he approves, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the House in which it (may) have originated, who shall enter the objections at large upon their Journals and proceed to reconsider it; if after such reconsideration, a majority of all the members elected to that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by a majority of all the members elected to that House, it shall be a law; but, in such cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for, and against the bill, shall be entered on the Journals of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor within five days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it; unless the general adjournment prevents its return; in which case it shall be a law, unless sent back within three days after their next meeting.

Sec. 23. Every resolution, to which the convenience [concurrence] of both Houses may be necessary, shall be presented to the Governor, and before it shall take effect, be approved by him or, being disapproved, shall be re-passed by a majority of all the members elected to both Houses, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in case of a bill.

Sec. 24. There shall be elected, by joint ballot of both Houses of the General Assembly, a Treasurer and Auditor, whose powers and duties shall be prescribed by law, and who shall hold their offices three years, and until their successors be appointed and qualified.

Sec. 25. There shall be elected in each county, by the qualified electors thereof, one Sheriff and one Coroner, at the times and places of holding elections for members of the General Assembly. They shall continue in office two years, and until successors shall be chosen and duly qualified: Provided, That no person shall be eligible to the office of Sheriff more than four years in any term of six years.

Sec. 26. There shall be a seal of this State, which shall be kept by the Governor and used by him officially, and shall be called the Seal of the State of Indiana.

ARTICLE V.

Section 1. The judiciary power of the State, both as to matters of law and equity, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts, and in such other inferior courts as the General Assembly may from time to time direct and establish.

Sec. 2. The Supreme Court shall consist of three Judges, any two of whom shall form a quorum, and shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be co-extensive with the limits of the State, under such restrictions and regulations not repugnant to this Constitution, as may from time to time be prescribed by law: Provided, Nothing in this article shall be so construed as to prevent the General Assembly from giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in capital cases, and cases in chancery where the President of the Circuit Court may be interested or prejudiced.

Sec. 3. The Circuit Courts shall each consist of a President and two Associate Judges. The State shall be divided, by law, into three circuits, for each of which a President shall be appointed, who, during his continuance in office, shall reside therein. The President and Associate Judges, in their respective counties, shall have common law and chancery jurisdiction, as also complete criminal jurisdiction in all such cases and in such manner as may be prescribed by law. The President alone, in the absence of the Associate Judges, or the President and one of the Associate Judges, in the absence of the other, shall be competent to hold a Court, as also the two Associate Judges in the absence of the President, shall be competent to hold a Court, except in capital cases and in cases in chancery: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the General Assembly from increasing the number of circuits and Presidents as the exigencies of the State may from time to time require.

Sec. 4. The Judges of the Supreme Court, the Circuit, and other inferior courts shall hold their offices during the term of seven years, if they shall so long behave well, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Sec. 5. The Judges of the Supreme Court shall, by virtue of their offices, be conservators of the peace throughout the State, as also the Presidents of the Circuit Courts in their respective circuits, and the Associate Judges in their respective counties.

Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall hold its sessions at the seat of government, at such times as shall be prescribed by law; and the Circuit Courts shall be held in the respective counties as may be directed by law.

Sec. 7. The Judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Presidents of the Circuit Courts shall be appointed by joint ballot of both branches of the General Assembly, and the Associate Judges of the Circuit Courts shall be elected by the qualified electors in the respective counties.

Sec. 8. The Supreme Court shall appoint its own Clerk, and the Clerks of the Circuit Court in the several counties shall be elected by the qualified electors in the several counties, but no person shall be eligible to the office of Clerk of the Circuit Court in any county unless he shall first have obtained, from one or more of the Judges of the Supreme Court, or from one or more of the Presidents of the Circuit Courts, a certificate that he is qualified to execute the duties of the office of Clerk of the Circuit Court: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the Circuit Courts in each county from appointing a Clerk pro tem. until a qualified Clerk may be duly elected, and provided, also, that the said Clerks, respectively, when qualified and elected, shall hold their offices seven years, and no longer, unless reappointed.

Sec. 9. All Clerks shall be removable by impeachment as in other cases.

Sec. 10. When any vacancies happen in any of the Courts, occasioned by the death, resignation or removal from office of any Judge of the Supreme or Circuit Courts, or any of the Clerks of the said Courts, a successor shall be appointed in the same manner as hereinbefore prescribed, who shall hold his office for the period which his predecessor had to serve, and no longer unless reappointed.

Sec. 11. The style of all process shall be "The State of Indiana;" all prosecutions shall be carried on in the name and by the authority of the State of Indiana; and all indictments shall conclude "against the peace and dignity of the same."

Sec. 12. A competent number of Justices of the Peace shall be elected by the qualified electors in each township in the several counties, and shall continue in office five years, if they shall so long behave well, whose powers and duties shall, from time to time, be regulated and defined by law.

ARTICLE VI.

Section 1. In all elections, not otherwise provided for by this Constitution, every white male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who has resided in the State one year immediately preceding such election, shall be entitled to vote in the county where he resides; except such as shall be enlisted in the armies of the United States or their allies.

Sec. 2. All elections shall be by ballot: Provided, That the General Assembly may, if they deem it more expedient, at their session in eighteen hundred and twenty-one, change the mode so as to vote viva voce, after which time it shall remain unalterable.

Sec. 3. Electors shall in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be free from arrest in going to, during their attendance at, and in returning home from elections.

Sec. 4. The General Assembly shall have full power to exclude from electing, or being elected, any person convicted of any infamous crime.

Sec. 5. Nothing in this article shall be so construed as to prevent citizens of the United States who were actual residents at the time of adopting this Constitution, and who, by the existing laws of this Territory, are entitled to vote, or persons who have been absent from home on a visit or necessary business, from the privilege of electors.

ARTICLE VII.

Section 1. The militia of the State of Indiana shall consist of all free, able-bodied male persons, negroes, mulattoes and Indians excepted, resident in the said State, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, except such persons as now are or hereafter may be exempted by the laws of the United States or of this State; and shall be armed, equipped and trained as the General Assembly may provide by law.

Sec. 2. No person or persons conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to do militia duty: Provided, such person or persons shall pay an equivalent for such exemption; which equivalent shall be collected annually by a civil officer, and be hereafter fixed by law, and shall be equal, as near as may be, to the lowest fines assessed on those privates in the militia who may neglect or refuse to perform militia duty.

Sec. 3. Captains and subalterns shall be elected by those persons in their respective company districts who are subject to perform militia duty, and the Captain of each company shall appoint the non-commissioned officers to said company.

Sec. 4. Majors shall be elected by those persons within the bounds of their respective battalion districts, subject to perform militia duty; and Colonels shall be elected by those persons within the bounds of their respective regimental districts, subject to perform militia duty.

Sec. 5. Brigadier-Generals shall be elected by the commissioned officers within the bounds of their respective brigades, and Major-Generals shall be elected by the commissioned officers within the bounds of their respective divisions.

Sec. 6. Troops and squadrons of cavalry and companies of artillery, riflemen, grenadiers or light infantry, may be formed in the said State in such manner as shall be prescribed by law: Provided, however, That every troop or squadron of cavalry, company of artillery, riflemen, grenadiers or light infantry, which may hereafter be formed within the said State, shall elect their own officers.

Sec. 7. The Governor shall appoint the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-Generals, as also his aides de camp.

Sec. 8. Major-Generals shall appoint their aides de camp and all other division staff officers. Brigadier-Generals shall appoint their Brigade Majors and all other brigade staff officers; and Colonels shall appoint their regimental staff officers.

Sec. 9. All militia officers shall be commissioned by the Governor, and shall hold their commissions during good behavior or until they arrive at the age of sixty years.

Sec. 10. The General Assembly shall, by law, fix the method of dividing the militia of the said State into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions and companies, and shall also fix the rank of all staff officers.

ARTICLE VIII.

Section 1. Every twelfth year, after this Constitution shall have taken effect, at the general election held for Governor, there shall be a poll opened in which the qualified electors of the State shall express, by vote, whether they

are in favor of calling a convention or not; and if there should be a majority of all the votes given at such election in favor of a convention, the Governor shall inform the next General Assembly thereof, whose duty it shall be to provide, by law, for the election of the members to the convention, the number thereof, and the time and place of their meeting; which law shall not be passed unless agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to both branches of the General Assembly, and which convention, when met, shall have it in their power to revise, amend or change the Constitution. But, as the holding any part of the human creation in slavery, or involuntary servitude, can only originate in usurpation and tyranny, no alteration of this Constitution shall ever take place so as to introduce slavery or involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

ARTICLE IX.

Section 1. Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government, and spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through the various parts of the country being highly conducive to this end, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to provide, by law, for the improvement of such lands as are or hereafter may be granted by the United States to this State for the use of schools, and to apply any funds which may be raised from such lands or from any other quarter to the accomplishment of the grand object for which they are or may be intended. But no lands granted for the use of schools or seminaries of learning shall be sold by authority of this State, prior to the year 1820; and the moneys which may be raised out of the sale of any such lands, or otherwise obtained for the purposes aforesaid, shall be and remain a fund for the exclusive purpose of promoting the interests of literature, and the sciences, and for the support of seminaries and public schools. The General Assembly shall, from time to time, pass such laws as shall be calculated to encourage intellectual, scientific and agricultural improvements, by allowing rewards and immunities for the promotion and improvement of arts, sciences, commerce, manufacture and natural history; and to countenance and encourage the principles of humanity, honesty, industry and morality.

Sec. 2. It shall be the duty of the General Assembly, as soon as circumstances will permit, to provide, by law, for a general system of education, ascending in a regular gradation from township schools to a State University, wherein tuition shall be gratis, and equally open to all.

Sec. 3. And for the promotion of such salutary end, the money which shall be paid, as an equivalent, by persons exempt from militia duty, except in times of war, shall be exclusively, and in equal proportion, applied to the support of County Seminaries; also, all fines assessed for any breach of the penal laws shall be applied to said seminaries in the county wherein they shall be assessed.

Sec. 4. It shall be the duty of the General Assembly, as soon as circumstances will permit, to form a penal code, founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice; and, also to provide one or more farms to be an asylum for those persons, who, by reason of age, infirmity, or other misfortunes, may have a claim upon the aid and beneficence of society; on such principles, that such persons may therein find employment and every reasonable comfort, and lose by their usefulness, the degrading sense of dependence.

Sec. 5. The General Assembly, at the time they lay off a new county, shall cause at least ten per cent. to be reserved out of the proceeds of the sale of town lots in the seat of justice of such county, for the use of a public library for such county, and at the same session they shall incorporate a Library Company under such rules and regulations as will best secure its permanence and extend its benefits.

ARTICLE X.

Section 1. There shall not be established or incorporated in this State, any bank or banking company, or monied institution for the purpose of issuing bills of credit, or bills payable to order or bearer: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent the General Assembly from establishing a State Bank, and branches, not exceeding one branch for any three counties, and to be established at such place within such counties as the Directors of the State Bank may select: Provided, There be subscribed, and paid in specie, on the part of individuals, a sum equal to thirty thousand dollars: Provided also, That the bank at Vincennes, and the Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of Indiana, at Madison, shall be considered as incorporated banks, according to the true tenor of the charters granted to said banks by the Legislature of the Indiana Territory: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be so con-

strued, as to prevent the General Assembly from adopting either of the aforesaid banks as the State Bank, and in case either of them shall be adopted as the State Bank, the other may become a branch under the rules and regulations hereinbefore prescribed.

ARTICLE XI.

Section 1. Every person who shall be chosen or appointed to any office of trust or profit, under the authority of this State, shall, before entering on the duties of said office, take an oath or affirmation, before any person lawfully authorized to administer oaths, to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of this State, and also an oath of office.

Sec. 2. Treason against this State shall consist only in levying war against it, in adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid and comfort.

Sec. 3. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or his own confession in open court.

Sec. 4. The manner of administering an oath, or affirmation, shall be such as is most consistent with the conscience of the deponent, and shall be esteemed the most solemn appeal to God.

Sec. 5. Every person shall be disqualified from serving as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Senator or Representative, for the term for which he shall have been elected, who shall have been convicted of having given, or offered any bribe, treat, or reward to procure his election.

Sec. 6. All officers shall reside within the State; and all district, county or town officers, within their respective districts, counties or towns (the trustees of the town of Clarksville excepted), and shall keep their respective offices at such places therein, as may be directed by law; and all militia officers shall reside within the bounds of the division, brigade, regiment, battalion or company to which they may severally belong.

Sec. 7. There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in this State, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, nor shall any indenture of any negro or mulatto, hereafter made and executed out of the bounds of this State, be of any validity within the State.

Sec. 8. No act of the General Assembly shall be in force until it shall have been published in print, unless in cases of emergency.

Sec. 9. All commissions shall be in the name, and by the authority of the State of Indiana; and sealed with the State seal, and signed by the Governor and attested by the Secretary of State.

Sec. 10. There shall be elected in each county a Recorder, who shall hold his office during the term of seven years, if he shall so long behave well: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the Clerks of the Circuit Courts from holding the office of Recorder.

Sec. 11. Corydon, in Harrison County, shall be the seat of Government of the State of Indiana, until the year eighteen hundred and twenty-five, and until removed by law.

Sec. 12. The General Assembly, when they lay off any new county, shall not reduce the old county, or counties, from which the same shall be taken to a less content than four hundred square miles.

Sec. 13. No person shall hold more than one lucrative office at the same time, except as in this Constitution is expressly permitted.

Sec. 14. No person shall be appointed as a county officer within any county, who shall not have been a citizen and an inhabitant therein one year next preceding his appointment, if the county shall have been so long erected, but if the county shall not have been so long erected, then within the limits of the county, or counties, out of which it shall have been taken.

Sec. 15. All town and township officers shall be appointed in such manner as shall be directed by law.

Sec. 16. The following officers of Government shall not be allowed greater annual salaries until the year eighteen hundred and nineteen, than as follows: The Governor, one thousand dollars; the Secretary of State, four hundred dollars; the Auditor of Public Accounts, four hundred dollars; the Treasurer, four hundred dollars; the Judges of the Supreme Court, eight hundred dollars each; the Presidents of the Circuit Courts, eight hundred dollars each; and the members of the General Assembly, not exceeding two dollars per day each, during their attendance on the same, and two dollars for every twenty-five miles they shall severally travel on the most usual route in going to and returning from the General Assembly; after which time their pay shall be regulated by law. But no law, passed to increase the pay of the members of the General Assembly, shall take effect until after the close of the session at which such law shall have been passed.

Sec. 17. In order that the boundaries of the State of Indiana may more certainly be known and established; It is hereby ordained and declared that the following shall be and forever remain the boundaries of the said State, to-

wit: Bounded on the east by the meridian line which forms the western boundary of the State of Ohio, on the south by the Ohio River, from the mouth of the Great Miami River, to the mouth of the River Wabash; on the west by a line drawn along the middle of the Wabash River from its mouth to a point, where a due north line drawn from the town of Vincennes would last touch the northwestern shore of the said Wabash River; and from thence by a due north line until the same shall intersect an east and west line, drawn through a point ten miles north of the southern extreme of Lake Michigan; on the north by the said east and west line, until the same shall intersect the first mentioned meridian line, which forms the western boundary of the State of Ohio.

ARTICLE XII.

Section 1. That no evils or inconveniences may arise from the change of a Territorial Government to a permanent State Government, it is declared by this Convention that all rights, suits, actions, prosecutions, recognizances, contracts and claims, both as it respects individuals and bodies corporate, shall continue as if no change had taken (place) in this Government.

Sec. 2. All fines, penalties and forfeitures, due and owing to the Territory of Indiana, or any county therein, shall inure to the use of the State or county. All bonds executed to the Governor, or any other officer in his official capacity in the Territory, shall pass over to the Governor or other officers of the State or county, and their successors in office for the use of the State or County, or by him or them to be respectively assigned over to the use of those concerned, as the case may be.

Sec. 3. The Governor, Secretary and Judges and all other officers, both civil and military, under the Territorial Government shall continue in the exercise of the duties of their respective departments until the said officers are superseded under the authority of this Constitution.

Sec. 4. All laws and parts of laws now in force in this Territory not inconsistent with this Constitution, shall continue and remain in full force and effect until they expire or be repealed.

Sec. 5. The Governor shall use his private seal until a State seal be procured.

Sec. 6. The Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts and Treasurer shall severally reside and keep all the public records, books and papers in any manner relating to their respective offices at the seat of the government: Provided, notwithstanding, That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to affect the residence of the Governor for the space of six months, and until buildings suitable for his accommodation shall be procured at the expense of the State.

Sec. 7. All suits, pleas, complaints and other proceedings now depending in any Court of Record or Justice's Court shall be prosecuted to final judgment and execution, and all appeals, writs of error, certiorari, injunction or other proceedings whatsoever, shall progress and be carried on in the respective court or courts, in the same manner as is now provided by law, and all proceedings had therein in as full and complete a manner as if this Constitution were not adopted. And appeals and writs of error may be taken from the Circuit Court and General Court now established in the Indiana Territory to the Supreme Court in such manner as shall be provided for by law.

Sec. 8. The President of this convention shall issue writs of election, directed to the several Sheriffs of the several counties, requiring them to cause an election to be held for a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, a Representative to the Congress of the United States, Members of the General Assembly, Sheriffs and Coroners, at the respective election districts in each county, on the first Monday in August next; which election shall be conducted in the (manner) prescribed by the existing election laws of the Indiana Territory; and the said Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Members of the General Assembly, Sheriffs and Coroners, then duly elected, shall continue to exercise the duties of their respective offices for the time prescribed by this Constitution, and until their successor or successors are qualified, and no longer.

Sec. 9. Until the first enumeration shall be made, as directed by this Constitution, the county of Wayne shall be entitled to one Senator and three Representatives; the county of Franklin, one Senator and three Representatives; the county of Dearborn, one Senator and two Representatives; the county of Switzerland, one Representative, and the counties of Jefferson and Switzerland, one Senator, and the county of Jefferson, two representatives; the county of Clark, one Senator and three Representatives; the county of Harrison, one Senator and three Representatives; the counties of Washington, Orange and Jackson, one Senator, and the county of Washington, two Representatives; the counties of Orange and Jackson, one Representative each; the county of Knox, one Senator and three Representatives; the county of Gibson, one Senator and two Representatives; the counties of Posey, Warrick and Perry, one Senator,

and each of the aforesaid counties of Posey, Warrick and Perry, one Representative.

Sec. 10. All books, records, documents, warrants and papers appertaining and belonging to the office of the Territorial Treasurer of the Indiana Territory, and all moneys therein, and all papers and documents in the office of the Secretary of said Territory, shall be disposed of as the General Assembly of this State may direct.

Sec. 11. All suits, actions, pleas, complaints, prosecutions and causes whatsoever, and all records, books, papers and documents now in the General Court, may be transferred to the Supreme Court established by this Constitution. And all causes, suits, actions, pleas, complaints and prosecutions whatsoever now existing or pending in the Circuit Courts of this Territory, or which may be therein at the change of government, and all records, books, papers and documents relating to the said suits or filed in the said courts may be transferred over to the Circuit Courts established by this Constitutions, under such rules and regulations as the General Assembly may direct.

Done in convention at Corydon on the twenty-ninth day of June, in the year of our Lord, Eighteen hundred and sixteen, and of the Independence of the United States the fortieth.

In witness whereof, We have hereunto subscribed our names.

JONATHAN JENNINGS,

President of the Convention and Delegate from the County of Clark.

Thomas Carr,	}	Delegates in Convention from the County of Clark.
John K. Graham,		
James Lemon,		
James Scott,		
James Dill,	}	Delegates in Convention from the County of Dearborn.
Ezra Ferris,		
Solomon Manwaring,		
James Brownlee,		
William H. Eades,	}	Delegates in Convention from the County of Franklin.
Robert Hanna.		
Enoch McCarty,		
James Noble,		
Fred'k Rapp,	}	Delegates in Convention from the County of Gibson.
Alexander Daein,		
David Robb,		
James Smith, Jr.,		
John Boone,	}	Delegates in Convention from the County of Harrison.
Davis Floyd,		
Daniel C. Lane,		
Dennis Pennington,		
Patrick Shields,	}	Delegates in Convention from the County of Jefferson.
Nath'l Hunt,		
David H. Maxwell,		
Samuel Smock,		
John Badottet,	}	Delegates in Convention from the County of Knox.
John Benefell,		
John Johnson,		
Wm. Polke,		
B. Parke,		
Charles Polke, Delegate from the County of Perry.		
Dann Lynn, Delegate from the County of Posey.		
William Cotton, Delegate from the County of Switzerland.		
John DePauw.		
William Graham.		
William Lonee.		
Samuel Milroy.		
Robert McIntire.		
Patrick Beard.		
Jeremiah Cox.		
Hugh Cull.		
Joseph Holman.		

Attest: WILLIAM HENDRICKS, Secretary.

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA—1851.

PREAMBLE.

To the end that justice be established, public order maintained, and liberty perpetuated: We, the people of the State of Indiana, grateful to Almighty God for the free exercise of the right to choose our own form of government, do ordain this Constitution.

ARTICLE I.

BILL OF RIGHTS.

Section 1. We declare that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the people; and that all free governments are, and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety and well being. For the advancement of these ends, the people have at all times an indefeasible right to alter and reform their government.

Sec. 2. All men shall be secured in their natural right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.

Sec. 3. No law shall, in any case whatever, control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.

Sec. 4. No preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society or mode of worship; and no man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent.

Sec. 5. No religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of trust or profit.

Sec. 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution.

Sec. 7. No person shall be rendered incompetent as a witness, in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion.

Sec. 8. The mode of administering an oath or affirmation shall be such as may be most consistent with, and binding upon, the conscience of the person to whom such oath or affirmation may be administered.

Sec. 9. No law shall be passed restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever; but for the abuse of that right every person shall be responsible.

Sec. 10. In all prosecutions for libel, the truth of the matters alleged to be libelous may be given in justification.

Sec. 11. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Sec. 12. All courts shall be open; and every man, for injury done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.

Sec. 13. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.

Sec. 14. No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. No person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself.

Sec. 15. No person arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with unnecessary rigor.

Sec. 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.

Sec. 17. Offenses, other than murder or treason, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties. Murder or treason shall not be bailable when the proof is evident, or the presumption strong.

Sec. 18. The penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.

Sec. 19. In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.

Sec. 20. In all civil cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.

Sec. 21. No man's particular services shall be demanded without just com-

pensation. No man's property shall be taken by law without just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered.

Sec. 22. The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life, shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter contracted; and there shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in case of fraud.

Sec. 23. The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.

Sec. 24. No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.

Sec. 25. No law shall be passed, the taking effect of which shall be made to depend upon any authority, except as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 26. The operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by the authority of the General Assembly.

Sec. 27. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except in case of rebellion or invasion, and then only if the public safety demand it.

Sec. 28. Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war against it, and giving aid and comfort to its enemies.

Sec. 29. No person shall be convicted of treason, except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or upon his confession in open court.

Sec. 30. No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.

Sec. 31. No law shall restrain any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together, in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; nor from instructing their representatives; nor from applying to the General Assembly for redress of grievances.

Sec. 32. The people shall have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the State.

Sec. 33. The military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power.

Sec. 34. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Sec. 35. The General Assembly shall not grant any title of nobility, nor confer hereditary distinctions.

Sec. 36. Emigration from the State shall not be prohibited.

Sec. 37. There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, within the State otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. No indenture of any negro or mulatto, made and executed out of the bounds of the State, shall be valid within the State.

ARTICLE II.

SUFFRAGE AND ELECTION.

Section 1. All elections shall be free and equal.

Sec. 2. In all elections not otherwise provided for by this Constitution, every male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who shall have resided in the State during the six months, and in the township sixty days, and in the ward or precinct thirty days immediately preceding such election; and every male of foreign birth, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who shall have resided in the United States one year, and shall have resided in this State during the six months, and in the township sixty days, and in the ward or precinct thirty days, immediately preceding such election, and shall have declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, conformably to the laws of the United States on the subject of naturalization, shall be entitled to vote in the township or precinct where he may reside, if he shall have been duly registered according to law. (Note—As amended March 24, 1831.)

Sec. 3. No soldier, seaman or marine, in the army or navy of the United States, or their allies, shall be deemed to have acquired a residence in the State in consequence of having been stationed within the same; nor shall any such soldier, seaman or marine, have the right to vote.

Sec. 4. No person shall be deemed to have lost his residence in the State by reason of his absence either on business of the State or of the United States.

Sec. 5. (Stricken out by constitutional amendment of March 24, 1831.)

Sec. 6. Every person shall be disqualified from holding office during the term for which he may have been elected, who shall have given or offered a bribe, threat or reward to procure his election.

Sec. 7. Every person who shall give or accept a challenge to fight a duel, or who shall knowingly carry to another person such challenge, or who shall agree to go out of the State to fight a duel, shall be ineligible to any office of trust or profit.

Sec. 8. The General Assembly shall have power to deprive of the right of suffrage, and to render ineligible any person convicted of an infamous crime.

Sec. 9. No person holding a lucrative office or appointment, under the United States, or under this State, shall be eligible to a seat in the General Assembly; nor shall any person hold more than one lucrative office at the same time, except as in this Constitution expressly permitted: Provided, That offices in the militia, to which there is attached no annual salary, and the office of Deputy Postmaster, where the compensation does not exceed ninety dollars per annum, shall not be deemed lucrative: And provided, also, That counties containing less than one thousand polls may confer the office of Clerk, Recorder and Auditor, or any two of said offices, upon the same person.

Sec. 10. No person who may hereafter be a collector or holder of public moneys, shall be eligible to any office of trust or profit until he shall have accounted for and paid over, according to law, all sums for which he may be liable.

Sec. 11. In all cases in which it is provided that an office shall not be filled by the same person more than a certain number of years continuously, an appointment pro tempore shall not be reckoned a part of that term.

Sec. 12. In all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, electors shall be free from arrest in going to elections, during their attendance there, and in returning from the same.

Sec. 13. All elections by the people shall be by ballot; and all elections by the General Assembly, or by either branch thereof, shall be viva voce.

Sec. 14. All general elections shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November; but township elections may be held at such time as may be provided by law: Provided, That the General Assembly may provide by law for the election of all judges of courts of general or appellate jurisdiction, by an election to be held for such officers only, at which time no other officers shall be voted for; and shall also provide for the registration of all persons entitled to vote. (As amended March 24, 1881.)

ARTICLE III.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS.

Section 1. The powers of the Government are divided into three separate departments: the Legislative, the Executive including the Administrative, and the Judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these departments shall exercise any of the functions of another except as in this Constitution expressly provided.

ARTICLE IV.

LEGISLATIVE.

Section 1. The Legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The style of every law shall be, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana;" and no law shall be enacted except by bill.

Sec. 2. The Senate shall not exceed fifty, nor the House of Representatives one hundred members; and they shall be chosen by the electors of the respective counties or districts into which the State may, from time to time, be divided.

Sec. 3. Senators shall be elected for the term of four years, and Representatives for the term of two years, from the day next after their general election: Provided, however, That the Senators-elect, at the second meeting of the General Assembly under this Constitution, shall be divided, by lot, into two equal classes, as nearly as may be; and the seats of Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of two years, and of those of the second class at the expiration of four years; so that one-half, as nearly as possible, shall be chosen biennially forever thereafter. And in case of increase in the number of Senators, they shall be so annexed by lot, to the one or the other of the two classes, as to keep them as nearly equal as practicable.

Sec. 4. The General Assembly shall, at its second session after the adoption of this Constitution, and every sixth year thereafter, cause an enumeration to be made of all the male inhabitants over the age of twenty-one years (As amended March 24, 1881.)

Sec. 5. The number of Senators and Representatives shall, at the session next following each period of making such enumeration, be fixed by law, and apportioned among the several counties, according to the number of male inhabitants, above twenty-one years of age, in each: Provided, That the first and second elections of members of the General Assembly, under this Constitution,

shall be according to the apportionment last made by the General Assembly before the adoption of this Constitution. (As amended March 24, 1881.)

Sec. 6. A Senatorial or Representative district, where more than one county shall constitute a district, shall be composed of contiguous counties; and no county, for Senatorial apportionment, shall ever be divided.

Sec. 7. No person shall be a Senator or a Representative, who, at the time of his election, is not a citizen of the United States; nor any one who has not been, for two years next preceding his election, an inhabitant of this State, and for one year next preceding his election, an inhabitant of the county or district whence he may be chosen. Senators shall be at least twenty-five, and Representatives at least twenty-one years of age.

Sec. 8. Senators and Representatives, in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest during the session of the General Assembly, and in going to and returning from the same; and shall not be subject to any civil process during the session of the General Assembly, nor during the fifteen days next before the commencement thereof. For any speech or debate in either House, a member shall not be questioned in any other place.

Sec. 9. The sessions of the General Assembly shall be held biennially, at the capital of the State, commencing on the Thursday next after the first Monday of January, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-three, and on the same day of every second year thereafter, unless a different day or place shall have been appointed by law. But if, in the opinion of the Governor, the public welfare shall require it, he may, at any time, by proclamation, call a special session.

Sec. 10. Each House, when assembled, shall choose its own officers (the President of the Senate excepted), judge the elections, qualifications and returns of its own members, determine its rules of proceedings, and sit upon its own adjournment. But neither House shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any place other than that in which it may be sitting.

Sec. 11. Two-thirds of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may meet, adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members. A quorum being in attendance, if either House fail to effect an organization within the first five days thereafter, the members of the House so failing shall be entitled to no compensation from the end of the said five days, until an organization shall have been effected.

Sec. 12. Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and publish the same. The yeas and nays, on any question, shall, at the request of any two members, be entered, together with the names of the members demanding the same, on the journal: Provided, That on a motion to adjourn, it shall require one-tenth of the members present to order the yeas and nays.

Sec. 13. The doors of each House, and of Committees of the Whole, shall be kept open, except in such cases as, in the opinion of either house, may require secrecy.

Sec. 14. Either House may punish its members for disorderly behavior, and may, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member; but not a second time for the same cause.

Sec. 15. Either House, during its session, may punish, by imprisonment, any person not a member, who shall have been guilty of disrespect to the House, by disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence; but such imprisonment shall not, at any time, exceed twenty-four hours.

Sec. 16. Each House shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the legislative department of a free and independent State.

Sec. 17. Bills may originate in either House, but may be amended or rejected in the other, except that bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.

Sec. 18. Every bill shall be read by sections, on three several days in each House; unless, in case of emergency, two-thirds of the House where such bill may be depending shall, by a vote of yeas and nays, deem it expedient to dispense with this rule; but the reading of a bill by sections, on its final passage, shall in no case be dispensed with; and the vote on the passage of every bill or joint resolution shall be taken by yeas and nays.

Sec. 19. Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.

Sec. 20. Every act and joint resolution shall be plainly worded, avoiding, as far as practicable, the use of technical terms.

Sec. 21. No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title; but the act revised, or section amended, shall be set forth and published at full length.

Sec. 22. The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say:

Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace and constables.

For the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors;

Regulating the practice in courts of justice;

Providing for changing the venue in civil and criminal cases;

Granting divorces;

Changing the names of persons;

For laying out, opening and working on, highways, and for the election and appointment of supervisors;

Vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys and public squares;

Summoning and impaneling grand and petit juries, and providing for the compensation;

Regulating county and township business;

Regulating the election of county and township officers, and their compensation.

For the assessment and collection of taxes for State, county, township or road purposes;

Providing for supporting common schools, and for the preservation of school funds;

In relation to fees or salaries; except that the laws may be so made as to grade the compensation of officers in proportion to the population and the necessary services required. (As amended March 24, 1881.)

In relation to interest on money;

Providing for opening and conducting elections of State, county or township officers, and designating the places of voting;

Providing for the sale of real estate belonging to minors, or other persons laboring under legal disabilities, by executors, administrators, guardians or trustees.

Sec. 23. In all the cases enumerated in the preceding section, and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the State.

Sec. 24. Provision may be made by general law, for bringing suit against the State, as to all liabilities originating after the adoption of this Constitution but no special act authorizing such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any person claiming damages against the State, shall ever be passed.

Sec. 25. A majority of all the members elected to each House shall be necessary to pass every bill or joint resolution; and all bills and joint resolutions passed shall be signed by the presiding officers of the respective houses.

Sec. 26. Any member of either House shall have the right to protest, and to have his protest, with his reasons for dissent entered on the Journal.

Sec. 27. Every statute shall be a public law, unless otherwise declared in the statute itself.

Sec. 28. No act shall take effect until the same shall have been published and circulated in the several counties of the State, by authority, except in case of emergency; which emergency shall be declared in the preamble or in the body of the law.

Sec. 29. The members of the General Assembly shall receive for the services a compensation, to be fixed by law; but no increase of compensation shall take effect during the session at which such increase may be made. No session of the General Assembly, except the first under this Constitution, shall extend beyond the term of sixty-one days, nor any special session beyond the term of forty days.

Sec. 30. No Senator or Representative shall, during the term for which he may have been elected, be eligible to any office, the election to which is vested in the General Assembly, nor shall he be appointed to any civil office of profit which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which shall have been increased, during such term; but this latter provision shall not be construed to apply to any office elective by the people.

ARTICLE V.

EXECUTIVE.

Section 1. The executive power of the State shall be vested in a Governor. He shall hold his office during four years, and shall not be eligible more than four years in any period of eight years.

Sec. 2. There shall be a Lieutenant-Governor, who shall hold his office during four years.

Sec. 3. The Governor and Lieutenant-Governor shall be elected at the time and places of choosing members of the General Assembly.

Sec. 4. In voting for Governor and Lieutenant-Governor the electors shall designate for whom they vote as Governor, and for whom as Lieutenant-Gov-

ernor. The returns of every election for Governor and Lieutenant-Governor shall be sealed up and transmitted to the seat of government, directed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall open and publish them in the presence of both Houses of the General Assembly.

Sec. 5. The persons, respectively, having the highest number of votes for Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, shall be elected; but in case two or more persons shall have an equal and the highest number of votes for either office, the General Assembly shall, by joint vote, forthwith proceed to elect one of the said persons Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, as the case may be.

Sec. 6. Contested elections for Governor or Lieutenant-Governor shall be determined by the General Assembly, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

Sec. 7. No person shall be eligible to the office of Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, who shall not have been five years a citizen of the United States, and also a resident of the State of Indiana during the five years next preceding his election; nor shall any person be eligible to either of the said offices who shall not have attained the age of thirty years.

Sec. 8. No member of Congress, or person holding any office under the United States, or under this state, shall fill the office of Governor or Lieutenant-Governor.

Sec. 9. The official term of the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor shall commence on the second Monday of January, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-three; and on the same day every fourth year thereafter.

Sec. 10. In case of the removal of the Governor from office, or of his death, resignation or inability to discharge the duties of the office, the same shall devolve on the Lieutenant-Governor; and the General Assembly shall, by law, provide for the case of removal from office, death, resignation, or inability, both of the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, declaring what officer shall then act as Governor; and such officer shall act accordingly until the disability be removed or a Governor be elected.

Sec. 11. Whenever the Lieutenant-Governor shall act as Governor, or shall be unable to attend as President of the Senate, the Senate shall elect one of its own members as President for the occasion.

Sec. 12. The Governor shall be commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces, and may call out such forces to execute the laws, or to suppress insurrection, or to repel invasion.

Sec. 13. He shall, from time to time, give to the General Assembly information touching the condition of the State, and recommend such measures as he shall judge to be expedient.

Sec. 14. Every bill which shall have passed the General Assembly shall be presented to the Governor; if he approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the House in which it shall have originated, which House shall enter the objections at large upon its journals and proceed to reconsider the bill. If, after such reconsideration, a majority of all the members elected to that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, with the Governor's objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by a majority of all the members elected to that House, it shall be a law. If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor within three days, Sundays excepted, after it shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law without his signature, unless the general adjournment shall prevent its return, in which case it shall be a law unless the Governor, within five days next after such adjournment, shall file such bill, with his objections thereto, in the office of [the] Secretary of State, who shall lay the same before the General Assembly at its next session in like manner as if it had been returned by the Governor. But no bill shall be presented to the Governor within two days next previous to the final adjournment of the General Assembly.

Sec. 15. The Governor shall transact all necessary business with the officers of Government, and may require information in writing from the officers of the administrative department, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.

Sec. 16. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

Sec. 17. He shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law. Upon conviction for treason, he shall have power to suspend the execution of the sentence until the case shall be reported to the General Assembly at its next meeting, when the General Assembly shall either grant a pardon, commute the sentence, direct the execution of the sentence, or grant a further reprieve. He shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and shall report to the General Assembly, at its next meeting, each case of reprieve, commutation, or pardon granted, and also the names of all persons in whose favor remission of fines and forfeitures shall have been made, and the several amounts remitted: Provided, however, That the General Assembly may by law, constitute a council, to be composed of officers of State, without whose

advice and consent the Governor shall not have power to grant pardons, in any case, except such as may, by law, be left to his sole power.

Sec. 18. When, during a recess of the General Assembly, a vacancy shall happen in any office, the appointment to which is vested in the General Assembly, or when, at any time, a vacancy shall have occurred in any other State office, or in the office of Judge of any court, the Governor shall fill such vacancy by appointment, which shall expire when a successor shall have been elected and qualified.

Sec. 19. He shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies as may have occurred in the General Assembly.

Sec. 20. Should the seat of Government become dangerous from disease or a common enemy, he may convene the General Assembly at any other place.

Sec. 21. The Lieutenant-Governor shall, by virtue of his office, be President of the Senate; have a right, when in Committee of the Whole, to join in debate, and to vote on all subjects, and, whenever the Senate shall be equally divided, he shall give the casting vote.

Sec. 22. The Governor shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the term for which he shall have been elected.

Sec. 23. The Lieutenant-Governor, while he shall act as President of the Senate, shall receive for his services the same compensation as the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and any person acting as Governor shall receive the compensation attached to the office of Governor.

Sec. 24. Neither the Governor nor Lieutenant-Governor shall be eligible to any other office during the term for which he shall have been elected.

ARTICLE VI.

ADMINISTRATIVE.

Section 1. There shall be elected by the voters of the State, a Secretary, an Auditor, and a Treasurer of State, who shall severally hold their offices for two years. They shall perform such duties as may be enjoined by law; and no person shall be eligible to either of said offices more than four years in any period of six years.

Sec. 2. There shall be elected in each county, by the voters thereof, at the time of holding general elections, a Clerk of the Circuit Court, Auditor, Recorder, Treasurer, Sheriff, Coroner and Surveyor. The Clerk, Auditor and Recorder shall continue in office four years, and no person shall be eligible to the office of Clerk, Recorder or Auditor more than eight years in any period of twelve years. The Treasurer, Sheriff, Coroner and Surveyor, shall continue in office two years; and no person shall be eligible to the office of Treasurer or Sheriff more than four years in any period of six years.

Sec. 3. Such other county and township officers as may be necessary, shall be elected or appointed, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

Sec. 4. No person shall be elected or appointed as a county officer, who shall not be an elector of the county; nor any one who shall not have been an inhabitant thereof during one year next preceding his appointment, if the county shall have been so long organized; but if the county shall not have been so long organized, then within the limits of the county or counties out of which the same shall have been taken.

Sec. 5. The Governor, and the Secretary, Auditor and Treasurer of State, shall, severally, reside and keep the public records, books and papers, in any manner relating to their respective offices, at the seat of government.

Sec. 6. All county, township and town officers shall reside within their respective counties, townships and towns, and shall keep their respective offices at such places therein, and perform such duties as may be directed by law.

Sec. 7. All State officers shall, for crime, incapacity or negligence, be liable to be removed from office, either by impeachment by the House of Representatives, to be tried by the Senate, or by a joint resolution of the General Assembly; two-thirds of the members elected to each branch voting, in either case, therefor.

Sec. 8. All State, county, township and town officers may be impeached, or removed from office in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

Sec. 9. Vacancies in county, township and town offices shall be filled in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

Sec. 10. The General Assembly may confer upon the Boards doing county business in the several counties, powers of a local administrative character.

ARTICLE VII.

JUDICIAL.

Section 1. The Judicial power of the State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts, and in such other courts as the General Assembly may establish. (As amended March 24, 1881.)

Sec. 2. The Supreme Court shall consist of not less than three, nor more than five Judges; a majority of whom shall form a quorum. They shall hold their offices for six years, if they so long behave well.

Sec. 3. The State shall be divided into as many districts as there are Judges of the Supreme Court, and such districts shall be formed of contiguous territory, as nearly equal in population as, without dividing a county, the same can be made. One of said Judges shall be elected from each district, and reside therein; but said Judges shall be elected by the electors of the State at large.

Sec. 4. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction, co-extensive with the limits of the State, in appeals and writs of error, under such regulations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law. It shall also have such original jurisdiction as the General Assembly may confer.

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall, upon the decision of every case, give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record of such case, and the decision of the Court thereon.

Sec. 6. The General Assembly shall provide by law, for the speedy publication of the decisions of the Supreme Court, made under this Constitution, but no Judge shall be allowed to report such decisions.

Sec. 7. There shall be elected by the voters of the State, a Clerk of the Supreme Court, who shall hold his office four years, and whose duties shall be prescribed by law.

Sec. 8. The Circuit Courts shall each consist of one Judge, and shall have such civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law.

Sec. 9. The State shall, from time to time, be divided into Judicial Circuits, and a Judge for each circuit shall be elected by the voters thereof. He shall reside within the circuit, and shall hold his office for the term of six years, if he so long behave well.

Sec. 10. The General Assembly may provide, by law, that the Judge of one circuit may hold the courts of another circuit, in cases of necessity or convenience; and in case of temporary inability of any Judge, from sickness or other cause, to hold the courts in his circuit, provision may be made, by law, for holding such courts.

Sec. 11. There shall be elected, in each judicial circuit, by the voters thereof, a Prosecuting Attorney, who shall hold his office for two years.

Sec. 12. Any Judge or Prosecuting Attorney, who shall have been convicted of corruption or other high crime, may, on information in the name of the State, be removed from office by the Supreme Court, or in such other manner as may be prescribed by law.

Sec. 13. The Judges of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts shall, at stated times, receive a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Sec. 14. A competent number of Justices of the Peace shall be elected by the voters in each township in the several counties. They shall continue in office four years, and their powers and duties shall be prescribed by law.

Sec. 15. All judicial officers shall be conservators of the peace in their respective jurisdictions.

Sec. 16. No person elected to any judicial office shall, during the term for which he shall have been elected, be eligible to any office of trust or profit under the State, other than a judicial office.

Sec. 17. The General Assembly may modify or abolish the Grand Jury system.

Sec. 18. All criminal prosecutions shall be carried on in the name, and by the authority of the State; and the style of all process shall be, "The State of Indiana."

Sec. 19. Tribunals of conciliation may be established, with such powers and duties as shall be prescribed by law; or the powers and duties of the same may be conferred upon other courts of justice; but such tribunals or other courts, when sitting as such, shall have no power to render judgment to be obligatory on the parties unless they voluntarily submit their matters of difference and agree to abide the judgment of such tribunal or court.

Sec. 20. The General Assembly, at its first session after the adoption of this Constitution, shall provide for the appointment of three commissioners whose duty it shall be to revise, simplify and abridge the rules, practice, pleadings and forms of the courts of justice. And they shall provide for abolishing the distinct forms of action at law now in use; and that justice shall be administered in a uniform mode of pleading, without distinction between law and equity. And the General Assembly may, also, make it the duty of said commissioners to reduce into a systematic code the general statute law of the State; and said commissioners shall report the result of their labors to the General Assembly, with such recommendations and suggestions, as to abridgment and amendment, as to said commissioners may seem necessary or proper. Provision shall be made by law for filling vacancies, regulating the tenure of office and the compensation of said commissioners.

Sec. 21. Every person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice.

ARTICLE VIII.

EDUCATION.

Section 1. Knowledge and learning generally diffused throughout a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific and agricultural improvement, and to provide by law for a general and uniform system of common schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.

Sec. 2. The common school fund shall consist of the congressional township fund, and the lands belonging thereto;

The surplus revenue fund;

The saline fund, and the lands belonging thereto;

The bank tax fund, and the fund arising from the one hundred and fourteenth section of the charter of the State Bank of Indiana;

The fund to be derived from the sale of county seminaries, and the moneys and property heretofore held for such seminaries; from the fines assessed for breaches of the penal laws of the State; and from all forfeitures which may accrue;

All lands and other estate which shall escheat to the State for want of heirs or kindred entitled to the inheritance;

All lands that have been or may hereafter be granted to the State, where no special purpose is expressed in the grant, and the proceeds of the sales thereof; including the proceeds of the sales of the Swamp Lands granted to the State of Indiana by the act of Congress, of the 28th of September, 1850, after deducting the expense of selecting and draining the same;

Taxes on the property of corporations that may be assessed by the General Assembly for Common School purposes.

Sec. 3. The principal of the Common School Fund shall remain a perpetual fund, which may be increased, but shall never be diminished; and the income thereof shall be inviolably appropriated to the support of Common Schools, and to no other purpose whatever.

Sec. 4. The General Assembly shall invest, in some safe and profitable manner, all such portions of the common School Fund as have not heretofore been entrusted to the several counties; and shall make provision, by law, for the distribution, among the several counties, of the interest thereof.

Sec. 5. If any county shall fail to demand its proportion of such interest for Common School purposes, the same shall be reinvested for the benefit of such county.

Sec. 6. The several counties shall be held liable for the preservation of so much of the said fund as may be entrusted to them, and for the payment of the annual interest thereon.

Sec. 7. All trust funds held by the State shall remain inviolate, and be faithfully and exclusively applied to the purposes for which the trust was created.

Sec. 8. The General Assembly shall provide for the election, by the voters of the State, of a State Superintendent of Public Instruction, who shall hold his office for two years, and whose duties and compensation shall be prescribed by law.

ARTICLE IX.

STATE INSTITUTIONS.

Section 1. It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to provide by law for the support of Institutions for the Education of the Deaf and Dumb, and of the Blind; and, also, for the treatment of the Insane.

Sec. 2. The General Assembly shall provide Houses of Refuge for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders.

Sec. 3. The County Boards shall have power to provide farms as an asylum for those persons who, by reason of age, infirmity, or other misfortune, have claims upon the sympathies and aid of society.

ARTICLE X.

FINANCE.

Section 1. The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation; and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and personal,

excepting such only for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes, as may be specially exempted by law.

Sec. 2. All the revenue derived from the sale of any of the public works belonging to the State, and from the net annual income thereof, and any surplus that may, at any time, remain in the Treasury derived from taxation for general State purposes, after the payment of the ordinary expenses of the government, and of the interest on bonds of the State, other than bank bonds, shall be annually applied, under the direction of the General Assembly, to the payment of the principal of the public debt.

Sec. 3. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in pursuance of appropriations made by law.

Sec. 4. An accurate statement of the receipts and expenditures of the public money shall be published with the laws of each regular session of the General Assembly.

Sec. 5. No law shall authorize any debt to be contracted, on behalf of the State, except in the following cases: To meet casual deficits in the revenue; to pay the interest on the State debt; to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or, if hostilities be threatened, provide for the public defense.

Sec. 6. No county shall subscribe for stock in any incorporated company, unless the same be paid for at the time of such subscription; nor shall any county loan its credit to any incorporated company, nor borrow money for the purpose of taking stock in any such company; nor shall the General Assembly ever, on behalf of the State, assume the debts of any county, city, town or township, nor of any corporation whatever.

Sec. 7. No law or resolution shall ever be passed by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana that shall recognize any liability of this State to pay or redeem any certificate of stock issued in pursuance of an act entitled "An act to provide for the funded debt of the State of Indiana, and for the completion of the Wabash and Erie Canal to Evansville," passed January 19, 1846, and an act supplemental to said act, passed January 29, 1847, which by the provisions of the said acts, or either of them, shall be payable exclusively from the proceeds of the canal lands, and the tolls and revenues of the canal in said acts mentioned; and no such certificates of stocks shall ever be paid by this State.

(Note—Agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each of the two houses of the General Assembly, Regular Session of 1871, and referred to the General Assembly to be chosen at the next general election. Agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly, Special Session of 1872. Submitted to the electors of the State by an act approved January 28, 1873. Ratified by a majority of the electors, at an election held on the 18th day of February, 1873. Declared a part of the Constitution by proclamation of Thomas A. Hendricks, Governor, dated March 7, 1873.

ARTICLE XI.

CORPORATIONS.

Section 1. The General Assembly shall not have power to establish, or incorporate any bank or banking company, or moneyed institution, for the purpose of issuing bills of credit, or bills payable to order or bearer, except under the conditions prescribed in this Constitution.

Sec. 2. No bank shall be established otherwise than under a general banking law, except as provided in the fourth section of this article.

Sec. 3. If the General Assembly shall enact a general banking law, such law shall provide for the registry and countersigning, by an officer of State, of all paper credit designed to be circulated as money; and ample collateral security, readily convertible into specie, for the redemption of the same in gold or silver, shall be required; which collateral security shall be under the control of the proper officer or officers of State.

Sec. 4. The General Assembly may also charter a bank with branches, without collateral security, as required in the preceding section.

Sec. 5. If the General Assembly shall establish a bank with branches, the branches shall be mutually responsible for each other's liabilities, upon all paper credit issued as money.

Sec. 6. The stockholders in every bank, or banking company, shall be individually responsible to an amount over and above their stock, equal to their respective shares of stock, for all debts or liabilities of said bank or banking company.

Sec. 7. All bills or notes issued as money shall be, at all times, redeemable in gold or silver; and no law shall be passed, sanctioning, directly or indirectly, the suspension, by any bank or banking company, of specie payments.

Sec. 8. Holders of bank notes shall be entitled, in case of insolvency, to preference of payment over all other creditors.

Sec. 9. No bank shall receive, directly or indirectly, a greater rate of interest than shall be allowed by law to individuals loaning money.

Sec. 10. Every bank, or banking company, shall be required to cease banking operations within twenty years from the time of its organization, promptly thereafter to close its business.

Sec. 11. The General Assembly is not prohibited from investing the funds in a bank with branches; but in case of such investment, the safety the same shall be guaranteed by unquestionable security.

Sec. 12. The State shall not be a stockholder in any bank, after the expiration of the present bank charter; nor shall the credit of the State ever be given, or loaned, in aid of any person, association, or corporation, nor shall the State hereafter become a stockholder in any corporation or association.

Sec. 13. Corporations, other than banking, shall not be created by special act but may be formed under general laws.

Sec. 14. Dues from corporations, other than banking, shall be secured by such individual liability of the corporators, or other means, as may be prescribed by law.

ARTICLE XII.

MILITIA.

Section 1. The militia shall consist of all able-bodied white male persons between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, except such as may be exempted by the laws of the United States, or of this State; and shall be organized, officered, armed, equipped and trained in such manner as may be provided by law.

Sec. 2. The Governor shall appoint the Adjutant, Quartermaster and Commissary Generals.

Sec. 3. All militia officers shall be commissioned by the Governor, and shall hold their offices not longer than six years.

Sec. 4. The General Assembly shall determine the method of dividing the militia into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions and companies, and the rank of all staff officers.

Sec. 5. The militia may be divided into classes of sedentary and active militia in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.

Sec. 6. No person conscientiously opposed to bearing arms shall be compelled to do militia duty; but such person shall pay an equivalent for exemption the amount to be prescribed by law.

ARTICLE XIII.

POLITICAL AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Section 1. No political or municipal corporation in this State shall ever become indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, to any amount, in the aggregate exceeding two per centum on the value of taxable property within the corporation, to be ascertained by the last assessment for State and local taxes, previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, and all bonds or obligations, in excess of such amount, given by such corporations, shall be void. That in time of war, foreign invasion, or other great public calamity, petition of a majority of the property owners, in number and value, within the limits of such corporation, the public authorities, in their discretion, may require obligations necessary for the public protection and defense, to such an amount as may be requested in such petition.

(The original Article 13 was stricken out and this amendment adopted March 24, 1881, inserted in lieu thereof.)

ARTICLE XIV.

BOUNDARIES.

Section 1. In order that the boundaries of the State may be known and established, it is hereby ordained and declared, that the State of Indiana be bounded on the east by the meridian line which forms the western boundary of the State of Ohio; on the south by the Ohio River, from the mouth of the Great Miami River to the mouth of the Wabash River; on the west, by a line drawn along the middle of the Wabash River, from its mouth to a point on a due north line, drawn from the town of Vincennes, would last touch the western shore of said Wabash River; and thence by a due north line, until the same shall intersect an east and west line, drawn through a point ten miles north of the southern extreme of Lake Michigan; on the north, by said east and west line, until the same shall intersect the first-mentioned meridian line, which forms the western boundary of the State of Ohio.

Sec. 2. The State of Indiana shall possess jurisdiction, and sovereign authority extensive with the boundaries declared in the preceding section; and shall have concurrent jurisdiction, in civil and criminal cases, with the State of Ken-

on the Ohio River, and with the State of Illinois on the Wabash River, so far as said rivers form the common boundary between this State and said States respectively.

ARTICLE XV.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Section 1. All officers whose appointment is not otherwise provided for in this Constitution, shall be chosen in such manner as now is, or hereafter may be, prescribed by law.

Sec. 2. When the duration of any office is not provided for by this Constitution, it may be declared by law; and if not so declared, such office shall be held during the pleasure of the authority making the appointment. But the General Assembly shall not create any office, the tenure of which shall be longer than four years.

Sec. 3. Whenever it is provided in this Constitution, or in any law which may be hereafter passed, that any officer, other than a member of the General Assembly, shall hold his office for any given term, the same shall be construed to mean that such officer shall hold his office for such term, and until his successor shall have been elected and qualified.

Sec. 4. Every person elected or appointed to any office under this Constitution shall, before entering on the duties thereof, take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of this State and of the United States, and also an oath of office.

Sec. 5. There shall be a seal of the State, kept by the Governor for official purposes, which shall be called the Seal of the State of Indiana.

Sec. 6. All commissions shall issue in the name of the State, shall be signed by the Governor, sealed with the State Seal, and attested by the Secretary of State.

Sec. 7. No county shall be reduced to an area less than four hundred square miles; nor shall any county under that area be further reduced.

Sec. 8. No lottery shall be authorized, nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be allowed.

Sec. 9. The following grounds owned by the State in Indianapolis, namely: the State House Square, the Governor's Circle, and so much of outlet numbered one hundred and forty-seven as lies north of the arm of the Central Canal, shall not be sold or leased.

Sec. 10. It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to provide for the permanent enclosure and preservation of the Tippecanoe Battle Ground.

ARTICLE XVI.

AMENDMENTS.

Section 1. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either branch of the General Assembly; and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals and referred to the General Assembly to be chosen at the next general election; and, if in the General Assembly so next chosen, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each house, then it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to submit such amendment or amendments to the electors of the State, and if a majority of said electors shall ratify the same, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this Constitution.

Sec. 2. If two or more amendments shall be submitted at the same time, they shall be submitted in such manner that the electors shall vote for or against each of such amendments separately; and while an amendment or amendments which shall have been agreed upon by one General Assembly, shall be awaiting the action of the succeeding General Assembly, or of the electors, no additional amendment or amendments shall be proposed.

SCHEDULE.

This Constitution, if adopted, shall take effect on the first day of November, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one, and shall supersede the Constitution adopted in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixteen. That no inconvenience may arise from the change in the government, it is hereby ordained as follows:

First. All laws now in force, and not inconsistent with this Constitution, shall remain in force until they shall expire or be repealed.

Second. All indictments, prosecutions, suits, pleas, complaints and other proceedings pending in any of the Courts, shall be prosecuted to final judgment

and execution; and all appeals, writs of error, certiorari and injunctions shall be carried on in the several Courts, in the same manner as is now provided by law.

Third. All fines, penalties and forfeitures, due or accruing to the State, or to any county therein, shall inure to the State, or to such county in the manner prescribed by law. All bonds executed to the State, or to any officer, in his official capacity, shall remain in force, and inure to the use of those concerned.

Fourth. All acts of incorporation for municipal purposes shall continue in force under this Constitution, until such time as the General Assembly shall, in its discretion, modify or repeal the same.

Fifth. The Governor, at the expiration of the present official term, shall continue to act until his successor shall have been sworn into office.

Sixth. There shall be a session of the General Assembly, commencing on the first Monday of December, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one.

Seventh. Senators now in office and holding over, under the existing Constitution, and such as may be elected at the next general election, and the Representatives then elected, shall continue in office until the first general election under this Constitution.

Eighth. The first general election under this Constitution shall be held in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two.

Ninth. The first election for Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Judges of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, Clerk of the Supreme Court, Prosecuting Attorney, Secretary, Auditor, and Treasurer of State, and State Superintendent of Public Instruction, under this Constitution, shall be held at the general election in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two; and such of said officers as may be in office when this Constitution shall go into effect, shall continue in their respective offices until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.

Tenth. Every person elected by popular vote, and now in any office which is continued by this Constitution, and every person who shall be so elected to any such office before the taking effect of this Constitution (except as in this Constitution otherwise provided), shall continue in office until the term for which such person has been, or may be, elected, shall expire: Provided, That no such person shall continue in office after the taking effect of this Constitution, for a longer period than the term of such office in this Constitution prescribed.

Eleventh. On the taking effect of this Constitution, all officers thereby continued in office shall, before proceeding in the further discharge of their duties, take an oath or affirmation to support this Constitution.

Twelfth. All vacancies that may occur in existing offices prior to the first general election under this Constitution, shall be filled in the manner now prescribed by law.

Thirteenth. At the time of submitting this Constitution to the electors for their approval or disapproval, the article numbered thirteen, in relation to negroes and mulattoes, shall be submitted as a distinct proposition, in the following form: "Exclusion and Colonization of Negroes and Mulattoes." "Aye." or "No." And if a majority of the votes cast shall be in favor of said article, then the same shall form a part of this Constitution, otherwise it shall be void and form no part thereof.

Fourteenth. No article or section of this Constitution shall be submitted as a distinct proposition to a vote of the electors otherwise than as herein provided.

Fifteenth. Whenever a portion of the citizens of the counties of Perry and Spencer shall deem it expedient to form, of the contiguous territory of said counties, a new county, it shall be the duty of those interested in the organization of such new county, to lay off the same by proper metes and bounds of equal portions as nearly as practicable, not to exceed one-third of the territory of each of said counties. The proposal to create such new county shall be submitted to the voters of said counties, at a general election in such manner as shall be prescribed by law. And if a majority of all the votes given at said election shall be in favor of the organization of said new county, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to organize the same out of the territory thus designated.

Sixteenth. The General Assembly may alter or amend the charter of Clarks-ville, and make such regulations as may be necessary for carrying into effect the objects contemplated in granting the same, and the funds belonging to said town shall be applied according to the intention of the grantor.

Done in Convention, at Indianapolis, the tenth day of February, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one, and of the independence of the United States, the seventy-fifth.

GEORGE WHITFIELD CARR,

President and Delegate from the County of Lawrence.

Attest: WM. H. ENGLISH,
Principal Secretary.

ADDENDA.

The original sections stricken out or amended read as follows:

ARTICLE II.

SUFFRAGE AND ELECTION.

Section 2. In all elections, not otherwise provided for by this Constitution, every white male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who shall have resided in the State during the six months immediately preceding such election; and every white male, of foreign birth of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who shall have resided in the United States one year, and shall have resided in this State during the six months immediately preceding such election, and shall have declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, conformably to the laws of the United States on the subject of naturalization, shall be entitled to vote in the township or precinct where he may reside.

Sec. 5. No negro or mulatto shall have the right of suffrage.

Sec. 14. All general elections shall be held on the second Tuesday in October.

ARTICLE IV.

LEGISLATIVE.

Section 4. The General Assembly shall, at its second session after the adoption of this Constitution, and every six years thereafter, cause an enumeration to be made of all the white male inhabitants over the age of twenty-one years.

Sec. 5. The number of Senators and Representatives shall, at the session next following each period of making such enumeration, be fixed by law, and apportioned among the several counties, according to the number of white male inhabitants, above twenty-one years of age, in each; Provided, That the first and second elections of members of the General Assembly, under this Constitution, shall be according to the apportionment last made by the General Assembly, before the adoption of this Constitution.

Sec. 22. In relation to fees or salaries.

ARTICLE VII.

JUDICIAL.

Section 1. The judicial power of the State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts, and in such inferior courts as the General Assembly may establish.

ARTICLE XIII.

NEGROES AND MULATTOS.

Section 1. No negro or mulatto shall come into, or settle in, the State, after the adoption of this Constitution.

Sec. 2. All contracts made with any negro or mulatto coming into the State, contrary to the provisions of the foregoing section, shall be void; and any person who shall employ such negro or mulatto, or otherwise encourage him to remain in the State, shall be fined in any sum not less than ten dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars.

Sec. 3. All fines which may be collected for a violation of the provisions of this article, or of any law which may hereafter be passed for the purpose of carrying the same into execution, shall be set apart and appropriated for the colonization of such negroes and mulattoes, and their descendants, as may be in the State at the adoption of this Constitution, and may be willing to emigrate.

Sec. 4. The General Assembly shall pass laws to carry out the provisions of this article.

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